Section 175(3) BNSS: Magistrate’s “Inquiry” Must Be Conducted by the Magistrate (No Police-Delegation) and Must Test Cognizable Offence + Sufficient Ground to Investigate

Court: Calcutta High Court (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Appellate Side)
Coram: The Hon’ble Dr. Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee
Date of Judgment: 17-03-2026
Matters: CRR 467 of 2026 (Kaushik Panja & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr.), CRR 363 of 2026 (Manoj Kumar Sharma Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr.), CRR 4982 of 2025 (Sri Nabakumar Das Vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr.)

1. Introduction

The Calcutta High Court decided three criminal revision applications raising a common and recurring procedural issue under the Bharatiya Nagarik Surakhsha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023: when a complainant approaches a Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS seeking directions for police investigation (the BNSS successor to Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.), can the Magistrate direct the Officer-in-Charge of the police station to conduct an “inquiry” and file a report before the Magistrate decides whether to order investigation?

In each of the three matters, the Magistrate had effectively asked the police to “inquire” and submit a report in response to a Section 175(3) prayer. The High Court treated this as a systemic question concerning the scope, meaning, and ownership of the “inquiry” contemplated by Section 175(3) BNSS, and the safeguards newly embedded in the provision (affidavit, prior approach to police hierarchy, and mandatory consideration of police submissions).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court held that the “inquiry” required by Section 175(3) BNSS is a judicial inquiry to be conducted by the Magistrate himself/herself and cannot be sub-delegated to the police. Directing the same police agency (which allegedly refused to register/act) to conduct an “inquiry” into whether investigation should be ordered is inconsistent with:

• the statutory text (“after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary”);
• the statutory definition of “inquiry” in Section 2(1)(k) BNSS (inquiry conducted by a Magistrate or Court); and
• the legislative purpose of introducing safeguards against misuse of the Magistrate’s power and to enforce police accountability.

The Court set aside the Magistrates’ orders in all three cases due to non-compliance with Section 175(3) requirements and remitted the matters for fresh consideration under a structured set of guidelines, to be decided preferably within 30 days, clarifying that it did not examine the merits of the complaints.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning)

Omprakash Ambedkar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (AIR 2025 SC 970)

• Function in this judgment: This was treated as the leading Supreme Court exposition of the three “prominent changes” BNSS introduced in Section 175(3) compared to Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
• Key takeaway applied: Section 175(3) BNSS mandates (i) proof of prior approach to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS, (ii) affidavit support, (iii) Magistrate’s power to conduct enquiry, and (iv) a duty to consider the police officer’s submissions regarding refusal to register FIR.
• Influence: The High Court uses this decision to anchor Section 175(3) as a more “structured and formalized” procedure, and to justify why the Magistrate’s stage is not mechanical but involves judicial discretion backed by inquiry.

Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of UP and Ors. ((2014) 2 SCC 1)

• Function in this judgment: Used to draw the critical doctrinal distinction between (a) mandatory FIR registration upon disclosure of cognizable offence, and (b) limits and purpose of preliminary inquiry at the police level.
• Key passages leveraged: The judgment quotes the well-known “Conclusion/Directions” (para 120) and later relies on para 111 (as extracted) to show that the threshold for starting investigation is higher than mere registration—police can foreclose investigation if “no sufficient ground”.
• Influence: This precedent supports the High Court’s thesis that a Magistrate ordering investigation under Section 175(3) must consider not only whether a cognizable offence is disclosed but also whether there is “sufficient ground” to investigate, aligning the order with the investigation threshold (BNSS Section 176(1)(b)).

Priyanka Srivastava & another Vs. State of UP & Ors. ((2015) 6 SCC 287)

• Function in this judgment: Treated as a foundational safeguard decision that insisted on judicial application of mind and discouraged casual invocation of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
• Affidavit safeguard: The High Court emphasizes the Supreme Court’s rationale (para 31, extracted) that affidavit support deters falsehood and frivolous litigations by exposing deponents to prosecution for false affidavits.
• Scope of “veracity” check: The High Court notes that Priyanka Srivastava allows Magistrates to verify veracity depending on the nature of allegations, especially categories flagged in Lalita Kumari (commercial/fiscal/matrimonial/medical negligence/corruption/ abnormal delay).
• Influence: The High Court uses this precedent to reinforce that the Magistrate’s Section 175(3) role is judicial and cannot be outsourced, and that safeguards are meant to “scuttle and curb” pervert litigation.

