Non-recording of Section 164(5A) CrPC and short delay in Section 354 IPC complaints do not, by themselves, justify quashing; CCTV defence must meet “sterling material/impossibility” thresholds

Case: NANDAKUMAR SUKUMAR PANICKER v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
Court: Bombay High Court (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Date: 10-06-2026
Coram: Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale, J.
Proceeding: Criminal Writ Petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of FIR No.139/2019 (Samata Nagar Police Station) and C.C. No.175/PW/2020 (Section 354 IPC)

1. Introduction

The petitioner (accused) sought quashing of an FIR alleging sexual assault/“outraging modesty” under Section 354 IPC, arising out of an incident allegedly committed in his flat where the complainant (Respondent No.2), engaged as a domestic cook, claimed she was caught from behind and her private parts were touched after her saree was pulled.

The central issues before the High Court were not the truth of the allegation (a matter for trial), but whether the prosecution should be terminated at the threshold on grounds that:

  • there was a 21-day delay in lodging the FIR;
  • CCTV timings/demeanour allegedly made the incident improbable;
  • the investigation was allegedly defective, notably non-recording of the complainant’s statement under Section 164(5A) CrPC;
  • the petitioner’s version suggested a monetary dispute/blackmail after termination of employment.
Core holding (emerging rule): For allegations under Section 354 IPC, (i) short or moderately short delay in filing the FIR—especially in offences against women—cannot, by itself, justify quashing unless mala fides are prima facie writ large; (ii) non-recording of a Section 164(5A) CrPC statement does not vitiate the prosecution and is not, by itself, a ground to quash; (iii) defence material like CCTV footage may be considered at the quashing stage only where it is of “sterling and impeccable quality” and demonstrates total impossibility of the incident, satisfying the Supreme Court’s structured test.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition and declined to quash the FIR and resultant proceedings. It held that:

  • On a plain reading, the FIR prima facie disclosed an offence under Section 354 IPC.
  • The petitioner’s submissions about delay, CCTV footage, alleged extortion calls, prior advocate letter to police, and alleged payment at the police station were defences to be tested at trial, not grounds for quashing.
  • Delay must be assessed in the context of the nature of the offence; in sexual/offences against women, stigma and hesitation can explain delay, and absence of explanation for a short delay is not enough to terminate prosecution.
  • Section 164(5A) CrPC is protective and “in aid of investigation”; its non-compliance does not automatically benefit the accused nor nullify the prosecution.
  • CCTV footage can justify quashing only if it negates the occurrence and fits within State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 355 categories and meets the four-step test in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the result)

(A) Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (Criminal Appeal No.3831 of 2025)

The judgment extracted the Supreme Court’s structured approach for quashing when an accused relies on defence material (often documents, electronic records, admitted circumstances). The four-step framework requires that:

  • the material be sound, reasonable, indubitable (“sterling and impeccable quality”);
  • it must rule out the prosecution’s factual assertions;
  • it must be unrefuted or not justifiably refutable by the prosecution/complainant;
  • continuation of trial would be an abuse of process and not serve justice.

The High Court used this to confine the role of CCTV footage and similar defence pleas: unless the footage demonstrates near-conclusive impossibility (not mere improbability), it cannot become a vehicle for pre-trial adjudication.

(B) Akhil Anil Chitre Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (Criminal Writ Petition No.05/2021)

This Bombay High Court decision was relied on to reiterate the boundary against “mini trials” in quashing jurisdiction and that accused defences should ordinarily be tested at trial where evidence is led and cross-examination occurs. The High Court in the present case applied that same approach: once the FIR discloses a prima facie offence, disputed factual narratives should not be resolved in writ/quashing proceedings.

(C) Central Bureau of Investigation V/s. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399

Cited (both via Akhil Anil Chitre and independently) for the principle that a High Court, while exercising quashing powers, cannot conduct a mini trial or undertake detailed appreciation of evidence. The present judgment used this to reject invitations to evaluate CCTV demeanour, inferential timelines, and alleged telephonic threats as if deciding merits.

(D) Manik B. V/s. Kadapala Sreyes Reddy & Anr., (2023) Live Law SC 642 / (2023) SCC OnLine 2540

Cited for the narrow scope of quashing: the court interferes only where, taking the case at face value, no offence is made out; the court should not examine “correctness” of the prosecution’s material as if in appeal after trial. This underpinned the High Court’s refusal to weigh the petitioner’s version against the FIR.

