Suppression and Prior Inaction as an Equitable Bar to Interim Copyright Injunctions in Song-Use/Synchronisation Disputes

1. Introduction

The Delhi High Court’s order in TRIMURTI FILMS PRIVATE LIMITED v. B62 STUDIOS PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS. (14.05.2026) concerns an interim injunction request arising from the alleged unauthorised use of the iconic song “Tirchi Topiwale” (from the plaintiff’s film Tridev) and its remix “Rang De Lal (Oye Oye)” in the defendants’ film Dhurandhar: The Revenge.

The core controversy turned on the scope of a historical assignment agreement dated 30.06.1988 between the plaintiff (producer) and defendant no.3 (Super Cassettes Industries Private Limited), and whether that agreement allowed defendant no.3 to create versions/remixes and permit incorporation of the song(s) into other cinematograph films.

The key issues at the interim stage were:

  • whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of copyright infringement warranting injunctive relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC;
  • whether equitable/discretionary relief was barred due to suppression/non-disclosure and prior inaction in earlier similar exploitations (e.g., Azhar, K.G.F: Chapter 1);
  • whether restraining OTT release (while theatrical release had already occurred) would be legally incongruous;
  • what interim balancing measure, if any, could protect the plaintiff pending trial.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court reiterated that interim injunctions require the “triple test” (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury) and are inherently discretionary.
  • It held that the plaintiff’s non-disclosures and contradictory explanations (notably regarding the 2016 notice and reply, litigation activity during 2016–2020, and lack of action over earlier uses) undermined its entitlement to equitable relief.
  • Even assuming no statutory “acquiescence” bar under the Copyright Act, the Court found the plaintiff’s conduct and prolonged inaction operated as an equitable bar to interim restraint, particularly after defendants had invested heavily and altered their position.
  • The Court found that restraining OTT release after nationwide theatrical release would create an incongruous outcome.
  • Instead of an injunction, the Court directed defendant no.3 to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs in Court (to be kept in an interest-bearing FDR) as a protective measure pending trial.
  • The Court’s observations were expressly confined to the interim application and not on final merits.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Discretionary nature of injunctions and the “triple test”

  • Wander Limited v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd.: 1990 Supp SCC 727
    The Court relied on this to emphasise that interim injunction power is discretionary and guided by established principles (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury). This framed the analysis: even a plausible right does not automatically translate into interim restraint.

(B) Clean hands, suppression, and vacation/denial of injunction

  • Kent RO System Limited & Anr. v. Gattubhai & Ors.: (2022) SCC OnLine Del 701
    Quoted to reaffirm that a party seeking discretionary relief must disclose all material facts. The Court used this as a direct foundation for evaluating whether the plaintiff’s omissions warranted denial of interim relief.
  • Wheels India v. S. Nirmal Singh (as quoted within Kent RO System Limited & Anr. v. Gattubhai & Ors.)
    Cited for the proposition that injunctions obtained through deliberate suppression should be vacated/denied; concealment is independently sufficient to refuse equitable relief.
  • Seemax Construction (P) Ltd. v. State Bank of India (as referenced within Kent RO System Limited & Anr. v. Gattubhai & Ors.)
    Reinforced the same clean-hands requirement in the injunction context.

(C) Delay, acquiescence-like conduct, and its equitable consequences

  • Sanjit Singh Salwan v. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1697
    Relied upon to support the Court’s equitable concern that defendants who invest substantial time and money based on the plaintiff’s prolonged inaction should not be subjected to crippling interim restraint once a project is complete/released.
  • Bengal Waterproof Limited v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company & Anr: (1997) 1 SCC 99 and M/s Power Control Appliances & Ors. v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd: (1994) 2 SCC 448
    The plaintiff cited these to argue that “acquiescence” is statutorily nuanced and mere delay does not defeat rights. The Court, however, turned the logic against the plaintiff: defendant no.3 had asserted rights (notably by reply notice dated 02.05.2016) and then acted on them by incorporating songs in films (Azhar, K.G.F: Chapter 1) without challenge—making the plaintiff’s later interim plea inequitable.

