No Protective Interim Orders Before Leave Under Section 92 CPC; Urgency May Justify Ex Parte Leave
Case: S. PANCHALINGU v. PEOPLES EDUCATION TRUST (R)
Citation: 2026 INSC 1010
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 18 September 2026
Bench: Manoj Misra and Manmohan, JJ.
Introduction
The Supreme Court resolved a conflict among High Courts concerning the powers of a civil court during the period between the filing of an application for leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) and the grant of such leave.
Section 92 governs representative suits concerning breaches of public charitable or religious trusts and the need for judicial directions in their administration. Two or more interested persons may bring such a suit only after obtaining the court’s leave.
In the present case, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, had constituted an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees to manage the day-to-day affairs of the People’s Education Trust while the leave application remained pending. The order was passed under Order XL Rule 1(a), which concerns the appointment of receivers. The Karnataka High Court set aside that order on the ground that, until leave was granted, the proposed Section 92 suit remained “stillborn” and no interlocutory jurisdiction existed.
The central question before the Supreme Court was whether a civil court could pass protective or preservatory interim orders—including the appointment of a receiver—before deciding the application for leave.
Rule Laid Down
A civil court presented with a plaint under Section 92 CPC and an application for leave cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders while the leave application is pending. Leave is a mandatory condition precedent to the institution of the suit.
Nevertheless, where compelling urgency exists, the court may dispense with prior notice to the proposed defendants, record cogent reasons, grant leave ex parte, and thereafter exercise its interlocutory powers. The defendants remain entitled to seek revocation of the leave.
Summary of the Judgment
- A Section 92 suit is instituted only after leave has been granted; presentation of the plaint with a leave application does not by itself create a pending suit.
- The leave proceeding is a threshold or “gateway” inquiry, not a substantive proceeding in which interlocutory relief can be granted.
- Section 94 and Order XL Rule 1 cannot be used before leave because supplemental proceedings presuppose an existing underlying proceeding.
- Section 141 merely applies procedural rules to miscellaneous proceedings and cannot override substantive safeguards created by Section 92.
- Section 151 cannot be invoked to defeat the express and special statutory requirement of prior leave.
- The appointment of a receiver over a public trust is intrusive rather than merely preservatory because it may displace the trust’s existing management.
- Urgency must be addressed through expeditious or ex parte grant of leave, not by granting interim protection before jurisdiction has arisen.
- The appeals were dismissed, and the Karnataka High Court’s decision setting aside the trial court’s order was sustained.
Analysis
1. Section 92 as Both a “Protective Shield” and a “Remedial Sword”
The Court described Section 92 as a special provision governing representative litigation concerning public religious or charitable trusts. Such litigation is not brought to enforce merely private rights; it is pursued on behalf of public beneficiaries and in the public interest.
Section 92 performs two competing functions:
- Remedial sword: It permits interested persons to act against breach, mismanagement, or the need for directions without joining every beneficiary.
- Protective shield: It protects public trusts and trustees from vexatious proceedings, harassment, and diversion of charitable funds towards litigation.
The leave requirement is the mechanism by which these objectives are balanced. Allowing intrusive interim orders before the leave scrutiny would undermine the protective purpose of the provision.
2. Leave Is a Condition Precedent to Institution
Sections 26 and 92, read with Order IV CPC, led the Court to distinguish an ordinary civil suit from a Section 92 suit. Ordinarily, a suit begins with presentation of the plaint. Section 92, however, uses the expression “having obtained the leave of the Court,” while Section 92(2) prohibits institution except in conformity with that requirement.
The 1976 amendment replaced the Advocate-General’s consent with judicial leave. It did not dilute the threshold; it transferred scrutiny from the executive to the judiciary. Therefore, until leave is granted, there is no validly instituted suit or lis in which an interlocutory application may operate.
Rule 16-A of the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice, which requires the leave application to be registered as a miscellaneous petition, did not alter this conclusion. A procedural registration rule cannot convert the threshold inquiry into a substantive suit or enlarge the court’s jurisdiction.
3. Section 94 and Order XL Require an Underlying Proceeding
The appellants relied on Section 94 and Order XL Rule 1, particularly the absence of the words “in any suit” and the phrase “before or after decree.” The Court rejected this textual argument.
Section 94 deals with supplemental proceedings. Something can be “supplemental” only if there is an underlying proceeding to supplement. Before Section 92 leave is granted, the proposed suit has not legally matured into such a proceeding.
The expression “before or after decree” in Order XL also presupposes a validly instituted suit because a decree cannot exist without one. The omission of the phrase “in a suit” could not, by itself, create jurisdiction contrary to Section 92’s express gateway requirement.
