No Appeal Under Section 14A SC/ST Act Against an Order Framing Charge: Such Order Treated as Interlocutory/Intermediate; Remedy Lies in Revision/Inherent Jurisdiction

1. Introduction

The decision in LAGNESH VERMA v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS (2026 HHC 3474), delivered by the Himachal Pradesh High Court (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj) on 06-02-2026, addresses a recurring procedural question in prosecutions under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC & ST Act”): whether an accused can file an appeal under Section 14A of the SC & ST Act against an order framing charge.

The appellant, Lagnesh Verma, challenged the Special Judge’s order dated 23.09.2025 framing charges under Sections 115(2) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 3(2)(Va) of the SC & ST Act. The core issue was maintainability: is an appeal permissible at the charge-framing stage, given Section 14A’s bar on appeals from “interlocutory” orders?

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court condoned a delay of 16 days in filing the appeal.
  • On merits of maintainability, the Court held that an appeal against an order framing charge is not maintainable under Section 14A of the SC & ST Act.
  • The Court relied substantially on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (1980 (Supp.) SCC 92), treating Section 14A SC & ST Act as pari materia with Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979.
  • The appellant was left at liberty to pursue other remedies (revision/inherent jurisdiction under the BNSS or other permissible routes), but not an appeal under Section 14A.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Authorities relied upon by the appellant (and how the Court dealt with them)

  1. Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and another (1977 (4) SCC 137)
    Use attempted: to argue that certain orders (including charge-related orders) are not “interlocutory” in the restrictive sense used for limiting revisional powers.
    Court’s treatment: The High Court noted that such decisions operate primarily in the context of the Code of Criminal Procedure’s scheme (especially revision/inherent powers), and do not establish that an appeal lies against framing of charge under a special statute like the SC & ST Act.
  2. Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977 (4) SCC 551)
    Use attempted: to claim that “framing of charge” is not an interlocutory order and therefore appealable.
    Court’s treatment: The High Court accepted that Madhu Limaye discusses “intermediate orders” and the narrower CrPC sense of “interlocutory,” but emphasized that it does not hold that a statutory appeal is maintainable against a charge-framing order. The judgment also stressed that Supreme Court authority under a pari materia appeal provision (i.e., V.C. Shukla) governs Section 14A.
  3. V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (1980 (Supp.) SCC 92)
    Relevance: This became the decisive precedent. The Supreme Court held that, for an appeal provision barring interlocutory orders (Section 11, Special Courts Act, 1979), an order framing charge is “intermediate” but nevertheless falls within the ordinary/natural meaning of “interlocutory order,” because it does not terminate proceedings or finally determine rights.
  4. Girish Kumar Suneja v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2017 (14) SCC 809)
    Use attempted: to support the broader argument that certain “intermediate” orders are not purely interlocutory.
    Court’s treatment: The High Court held that none of the relied-upon judgments established maintainability of an appeal against a charge-framing order under an appeal clause like Section 14A.
  5. Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2022 (15) SCC 720)
    Use attempted: to show High Court’s power to interfere at the charge stage.
    Court’s treatment: The High Court treated this as supporting the availability of Section 397/482-type routes (revision/inherent powers), not an appellate remedy under Section 14A.
  6. Shashikant Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2023 (15) SCR 1067)
    Use attempted: similar to above, to attack charge-framing at an interlocutory stage.
    Court’s treatment: Found not to assist on the specific proposition of a statutory appeal being maintainable against the framing of charge.

B. The controlling Supreme Court framework imported via V.C. Shukla (and the cases embedded in it)

Because the High Court treated Section 14A SC & ST Act as pari materia with Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, it effectively adopted the interpretive apparatus of V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I.. That apparatus draws on a chain of English and Indian authorities to define “final” versus “interlocutory” orders by their effect on termination of proceedings and final determination of rights.

  • In re Faithful : Ex Parte Moore (English authority): cited for the concept that a final judgment requires a “final adjudication … on the merits.”
  • Salaman v. Warner (English authority): cited for the influential “two-way test”—if a decision in one direction ends the matter but in the other direction allows the action to continue, it is interlocutory.
  • Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council (English authority): cited for the test whether the order “finally dispose[s] of the rights of the parties.”
  • Shubrook v. Tufnell, Isaacs & Sons v Salbstein, Hunt v. Allied Bakeries Ltd., Salter Rex & Co. v. Ghosh (English authorities): discussed in V.C. Shukla to show the evolution and application of final/interlocutory tests.
  • Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor (Federal Court era): cited to apply the “final disposal of rights” concept even to criminal proceedings.
  • S. Kuppuswami Rao v. King (locus classicus, as termed in V.C. Shukla): cited for the settled proposition that an order is final if it finally disposes of rights, and interlocutory if it leaves the matter to be determined in ordinary course.
  • Mohan Lal Magarl Lal Thacker v. State of Gujarat: discussed in V.C. Shukla for the proposition that finality can be context-dependent, but not so as to convert a charge-framing order into an appealable “final” order under a clause excluding interlocutory orders.
  • State v. Ghani Bandar (Full Bench, Jammu & Kashmir High Court): considered in V.C. Shukla and distinguished on procedural-history grounds (pre-1955 warrant-case procedure), illustrating that “trial commencement” arguments do not make framing of charge a final order.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) The statutory hinge: Section 14A SC & ST Act

Section 14A(1) provides an appeal to the High Court from any “judgment, sentence or order” of a Special Court/Exclusive Special Court, “not being an interlocutory order,” and begins with a non obstante clause (overriding the CrPC framework).

