Summoning Persons Not Sent Up for Trial Requires Individualised, Material-Based Reasons

Case: ZUBAIR AHMED & ANR. v. STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.

Citation: 2026 DHC 8965
Court: Delhi High Court
Judge: Justice Madhu Jain
Decision: 12 October 2026
Proceeding: CRL.M.C. 2148/2025

1. Introduction

This judgment addresses an important safeguard at the threshold of criminal proceedings: what must a Magistrate explain before summoning a person whom the investigating agency has investigated but declined to prosecute? The Delhi High Court reaffirmed that a Magistrate may disagree with the police. However, that disagreement must rest on identifiable material and an independently reasoned assessment of the particular person’s alleged involvement.

The petitioner, Zubair Ahmed, was a former Non-Executive Director of M/s Raheja Developers Ltd. He challenged an order summoning him for alleged criminal breach of trust, cheating and criminal conspiracy arising from a residential property transaction. The respondents were the State Government of NCT of Delhi and complainant Rajat Dayal, who, together with his wife Astha Dayal, had booked the property.

The decision principally applies settled law rather than creating an entirely new rule. Its distinctive contribution is its treatment of a summoning order that attributed the complainant’s assertions to the charge-sheet, despite the investigating agency having expressly recorded an absence of incriminating evidence against the petitioner.

2. Background and Questions Before the Court

The transaction and subsequent complaint

  • Directorship: Ahmed became a Non-Executive Director on 20 August 2009. He tendered his resignation on 18 August 2015, and the Registrar of Companies recorded cessation of his directorship on 21 August 2015.
  • Property purchase: The complainants booked a residential unit in the company’s “Raheja Revanta” project in Gurugram. An Agreement to Sell dated 31 December 2014 recorded consideration of ₹1,94,51,485.
  • Refund arrangement: A Memorandum of Understanding dated 28 January 2015 permitted cancellation within 33–36 months of booking, with repayment and a guaranteed premium of ₹1,400 per square foot. It also prescribed a period for effecting cancellation and interest at 18% per annum for delayed repayment.
  • Bank finance: A tripartite agreement supported a housing loan of ₹1,35,00,000 from ICICI Bank, with disbursement directly to the company.
  • Dispute: Following a site visit in June 2017, the allottees complained of delayed construction. Astha Dayal sought cancellation and refund on 1 September 2017. A partial refund of ₹20,00,000 followed on 28 May 2018.
  • Criminal proceedings: A police complaint dated 4 September 2018 alleged false inducement and unfulfilled repayment commitments. Ahmed was not named in that complaint. Following proceedings under Sections 200 and 156(3) CrPC, FIR No. 603/2018 was registered on 5 October 2018 under Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC.
  • Settlement: The company and the allottees entered into a settlement on 23 April 2019 concerning repayment and discharge of the housing loan. Cooperation in quashing the FIR depended on fulfilment of the settlement obligations.

The investigation and summoning order

The Economic Offences Wing examined Ahmed’s tenure and role. Its charge-sheet, dated 27 December 2021 and filed on 13 January 2022, sought prosecution of Navin M Raheja, Yogesh Raheja and the company. Ahmed was placed in Column No. 12, indicating that the investigating agency was not sending him up for trial.

The agency recorded that Ahmed received only sitting fees for Board meetings, did not participate in the company’s day-to-day affairs and was not implicated by incriminating evidence discovered during investigation. The complainant nevertheless sought his summoning. A synopsis dated 5 January 2023 alleged that his regular attendance at Board meetings demonstrated knowledge of, and participation in, the conspiracy.

On 7 February 2025, the Chief Judicial Magistrate summoned Ahmed along with other persons placed in Column No. 12. Ahmed challenged that order under Section 528 BNSS.

The central questions

  1. Did the summoning order demonstrate independent judicial consideration under Sections 190 and 204 CrPC?
  2. Could assertions in the complainant’s synopsis support summoning without identification of the underlying material?
  3. Should the High Court decide the sufficiency of the case itself, or remit the matter to the Magistrate?
  4. Did the availability of revision under Section 397 CrPC prevent recourse to inherent jurisdiction?

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court partly allowed the petition. It set aside the order dated 7 February 2025 only insofar as it directed issuance of process against Ahmed and remitted that question for fresh consideration.

The Court’s principal findings were:

  1. The police opinion was not binding. A Magistrate could summon a person placed in Column No. 12 if sufficient grounds existed.
  2. The contrary judicial conclusion required reasons. The order had to identify material supporting the petitioner’s individual involvement and briefly explain why it justified proceeding against him.
  3. The order inaccurately described the record. Allegations presented as emerging from the charge-sheet were substantially reproduced from the complainant’s synopsis. The charge-sheet itself recorded the absence of incriminating evidence against Ahmed.
  4. Collective observations were insufficient. General statements about all persons in Column No. 12 did not disclose the necessary individualised assessment.
  5. Remand, not a merits determination, was appropriate. The Magistrate had to reconsider the complete record and pass a reasoned order.
  6. Revision was not an absolute prerequisite. Its availability did not bar this limited exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Crucially, the High Court did not quash the criminal case, exonerate Ahmed, or decide whether the complete record justified summoning him. Proceedings against the other accused remained unaffected. Pending applications were disposed of, and any interim orders or directions stood vacated.

