Writ Maintainability to Challenge Industrial Awards Against a Privatised Employer & Proportional Compensation for Section 25-F Breach

1) Introduction

The Delhi High Court (Shail Jain, J.) decided a batch of writ petitions led by SAURAJ SINGH v. M/S INDIAN AIRLINES LTD AND ANR (08.05.2026), arising from industrial disputes concerning termination of casual/daily-rated workmen engaged by Indian Airlines (later Air India). The workmen had served during the period 1993–1998 and were disengaged without notice or retrenchment compensation.

The Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT) held the terminations illegal for non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but awarded only modest compensation (Rs. 25,000–55,000) in lieu of reinstatement. The workmen/Union challenged the relief (seeking reinstatement/back wages), while Air India raised a threshold objection: post-privatisation (2022) Air India is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

The Court framed two central issues:

1. Whether writ petitions (Articles 226/227) are maintainable against Air India after privatisation (2022)?
2. Whether the CGIT’s award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement warranted interference?

2) Summary of the Judgment

The High Court:

• Rejected the maintainability objection in the present posture: even if Air India is not “State” post-disinvestment, a writ is maintainable to judicially review an industrial tribunal’s award under Articles 226/227 because the challenge is to the adjudicatory outcome and process, and the Industrial Disputes Act provides no appellate mechanism against awards.
• Upheld the finding of illegality: the terminations violated Section 25-F (read with Section 25-B on continuous service). The Court also rejected the plea that the disengagement was in “pursuance” of the earlier Delhi High Court judgment dated 09.05.1997, noting the delayed and staggered disengagement pattern.
• Declined reinstatement given the casual nature of engagement, short tenure, and the passage of nearly three decades, holding compensation to be an appropriate substituted remedy.
• Enhanced and rationalised compensation, partly modifying the CGIT award by adopting proportionality considerations aligned with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Amit Kumar Dubey v. M.P.P.K.V.V. Co. Ltd. &Anr.:
  • 1+ year service: Rs. 1,25,000
  • 2+ years service: Rs. 2,50,000
  • 3+ years service: Rs. 3,75,000

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and their role)

(A) Scope of writ/supervisory jurisdiction over tribunals

The judgment opens with a reminder (quoted) from State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj that Article 226 is designed to keep tribunals “within bounds”. This frames the Court’s approach: not appellate reappreciation, but correction of jurisdictional error, perversity, or patent illegality.

To answer maintainability, the Court relies on:

• Hindustan Lever Lid v. B.N. Dongre: cited for the proposition that where the Industrial Disputes Act provides no remedy against a tribunal’s decision, the aggrieved party can invoke Articles 226/227.
• Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles: invoked for the broader principle that awards of industrial adjudicatory bodies may be subject to writ scrutiny (certiorari) when the authority acts illegally or beyond jurisdiction.

These authorities collectively support the Court’s key doctrinal move: even if the employer is private, the tribunal remains a statutory adjudicator whose awards are reviewable to prevent “award-immunity” inconsistent with constitutional supervision.

(B) Privatisation and non-amenability of Air India as “State”

The management relied on R.S. Madireddy and Another v. Union of India and Others (Bombay High Court) and the Supreme Court’s affirmation in Mr. R.S. Madireddy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., which held that post-disinvestment Air India is not “State” under Article 12 and, in that setting, writ relief against Air India is not maintainable.

The Delhi High Court distinguished those decisions on a procedural and remedial axis:

• In Mr. R.S. Madireddy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., employees directly invoked writ jurisdiction in a service dispute, without first exhausting labour-law remedies.
• Here, the parties had already traversed the Industrial Disputes Act route; the writ petitions targeted the CGIT award. The Court treated this as a constitutionally permissible supervisory review of a statutory adjudication, not as direct writ enforcement of service rights against a private employer.

In effect, the Court harmonised the “Air India is not State post-privatisation” line with the principle that statutory tribunal awards cannot be placed beyond constitutional review.

(C) Casual engagement, replacement norms, and regularisation themes

The workmen invoked State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 to argue that one casual cannot be replaced by another casual and that continuation should persist until regular recruitment. While the Court recorded this submission, the decisive legal analysis turned not on “regularisation” but on: (i) Section 25-F illegality, and (ii) the modern remedial trend away from reinstatement for short-term casual work.

