3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Role)
Watali supplied the controlling interpretive frame for Section 43D(5): at bail stage, courts ask whether the accusation is
“prima facie true” based on materials collected by the investigating agency, which “must prevail until contradicted”.
The High Court applied this “lighter” threshold (relative to “not guilty” regimes under other special statutes) and reiterated that it must not conduct
an elaborate dissection of evidence.
These were used to answer the appellant’s “temporal” objection: because the blasts were in September 2008, he argued the amended Section 43D(5)
(effective 31.12.2008) could not govern his bail.
The Court relied on Pragya Singh Chandrapalsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 493,
which itself invokes Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State Of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602, to hold that
bail provisions are procedural and therefore apply to pending bail determinations even if the alleged offence predates the amendment.
This is the judgment’s sharpest rule-like holding.
The Court treated K.A. Najeeb as recognising that constitutional courts can grant bail despite Section 43D(5) where
delay makes continued incarceration constitutionally unjustifiable. However, it distinguished the present case by stressing:
(i) Najeeb arose in a posture involving cancellation vs grant dynamics; and (ii) the present trial had meaningfully progressed
and was near completion.
Gulfisha Fatima was used to reinforce a structured, contextual approach: delay is not an “automatic” bail trigger; courts must consider
the accused’s role, the statutory gravity, prima facie strength, trajectory of trial, and risks to trial integrity.
The High Court substantially adopted this framing to conclude that prolonged custody, though significant, did not outweigh the statutory embargo
given the allegation of central involvement and the “fag-end” stage of trial.
(E) Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu, 2026 INSC 503 and SLP(Crl.) No. 2867/2026 titled 'Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi'
The High Court noted that Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu, 2026 INSC 503 re-emphasises Najeeb
and cautions that Section 43D(5) cannot dominate Article 21. It then recorded that SLP(Crl.) No. 2867/2026 titled 'Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi'
refers the broader “Article 21 vs special-statute bail restrictions” question to a larger Bench.
Despite this evolving landscape, the Court decided the matter on existing principles: even on an Article 21 lens, the present facts did not justify release.
These authorities were invoked to restate classic bail factors—gravity, punishment severity, flight risk, witness influence, and justice thwarting.
The Court used them to underscore that even apart from UAPA, the mass casualty nature of the incident and severity of potential punishment weigh heavily against bail.
(G) Conspiracy principle: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishanlal Pardhan and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 773
Cited by the State to emphasise that in conspiracy cases, liability extends to acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy even without direct participation in every act.
This supported treating the alleged “media cell” role as integrally connected to the terror operation.
(H) Prior and connected proceedings: Mubeen Kadar Shaikh v. State of Nct of Delhi, Mansoor Asghar Peerbhoy v. State, and Mohd. Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi)
The Court drew strength from earlier bail adjudications. Notably, it quoted the co-ordinate Bench’s narrative in
Mubeen Kadar Shaikh v. State of Nct of Delhi describing the alleged mechanism of drafting/correcting the email, travel to Mumbai,
discovering unsecured Wi-Fi, creating the ID, and sending the mail at 6:25 pm.
It also relied on its own earlier rejection in Mansoor Asghar Peerbhoy v. State (second bail round) to hold the present grounds were not materially new.
Parity with Mohd. Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) was rejected because Hakim’s alleged role (ball bearings) was substantially peripheral.
(I) “National security preference” articulation: State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 INSC 618
The Court used this to bolster the proposition that where personal liberty conflicts with sovereignty/security considerations,
courts may prioritise the latter—especially in organised, security-threatening offences—while also noting the pending reference in Tasleem Ahmed.
(J) Other authorities cited by parties
The State relied on Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar & Anr., (2022) 4 SCC 497 (gravity of offence) and
X v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN and Anr. 2024 INSC 909 (speedy trial and delay attribution).
The appellant cited additional Supreme Court matters (e.g., SLP(Crl.) No. 83/2024 titled 'Suhail Ahmad Thokar v. National Investigation Agency');
the High Court’s operative reasoning, however, turned primarily on Watali and the Article 21 line culminating in Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) Retrospective application of Section 43D(5): “bail is procedural”
The Court’s first decisive move was to reject the appellant’s argument that the amended Section 43D(5) cannot apply because the offence predates 31.12.2008.
It held bail law to be procedural and therefore applicable to pending bail adjudication, aligning with
Pragya Singh Chandrapalsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 493.
This reasoning effectively blocks a common defence strategy in older UAPA cases: attempting to access a “less stringent” bail regime by pegging rights to the date of occurrence.
(ii) “Prima facie true” assessment under Watali
The Court reiterated it would not conduct a mini-trial. It identified the prima facie links as:
PW-231’s identification of the appellant as purchaser of the laptop; forensic retrieval of PDFs matching the “terror email” attachments;
the presence and/or logs of wiping tools (Hex “00”, “STELLAR WIPE”); recovery of technical devices; and the allegation of Wi-Fi hacking at the relevant place/time.
These were treated cumulatively to cross the “broad probabilities” threshold.
(iii) Parity rejected as role-sensitive
The judgment treats parity as a role-comparison exercise, not a headcount.
Because Mohd. Hakim was allegedly involved in supply of ball bearings while the appellant was alleged to head a media cell and enable real-time claim-of-responsibility transmission,
the Court found parity inapplicable.
(iv) Article 21, prolonged incarceration, and the “fag-end trial” brake on constitutional override
The Court accepted that constitutional courts can, in principle, grant bail notwithstanding Section 43D(5) (drawing from K.A. Najeeb).
Yet it declined intervention because: the offence involved mass casualties; the appellant’s alleged role was central; and, critically, the trial had substantially progressed
(303 witnesses examined; only two left). The Court treated imminent completion as a practical and normative reason to avoid disrupting the process and to prefer
expeditious conclusion over release.
(v) Risk and societal security framing
Beyond “flight” or “tampering”, the Court’s refusal rests on an assessment that the appellant’s alleged position and technical capability create a
continuing risk of re-engagement with banned networks and threaten public safety—an evaluative stance consistent with UAPA’s preventive logic.