1. Introduction
The Delhi High Court considered whether an accused already released on bail could be refused permission to travel abroad for documented academic purposes primarily because she faced serious allegations under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (“UAPA”). Allowing Natasha Narwal’s petitions, the Court held that such allegations did not justify a blanket restriction on overseas travel. Instead, the request required an assessment of her circumstances, academic needs, compliance with bail, and the safeguards available to secure her return.
The judgment applies the established constitutional protection of foreign travel to the particular situation of an accused pursuing doctoral research while criminal proceedings remain pending. Its significance lies not in creating an unrestricted entitlement to travel, but in rejecting the seriousness of the accusation as an automatically decisive objection.
Background and parties’ positions
Narwal challenged two orders dated 6 October 2026 through which the Additional Sessions Judge, acting as Special Judge at Karkardooma Courts, had refused her applications to visit the United Kingdom. The applications arose in Sessions Case 163/2020 and Sessions Case 354/2022, connected respectively with FIR 50/2020 and FIR 59/2020.
The FIRs contained numerous allegations under the Indian Penal Code, the Arms Act, 1959, and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. FIR 59/2020 additionally invoked Sections 13, 16, 17 and 18 of the UAPA. These were pending allegations, not findings of guilt. Counsel stated that charges had yet to be framed in both cases.
Narwal had received bail in FIR 50/2020 on 17 September 2020 and in FIR 59/2020 on 15 June 2021. The latter bail order required her to surrender her passport and obtain the Trial Court’s permission before leaving India.
Having enrolled in the University of Warwick’s PhD programme in law on 2 October 2023, she had pursued her studies remotely for approximately three years. She sought permission to travel between 2 November and 1 December 2026 to:
- Present her paper, “Gendered Carceral Labour as Social Reproduction”, at a conference at the School of Oriental and African Studies (“SOAS”), London, from 5 to 8 November 2026; and
- Visit the University of Warwick for in-person supervision, academic presentations, doctoral training, and research.
The State opposed the request. It argued that obtaining her extradition from the United Kingdom would be difficult if she sought asylum, and that her academic objectives could be achieved virtually. Narwal relied on her academic documentation, local family ties, undertaking to return, and her brother’s willingness to stand surety.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court allowed the petitions and permitted the proposed travel, subject to conditions. Its principal findings were:
- Foreign travel falls within Article 21: The right to travel abroad forms part of the constitutional protection of life and personal liberty.
- The academic purpose was substantiated: Her supervisors’ letter explained the value of physical attendance and the limitations of continuing entirely through remote engagement.
- Her compliance record mattered: The State did not allege that she had violated her bail conditions.
- The proceedings would take time: The Court considered the likely duration of the trial relevant to the travel request.
- Serious UAPA allegations were not conclusive: They could not curtail her right to travel abroad “in a blanket manner.”
- Safeguards could address the risks: Her family connections in the National Capital Region and the conditions imposed supported permission for a limited visit.
Operative directions
| Subject |
Direction |
| Permitted travel |
Travel to the United Kingdom from 2 November to 1 December 2026. |
| Undertakings |
Narwal and her brother were to furnish undertakings before the Trial Court that she would return to India on 2 December 2026, would not apply for asylum in the United Kingdom, and would not comment on the merits of her ongoing cases during her stay there. |
| Bond and surety |
A cumulative personal bond of ₹1,00,000 across both cases, with her brother as surety, to the Trial Court’s satisfaction. |
| Travel documentation |
The UK visa, when obtained, flight tickets, and a detailed itinerary were to be supplied to the Investigating Officer before departure. |
| Visa application |
The High Court’s order was to accompany her application for a UK visa. |
| Passport |
The Trial Court was directed to release it immediately. Narwal was required to surrender it within 48 hours of returning to India. |
| Look Out Circular |
Any existing Look Out Circular was suspended for the specified travel period, from 2 November to 1 December 2026. |
The travel and Look Out Circular provisions end on 1 December, while the undertaking specifies return on 2 December. Those distinct dates are part of the order’s precise terms.