4. Section 141 Does Not Create Substantive Jurisdiction
Section 141 extends the CPC’s procedural framework to miscellaneous proceedings “as far as it can be made applicable.” It does not confer substantive powers that the special statutory scheme withholds.
The appointment of a receiver affects substantive interests because it transfers control and management of property to an officer of the court. Consequently, Section 141 could not be used to bypass the substantive protection conferred upon public trusts by Section 92.
5. Section 151 Cannot Override the Special Provision
The Court accepted that Section 151 preserves inherent judicial powers, but stressed that such powers operate only where jurisdiction already exists and cannot conflict with an express statutory provision.
Applying generalia specialibus non derogant—general provisions do not derogate from special provisions—the special threshold in Section 92 prevailed over the general inherent power in Section 151. Inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to create a suit, circumvent leave, or grant relief in a proceeding which the court is not yet competent to entertain.
6. A Receiver Is Not Merely Preservatory
Although a receiver is commonly described as the “hand of the Court,” the Court held that the label “protective” or “preservatory” does not answer the jurisdictional question. A receiver over a public trust may displace its management and interfere with its administration.
If a receiver were appointed and leave later refused, the trust would already have suffered an intrusion despite the suit never having been validly instituted. That result would defeat the very safeguard Section 92 was designed to provide.
7. Urgency Is Addressed Through Ex Parte Leave
The Court avoided leaving trust property unprotected in genuine emergencies. Ordinarily, proposed defendants should receive notice before leave is granted. But notice is not an absolute condition.
Where compelling urgency is shown, the court may:
- dispense with prior notice;
- record cogent prima facie reasons in writing;
- grant Section 92 leave ex parte; and
- after the suit is thereby instituted, consider appropriate interim relief.
The proposed defendants may subsequently seek revocation of leave. This mechanism preserves both the trust’s protection against vexatious litigation and the court’s ability to respond quickly to threats to trust property.
Precedents Cited and Their Treatment
A. Supreme Court Authorities
This decision supplied the three cumulative requirements for a Section 92 action: a public charitable or religious trust, breach or necessity for directions, and a claim for one or more statutory reliefs. It also supported treating leave as a threshold proceeding rather than an adjudication of substantive rights.
Cited for the essential prerequisites governing maintainability under Section 92. It reinforced the special and conditional character of the jurisdiction.
Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R and Ors., (2008) 4 SCC 115
This authority explained that Section 92 protects public trusts from harassment, multiplicity of litigation, wastage of charitable funds, and the discouragement of honest persons from acting as trustees. It strongly informed the Court’s “protective shield” analysis.
R.M. Naryana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, (1991) 1 SCC 48
The Court relied on this case for two propositions: a suit without Section 92 leave is not maintainable, and notice before granting leave is ordinarily desirable but not invariably mandatory. Leave granted without notice does not automatically invalidate the suit because defendants may apply for its revocation.
This case established that Section 94 is the source of specified interim powers, to be exercised where the relevant procedural rules are satisfied. Section 151 is residual and cannot be employed in conflict with express provisions. The Court used it to reject pre-leave resort to either Section 94 or Section 151.
The appellants invoked this Constitution Bench judgment to argue that the CPC is not exhaustive and that temporary injunctions may be issued under inherent powers even outside Order XXXIX. The Court distinguished the principle: inherent powers may fill procedural gaps, but cannot override the express leave requirement in the special Section 92 regime.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 689
This decision embodies the presumption against exclusion of civil-court jurisdiction. The Court held that the principle did not assist the appellants because the issue was not general exclusion of civil jurisdiction but compliance with an express statutory condition precedent to its exercise.
Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. United Industrial Bank & Ors. (1983) 4 SCC 625
Cited for the principle that interim relief must be in aid of final relief in a suit. Before leave, no competent suit existed whose final relief could be supported by an interim order.
Taylor Vs. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch.D.426, Nazir Vs. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 and Babu Verghese Vs. Bar Council of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 422
These authorities support the rule that where the law prescribes that an act be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all. Thus, Section 92 jurisdiction had to be activated through prior leave, not through an alternative route under Sections 94, 141, or 151.
B. High Court Authorities
Authorities recognising pre-leave protective powers
Muhammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan & Ors., Sri Vir Digambar Jain Dharmashala and Sri Mahavir Jain Dharmarth Aushadhalai (Trust) & Anr. v. Pramod Kumar Jain, Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani, Sulaiman v. Chunakara S.M. Jama Ath, N. Anandan v. Ayyanna Gounder & Ors., and R. Shanmugam & Ors. v. M. Ganesa Mudaliar & Ors. had recognised varying forms of protective jurisdiction before leave.