(E) Hemendra Pranjivan Bosmiya V/s. The State of Maharashtra & Anr (Criminal Application No.277 of 2023)

Cited as reinforcing the same discipline (no mini trial; limited interference) and noting that where investigation is complete and charge-sheet is filed/ready, courts typically allow the trial court to examine the collected material. This supported the refusal to short-circuit the prosecution.

(F) Maksood Ahmad v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr., 2024 SCC Online Del 418

This Delhi High Court decision was cited to explain the importance and sensitivity behind recording statements under Section 164(5A) CrPC in sexual offence investigations, emphasizing voluntariness, safeguards for disabled victims, and the evidentiary/structural value of the statement.

The Bombay High Court acknowledged these objectives but distinguished importance from fatality: the provision is desirable and protective, yet the statute does not specify that non-recording automatically vitiates prosecution—hence it cannot, by itself, be treated as a quashing ground.

(G) Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya And Others v. State Of Gujarat And Another, (2019) 17 SCC 1

Cited for Article 21’s overarching requirement that criminal procedure be “right, just and fair,” and that fair investigation is foundational to fair trial. The petitioner invoked this line to argue investigation unfairness. The High Court accepted the principle but found that the alleged lapses (non-recording of 164(5A) statement; non-recording of certain defence witnesses) did not, on the facts, render the investigation so unfair as to warrant quashing.

(H) Pooja Pal v. Union of India and others, (2016) 3 SCC 135

Cited to reinforce that fair trial includes fair investigation, and courts may direct further investigation/reinvestigation where investigation is ineffective or unfair. In the present case, the High Court held that the omissions complained of were not of a character that undermined the prosecution’s very foundation or made continuation an abuse of process; rather, they were matters to be tested at trial.

(I) Kishan Singh V.s Gurpal Singh and others, (2010) 8 SCC 775

Cited by the petitioner to contend that delay in lodging FIR must be plausibly explained and that unexplained delay can be fatal. The High Court did not reject the principle in the abstract, but contextualised it: in offences against women, delay often has social and psychological explanations; therefore, delay is not a straight-jacket ground for quashing unless it is “exceptionally long” or demonstrably mala fide.

(J) Madhavrao Jivajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, 1988 (1) SCC 692

Relied upon by the petitioner for the proposition that proceedings can be quashed where allegations do not make out an offence or where prosecution is vexatious and chances of conviction are bleak. The High Court effectively held that, since the FIR did disclose Section 354 IPC prima facie and the petitioner’s pleas were defences requiring evidence, the threshold for invoking this principle was not met.

(K) State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 355

While not reproducing the categories, the High Court invoked Bhajanlal to set the high bar for quashing based on defence material: only where the case falls within recognised exceptional categories (e.g., allegations inherently improbable; legal bar; mala fide prosecution; etc.) should the FIR be quashed. CCTV footage, the Court held, would justify quashing only if it shows total impossibility or negates “every possibility” of the occurrence.

(L) Joseph Paul de Sousa Vs. State at the instance of Crime Branch and Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2719 : (2024) 3 AIR Bom R (Crl) 889; M. M. Harries v. State of Kerala; Ramkripal s/o Shyamlal Charmakar V. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 11 SCC 265; State Of Punjab v. Major Singh . (AIR 1967 SC 63); Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka and another, (2025) 3 SCC 612; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill

These authorities were set out to explain the content of “modesty” and the test for outraging modesty (shock to sense of decency; sex-related nature of act; intention as crux). Although the present allegation involved physical touching (classically within Section 354), the citation set provides doctrinal backing: “modesty” is not rigidly defined, and the court assesses whether the act is capable of outraging/insulting a woman’s modesty judged by contemporary societal standards.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Prima facie test: FIR allegations satisfy Section 354 IPC

The Court focused on the FIR’s narrative: holding from behind, pulling saree, touching/pressing breast/private parts. Without weighing competing versions, that account—if taken at face value—constituted “criminal force” with intent/knowledge likely to outrage modesty, satisfying the Section 354 IPC ingredients at the threshold.

(ii) Delay: contextual approach for offences against women

The Court’s reasoning is notable for expressly rejecting a mechanical approach. It held:

  • delay must be evaluated with the nature of offence (sexual/offences against women), social stigma, victim’s circumstances, and surrounding facts;
  • an unexplained delay of “a few days” (here, 21 days) cannot alone justify quashing;
  • only exceptionally long and unexplained delay, or delay coupled with prima facie mala fides/vendetta, might justify terminating prosecution at the threshold.

