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  • Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC, provisions of Order 40 Rule 1
  • Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC. is:1.
  • provisions of Order 40 Rule 1
  • Order 40 Rule 1 of the CPC.
  • Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC.
  • Order 40 Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • Order 26 Rule 1,
  • Order 40 Rule 1
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC, provisions of Order 40 Rule 1
  • Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC. is:1.
  • provisions of Order 40 Rule 1
  • Order 40 Rule 1 of the CPC.
  • Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC.
  • Order 40 Rule 1 C.P.C,
  • Order 26 Rule 1,
  • Order 40 Rule 1
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Original Petition (O.P. No. 98 of 1979) sought leave under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to institute a suit against the first counter-petitioner, a public religious Trust, and against its office-bearers (counter-petitioners 2–6). It was alleged that the Trust was being mismanaged by the office-bearers (except counter-petitioner No. 6).

Notice was ordered on 27-7-1979; respondents appeared and the matter was repeatedly adjourned for filing objections and for evidence. Objections were ultimately filed on 10-10-1979. After prolonged delay and attempts to obtain evidence (which were not pursued by either side), the court recorded on 5-2-1982 that there was no evidence for either party.

In the interim an interlocutory application for appointment of a receiver (under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC) had been filed and heard (heard on 20-2-1982). By order dated 26-2-1982 that receiving application was dismissed by the court below on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application before leave under Section 92 was granted. A Revision Petition/appeal was filed against that order, and the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal challenges the correctness of the court below's refusal to entertain the receiving application prior to the grant of leave under S.92. No final order had been passed on the main petition (leave under S.92) at the time of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a court has power under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC to appoint a receiver in proceedings under Section 92 CPC before the court grants leave to institute a suit (i.e., at a stage when the Section 92 petition has not yet ripened into a regular suit).
  2. Whether the observation in Achuthan Pillai v. Mohanan Unnithan (1979 KLT SN 53) — that "No interlocutory order can be passed until a suit is instituted and S.92 requires leave to be obtained for institution of a suit" — establishes an absolute rule barring all interlocutory orders (including appointment of a receiver) before leave is granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents' counsel submitted that allowing a court to entertain and grant a receiving order before deciding the leave question under Section 92 could produce anomalous and undesirable results.
  • They emphasized the policy of insulating a public Trust from harassment by unnecessary proceedings, which is safeguarded by requiring leave under Section 92 before a suit is instituted; this policy, they argued, would be undermined if a receiving order could be made before leave is granted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Achuthan Pillai v. Mohanan Unnithan, 1979 KLT S.N. 53 Contains the observation that "No interlocutory order can be passed until a suit is instituted and S.92 requires leave to be obtained for institution of a suit." The court examined the context of that observation and held it was intended in relation to the issue of commissions (Order 26 Rule 1) where the statute itself speaks of a "suit." The present court distinguished Achuthan Pillai as not laying down an absolute rule preventing all interlocutory orders (specifically not intended to govern receiving orders under Order 40 Rule 1).
Mathew v. Thomas, 1982 KLT 493 The Division Bench accepted the view in Achuthan Pillai in the context of commissions and also discussed procedure for grant of leave under Section 92. The present court noted the Division Bench's acceptance was understandable in that factual context; it interpreted Mathew v. Thomas as not intending to hold that no interlocutory order of any kind could be passed before leave under S.92 is granted.
Ram Khelawan v. Smt. Sudama Devi, AIR 1964 Allahabad 366 Explained legislative change: former S.503 CPC limited receivers to "subject of a suit or attachment"; amendment (Order 40 Rule 1) deleted that phrase, removing the restraint and widening court's power to appoint receivers even when there is no suit. The court relied on this legislative-history analysis to conclude that Order 40 Rule 1 does not require the property to be "the subject of a suit" and therefore permits appointment of a receiver in proceedings other than a registered suit (supporting entertainability of receiving applications pending S.92 proceedings).
Mohammed Ali v. Ahmad Ali, AIR 1945 Allahabad 261 Held that a court has jurisdiction to protect property pending ascertainment of rights in any form of dispute involving a trust or administration of assets; receiver may be appointed in proceedings other than suits. The present court cited the case to support the proposition that appointment of a receiver is maintainable in proceedings other than suits and that the court has a duty to safeguard property even when formal suit proceedings have not yet been instituted.
Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani, AIR 1948 Bombay 139 Addressed whether a court could appoint a receiver in proceedings in forma pauperis; supported the view that receiver could be appointed in non-suit proceedings. The court cited this decision as another authority supporting the proposition that receivership applications may be entertained outside of formally instituted suits.
AIR 1925 Lahore 489 and AIR 1929 Nagpur 119 (Guardianship proceedings) Examples where a receiver was appointed during the course of guardianship proceedings — indicating receivers can be appointed in proceedings that are not suits. These cases were cited as analogous authorities showing that Order 40 Rule 1 has been applied in non-suit contexts (guardianship proceedings), bolstering the court's conclusion that a receiving order can be made while S.92 proceedings are pending.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and contextual analysis comparing the statutory provisions that govern commissions (Order 26 Rule 1) and receivers (Order 40 Rule 1). It proceeded in the following steps:

