Section 33(2)(b) “One Month’s Wages” Must Be an Additional Statutory Payment, Not the Earned Salary of the Dismissal Month

1) Introduction

In DR. SATISH BHIDE v. SHRI. RAVINDRA M. PANDE (Bombay High Court, decided on 07-07-2026, per Sandeep V. Marne, J.), the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai challenged the Industrial Tribunal’s refusal to grant approval under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”) to a removal order passed against a municipal clerk.

The respondent-employee (a Clerk in the Octroi Department) was found guilty—after a departmental enquiry held to be fair—of a serious fraud involving diversion of an octroi refund cheque of Rs. 4,10,885/- to a third-party account and receipt of Rs. 1,50,000/- by him. Despite upholding the finding of guilt, the Industrial Tribunal rejected approval solely on the ground that the Corporation allegedly did not pay “full” one month wages because (i) deductions appeared in the November 2006 pay slip and (ii) an increment due in October 2006 was not included.

The central issue before the High Court was whether the Tribunal could deny approval by treating the employee’s earned monthly salary (with routine deductions) as the statutory “one month’s wages” under Section 33(2)(b), while ignoring undisputed evidence that a separate amount was remitted by money order as one month’s wages.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • The High Court held that the Industrial Tribunal committed a grave error by examining the November 2006 salary slip as though it represented compliance with the proviso to Section 33(2)(b).
  • The “one month’s wages” under Section 33(2)(b) are additional statutory wages paid because dismissal is effected during pendency of industrial proceedings; they are not the wages earned for the month in which the workman served up to the date of removal.
  • The employer had specifically pleaded, produced documents, and led evidence that it remitted Rs. 14,468/- by money order as one month’s wages; this was not denied in the written statement and was not challenged in cross-examination.
  • The Tribunal’s finding of non-compliance was therefore perverse (being in ignorance of material evidence).
  • Even assuming a minor deficit were to exist, the Court emphasised that Tribunals can adopt a curative approach (e.g., directing deposit of the deficit) rather than using hyper-technicality to restore employment with back wages to a workman found guilty of corruption.

Accordingly, the High Court set aside (i) the order dated 07 May 2010 rejecting approval and (ii) the order dated 05 January 2012 rejecting review, and it granted approval to the removal action dated 30 November 2006.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

S. Ganapathy and Ors. v. Air India and Anr.

This precedent was pivotal to the High Court’s treatment of “shortfall/ deductions” objections. The Supreme Court recognised that in the fluid state created by Section 33(2)(b)—where dismissal is factually effective but becomes legally complete only upon approval—Tribunals may avoid rejecting approval applications solely due to statutory deductions by making approval conditional, including by directing that the deducted/deficit amount be deposited with the Tribunal.

The High Court used this authority to underline that even if a minor deficit were hypothetically shown, rejection of approval should not be the automatic consequence; a deposit/conditional approval approach may better balance statutory compliance with avoidance of unjust windfalls.

Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. Waman B. More and Anr.

The High Court relied on this Bombay decision for the proposition that while Section 33(2)(b) compliance is generally mandatory and contemporaneous (“one transaction”), there is limited room where bona fide calculation difficulty exists for the employer to offer deposit of disputed components before the Tribunal. The case also cautions employers that omission of wage components can be fatal unless properly addressed at the stage of application.

In the present judgment, the Court referred to the broader principle: tribunals should not treat marginal/curable controversies in wage computation as mechanically vitiating approval, especially when the employer has in fact tendered the one month’s wages separately.

Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Versus. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors.

The respondent invoked this authority to stress strictness and the non-superfluous nature of Section 33(2)(b). The High Court did not dispute the strictness principle, but distinguished its practical application: this was not a case of non-payment of one month’s wages; rather, it was a case where payment by money order was pleaded and evidenced, and the Tribunal ignored it.

Sindhu Diwakar Dabholkar v. B.N. Dongre and Ors.

Cited to argue that deductions are impermissible. The High Court distinguished it on facts: that case involved deductions/adjustments towards alleged past dues. Here, there was no such “set off” from the Section 33(2)(b) wages; moreover, the Tribunal never even examined the money-order wage amount (Rs. 14,468/-), and no pleaded case established deductions from that remittance.

Management of Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Versus. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal

Cited in relation to increment/non-payment issues. The High Court held the increment dispute could not be determinative of Section 33(2)(b) compliance in the circumstances because: (i) the employer asserted increment was withheld at the relevant time; (ii) the “wages” concept under Section 33(2)(b) concerns what the workman would ordinarily receive at that time, not a separately contested entitlement; and (iii) critically, the Tribunal erred by focusing on November salary rather than the statutory one-month payment.

Other cases relied upon by the Respondent and why they did not govern

  • Management of Indian Express and Chronicle Press v. M.C. Kapur: addressed validity of disciplinary action on a distinct factual/ legal basis; not a Section 33(2)(b) computation case as applied here.
  • Dinesh Khare v. Industrial Tribunal and Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Prabhakar H. Manjare and Ors.: treated as cases of non-payment (or materially different compliance failures); distinguished because here an amount was remitted as one month’s wages and not denied.
  • Mahalakshmi Fibres and Industrial Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Anr.: involved an approach of directing collection/clearance rather than actual payment/tender; not comparable to tender by money order pleaded and proved here.
  • Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Company Limited v. S K Dutta: concerned deduction of loan amounts; not analogous to this record.
  • Management of Eastern Electric & Trading Co. v. Baldev Lal: the High Court noted Section 33(2)(b) compliance was not the issue there.