The judgment also refers to earlier litigation around panels (1990 select list; 1995 panel) and mentions Khagesh Kumar v. Inspector General Of Registration and Inspector General of Registration, U.P. v. Avdesh Kumar (as part of the historical background on age relaxation/opportunity to compete for regular posts). These references contextualise that the earlier writ litigation did not confer an automatic right to regularisation.

(D) Whether court-order-linked engagement can bypass Section 25-F (and the J.D. Biswas debate)

The management relied on J.D Biswas v. Indian Airlines to argue that disengagement in consequence of the final disposal of writ proceedings (where engagement was under an interim order) would take the case outside Sections 2(oo), 25-F and 25-G.

The Court declined to apply J.D Biswas v. Indian Airlines for two reasons:

1. Statutory text primacy: Section 25-F contains no “court-order engagement” exception; courts cannot judicially graft one.
2. Factual distinction: unlike a direct and immediate disengagement linked to disposal of proceedings, Sauraj Singh’s termination occurred over a year after the 09.05.1997 judgment, suggesting the required causal nexus was missing.

(E) Relief for Section 25-F breach: compensation replacing reinstatement

On remedy, the management relied on BSNL V Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177, Ranbir Singh V. Executive Engineer PWD (2021) 14 SCC 815, Deepali Gundu Surwase V. Krantl Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed) and ors. (2013)10 SCC 324 and Jasmer Singh V. State Of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 458 for the proposition that reinstatement is not automatic even when Section 25-F is violated, especially for casual/daily wagers and where long time has passed.

The Court’s own reasoning also draws support from Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327, explicitly recognising the “shift” away from automatic reinstatement to context-sensitive compensation.

(F) Quantification of compensation and proportionality

The doctrinal pivot for enhancing compensation is Amit Kumar Dubey v. M.P.P.K.V.V. Co. Ltd. &Anr. (29 January 2025), cited for the rule that compensation cannot be nominal, uniform, or arbitrary and must bear nexus to length of service, applying proportionality (including pro-rata logic).

The Delhi High Court translated that guidance into slab-based lump sums (1/2/3 years), thereby converting the CGIT’s low, service-banded figures (Rs. 25k/40k/55k) into materially higher, time-linked compensation.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Maintainability: “private employer” vs “review of tribunal award”

The Court’s core reasoning is structural:

• Even if Air India post-2022 is not “State” under Article 12 (as per Mr. R.S. Madireddy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.), that does not end the enquiry where a statutory tribunal has adjudicated the dispute and issued an award.
• Section 17(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act stresses finality of published awards and indicates absence of a statutory appeal, but such finality cannot constitutionally exclude Articles 226/227 scrutiny for jurisdictional errors/patent illegality.
• Therefore, the writ petitions were treated as directed against the award and adjudicatory process (CGIT), not as a direct writ command enforcing service conditions against a private airline.

This reasoning preserves two values simultaneously: (i) the post-privatisation “non-State” status of Air India for direct writ service disputes, and (ii) the High Court’s constitutional role to supervise statutory tribunals so that their awards do not become unreviewable.

(B) Section 25-F: mandatory conditions and “no implied exceptions”

After finding continuous service (Section 25-B threshold), the Court emphasised the absolute character of Section 25-F’s three conditions precedent (notice/pay, retrenchment compensation, government notice). It further noted that the earlier proviso to Section 25-F had been omitted by Act 49 of 1984, reinforcing that courts should not dilute the provision by reading in exceptions.

This statutory approach drove two outcomes:

• the illegality finding (non-compliance admitted/established);
• rejection of the “court-order engagement implies Section 25-F does not apply” contention.

(C) Rejecting “termination was pursuant to 09.05.1997 judgment”

A notable factual-legal inference was drawn from timing and pattern:

• The 09.05.1997 judgment preceded Sauraj Singh’s termination (09.10.1998) by over a year. Such delay was treated as inconsistent with genuine, immediate compliance.
• Terminations were staggered across workers over months (August 1997–October 1998), not by a single uniform action. This undermined the claimed causal link to a single judicial direction.

The Court thus treated “pursuance of court order” as a defence requiring conduct consistent with prompt, faithful compliance, not a flexible post-hoc justification.