3. Analysis of the Precedents Cited
This was the principal authority expressly relied upon by the High Court. The Court cited it for the proposition that travelling abroad is a facet of personal liberty protected by Article 21, and that deprivation of that liberty must be in accordance with procedure established by law.
The reproduced passage discusses the Passports Act, 1967, explaining its legislative background and its role in regulating departure from India. For the present dispute, the essential point was that overseas travel is not merely a discretionary benefit: restrictions engage a constitutionally protected interest.
The precedent influenced the decision by supplying its constitutional starting point. Although Narwal was subject to a valid requirement of prior judicial permission, that requirement did not mean permission could be refused automatically because the prosecution involved grave offences. The Court still had to consider the circumstances supporting and opposing the particular journey.
The High Court did not invalidate the passport-surrender condition or declare that criminal courts lack power to restrict travel. It permitted a temporary departure within that existing supervisory framework. Nor did it expressly formulate a separate, multi-stage proportionality test; its reasoning nevertheless reflects a practical balancing of liberty, demonstrated need, and procedural safeguards.
3.2 Satwant Singh v. Union of India
This authority appears within the passage quoted from Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. The quoted passage identifies it as recognising foreign travel as part of personal liberty under Article 21 and explains that the Passports Act followed that recognition.
Its contribution to the present judgment is therefore foundational but indirect. It helps explain why restrictions on leaving India must have a legal basis. The High Court did not separately examine its facts or undertake an independent application of its reasoning.
3.3 Limits of the precedent discussion
The supplied judgment cites no separate decision specifically governing foreign travel by an accused facing UAPA allegations. The Court resolved that issue by applying established constitutional protection to Narwal’s individual circumstances. The decision should therefore be understood as a fact-sensitive application of existing principle, rather than the announcement of an unrestricted new right for every accused person to travel abroad.
4. Legal Reasoning
4.1 Serious allegations cannot replace an individual assessment
The Trial Court had refused permission primarily because of the seriousness of the UAPA allegations. The High Court rejected that consideration as a sufficient, standalone basis for refusal.
The distinction is important: the gravity of an accusation may remain relevant, but it cannot automatically determine every subsequent question concerning an accused’s liberty. Here, the Court considered the purpose and duration of travel, the applicant’s conduct on bail, her family connections, and the possibility of imposing protective conditions.
The judgment did not decide whether the accusations were true or reconsider whether bail should originally have been granted. It addressed a narrower question: whether a temporary, documented academic visit could be accommodated while preserving the criminal courts’ authority over the accused.
4.2 Academic documentation answered the virtual-participation objection
The supervisors’ letter dated 21 September 2026 was central to the reasoning. It confirmed satisfactory academic progress, no outstanding academic or disciplinary matters, and three years of entirely remote participation.
It also identified specific benefits of attendance at Warwick between 10 and 22 November 2026:
- First in-person supervisory meetings;
- Presentation of work to academic staff and postgraduate researchers;
- Campus-only doctoral training and researcher-development sessions; and
- Access to library and archival resources available only offline.
The letter further confirmed that the conference paper had been accepted following competitive peer review. These details gave the request an independently supported academic foundation.
The Court’s response to the State’s virtual-participation argument was consequently fact-specific. It did not hold that remote participation is invariably inadequate. Rather, it accepted that the proposed activities offered benefits that virtual arrangements had not fully supplied.
4.3 Compliance and social roots informed the assessment of return
The absence of any alleged breach of bail conditions was significant. The Court also noted that Narwal’s close family lived in the National Capital Region.
These circumstances, alongside her brother’s proposed surety, supported permitting travel. They did not eliminate every possibility of non-return, but helped the Court assess whether the risk could be managed through conditions rather than an outright prohibition.
The judgment does not make local family residence or a relative’s surety universal requirements. They were relevant features of this application.
4.4 Trial duration mattered to the practical burden on liberty
The Court observed that the trial was likely to take considerable time. Counsel had also stated that charges remained unframed.