Additionally, the High Court referred (through the extract in S. Ganapathy and Ors. v. Air India and Anr.) to the Bharat Electronics case and the Tata Iron & Steel Co. case to explain the “de facto vs de jure” nature of dismissal pending approval.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Correct identification of the statutory wage payment

The Court’s key doctrinal clarification is that the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) requires payment of an additional one month’s wages as a condition precedent to effecting dismissal for misconduct unconnected with the pending dispute. The Tribunal, however, treated the employee’s earned salary for November 2006 (the month in which he worked up to 30 November) as the statutory “one month wages,” and then invalidated approval due to deductions shown on that pay slip.

The High Court held this approach misconceives Section 33(2)(b). Wages earned for November 2006 were payable in ordinary course because the employee remained in service till 30 November 2006; those cannot substitute the statutory payment meant to cushion the workman against immediate unemployment during pending proceedings.

(B) Perversity by ignoring pleaded and proved money-order remittance

The employer pleaded in the approval application that Rs. 14,468/- was offered and, upon refusal, sent by money order simultaneously with dispatch of the removal order by RPAD. The employee did not specifically deny this in the written statement; nor was the employer’s witness cross-examined to dispute it. The Tribunal nevertheless ignored this entire body of material and decided the case on the November salary slip.

The High Court therefore characterised the Tribunal’s conclusion as perverse—a finding reached by ignoring vital evidence that went to the heart of statutory compliance.

(C) Burden, pleading discipline, and limits of “technical escape”

The Court stressed that non-compliance cannot be presumed. Once the employer established tender/payment of a stated amount as “one month’s wages,” the burden shifted to the workman to plead and prove that it was not “full” wages (e.g., by identifying specific missing wage components or demonstrating impermissible deductions from that remittance). Oral assertions at the writ stage—without pleadings, evidence, or a Tribunal finding—were disfavoured.

(D) Curative approach even where a deficit exists

Drawing from S. Ganapathy and Ors. v. Air India and Anr., the Court noted that where the objection concerns a minor statutory deduction or deficit, the Tribunal may protect the workman by directing deposit of the shortfall rather than refusing approval and thereby restoring a workman guilty of corruption with back wages. This aligns Section 33(2)(b)’s protective purpose with a proportional response to technical objections.

(E) Increment dispute held not determinative for Section 33(2)(b)

The Court treated the increment issue as a separate controversy. Where increment was said to be withheld (and thus disputed as payable at that time), its non-inclusion could not be used to strike down Section 33(2)(b) compliance—particularly when the Tribunal had already erred in identifying the relevant statutory wage payment.

3.3 Impact

  • Clarifies the correct “wage” benchmark under Section 33(2)(b): Tribunals must not confuse the employee’s earned salary for the month of dismissal with the separate statutory “one month’s wages” contemplated by the proviso.
  • Strengthens evidentiary discipline in approval proceedings: if the employer proves tender/payment, the workman must specifically plead and prove shortfall/deductions; vague objections should not succeed.
  • Promotes proportionality: for minor/curable wage disputes, conditional approval and deposit mechanisms are preferable to outcomes that effectively reward proven corruption through reinstatement and back wages.
  • Signals restraint against hyper-technical outcomes: the judgment frames Section 33(2)(b) as protective, not as a device to manufacture “technical loopholes” to defeat disciplinary consequences for grave misconduct.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 33(2)(b) approval: When an industrial proceeding is pending, an employer may dismiss a workman for misconduct unrelated to that dispute only if it (i) pays one month’s wages and (ii) promptly applies for approval to the adjudicatory authority.
  • “One month’s wages”: This is a statutory payment meant to cushion the immediate effect of dismissal during pendency—it is not automatically the wage slip of the month in which the employee worked up to the dismissal date.
  • De facto vs de jure termination: Factually, the employee may be kept out of work after dismissal; legally, the dismissal’s finality during pending proceedings depends on approval.
  • Perversity: A finding may be termed perverse when a court/tribunal ignores material evidence or bases its conclusion on an irrelevant consideration (here, focusing on the November pay slip and ignoring the money-order remittance).
  • Conditional approval / deposit of deficit: Rather than rejecting approval due to a small deficit (especially for statutory deductions), courts recognise that directing deposit can preserve statutory compliance without producing unjust outcomes.

5) Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s decision establishes a practical and important rule for Section 33(2)(b) cases: the Tribunal must examine whether the employer paid/tendered the separate statutory one month’s wages, not misread the employee’s earned salary for the dismissal month as the statutory payment. By treating the Tribunal’s approach as perverse and by endorsing curative mechanisms (deposit/conditional approval) for minor deficits, the judgment limits hyper-technical challenges that can otherwise overturn justified dismissals—particularly in cases of proven corruption—while still preserving the protective purpose of Section 33(2)(b).