  1. Identified that Order 26 Rule 1 expressly refers to "a suit" and therefore applications for commissions are statutorily tied to the existence of a suit; consequently, an application for a commission cannot lawfully be entertained before leave under S.92 ripens into a suit.
  2. Contrasted this with Order 40 Rule 1, which contains no requirement that a suit already exist before a receiver can be appointed; the rule permits appointment "whether before or after decree" and contains no language making the power contingent upon the subject-matter being "the subject of a suit."
  3. Examined legislative history (as set out in Ram Khelawan, AIR 1964 All. 366) showing that the previous restraining phrase "subject of a suit or attachment" (in old S.503) was deliberately deleted in the amended provision (now O.40 R.1), indicating a legislative intention to broaden the court's power to appoint receivers beyond properties that are already the subject-matter of a suit.
  4. Reviewed earlier judicial authorities (Mohammed Ali v. Ahmad Ali; Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani; and guardianship decisions) that held a receiver could be appointed in proceedings other than suits, and that courts have inherent jurisdiction and a duty to protect property pending adjudication of rights in trust or asset-administration disputes.
  5. Distinguished the Achuthan Pillai observation relied upon by the court below, explaining that the decision dealt with the competence to issue commissions (a context where the statute requires a "suit") and that the broad dictum quoted from that case should not be read as an absolute bar to all interlocutory orders in S.92 proceedings. The court held the sentence must be understood in the factual context of that case and not as a universal rule forbidding receiving orders prior to leave.
  6. Addressed policy concerns raised by respondents (possible harassment of trusts, anomalous results) but concluded these do not override the clear statutory language and the supporting authorities that permit the court to exercise its discretion to appoint a receiver when justified even before leave under Section 92 is finally decided.
  7. Concluded that the court below erred in holding that no receiving application could be entertained until a final decision on leave under S.92; accordingly the relevant portion of that order was set aside and the matter remitted to the court below to deal with the receiving application according to law and in light of the Court's observations.

Holding and Implications

The court set aside the portion of the order of the court below which held that an application for the appointment of a receiver could not be entertained before a final decision on the grant of leave under Section 92 CPC.

Implications and immediate consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The lower court's conclusion that interlocutory applications for appointment of a receiver are impermissible until leave under S.92 is granted was held to be erroneous and is set aside to that extent.
  • The receiving application should be dealt with and disposed of by the court below in accordance with law and in light of the observations contained in this opinion (i.e., the court may entertain and decide such applications even while S.92 proceedings are pending, if justified).
  • The court directed that, given the lapse of time since institution of O.P. No. 98 of 1979, the question of leave itself should be decided without further delay.
  • The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was disposed of on these terms, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs (the opinion records: "I direct the parties to bear their costs").