(iii) Section 164(5A) CrPC: “protective shield”, not a quashing lever

The Court characterised Section 164(5A) as:

  • protective (ensuring voluntariness, safety, fear-free narration);
  • investigation-aiding (clarifying facts, guiding direction of investigation);
  • desirable and important, but not a statutory condition whose breach automatically nullifies prosecution.

Crucially, the Court held that the CrPC provision does not state the effect of non-recording; therefore, non-recording (or even refusal by the victim) cannot, “in all cases,” be fatal or automatically confer advantage to the accused. At most, it may—depending on facts—support an argument of mala fides, but it is not a standalone quashing ground where the FIR otherwise makes out an offence.

(iv) CCTV and defence material: “impossibility” + “sterling quality” gatekeeping

The Court treated CCTV arguments as classic “defence” contentions and held that such material can support quashing only when:

  • it is from an independent/credible source and shows total impossibility of the alleged occurrence (not mere timing discrepancy);
  • it brings the case within relevant Bhajanlal categories;
  • it satisfies the four-step framework of Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

A “slight/minor difference” between FIR timing and CCTV timing was held insufficient to infer that no incident occurred—particularly where the alleged act could occur quickly and CCTV does not capture inside the kitchen/flat.

(v) Alleged investigative omissions (non-recording of petitioner’s friends’ statements)

The Court held such omissions are not fatal at the threshold: the accused can examine defence witnesses at trial and cross-examine prosecution witnesses on delay, omissions, motive, and credibility.

3.3 Impact

  • Strengthening threshold discipline in sexual-offence quashing petitions: The judgment reinforces that courts will not short-circuit Section 354 IPC prosecutions based on disputed factual defences (employment dispute, extortion narrative, CCTV demeanour) unless the defence material is near-conclusive and unimpeachable.
  • Clarifying Section 164(5A) CrPC non-compliance: While recognising the provision’s protective rationale, the Court’s explicit holding that non-recording does not vitiate the prosecution will likely be cited to resist quashing attempts grounded solely on investigative omission—shifting the debate to prejudice, fairness, and trial-stage appreciation rather than automatic invalidation.
  • Contextual approach to delay in women-centric offences: The judgment’s statement that delay is not a straight-jacket formula—particularly in offences against women, POCSO contexts, and even Section 498-A IPC—may influence future benches to require stronger indicators of mala fides before treating delay as a quashing trigger.
  • Electronic evidence at the threshold: The decision tightens the “CCTV as silver bullet” narrative: unless footage negates the occurrence altogether and meets the Supreme Court’s structured test, it remains a trial issue.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 What does “quashing” mean?

“Quashing” is the High Court’s power to terminate criminal proceedings at the outset (FIR/charge-sheet/trial) to prevent abuse of process or secure justice. It is exceptional: courts generally assume the FIR’s allegations to be true for this limited purpose and ask only whether an offence is disclosed.

4.2 Why is Section 354 IPC called “outraging modesty” and how is it judged?

“Modesty” is not defined in the IPC. Courts have explained it through common notions and contemporary standards: the test is whether the act is sexual in nature and capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. Physical touching, grabbing, pulling clothing, and pressing private parts are paradigmatic Section 354 allegations.

4.3 What is a Section 164(5A) CrPC statement?

It is a statement of the victim recorded by a Judicial Magistrate “as soon as” the offence is brought to the notice of the police for specified sexual offences (including Section 354 IPC). Its purpose is to ensure a voluntary, safe, accurate account early in the process. It is a protective procedure and can help the trial process, but (as held here) non-recording does not automatically invalidate the case.

4.4 Why doesn’t CCTV automatically lead to quashing?

CCTV can show timings or movement but may not capture the place of occurrence (e.g., inside the flat). At the quashing stage, courts will not draw fine-grained inferences about probability unless the footage conclusively shows that the incident could not have happened—i.e., impossibility—meeting strict standards for unimpeachable defence material.

5. Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s decision in NANDAKUMAR SUKUMAR PANICKER v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. consolidates a practical threshold rule for Section 354 IPC prosecutions: short/moderate delay in reporting and non-recording of Section 164(5A) CrPC do not, by themselves, justify quashing where the FIR discloses a prima facie offence. The judgment also provides a disciplined framework for dealing with defence reliance on CCTV/electronic material at the pre-trial stage, aligning with Supreme Court guidance against “mini trials.”

The broader significance lies in balancing Article 21 fairness (including fair investigation) with the institutional caution that credibility contests, motive disputes, and evidentiary assessments in sexual-offence allegations are ordinarily matters for trial—unless the case falls within the narrow, exceptional quashing categories.