That context mattered because treating the pending prosecution as an automatic bar could prevent meaningful academic opportunities for an extended period. The judgment accommodates a defined opportunity without requiring Narwal to await the conclusion of the proceedings.
This was not, however, a finding that delay alone creates an entitlement to foreign travel, nor did the Court prescribe any deadline for completing the trials.
4.5 Safeguards addressed the State’s concerns without deciding foreign law
The State raised the prospect of asylum and difficulties in extradition. The Court permitted travel while requiring an undertaking against seeking asylum, a return undertaking, a bond, family surety, and advance disclosure of travel arrangements.
These conditions show how the Court accommodated the prosecution’s concerns within a permission order. They should not be mistaken for findings about UK asylum law or the enforceability of extradition. The judgment did not examine those foreign-law questions.
Similarly, the restriction on commenting on the merits of the pending cases was specific to the overseas stay. The Court did not separately analyse its constitutional validity or formulate a general rule restricting an accused person’s public speech.
5. Potential Impact and Limits
5.1 More individualised travel-permission decisions
The judgment supports a reasoned approach to applications by accused persons already on bail. A refusal based predominantly on the label or seriousness of the offence may be insufficient where the applicant presents a supported purpose, a satisfactory compliance history, and workable safeguards.
Its reasoning may assist future applicants seeking permission for research, conferences, examinations, or other substantial overseas commitments. It does not ensure that those applications will succeed.
5.2 Greater importance of evidence supporting the journey
The decision illustrates the value of detailed institutional correspondence. The supervisors’ explanation of in-person activities and offline resources was more persuasive than an unsupported assertion that travel would be useful.
Conversely, opposition to such applications is more directly addressed to the Court’s reasoning when it identifies concrete concerns about compliance or return, rather than relying solely on the seriousness of pending allegations.
5.3 Conditional permission as an alternative to refusal
The order demonstrates how bonds, undertakings, itineraries, temporary passport release, and limited suspension of a Look Out Circular can operate together. These measures preserve judicial supervision while allowing a specific exercise of liberty.
5.4 What the judgment does not establish
- It does not confer an automatic right to foreign travel on every person accused under the UAPA.
- It does not remove the requirement to obtain prior permission where a bail order requires it.
- It does not determine guilt, invalidate the pending prosecutions, or relax the original criteria for granting bail.
- It does not require permission where the evidence shows a materially different risk of absconding or non-compliance.
- It does not hold that academic purposes invariably override the administration of criminal justice.
6. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Article 21 and foreign travel
- Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. The cited Supreme Court authorities recognise travelling abroad as part of that liberty, although lawful restrictions remain possible.
- Bail condition
- A requirement attached to release from custody. Release on bail does not itself remove a condition requiring permission before overseas travel.
- Framing of charges
- The stage at which the trial court formally identifies the accusations to be tried. Registration of an FIR and framing of charges are different steps; neither is a conviction.
- Personal bond and surety
- A personal bond is the accused’s financial undertaking to comply with specified obligations. A surety provides an additional guarantee. Here, the ₹1,00,000 bond was cumulative across both cases, not a separate ₹1,00,000 bond for each.
- Undertaking
- A formal promise given to the court. The undertakings here concerned return, asylum, and comments on the pending cases.
- Look Out Circular
- An immigration-related alert that may affect departure or movement through border checkpoints. The Court suspended any such circular only for the specified period; it did not cancel it permanently.
- Asylum and extradition
- Asylum concerns protection sought from another country. Extradition concerns surrender by one country to another for criminal proceedings or punishment. The State raised these possibilities, but the Court did not decide their operation under UK law.
7. Conclusion
NATASHA NARWAL v. STATE NCT OF DELHI establishes a focused proposition: serious UAPA allegations do not, by themselves, justify a blanket denial of foreign travel to an accused already on bail.
The Court combined constitutional protection with practical supervision. Documented academic need, sustained compliance with bail, family connections, and tailored conditions justified the limited visit. The broader lesson is that pending criminal proceedings require careful regulation of liberty—not its automatic suspension whenever an overseas opportunity arises.