Recusal Cannot Be Manufactured: Objective “Reasonable Apprehension” Test, Interim Prima Facie Orders, and Non-Lis Associations Do Not Disqualify a Judge
1. Introduction
The decision in CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. KULDEEP SINGH & ORS. (Delhi High Court, 20.04.2026; 2026 DHC 3291)
arises from a criminal revision filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) challenging a trial court order dated 27.02.2026
discharging multiple accused in the “Delhi Excise Policy” prosecution.
Before the revision could be heard on merits, six discharged accused—including Respondent No. 18 Arvind Kejriwal (in person),
Respondent No. 8 Manish Sisodia, and others—moved applications seeking recusal of the Single Judge (Dr. Swarana Kanta Sharma, J.)
on a cluster of grounds: alleged apprehension arising from the interim order dated 09.03.2026, alleged subject-matter bias due to earlier detailed
orders of the same judge in connected proceedings, alleged “undue haste”, alleged ideological leanings based on participation in events organised by
Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad, alleged conflict of interest based on professional engagements of relatives, and even an alleged public statement
attributed to the Union Home Minister.
The core legal issue was not the merits of discharge, but the threshold: when does a litigant’s apprehension become a legally cognizable,
“reasonable apprehension of bias” warranting recusal—particularly in politically salient criminal litigation?
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Court dismissed all recusal applications and held that the grounds urged did not meet the governing legal standard of
reasonable apprehension of bias assessed objectively from the standpoint of a fair-minded, informed observer.
Key holdings (in substance) include:
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An interim order with prima facie observations (including ex parte issuance of notice or limited protective directions) is not, by itself, a ground for recusal;
the remedy is appellate challenge, not “bench avoidance”.
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Prior judicial consideration of connected issues (e.g., arrest validity under Section 19 PMLA, bail under Section 45 PMLA) does not create “subject-matter bias”;
those determinations are stage-specific and often statutorily require a prima facie merits engagement.
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Expedited scheduling in MP/MLA-category cases is mandated by Supreme Court and High Court directions; it cannot be recast as “undue haste” indicating bias.
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Attendance at professional/Bar events (without political/ideological statements) cannot reasonably ground an apprehension of bias.
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Professional engagements or empanelment of relatives, absent a direct nexus to the lis, do not constitute a disqualifying conflict of interest;
“conflict” cannot be inferred from social media narratives or remote associations.
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Bias cannot be manufactured; recusal cannot become a tool for forum shopping or creating a “catch-22” where the litigant claims victory regardless of outcome.
The Court clarified that it would hear the main revision petition on merits uninfluenced by the recusal proceedings.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)
Invoked by the applicants to stress that justice must appear to be done, and that bias may be inferred from circumstances creating an apprehension
in a litigant’s mind. The Court accepted the relevance of the appearance principle, but effectively confined its operation to an
reasonable (not subjective) apprehension tested against objective standards.
This authority anchored the Court’s rejection of the idea that adverse orders (or orders “not in favour” of a party) justify recusal.
The Court used it to reinforce the anti-forum-shopping principle: a litigant cannot browbeat the court into a bench of choice.
(c) Kanaklata v. State (NCT of Delhi): (2015) 6 SCC 617
Relied upon by the applicants to argue that “strong observations” can generate reasonable apprehension. The Court distinguished it factually:
Kanaklata turned on unusually sweeping, strongly worded observations by the same trial court while remanding to itself—creating a credible fear
of predetermined re-adjudication. Here, by contrast, the impugned discharge order was being tested for the first time in revision, and prior observations
arose in distinct procedural contexts (arrest/bail), explicitly marked as prima facie and stage-limited.
(d) Satyendra Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement: CRL.M.C. 4916/2022
Cited by applicants to suggest a comparable fact-pattern where recusal was sought. The present Court treated the reliance as unpersuasive on the
governing test: mere apprehension is insufficient unless objectively reasonable on the record, and interim prima facie engagement is a
routine judicial function rather than evidence of predisposition.
Extensively used as a Delhi High Court exemplar rejecting recusal demands founded on alleged “prejudging” from interim orders.
The decision supplied a directly analogous reasoning structure: where courts grant interim relief, they often provide prima facie reasons;
that does not translate into final determination or bias.
