Unmarried Women Included in the 20–24 Week MTP Window Through Purposive Interpretation of Rule 3-B

1. Introduction

In ABC v. State of Maharashtra Thr Principal Secretary Public Health Dept and Anr (Bombay High Court, 29 January 2026), a 26-year-old unmarried petitioner sought (i) permission to medically terminate a 22-week pregnancy and (ii) a declaration that Section 3(2)(b) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (as amended in 2021) was unconstitutional to the extent it allowed termination between 20–24 weeks only for “such category of woman as may be prescribed,” contending that the Rules unlawfully excluded unmarried women.

The petitioner’s case was premised on an unwanted pregnancy due to contraceptive failure, her apprehension of social stigma and lack of family support, and the asserted impact on her mental health and dignity. She argued that exclusion of unmarried women from the 20–24 week window under Rule 3-B of the MTP Rules violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Although the High Court had already permitted termination pursuant to a medical board opinion (order dated 23.08.2022), it issued notice on the constitutional challenge. During pendency, the Union of India relied on a binding Supreme Court ruling that directly addressed the same interpretive issue.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Bombay High Court disposed of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner’s constitutional challenge had been effectively resolved by the Supreme Court decision in X Vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr. The Supreme Court had held that Rule 3-B must be purposively interpreted so that the 20–24 week termination benefit is not confined to married women, and that excluding unmarried/single women would be discriminatory under Article 14 and inconsistent with reproductive autonomy under Article 21.

The High Court further emphasized that, by virtue of Article 144 of the Constitution, all authorities must act in aid of Supreme Court decisions. It therefore requested the Public Health Department, State of Maharashtra to ensure wide circulation of the Supreme Court’s ruling to implementing functionaries, so similarly situated women are not compelled to approach courts.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) X Vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr. (2023) 9 SCC 433

This was the controlling authority. The Supreme Court considered a materially similar fact pattern: an unmarried woman at about 22 weeks sought termination under Section 3(2)(b) read with Rule 3-B; the High Court had denied relief because unmarried women were not expressly included in the listed categories.

The Supreme Court’s interpretive holdings—expressly quoted in the Bombay High Court judgment—were central:

  • Object-based reading of Section 3(2)(b) and Rule 3-B: the 20–24 week window addresses pregnancies rendered unwanted due to “change in material circumstances,” and is not rationally limited to married women.
  • Equality and non-discrimination: excluding unmarried/single women would be discriminatory and violative of Article 14.
  • Reproductive autonomy under Article 21: dignity, privacy, and bodily integrity support an unmarried woman’s equal entitlement to choose.
  • Constitutional avoidance: because a purposive interpretation cures the exclusion, the Supreme Court stated it was “not required to adjudicate upon its constitutional validity.”

The Bombay High Court treated this as conclusively settling the petitioner’s challenge and as binding guidance for all implementing authorities.

(b) Suchita Srivastava & Anr. Vs. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1

The judgment notes that the Supreme Court in X relied on Suchita Srivastava for the proposition that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices is a facet of “personal liberty” under Article 21. The Bombay High Court’s reasoning is anchored in this constitutional baseline: reproductive choice is intertwined with privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity, which cannot be curtailed by narrow, status-based assumptions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Issue identification: The petitioner’s core legal grievance was that Rule 3-B’s categories, as applied, excluded unmarried women from accessing the 20–24 week termination regime under Section 3(2)(b), thereby infringing Articles 14 and 21.
  2. Deference to binding precedent: The High Court recognized that the Supreme Court’s three-judge bench ruling in X Vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr. directly interpreted the same statutory scheme, and hence the controversy was “put to rest.”
  3. Purposive interpretation as the operative tool: Rather than striking down the provision, the Supreme Court’s interpretive method (adopted by the High Court) reads Rule 3-B consistently with the MTP Act’s object—ensuring access to abortion between 20–24 weeks for women facing changed circumstances—thereby preventing discriminatory outcomes.
  4. Implementation mandate via Article 144: The High Court underscored that all civil and judicial authorities must act in aid of Supreme Court decisions. This transforms the Supreme Court’s interpretation from a case-specific remedy into an administratively enforceable directive for hospitals, medical boards, and health departments.
  5. Systemic compliance emphasis: By requesting “wide circulation” of the ruling, the Court addressed the recurring practical barrier: frontline implementers often follow the text of Rule 3-B mechanically and deny access unless explicitly named categories are met.

3.3 Impact

  • Access parity for unmarried women (20–24 weeks): The decision operationalizes the Supreme Court’s holding that unmarried/single women are not to be excluded from the Section 3(2)(b) read with Rule 3-B framework merely due to marital status.
  • Reduced need for litigation: The High Court explicitly sought to prevent similarly situated women from having to “knock the doors of the Court,” pushing the health system toward compliance at the point of service.
  • Administrative accountability: By invoking Article 144 and directing circulation, the judgment strengthens the expectation that medical and governmental authorities must update protocols, training, and decision-making templates in line with Supreme Court interpretation.
  • Constitutional lens in reproductive healthcare: The combined reliance on Articles 14 and 21 signals that abortion access cannot be administratively constrained by moralistic or patriarchal notions of “permissible sex” or family structure; classification must track legitimate statutory purpose and constitutional rights.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 3(2)(b) (MTP Act)
A statutory route allowing termination in the 20–24 week bracket for certain pregnancies, subject to conditions and the categories specified by Rules.
Rule 3-B
A list of categories of women who can access termination between 20–24 weeks. The Supreme Court held the list must be read purposively so that unmarried/single women facing relevant changed circumstances are not excluded.
Purposive interpretation
Reading a provision to advance the purpose of the law rather than adhering to a narrow literal reading that defeats the law’s objective. Here, it avoids an interpretation that would discriminate against unmarried women.
Article 14 (Equality)
Requires the State to treat similarly placed persons alike and forbids arbitrary discrimination. Denying access to abortion solely because a woman is unmarried—when the statutory purpose is to address unwanted pregnancies due to changed circumstances—would violate equality.
Article 21 (Life and Personal Liberty)
Protects bodily integrity, privacy, dignity, and decisional autonomy. Reproductive choice, including whether to carry a pregnancy to term, falls within this protection.
Article 144
Mandates that all authorities (civil and judicial) must act in aid of the Supreme Court. Practically, it means hospitals and health departments must implement the Supreme Court’s interpretation without insisting on fresh court orders.

5. Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s decision is significant less for creating a new constitutional holding and more for institutionalizing compliance with a binding Supreme Court precedent. By recognizing that X Vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr. authoritatively includes unmarried/single women within the protective reach of Section 3(2)(b) read with Rule 3-B through purposive interpretation, the Court closed the door on marital-status-based denial of the 20–24 week termination window.

Its explicit reliance on Article 144 and the request for wide circulation underscores an important systemic message: reproductive rights must be realized administratively, not only judicially, and constitutional values of equality, dignity, privacy, and bodily autonomy must guide implementation of abortion law.