Ram Dev Food Products Private Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat ((2015) 6 SCC 439)

• Function in this judgment: Cited to highlight judicial caution against converting civil/commercial disputes into criminal prosecutions through a route that compels investigation.
• Influence: The High Court draws from the Supreme Court’s warning about a “judicially acknowledged tendency” to give criminal colour to civil transactions, supporting the need for Magistrate-led scrutiny (inquiry) before compelling investigation.

Babu Venkatesh & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr. (Feb 18, 2022)

• Function in this judgment: Mentioned as part of the line of Supreme Court decisions shaping the safeguards around Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which BNSS Section 175(3) attempts to codify.
• Influence: Though not discussed in detail, it is invoked to show continuity: BNSS legislatively internalizes earlier judicial guardrails against misuse of Magistrate-directed investigations.

XXX Vs. State of Kerala and Ors. (2026 SCC Online, SC 114)

• Function in this judgment: Relied upon for the procedure and guiding principles on when Section 175(4) BNSS must be invoked in complaints against public servants regarding acts in discharge of official duties.
• Core contribution: The Supreme Court’s “symbiotic relationship” principle—Section 175(4) is not an independent silo; it is an extension of Section 175(3) and must be read harmoniously.
• Influence: The High Court incorporates these guidelines into its own roadmap (especially for public servant cases), while reiterating that even then, the Magistrate retains power to reject untenable/absurd complaints by reasoned order.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Section 175(3) BNSS is designed as a structured judicial checkpoint

The Court reads Section 175(3) as a deliberate legislative response to the misuse concerns addressed by Supreme Court jurisprudence under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It identifies three procedural “gates” before judicial direction for investigation:

• Prior approach requirements: the complainant must have first approached the police station and then the SP (Section 173(4)).
• Affidavit: the application must be supported by affidavit.
• Judicial inquiry + police submission consideration: the Magistrate must make such inquiry as he thinks necessary and consider the police officer’s submissions as to refusal.

The judgment reinforces that these are not optional “formalities”; they are embedded safeguards intended to filter frivolous/vexatious invocations and to increase police accountability for refusals.

(B) “Inquiry” under Section 175(3) must be conducted by the Magistrate, not the police

The decision’s central holding flows from a combined textual, definitional, purposive, and policy analysis:

• Text: Section 175(3) uses “after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary”—the actor is the Magistrate.
• Definition clause: “inquiry” (Section 2(1)(k) BNSS) means inquiry conducted “by a Magistrate or Court”, other than a trial.
• Purpose: asking the police to “inquire” at this stage undermines the safeguard because the police is the very agency whose inaction/refusal is under challenge.
• Institutional logic: it is “paradoxical” to ask the refusing agency to opine whether the complainant deserves investigation, while simultaneously asking the same agency to justify its refusal.
• Anti-corruption/anti-abuse rationale: the Court expresses concern that such a practice could fuel “rampant corruption” and defeats the legislative design.

Importantly, the Court does not prescribe a rigid template for how the Magistrate must inquire; it explicitly leaves the manner/procedure to vary “from case to case” given the statutory wording “as he thinks necessary,” while insisting that the inquiry is judicial and must not become a “roving inquiry.”

(C) The Magistrate’s satisfaction must meet two substantive thresholds: cognizable offence + sufficient ground to investigate

The Court’s most consequential doctrinal refinement is its insistence on “twin tests” before ordering investigation:

1. Existence of information disclosing a cognizable offence (aligned with Section 173(1) BNSS / Lalita Kumari principles).
2. Sufficiency of grounds to investigate (aligned with Section 176(1)(b) BNSS, akin to Section 157 Cr.P.C. logic).

The Court reasons that if Magistrates order investigation without considering “sufficient ground,” it would effectively nullify Section 176(1)(b) BNSS. It also emphasizes that while police must register FIR where cognizable offence is disclosed, investigation is not automatic; it requires a higher threshold (“sufficient ground”).

(D) Consideration of police submissions is confined to “refusal” reasons, and should be efficient

Interpreting the phrase “submission made in this regard by the police officer,” the Court limits the scope to the cause of refusal/inaction. It proposes an efficiency-oriented mechanism:

• Magistrate should seek explanation from the Officer-in-Charge for inaction/refusal.
• Such explanation may be taken via video conference preferably within 3 days.
• Physical presence should not be insisted upon routinely (only exceptional cases), to avoid delay.
• VC process must adhere to Calcutta High Court Video Conference rules.