(f) Indore Development Authority (Recusal Matter-5) v. Manohar Lal: (2020) 6 SCC 304
Central to the judgment’s doctrinal stance: a judge’s earlier legal view does not automatically create bias when that issue reappears,
and accepting such pleas would cripple adjudication and enable litigants to dictate bench composition.
The Delhi High Court applied this logic to “subject-matter bias” arguments arising from earlier orders in connected proceedings.
Deployed to rebut the notion that prior professional association (or background links) presumptively disqualify a judge. The precedent supported the
requirement of a direct nexus to the lis, not a generalized suspicion drawn from past roles or associations.
(h) Virbhadra Singh & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors.: 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7747
Used as a close analogue to the “influence” insinuation. The quoted reasoning emphasizes that recusal pleas can carry an impermissible innuendo:
that a judge will entertain influence and betray oath. The present Court applied that logic to “conflict” allegations grounded in relatives’ professional
engagements—holding that, absent a real link to the case, such claims are speculative and institutionally corrosive.
This provided the structured taxonomy: (i) automatic disqualification for financial interest; (ii) otherwise, apply “real danger” or
“reasonable apprehension” tests; (iii) additional automatic category (Pinochet-type) for interest in a cause promoted by a party.
The Delhi High Court implicitly located the case in the “non-financial interest” domain and found no objective material meeting the test.
Supported the Court’s insistence that apprehension cannot be “imagination or mere suspicion”, and that the “justice must be seen” principle cannot be
invoked in a vacuum. This case was used to answer the applicants’ attempt to elevate subjective unease into a ground of recusal.
(k) Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India and Anr.: W.P.(C) No.699/2016 and Court on its Own Motion v. Union of India & Ors.: W.P.(CRL) 1542/2020
These authorities were invoked not on recusal doctrine per se, but to defeat the “undue haste” narrative:
MP/MLA matters are to be treated on priority and heard expeditiously. The Court treated its scheduling decisions as compliance with binding
institutional directions rather than any indicator of partiality.
(l) Sajid v. State of Uttar Pradesh: SLP(Crl) No. 7203/2023; Rajpal v. State of Rajasthan: SLP (Crl.) No. 15585/2023; Shekhar Prasad Mahto @ Shekhar Kushwaha v. The Registrar General, Jharkhand High Court & Anr.: WP (Crl.) No. 55/2025; M/s Netsity Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr.: 2025 INSC 1181
Cited to demonstrate an important counter-intuition: in some contexts, listing connected matters before the same judge is preferred to avoid conflicting
orders—undercutting the premise that prior exposure itself is disqualifying.
3.2 Legal Reasoning (How the Court Reached Its Result)
(i) The controlling standard: objective reasonableness
The judgment repeatedly distinguishes between subjective apprehension and reasonable apprehension.
The Court treated the latter as an objective test: whether a fair-minded, informed observer on correct facts would apprehend bias—not whether a party
asserts anxiety, suspicion, or political discomfort.
(ii) Interim orders and prima facie observations: adjudicative necessity, not predisposition
Much of the recusal attack was built around the order dated 09.03.2026: prima facie observations, stay of remarks against an investigating officer,
and directions affecting connected proceedings. The Court’s reasoning is that:
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Courts routinely record prima facie reasons while issuing notice or granting interim protection; eliminating that ability would disable ordinary
interim jurisdiction.
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Prima facie observations are expressly tentative; equating them with conclusive findings would collapse the distinction between interim and final
adjudication.
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The proper remedy for disagreement with an interim order is appellate challenge (indeed SLPs were filed), not recusal.
(iii) Prior detailed judgments in connected proceedings: statutory stage-specific scrutiny
On “subject-matter bias”, the Court emphasized that earlier proceedings (challenge to arrest under Section 19 PMLA; bail under Section 45 PMLA)
require judicial engagement with the material at that stage. The applicants’ complaint—“detailed findings” were unnecessary—was rejected
as incompatible with statutory schemes that compel prima facie evaluation and reasoned decision-making.
(iv) “Undue haste” vs institutional priority (MP/MLA jurisprudence)
The Court held that expedited timelines were consistent with Supreme Court and High Court monitoring directions in MP/MLA cases.