4. Analysis

A. Statutory Framework: Cognizance and Issuance of Process

Section 190 CrPC empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence. Section 204 governs the subsequent decision to issue process where there is “sufficient ground for proceeding.” The judgment identifies Sections 210 and 227 BNSS as the corresponding provisions.

These are connected but distinct judicial functions. Recognising that an alleged offence warrants judicial consideration does not automatically establish that every person associated with the relevant organisation should be summoned. Issuance of process requires attention to the material concerning the particular individual.

The applicable threshold is not proof sufficient for conviction. Equally, it is not satisfied merely because an allegation has been made. The Magistrate must identify a prima facie basis for proceeding and exercise judicial discretion rather than mechanically endorse either the police conclusion or the complainant’s accusation.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609

This Supreme Court decision supplied the principal standard governing issuance of process. The High Court relied on its explanation that the words “sufficient ground for proceeding” require formation of an opinion after due application of mind.

The precedent reconciles two propositions: a summoning order need not contain detailed reasons, but it must disclose a reasoned basis. An order giving no reasons, or reasons that are facially incorrect, is vulnerable to being set aside.

That distinction directly informed the result. The problem was not simply that the Magistrate’s explanation was brief. Its stated premise—that the charge-sheet disclosed Ahmed’s active participation—was inconsistent with the charge-sheet’s recorded conclusion.

2. Radesh Singh v. State, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 901

This decision of a Coordinate Bench addressed the specific situation in which a Magistrate summons someone whom the police have not sent for trial. It requires the Magistrate to explain the departure from the investigative conclusion and identify the prima facie material showing the individual’s role.

Its significance lies in distinguishing cognizance of an offence from summoning a particular person. Although cognizance concerns the offence, a summons exposes an identified individual to criminal proceedings. The order must therefore show what connects that person to the alleged wrongdoing.

The High Court used this authority both to establish the need for a speaking order and to support setting aside the defective order and remitting the matter for reconsideration.

3. Jagdish Ram v. State Of Rajasthan, (2004) 4 SCC 432

The complainant relied on this authority for the propositions that a Magistrate is not bound by the investigating agency’s opinion and that sufficient grounds for proceeding, rather than proof sufficient for conviction, govern the summoning stage.

The High Court accepted the underlying power to depart from the police report. However, that power did not answer whether the Magistrate had lawfully exercised it in this case. A lower evidentiary threshold does not dispense with the need to identify supporting material or demonstrate judicial application of mind.

4. Sangita Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7032

This case appeared in the petitioner’s submissions. Counsel distinguished it on the basis that the director concerned held approximately 34% shareholding and that documentary material, including documents signed by her, demonstrated involvement.

Its role in the present judgment is limited. The High Court did not undertake a substantive comparison culminating in a ruling on Ahmed’s liability. The reference instead illustrates the petitioner’s argument that actual involvement must be assessed through case-specific material, rather than inferred solely from the title of director.

5. SHIV JATIA v. GIAN CHAND MALICK & Ors., 2024 INSC 142

This Supreme Court decision guided the choice of remedy. It recognised remand as appropriate where an order issuing process did not show due application of mind. The Supreme Court had nevertheless examined the merits there because of exceptional delay: the complaint was nearly twenty years old and the summoning order eleven years old.

No comparable circumstance existed here. The challenged order was dated 7 February 2025. The High Court therefore found no reason to replace the Magistrate’s assessment with its own first-instance evaluation of the complete record.

6. Sanjit Bakshi v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3614

This decision provided a further remedial parallel. A cryptic, non-speaking cognizance order had been set aside, with directions for fresh consideration on the charge-sheet.

It supported a proportionate response: correct the defective decision-making process without treating that defect as a conclusive determination that prosecution could never be justified.

7. Prabhu Chawla v. State Of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30

The High Court relied on this authority to reject the objection that Ahmed should first have pursued revision under Section 397 CrPC. The availability of revisional jurisdiction does not, by itself, bar the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction, although that power must be exercised with self-restraint.

The limited relief granted illustrated that restraint. The Court corrected an inadequately reasoned summoning order and restored the question to the proper judicial forum without deciding the merits.

Underlying proceeding: “State v. Navin M Raheja & Ors.” identifies the criminal case from which the challenge arose; it is not a precedent relied upon for a legal proposition.

C. Why the Summoning Order Failed

Misidentification of the source of allegations

The most consequential defect was the order’s treatment of the complainant’s assertions as contents of the charge-sheet. It attributed knowledge of conspiracy and active participation to Ahmed while stating that these matters emerged from the police report.

In contrast, the charge-sheet described his non-executive position, sitting-fee remuneration and lack of participation in day-to-day affairs, and recorded that no incriminating evidence had emerged. The discrepancy undermined the stated foundation for summoning him.