The opinion distinguishes applications for commissions (tied to the existence of a "suit" by Order 26 Rule 1) from receiving applications under Order 40 Rule 1 (which, on the statutory text and supporting authorities, can be entertained prior to the grant of leave under Section 92). The court supported this view through statutory interpretation, legislative history, and precedent; it remitted determination of the receiver application to the court below for a merits-based decision.

    Sulaiman v. Chunakara S.M Jama Ath

    1. A question of general importance arises in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. It relates to the power of a court to appoint a receiver, in proceedings in relation to a Trust under S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, at a stage before leave to institute the suit is granted. The court below declined to consider a Receiving application at such a stage, as it felt that it had no jurisdiction to deal with such a prayer at a stage before permission is granted by the court and before the proceedings assumed the form of a regular suit. In taking that view, the court below felt bound by the observations of this Court in the decision reported in Achuthan Pillai v. Mohanan Unnithan, 1979 KLT. Short Notes 53 (Case No. 116). The correctness of the view taken by the court below is challenged in the appeal.

    2. The skeletal facts necessary for the determination of this legal issue are as follows: The Original Petition, O.P No. 98 of 1979 was filed seeking leave under S. 92 CPC., for instituting a suit against the counter-petitioners, of whom the first is a public Trust of a religious nature. Counter petitioners 2 to 6 are the present office bearers of the Trust. It was alleged that the office bearers, except counter-petitioner No. 6 were not managing the Trust properly and that they were guilty of condemnable conduct in relation to the affairs of the Trust.

    3. Notice on the petition had been ordered on 27-7-1979. Respondents Nos. 1 to 6 appeared through counsel and the case was thereafter posted to 21-8-1979. Requests for time for filing the objections appear to have been granted on various occasions, till ultimately they were filed on 10-10-1979. For over one year, thereafter, the application had been drifting, without any effective action thereon. On 27-4-1980, it was represented that evidence was required and the case was adjourned for that purpose. However, no evidence was attempted by either side Ultimately on 5-2-1982, the court recorded that there was no evidence for both sides.

    4. In the meanwhile the application for the appointment of a receiver was filed. It was heard ultimately on 20-2-1982. By order dated 26-2-1982 that application was dismissed. The Revision Petition was filed against the above order. The records appear to have been transmitted to this Court shortly thereafter. The resultant situation is that no final orders have been passed so far on the main petition.

    5. S. 92 of the CPC under which leave has been sought, for the institution of a suit against the Trust, opens with the following wording:

    “92. Public Charities:—(1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the court, may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court, empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate, to obtain a decree—

    (emphasis supplied)

    6. (The matters on which decree could be obtained are not material for the purpose of this case and are therefore omitted.) It has been held that while deciding the question whether leave should be granted or not, it is not obligatory that the respondent should be notified about the same or heard in the matter. It is optional for the court, however, to hear the respondents also before it decides whether leave should be granted or not.

    7. The interlocutory application which has been filed in the case even before the question relating to the grant of leave remained undecided, is an application for the appointment of a receiver filed under Order 40 Rule 1 of the C.P.C In as much as the wording of the statutory provision under which this interlocutory petition is made is relevant for the decision in the case, it is desirable that the relevant portion is also extracted, with due emphasis indicated therein:

    “Appointment of Receivers:—(1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the court may by order—

    (a) appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after decree;

    (b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property;

    (c) commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver; and

    (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits and the execution of document as the owner himself has or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit.”