(D) Non-disclosure despite opponent’s knowledge

  • Nizam Sugar Factory v. Collector of Central Excise, A.P; (2006) 11 SCC 573
    The plaintiff argued that if the defendant already knows a fact, non-pleading it is not “suppression.” The Court distinguished this in principle: material facts must be disclosed to the Court because they could influence whether ex parte or urgent interim relief is granted; the defendant’s knowledge does not cure the plaintiff’s duty of candour.

(E) Estoppel/royalties argument

  • Saregama India Limited v. Balaji Motion Pictures Limited; 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10036
    The plaintiff relied on this to argue that payment/acknowledgment of royalties estops denial of title. The Court found it inapposite: here defendant no.3 did not concede infringement and, on the contrary, asserted broad assigned rights and demonstrated prior exploitations without challenge.

(F) Adequacy of damages and refusal of injunctive restraint

  • John John Hart Jr. v. Mukul Deora : 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3499
    Used to support the proposition that where monetary compensation is an adequate remedy, interim injunction may be refused— particularly relevant because Dhurandhar: The Revenge had already released theatrically.

(G) Contract interpretation comparator (distinguished)

  • Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. v. Amrit Sharma & Ors.: 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3772
    The plaintiff pressed this as a near-identical assignment case. The Court distinguished it on textual grounds, highlighting that the present agreement expressly defined “the said work” and contained assignment language (notably clauses 2(i) and 2(xi), read with clauses 7, 8, and 12) that, prima facie, was broader than the agreement construed in Shemaroo.

(H) Other authorities referenced in argument but not determinative in the Court’s reasoning

  • Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia; 2004 3 SCC 90 was invoked by the plaintiff to argue injunction should follow once infringement is shown; the Court, however, prioritised equitable conduct and the post-release context over a near-automatic injunction approach.
  • Trimurti Films v Dharma Productions Order dated December 23, 2025 in I.A. (L) No. 41013 of 2025 in Comm IP Suit No. 717 of 2025 before Bombay High Court. was cited by defendant no.3; the Delhi High Court noted the defendants’ reliance (including delay considerations), but its refusal here was anchored primarily in suppression/inaction and interim equities.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Interim injunctions are discretionary; equity is central

The Court anchored its approach in the classic injunction framework: even if a legal right is arguable, interim relief is not automatic. The plaintiff had to satisfy the triple test and also pass the “clean hands” threshold.

(ii) Suppression and inconsistent pleadings/affidavits undermined entitlement to interim relief

The Court treated as “material” the plaintiff’s failure to cleanly disclose, at the outset:

  • the plaintiff’s own legal notice dated 26.04.2016 (re: Azhar);
  • defendant no.3’s reply notice dated 02.05.2016 asserting rights under the 1988 agreement;
  • service proof of that reply;
  • multiple litigations pursued by the plaintiff in India during the period it claimed to be disconnected from the industry; and
  • the earlier unchallenged exploitation in K.G.F: Chapter 1.

The Court found the explanatory affidavits (of Mr. Rajiv Rai and Mr. Umesh G. Mehta) did not restore confidence because they introduced further contradictions and did not satisfactorily explain the prolonged silence after the 2016 exchange. Applying the equitable maxim underlying Kent RO System Limited & Anr. v. Gattubhai & Ors., the Court concluded the plaintiff could not, at this stage, demand discretionary injunctive relief.

(iii) “No statutory acquiescence” did not guarantee interim restraint

The plaintiff’s argument—each infringement is a fresh cause of action and Copyright Act lacks statutory acquiescence—was accepted only as a general proposition, but was insufficient for interim relief. The Court held that equitable discretion can still deny injunction where a rights-holder’s conduct (silence after an explicit rights-assertion in 2016, and non-action against 2016/2019 exploitations) has allowed others to proceed and invest.

(iv) Contractual interpretation: a prima facie view that rights assigned may be broad enough to include versions/remixes and modern platforms

On a prima facie reading, the Court considered the agreement’s definition of “the said work” (including multiple copyrights in the film), and the combined effect of:

  • Clause 2(i) (assignment of rights, titles, interests in literary/dramatic/musical works embodied in “the said work”);
  • Clause 2(xi) (right to make/authorise versions and to perform/broadcast/transmit such versions);
  • Clause 7 (adaptations; combining “the said work” with any other work for reproduction in the form of records);
  • Clause 8 (authorship/ownership of “Original Plate” and authorship of records);
  • Clause 12 (rights/obligations apply to songs/dialogues/sequences included in “the said work”, even if not in final/other versions).