The Supreme Court rejected this position insofar as it permits interlocutory orders before the Section 92 gateway has been crossed.
Muhammad Ali Khan v. Ahmed Ali Khan
Though relied upon for the proposition that courts have an inherent duty to prevent waste of trust property, the Supreme Court held that it concerned a private trust—specifically a waqf alal-aulad—to which Section 92 did not apply. It therefore could not establish pre-leave jurisdiction in public-trust litigation.
Kintali China Jaganadham & Ors. v. K. Laxmi Naidu & Ors. and Shree Beereshwara Swamy Devaru Temple v. G.N. Sathya
These Orissa and Karnataka decisions denied pre-leave interlocutory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s ruling substantially affirms this approach.
Gopal Dei & Anr. v. Kanno Dei & Ors., (1903) ILR 26 All 162
This authority supported the interpretation that consent or leave expressed as a condition precedent must be obtained before institution and cannot be treated merely as a restriction on further progress of an already instituted suit.
The Supreme Court expressly agreed with this Full Bench decision that Section 141 applies to procedural matters and does not extend substantive rights or jurisdiction.
Bachacha v. Lakhpati Devi, AIR 1972 All 513
This case helped distinguish proceedings involving minors. The CPC does not declare a suit without a next friend or guardian wholly incompetent in the same manner that Section 92 prohibits institution without leave. Analogies with Order XXXII were therefore rejected.
The appellants cited this case for the stringent standards governing receivership, such as a strong prima facie case, imminent danger, and the requirement that appointment be just and convenient. The Supreme Court held that these merits-based standards arise only after jurisdiction exists; they cannot create pre-leave jurisdiction.
Other receivership authorities
Chandrawati v. Jagannath Singh, Godobai v. Janabai, C. Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. Y. Subramaniam Chettiar, and T.A. Balkrishna Odayar v. Chakravarthy v. Jagannada Chariar were referred to through the discussion in Muhammad Ali Khan v. Ahmed Ali Khan. They showed that receivers may be appointed in certain non-suit proceedings or in validly instituted Section 92 suits. They did not establish that a receiver could be appointed before the mandatory Section 92 leave had been granted.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 92 suit
- A representative action concerning the management or breach of a public charitable or religious trust.
- Leave of the court
- Judicial permission that must be obtained before a Section 92 suit legally comes into existence.
- Threshold or gateway proceeding
- A preliminary examination of whether the proposed litigation should be allowed to proceed; it is not the suit itself.
- Receiver
- A neutral person appointed as an officer or “hand” of the court to take custody, preserve, or manage property during litigation.
- Supplemental proceeding
- A proceeding that supports an already existing principal action. It cannot exist independently where the principal suit has not yet been instituted.
- Lis
- A legally cognisable dispute pending before a court.
- In custodia legis
- Property placed in the custody and control of the law through the court.
- Generalia specialibus non derogant
- A special statutory rule prevails over a general one. Here, Section 92 prevailed over the general inherent power under Section 151.
- Ex parte leave
- Leave granted without first hearing the proposed defendants. It may be granted for compelling urgency but can later be challenged through an application for revocation.
Impact of the Judgment
- Resolution of conflict: The judgment settles the divergence among High Courts by denying pre-leave interlocutory jurisdiction in Section 92 matters.
- Strict procedural sequence: Courts must first grant leave; only thereafter may they appoint a receiver, issue an injunction, or make another interim order.
- Protection of public trusts: Trust management cannot be displaced on an untested application before the statutory screening process is completed.
- Emergency flexibility: Courts may grant leave ex parte in compelling cases, preventing the threshold requirement from becoming an obstacle to urgent protection.
- Limits on inherent powers: Sections 141 and 151 cannot be used to manufacture jurisdiction or neutralise an express condition precedent.
- State procedural rules: Rules requiring leave applications to be registered separately cannot alter the substantive point at which a Section 92 suit is instituted.
Conclusion
S. PANCHALINGU v. PEOPLES EDUCATION TRUST (R) establishes that leave under Section 92 CPC is jurisdictional, mandatory, and prior to institution. Until leave is granted, there is no suit, no underlying lis, and no power to issue protective or preservatory interim orders.
The Court nevertheless preserved an effective emergency remedy: compelling urgency may justify ex parte leave, supported by recorded reasons, after which interim relief becomes available. The ruling therefore reinforces statutory discipline while maintaining the balance between protecting public trusts from vexatious litigation and safeguarding charitable property from genuine danger.