(D) Remedy: why reinstatement was refused despite illegality

The Court adopted the now-dominant remedial framework: illegality under Section 25-F does not mechanically entail reinstatement. Factors highlighted include:

• casual/daily-rated status and non-regular recruitment;
• short overall tenure (around two years for the lead workman);
• the near 30-year passage of time, making reinstatement impractical and disruptive;
• even reinstatement would only restore casual status, not regularisation—thus potentially illusory.

Compensation was therefore treated as the equitable substitute remedy.

(E) Quantum: proportional, non-arbitrary compensation

The Court found the CGIT’s compensation too low and modified it by setting higher slabs aligned to service duration. This is significant because it signals that when reinstatement is denied, courts must still ensure compensation is not tokenistic.

3.3 Impact

(A) Post-privatisation litigation strategy: tribunal-award route remains reviewable

The judgment has practical importance for employees of privatised entities: while direct writ service claims may fail on “not State” grounds, challenges to labour adjudication (CGIT/Labour Court awards) remain open under Articles 226/227. This preserves a constitutional “safety valve” against jurisdictional error and perversity in industrial awards.

(B) Strengthening Section 25-F’s mandatory nature

By refusing to infer exceptions (including “engaged due to court order”), the Court reinforces Section 25-F as an across-the-board statutory floor once continuous service is met. Employers cannot rely on the provenance of engagement (panel, interim order, exigency) to bypass retrenchment safeguards.

(C) Evolving relief: reinstatement de-emphasised, but compensation must be meaningful

The decision is a clear example of the modern two-step approach: (1) hold retrenchment illegal for Section 25-F breach; (2) tailor relief contextually, often via compensation. Crucially, it also shows that compensation is not meant to be nominal and must be proportionate to service, consistent with Amit Kumar Dubey v. M.P.P.K.V.V. Co. Ltd. &Anr..

(D) Evidentiary and conduct-based scrutiny of “pursuance of court order” defences

The Court’s insistence on promptness and uniformity (as indicia of genuine compliance) may affect future cases where employers invoke prior judicial directions to justify later disengagements.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Article 12 (“State”)

Defines entities against whom fundamental-right writs typically lie. After privatisation, Air India was held not to be “State”. But this judgment distinguishes between suing Air India directly and reviewing a statutory tribunal’s award.

Article 226 vs Article 227

Article 226 allows writs (including certiorari) and broader judicial review; Article 227 is supervisory control over courts/tribunals. Here, the Court treats the petitions as supervisory/judicial review of the CGIT award.

Industrial Disputes Act: Section 25-B (continuous service)

A workman is treated as in “continuous service” if they satisfy statutory thresholds (commonly “240 days” in a year). Once met, retrenchment protections are triggered.

Section 25-F (conditions precedent to retrenchment)

Before retrenching a qualifying workman, the employer must give notice/pay in lieu, pay retrenchment compensation, and notify the government. Non-compliance makes retrenchment illegal.

Reinstatement vs compensation

Reinstatement restores employment; compensation is a monetary substitute. Modern labour jurisprudence often prefers compensation for short-term/casual engagements, especially after long delays, but insists compensation be proportionate and non-token.

“De hors the Rules”

Means “outside the rules”—i.e., engagement not made through regular recruitment rules/sanctioned process, often relevant to remedy.

Section 17(2) finality of awards

Awards are “final” in the sense of no ordinary civil-court challenge/appeal under the Act, but they remain reviewable under the Constitution for jurisdictional or patent errors.

5) Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in SAURAJ SINGH v. M/S INDIAN AIRLINES LTD AND ANR sets out two key takeaways:

1. Maintainability principle: Even after Air India’s privatisation, writ jurisdiction can be invoked to judicially review CGIT/Labour Court awards under Articles 226/227; otherwise, industrial awards would risk becoming effectively unreviewable.
2. Remedial principle: Breach of Section 25-F establishes illegality, but reinstatement is not automatic—especially for casual, short-tenure engagements after long lapse. However, if compensation substitutes reinstatement, it must be meaningful and proportionate to service, prompting the Court’s substantial enhancement and slab-based rationalisation.

In broader labour-law terms, the judgment simultaneously preserves statutory retrenchment protections (by rejecting implied exceptions) and modernises relief (by aligning compensation with proportionality guidance), offering a structured template for future industrial-award challenges involving privatised employers.