The Court also highlighted the “record” definition including devices “now or hereafter known,” using it to justify a protective deposit given exploitation on digital platforms. Importantly, it avoided a final ruling on construction, expressly limiting itself to the interim stage.

(v) Incongruity of restraining OTT release after theatrical release

The plaintiff sought a narrower restraint (OTT release) because theatrical release had already occurred. The Court rejected this as producing an untenable inconsistency: permitting the same allegedly infringing content in cinemas while restraining it on OTT. This reinforced refusal of injunctive relief.

(vi) Balancing equities: deposit in lieu of injunction

Although refusing restraint, the Court fashioned a pragmatic interim safeguard: directing defendant no.3 to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs, to be held in an interest-bearing FDR for the benefit of the ultimately successful party. This reflects a developing remedial pattern in IP interlocutory disputes where (a) immediate takedown/restraining orders are inequitable or disruptive, but (b) some interim financial protection is justified.

3.3 Impact

  • Reinforced duty of candour in IP interim relief: The decision strengthens the principle that copyright owners seeking urgent relief must fully disclose past disputes, notices, and prior exploitations—especially where the same repertoire has been used earlier.
  • Equitable “acquiescence-like” consequences even without statutory acquiescence: The Court’s approach indicates that while fresh causes of action may exist, interim injunctions can still be denied where prolonged inaction has induced third-party investment.
  • OTT-specific restraint is not a guaranteed workaround: If a film is already in theatrical circulation, courts may view OTT-only restraint as doctrinally awkward unless a clear, principled basis distinguishes the modes of exploitation.
  • Rise of deposit/security orders in content disputes: The Rs. 50 lakh deposit illustrates an increasingly common balancing tool in high-stakes media disputes where injunctions risk disproportionate disruption.
  • Contract drafting/definition clauses matter decisively: The Court’s distinction from Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. v. Amrit Sharma & Ors. underscores that small definitional differences (“the said work”, “record”, “versions”) can materially shift interim outcomes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Interim injunction (Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC): A temporary court order to stop an act (here, alleged copyright infringement) until final trial.
  • Triple test: The plaintiff must show (i) a strong prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience in its favour; (iii) irreparable harm not adequately compensable by damages.
  • Discretionary/equitable relief: Even if rights arguably exist, the court can refuse relief if the claimant’s conduct is unfair (e.g., suppression).
  • Suppression of material facts (“suppresio veri suggestio falsi”): Not telling the court key facts that could influence interim relief. The duty is owed to the court; the opponent’s knowledge does not excuse non-disclosure.
  • Acquiescence vs. delay: “Delay” is lateness; “acquiescence-like” conduct is when silence/inaction (especially after notice) leads the other side to reasonably proceed and invest, making an injunction inequitable.
  • Contra proferentem: If a contract term is genuinely ambiguous, it may be interpreted against the drafter. The Court declined to apply it because it found no prima facie ambiguity warranting that rule.
  • Contemporanea expositio: Using contemporaneous documents/conduct to interpret an old contract. The Court held that such material required fuller evidentiary testing at trial.
  • Deposit/security in court: Money is secured pending trial so that, if the plaintiff ultimately succeeds, it is not left remediless even though no interim injunction was granted.

5. Conclusion

This order’s central contribution is a clear reaffirmation that interim copyright injunctions are not granted as of right: a claimant must satisfy not only the triple test but also the equitable threshold of clean hands and full disclosure. The Court treated prior silence in the face of asserted adverse rights (2016 notice-reply episode) and failure to act against earlier exploitations (Azhar, K.G.F: Chapter 1) as fatal to interim restraint—particularly once defendants had released the film theatrically and invested heavily.

At the same time, the Court’s direction for a Rs. 50 lakh deposit demonstrates a pragmatic middle path: refusing disruptive injunctive relief while preserving a financial cushion pending trial. For future media and music-rights disputes, the decision signals that timely enforcement, consistent pleadings, and complete candour are often as decisive at the interim stage as the underlying copyright claim.