A synopsis could identify material, but could not replace it

The Court did not hold that the complainant’s synopsis was irrelevant or could never be considered. It could draw attention to material allegedly overlooked during investigation. But assertions of knowledge, participation or conspiracy could not themselves substitute for the material needed to support judicial satisfaction.

If the Magistrate intended to rely on those assertions, the order had to identify what supported them. The judgment therefore draws an important distinction between an allegation directing attention to evidence and an allegation being treated as the evidentiary foundation itself.

Collective conclusions did not establish individual involvement

The order grouped together directors, authorised signatories, representatives and other personnel. It referred broadly to active participation and stated that connivance could not be ruled out.

Such observations did not explain what Ahmed himself allegedly did or which material connected him to the offences. The inability to rule out involvement was not a substitute for identifying sufficient grounds affirmatively supporting issuance of process against him.

D. Corporate Office, Resignation and Alleged Conspiracy

Ahmed argued that prosecution based merely on his former designation would impose vicarious criminal liability. He also relied on his resignation before the construction-delay and repayment disputes emerged in 2017–2018.

The complainant responded that the alleged conspiracy began with the 2014–2015 transactions, while Ahmed remained a director. On that account, resignation before the later default would not necessarily exclude earlier involvement.

The Court did not finally resolve these competing positions. It neither recognised blanket immunity for non-executive directors nor held that directorship during execution of the agreements established participation. Likewise, the absence of Ahmed’s name from the original complaint was not treated as conclusive.

The narrower requirement was that the Magistrate identify material showing his individual role. Attendance at Board meetings could not simply be equated with knowing participation without explaining the supporting connection. This does not mean that conspiracy requires direct evidence in every case; the judgment leaves the evidentiary assessment open.

The alleged breach of the later settlement also formed part of the submissions. Ahmed maintained that he was not a party to it. The Court did not decide any independent criminal consequence of that settlement’s non-fulfilment or treat it as an established basis for proceeding against him.

E. Why Remand Was the Appropriate Remedy

The defect concerned the Magistrate’s exercise of judicial discretion. The High Court therefore declined to determine, for the first time, whether the complete record contained sufficient material against Ahmed.

This preserved the distinction between reviewing a decision and making the underlying decision. The Magistrate must now examine the charge-sheet, the complainant’s synopsis and any supporting material, independently determine whether sufficient grounds exist, and record reasons.

Accordingly, the petitioner succeeded against the existing summoning order, not against every possibility of future prosecution. A fresh summons remains possible if justified by the record and supported by a lawful, reasoned order.

F. Potential Impact

  • More accountable summoning decisions: Magistrates departing from a police recommendation against prosecution must make the material basis of that departure visible.
  • Individualised scrutiny in corporate cases: Courts should distinguish among persons with different corporate functions rather than infer a common criminal role from organisational association.
  • Greater care with complainant submissions: Written allegations must be accurately distinguished from investigative findings and the underlying record.
  • No investigative veto: Police conclusions remain open to judicial disagreement where sufficient material supports it.
  • No premature merits determination: A defective summoning order ordinarily calls for reconsideration, not automatic termination of the prosecution.
  • Focused inherent-jurisdiction review: The existence of revision does not prevent limited intervention to correct a demonstrable failure of judicial reasoning.

The judgment does not decide whether the property dispute was merely contractual or also criminal, whether the alleged offences were established, or whether Ahmed ultimately should face proceedings. Its impact lies primarily in procedural discipline at the summoning stage.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Cognizance
The court’s formal application of judicial attention to an alleged offence. It is not a finding of guilt.
Issuance of process
The step by which the court directs a person to appear, usually through summons. It requires sufficient grounds to proceed against that person.
Column No. 12
In this case, the charge-sheet category containing persons whom the police did not send up for trial. Placement there does not prevent the Magistrate from summoning them.
Speaking order
An order that explains the essential reasons for its conclusion. It may be brief, but must reveal the material and reasoning supporting the decision.
Prima facie case
A case sufficiently supported at the preliminary stage to justify further proceedings. It falls short of proof required for conviction.
Mini-trial
An inappropriate attempt to resolve disputed evidence fully at an early procedural stage. Checking whether a summoning order identifies supporting material is not the same as conducting a trial.
Vicarious criminal liability
Criminal responsibility imposed for another person’s conduct because of a legally recognised relationship. The petitioner disputed any attempt to prosecute him merely because he had been a director; the Court left the substantive liability question open.
Inherent jurisdiction
The High Court’s exceptional power, invoked here under Section 528 BNSS, to address abuse of judicial process and secure justice. An available revision remedy does not automatically exclude it.
Remand
Returning a question to the lower court for a fresh decision. Here, it means reconsideration of summoning, not a finding that the petitioner is innocent or guilty.

6. Conclusion

The judgment affirms a balanced rule: a Magistrate may summon a person whom the police declined to prosecute, but must identify the material supporting that person’s alleged involvement and briefly explain the decision.

By setting aside only Ahmed’s summoning order and directing reconsideration, the High Court preserved both judicial independence from police opinion and protection against mechanically instituted criminal proceedings. The central lesson is that brevity is permissible; unsupported, inaccurate or collective reasoning is not.