    8. The present provision is the result of an amendment which the earlier version as contained in S. 503 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure underwent. The legislative history and the impact of the change have been succinctly stated in the following passage in the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Ram Khelawan…Opp. Party v. Smt. Sudama Devi…Applicant-., AIR. 1964 Allahabad 366:

    “This becomes apparent when a comparison is made between the phraseology used in Or. XL R. 1 and the words of S. 503 of the old Code. S. 503 provided as follows:—

    “Where it appears to the court to be necessary for the realization, preservation or better custody or management of property, moveable or immoveable, the subject of a suit or attachment”

    Thus according to S. 503 CPC., as it stood, the court could appoint a Receiver only in respect of the subject of a suit or attachment. When the provisions of the Code were amended the words “subject of a suit or attachment” were deleted by the Legislature. This is significant. This shows that the legislature thought it fit to remove the restraint which formerly existed in respect of the power of the court to appoint a Receiver only he respect of properties which were the subject-matter of a suit or attachment.”

    (vide para. 11 of the judgment)

    9. As stated earlier, the court below rejected the application even at the very threshold, for, it thought that no interlocutory application, whatever be its nature, could he entertained before the leave question is settled. The observation of this court in Achuthan Pillai v. Mohanan Unnithan, 1979 KLT. S.N 53, particularly the following sentence with an apparently wide amplitude, appeared to it to be of a compulsive character:

    “No interlocutory order can be passed until a suit is instituted and S. 92 requires leave to be obtained for institution of a suit.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    10. A deep scrutiny of the decision would, however, reveal that no such absolute rule had been intended to be laid down by the learned judge. The observation occurs in a case wherein this court dismissed in limine a revision petition directed against an order by which the court below declined to issue a commission, at a time when the application for leave under S. 92 had not been decided. The question which arose for consideration by this court was whether such an order was amenable to revisional jurisdiction. It must be remembered that the prayer for the issue of a commission stands on a footing entirely different from an application for the appointment of a receiver. The wording in Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC. is:

    “1. Cases in which court may issue commission to examine witness:— A court may in any suit issue a commission for … … …”

    (emphasis supplied)

    11. Mark the word “suit” occurring in Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC. It is therefore clear from the language of the statutory provision itself, that an application for the issue of a commission could be conceived of only in a suit. And therefore until leave is granted under S. 92, an application under S. 92 does not ripen into a suit. In that view of the matter, to the extent it has been held that an application for the issue of a commission is incompetent before leave is granted under S. 92, the decision is perfectly correct. The opening sentence in the decision in 1979 KLT. SN. 53 has to be understood in the background of the facts of that case so understood, there is absolutely no difficulty in following that decision as a proper guide in relation to the exercise of the power of issuing a commission, in proceedings under S. 92 of the CPC. The acceptance of the view by the learned single Judge in a later decision of the Division Bench in Mathew v. Thomas, 1982 KLT 493, is equally understandable in that light.

    12. One of the questions which arose before the Division Bench related to the legality of a court granting ‘interim leave’ in proceedings under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench held that “the court below was not right in granting interim leave……”. However, it was further observed that such a flaw did not vitiate the orders under appeal before the Division Bench, under which the court below had passed an order appointing a receiver and ordered attachment before judgment. The reason was that those orders of appointment of receiver and attachment before judgment were “made only subsequent to the order of ‘final leave’ although passed on same day, as disclosed by the order on T.A No. 626 of 1981”. It is in the course of the discussion on the propriety of granting interim leave that the Division Bench formulated the procedure for the grant of leave by the court and incidentally referred to the judgment in 1979 KLT. SN. 53 and expressed agreement with that decision. That, however, does not mean that the Division Bench had intended to decide that no interlocutory order whatever, could be passed in proceedings under S. 92 of the CPC. till leave is granted by the court.