(ii) Pari materia comparison: Section 14A SC & ST Act and Section 11 Special Courts Act, 1979

The High Court reproduced Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979 and held the provisions to be pari materia with Section 14A. On that basis, the interpretive conclusion in V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. was treated as directly applicable.

(iii) The core classification: why framing of charge blocks the appeal

The High Court adopted the essence of V.C. Shukla:

  • An order framing charge does not end the prosecution; it is a step that allows the trial to proceed to evidence and verdict.
  • Applying the “two-way” finality test referenced in V.C. Shukla: if the accused is discharged, proceedings end; if charges are framed, proceedings continue. Therefore, the charge-framing order is interlocutory in the ordinary/natural sense.
  • Because Section 14A (like Section 11 in the Special Courts Act) excludes appeals from “interlocutory orders,” the appeal is barred.

(iv) Treatment of “intermediate order” arguments

The appellant’s thrust was that “framing of charge” is not an interlocutory order (as discussed in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra). The High Court’s answer is twofold:

  1. Even if charge-framing is described as “intermediate,” the decisive question under Section 14A—read through V.C. Shukla—is whether it is interlocutory in the natural sense (i.e., non-final). On that approach, it is not appealable.
  2. The Court additionally stated (para 17) that even assuming it is not interlocutory but “intermediate,” the appeal is still not maintainable, reasoning that “the charge is neither the judgment nor sentence.” Read contextually, this appears to reinforce the Court’s overall view that the Section 14A appellate gateway is not intended for the charge-framing stage and that the proper vehicle is revision/inherent jurisdiction. (Notably, the impugned act was the order framing charge, which is ordinarily an “order”; the judgment’s ultimate ratio remains that the order is barred as interlocutory/non-final under Section 14A.)

(v) Remedy is not extinguished—only the appellate route is

The Court emphasized that an aggrieved accused is not remediless: the challenge to charge-framing may be pursued, where permissible, through revisional jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction under the BNSS or other applicable provisions—consistent with the manner in which Supreme Court jurisprudence typically channels such grievances.

3.3 Impact

  • Procedural clarity in SC & ST prosecutions: The judgment sets a clear High Court-level rule that Section 14A is not an avenue to appeal charge-framing orders, thereby discouraging premature appellate filings.
  • Expedition and trial-continuity: By aligning Section 14A with the “natural meaning” approach in V.C. Shukla, the ruling supports the policy of avoiding delays caused by interlocutory appellate challenges.
  • Channeling to supervisory remedies: Litigants are directed toward revision/inherent powers for exceptional interference, maintaining a higher threshold than an “appeal as of right.”
  • Interpretive method: The decision exemplifies a strong pari materia + Supreme Court ratio method: where a special statute’s appeal clause mirrors another statute already interpreted by the Supreme Court, that interpretation is imported to the SC & ST Act framework.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Framing of charge
A court’s formal decision that there is sufficient ground to proceed to trial on specified offences. It does not decide guilt or innocence.
Interlocutory order
An order made during proceedings that does not finally end the case or finally decide the parties’ rights. Under the approach adopted from V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., if the case continues after the order, it is typically interlocutory in the natural sense.
Intermediate order
A term used in some jurisprudence to describe orders that are not purely procedural yet not final. The present judgment treats such labels as insufficient to create an appellate right where Section 14A bars appeals from non-final/interlocutory orders.
Final order
An order that ends the proceeding or finally determines rights—e.g., conviction, acquittal, or discharge (depending on context).
Non obstante clause
“Notwithstanding anything contained in …” indicates legislative priority over conflicting provisions in another law (here, over the CrPC/BNSS framework).
Pari materia
Provisions in different statutes with materially similar language and purpose; courts often interpret them consistently.

5. Conclusion

LAGNESH VERMA v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS establishes, within the SC & ST Act appellate framework, that an appeal under Section 14A does not lie against an order framing charge. By treating Section 14A as pari materia with Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979, and applying the Supreme Court’s binding analysis in V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., the High Court categorizes charge-framing as non-final/interlocutory in the natural sense, thus outside the statutory appeal right.

The judgment’s practical message is straightforward: challenges to charge-framing in SC & ST cases must generally be pursued, if at all, through revision/inherent jurisdiction, not via a Section 14A appeal—reinforcing the legislative objective of minimizing delay and keeping trials on track.