Comparisons with non-MP/MLA matters were treated as inapt and selective.
(v) Ideology and public discourse: attendance at Bar events is not evidence of bias
The Court rejected the argument that participation in events of Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad could found a reasonable apprehension,
especially where the applicant conceded no political statements were made. The judgment treats professional engagement with the Bar as a legitimate
judicial function, and warns against allowing litigants to weaponize such attendance to intimidate courts.
(vi) “Conflict of interest” based on relatives’ professional engagements: nexus and materiality
The Court required a concrete nexus between the alleged interest and the lis. It rejected social media-driven insinuations and engaged factually with
the “RTI/dockets” claim, noting the distinction between “dockets issued” and “cases allotted”. In doctrinal terms, it applied the
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India: (2016) 5 SCC 808 framework to conclude there was no disqualifying interest.
(vii) Institutional integrity and “recusal as strategy”
A defining feature of the judgment is its candid articulation of systemic risk: recusal demands can be deployed to create a “win-win” for powerful
litigants (the “catch-22”), incentivising forum shopping and degrading public confidence. The Court treats this as a reason to insist that recusal be
granted only on legally sustainable grounds—not to satisfy narrative pressure.
3.3 Impact
(i) Tightening the gate against “manufactured bias” in criminal-political litigation
The judgment is likely to be cited for the proposition that recusal cannot be built out of interim prima facie orders, scheduling discipline,
generalized allegations of ideological proximity, or remote professional associations. It strengthens the judiciary’s ability to resist
recusal-as-tactic in high-stakes prosecutions involving public officials.
(ii) Practical guidance on what will not qualify as “reasonable apprehension”
The decision supplies a fact-pattern catalogue—advance service on counsel, interim protection against remarks on an investigating officer,
participation in professional events, social media narratives about family members’ work—that future benches may use to quickly separate genuine
disqualifying conflicts from speculative claims.
(iii) Reinforcing MP/MLA prioritisation against “undue haste” arguments
By expressly tying accelerated timelines to Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India and Anr.: W.P.(C) No.699/2016 and
Court on its Own Motion v. Union of India & Ors.: W.P.(CRL) 1542/2020, the Court shields priority scheduling from being reframed as bias.
(iv) Normative signal on judicial independence
The judgment’s broader institutional message—courts cannot allow litigants to choose judges by insinuation—may influence how recusal motions are argued,
how they are judicially managed, and how appellate courts evaluate recusal refusals in politically charged contexts.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Recusal: A judge stepping aside from hearing a case due to a legally relevant concern (e.g., real conflict of interest) that could
compromise impartiality or its appearance.
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Reasonable apprehension of bias: Not “I feel the judge is against me”, but whether an objective, fair-minded observer—knowing the true
facts—would reasonably fear lack of impartiality.
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Prima facie observations: Initial, tentative views expressed for interim purposes; they are not final findings and can change after full
hearing.
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Subject-matter bias: The claim that prior exposure to the same dispute makes a judge predisposed; the judgment treats this as generally
untenable where prior orders were stage-specific and legally required.
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Conflict of interest: A disqualifying conflict typically needs a direct, substantial interest (often financial) or a real nexus to the
case—not remote associations or speculative influence.
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MP/MLA priority listing: A special institutional emphasis on expeditious disposal of criminal cases involving elected representatives,
stemming from Supreme Court monitoring directions.
5. Conclusion
The Delhi High Court’s refusal to recuse in CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. KULDEEP SINGH & ORS. crystallises a robust rule:
recusal is an exceptional remedy governed by objective reasonableness, not a litigant’s narrative, unease, or tactical preference.
By synthesising Supreme Court doctrine (including Neelam Manmohan Attavar v. Manmohan Attavar: (2021) 3 SCC 727,
Indore Development Authority (Recusal Matter-5) v. Manohar Lal: (2020) 6 SCC 304,
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India: (2016) 5 SCC 808, and
Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India: (2012) 6 SCC 369)
with Delhi High Court exemplars (notably AIIMS v. Prof. Kaushal K. Verma: 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9226 and
Virbhadra Singh & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors.: 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7747),
the judgment positions itself as a significant precedent against forum shopping—especially in politically sensitive criminal adjudication.