    13. As noted earlier, unlike Order 26 Rule 1 of the CPC, provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 do not posit the existence of a suit for a receiving order to be issued. There are analogous situations, where there is no suit, but where an application for the appointment of a receiver could be moved before court. The question whether Order 40 Rule 1 of the CPC. would enable the court to appoint a receiver even in such proceedings, had been the subject-matter of decisions from early times. It has been held that in such proceedings, an application for the appointment of Receiver is maintainable and that courts could deal with such applications even before leave is granted and before proceedings result in a regular suit. One of those early decisions is the one rendered by the Allahabad High Court in Mohammed Ali v. Ahmad Ali, AIR. 1945 Allahabad 261. A decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani, AIR. 1948 Bombay 139 also takes a similar view. The question was whether in proceedings in forma pauperis, the court was competent to appoint a receiver. The following observation at page 267 of the judgment in AIR. 1945 All. 261 is apposite:

    “………in the end I find myself in agreement with the views of my brother Braund J., when he says:

    “Jurisdiction to protect property pending the ascertainment of rights is inherent in any Court which once has cognisance in any form of a dispute involving the execution of a trust or the administration of assets; and I think the Court has, not merely jurisdiction, but a duty to safeguard them.”

    It is clear from O. 40 R. 1, Civil P.C, that a Receiver can be appointed in proceedings other than suits. Thus, it has been held that a Receiver may be appointed during the course of the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act: vide AIR. 1925 Lah. 489 and AIR. 1929 Nag. 119.”

    14. The result of the above discussion is that unlike an application for the issue of a commission, which contemplates the existence of a suit for passing an order under Order 26 Rule 1, an application for the appointment of a Receiver does not, in terms of Order 40 Rule 1 C.P.C, contemplate an already registered suit for the exercise of the power thereunder. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in AIR. 1964 Allahabad 366 referred to above also takes the same view. Even while proceedings for leave under S. 92 are pending, and the question of leave remains undecided, it will be open to the court to entertain an application for the appointment, of a receiver, and deal with and dispose of the same in accordance with law.

    15. Counsel for the respondents submits that anomalous results may follow, if before the court makes up the mind on the question of leave, an application for the appointment of a receiver is entertained, and as a matter of fact, a receiver is appointed. The object of insulating a Trust from harassment by unnecessary legal proceedings by an insistence on leave being obtained from a court before hand, was strongly relied on in that connection. There is some force in this contention. However, it must also be borne in mind that due to a variety of reasons, the proceedings under S. 92 of the CPC. can have, as has happened in the present case, a protracted course. Though not obligatory always, it is optional for a court to issue notice to the respondents. Adequate opportunities to file objections and to establish the contentions of the rival parties, may all entail delay in the disposal of the “leave question”. Should the court be a mute spectator in relation to the affairs of a public Trust even if circumstances are such that a Receiving Order in relation to the Trust is eminently justified, for the only reason that the decision on the ‘leave question’ gets protracted either in that court or in superior courts? If the provisions of Order 40 Rule 1 enable the court to issue a receiving order only in a suit, the result, however hard, would have to be suffered. But the statutory provisions, as they now stand do not have any such rigour. If that be so, it is not necessary to constrict the powers of a court in the matter of exercise of its discretion for the preservation of the interests of a Trust, if circumstances otherwise justify and compel it. On a plain reading of the section, it is clear that there is no such interdict in the matter of entertaining an application for the appointment of a receiver, in relation to a Trust, even when the question of leave under S. 92 remains undecided by the court. It is a well known principle that courts always lean to that interpretation which keeps the jurisdiction and authority of a court as wide as is possible.

    16. In the light of the conclusion reached above, it is obvious that the order of the court below is erroneous. I therefore set aside the order to the extent it has held that the application for the appointment of a receiver cannot be entertained before a final decision is made on the question whether leave should be granted in the proceedings under S. 92 of the CPC. The court below will deal with and dispose of the application in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein.

    17. In view of lapse of time after the institution of the proceedings in O.P No. 98 of 1979, it is also desirable that the question of leave itself is decided without further delay. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is disposed of as above. I direct the parties to bear their costs.

    18. Allowed.

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    Comments

    Sulaiman v. Chunakara S.M Jama Ath
    (Sep 20, 1982)