(E) Consistency across Section 173(1), 173(4), and 175(3): no “embellishment” through escalation

A notable procedural clarification is the Court’s caution that the Magistrate must verify whether the Section 173(4) application is the same as the Section 173(1) information. If the Section 173(4) application contains “additions” not found in the original information, then:

• calling for police submissions on refusal becomes misconceived (police refused something different); and
• the statutory scheme (which presupposes refusal on the same information) is not properly engaged.

(F) Public servant complaints and Section 175(4): harmonized reading

Borrowing from XXX Vs. State of Kerala and Ors., the Court underscores that Section 175(4) is not a free-standing bypass. Where allegations are against public servants for acts in discharge of official duties, the Magistrate must follow the additional safeguards (superior officer report, accused public servant’s version) where attracted, while retaining power to reject wholly untenable complaints by reasoned order.

3.3 Impact

• Operational reset for Magistrate practice under BNSS: The decision squarely disapproves a common shortcut—seeking a police “inquiry report” before deciding Section 175(3). Magistrates must now treat the “inquiry” as their own judicial task.
• Higher quality of Section 175(3) orders: Orders must reflect satisfaction on the twin tests (cognizable offence + sufficient ground) and record compliance with statutory preconditions (prior approach, affidavit, police refusal submissions).
• Enhanced accountability for police refusal: By mandating that Magistrates call for and consider the Officer-in-Charge’s explanation, the judgment strengthens scrutiny of non-registration/inaction and may increase disciplinary/legal exposure for unjustified refusals.
• Reduced misuse of criminal process: The “no police-delegated inquiry” rule, combined with affidavit and sufficiency screening, makes it harder to weaponize Section 175(3) in commercial and private disputes.
• Procedural harmonization: The insistence that Section 173(1) information and Section 173(4) application must be consistent may materially affect drafting and strategy for complainants and counsel, preventing “improved versions” at higher tiers.
• Time-bound remand culture: By remitting with a preferred 30-day timeline and suggesting VC-based police explanations, the decision encourages speed without sacrificing safeguards.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “FIR registration” vs “Investigation”

Registration means formally recording information about a cognizable offence (BNSS Section 173(1)). Investigation is the next stage—collecting evidence, examining witnesses, etc.—and is not automatic in every case. Under BNSS Section 176(1)(b), police may not investigate if there is “no sufficient ground.”

4.2 “Inquiry” (Magistrate) vs “Preliminary inquiry” (Police)

A police “preliminary inquiry” (as discussed in Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of UP and Ors.) is limited and aimed at determining whether a cognizable offence is disclosed in certain categories of cases.

The “inquiry” under Section 175(3) BNSS, as held here, is a judicial inquiry (per Section 2(1)(k) BNSS), performed by the Magistrate to decide whether to direct investigation—particularly testing whether there is sufficient ground to investigate.

4.3 Why an affidavit is required

The affidavit requirement (endorsed via Priyanka Srivastava & another Vs. State of UP & Ors.) is a deterrent: false statements on affidavit can expose the applicant to prosecution, discouraging frivolous or malicious applications.

4.4 “Sufficient ground to investigate”

This is a threshold judgment: whether the allegations and supporting material justify the machinery of investigation being set in motion. The Court treats it as a necessary safeguard so that Magistrate-directed investigations are not ordered merely because an allegation is made, but because there is a rational basis to investigate.

5. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision lays down a clear procedural rule under the BNSS: the Section 175(3) “inquiry” is the Magistrate’s responsibility and cannot be delegated to the police. It further crystallizes that a Magistrate’s direction for investigation must satisfy two conditions—cognizable offence disclosure and sufficient ground to investigate—and must be issued only after statutory prerequisites (prior approach under Section 173(4), affidavit support, and consideration of police refusal submissions) are met.

By setting aside orders that relied on police-conducted “inquiry” reports and remitting the matters with practical guidance (including VC-based explanations and attention to consistency across complaints), the judgment meaningfully shapes how Section 175(3) BNSS is to operate: as a disciplined judicial gateway that both enables genuine complainants to obtain intervention and prevents misuse of the criminal process.