Mere Apprehension of Bias Is Insufficient to Transfer Matrimonial Proceedings Under Section 24 CPC Without Prima Facie Material

1. Introduction

In Varun Jeeri v. Siddavatam Pujitha alias Pujitha Jeeri (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 15-06-2026), the petitioner-husband invoked Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking withdrawal and transfer of F.C.O.P.No.176 of 2025 (a wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955) from the Family Court-cum-V Additional District Judge, Tirupati, to another competent court in Chittoor District.

The husband’s core ground was an asserted reasonable apprehension of bias against the Presiding Officer at Tirupati, allegedly reflected in directions requiring him (being in the USA) to “make arrangements for virtual mode” and in the court’s insistence on his appearance. The wife opposed the transfer, asserting that the husband was avoiding proceedings, had been set ex parte, and was already litigating related issues through revisions.

The decision addresses the threshold for transfer on allegations of bias, the evidentiary burden on the applicant, and the relevance (or irrelevance) of exemptions from personal appearance/virtual participation orders granted in other connected proceedings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The High Court dismissed the transfer petition.
  • It held that the husband’s allegation of bias/restlessness on the part of the Family Court Judge was baseless and unsupported by prima facie material.
  • It reaffirmed the principle that “mere apprehension is not a ground for seeking transfer of a case from one Court to another Court”.
  • It noted that any exemption from personal appearance was granted only in another matter (the husband’s divorce petition), and not in the wife’s Section 9 petition sought to be transferred.
  • It also considered practical convenience: the wife resided at Tirupati and all three cases were pending there; shifting within Chittoor District would not materially improve convenience.
  • No costs were awarded; interim orders stood closed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The petitioner relied on multiple authorities, largely to support requests for virtual participation, waiver of personal appearance, or broader procedural fairness. The High Court, however, expressly found that the facts in those authorities were “not at all applicable” because the central issue before it was not whether virtual mode should be permitted, but whether the case should be transferred for alleged bias absent supporting material.

  • G.Shrilakshmi Vs. Anirudh Ramkumar (Madras High Court; C.R.P.Nos.1994 & 89 of 2024 and C.M.P.No.12451 of 2024 in C.R.P.No.1800 of 2024):
    Role in this judgment: Cited to argue procedural accommodation/virtual participation. The Court distinguished it on facts, holding that the husband’s exemption/virtual participation issues in other proceedings could not, by themselves, establish bias warranting transfer in this specific case.
  • Amardeep Singh Vs. Harveen Kaur:
    General principle: Known for liberal, purposive interpretation of matrimonial procedure (notably waiver/cooling-off in mutual consent contexts).
    Role in this judgment: Treated as inapposite because the dispute was not about substantive matrimonial relief standards but about transfer for bias under Section 24 CPC.
  • Anuradha Bhashin Vs. Union of India:
    General principle: Often invoked for constitutional scrutiny, proportionality, and procedural safeguards in executive restrictions.
    Role in this judgment: Found irrelevant to the narrow transfer question; the Court required case-specific prima facie material of bias rather than broad fairness rhetoric.
  • Reena Chadha & Anr. Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi:
    General principle: Typically cited in contexts involving procedural fairness and protection of rights in legal proceedings.
    Role in this judgment: Distinguished as not addressing the evidentiary threshold for transfer based on allegations against a Presiding Officer.
  • S.Venkataraman Vs. L.Vijayasaratha:
    General principle: Often cited in procedural/civil context.
    Role in this judgment: The Court did not find it helpful because the husband failed to show any concrete circumstances suggesting the Tirupati court was influenced by extraneous considerations.
  • Prabhat Narain Tickoo Vs. Mamta Tickoo and Ors.:
    General principle: Generally relied upon in transfer/procedural contexts.
    Role in this judgment: Not applied because the petitioner’s case lacked factual foundation for transfer; pending revisions already existed for grievance redressal.
  • Santhini Vs. Vijaya Venkatesh:
    General principle: A leading authority in matrimonial procedure discussions, often cited regarding video conferencing/appearance issues.
    Role in this judgment: The Court emphasized that even if video-conferencing principles exist, they do not translate into an automatic inference of bias or justify transfer when exemption/appearance is not already granted in the particular case sought to be moved.
  • Palakben Ravi Luni D/o. Dhamasibhai Gobarbhai Rabari & Anr. Vs. None, R/Special Civil Application No.2494 of 2026:
    Role in this judgment: The Court held it was not applicable on facts, since the present case turned on the absence of prima facie proof of prejudice and the limited scope of earlier exemption orders.

Key takeaway from the treatment of precedents: even strong authorities on procedural accommodation do not assist a transfer plea unless the applicant establishes case-specific and prima facie grounds meeting the transfer standard—particularly where the transfer is sought on allegations against the judicial officer.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Nature of the proceeding sought to be transferred: The Court noted that F.C.O.P.No.176 of 2025 is the wife’s Section 9 petition pending at Tirupati; the husband is the respondent there. The transfer request had to be tested with reference to that proceeding’s record and orders.
  2. Apprehension of bias requires more than assertion: The Court framed the petitioner’s case as resting on an alleged “reasonable apprehension” of unfair trial due to the Family Court’s insistence on steps for virtual mode and appearance. It found:
    • No prima facie evidence was produced to show the Presiding Officer was acting unfairly.
    • There was no material to suggest the judge was influenced by extraneous considerations.
    • Therefore, the apprehension was baseless.
    It crystallized the controlling standard in the order itself: “mere apprehension is not a ground for seeking transfer of a case from one Court to another Court”.
  3. Exemption from appearance in one case does not automatically extend to others: The Court treated as decisive the procedural distinction between:
    • the divorce case (where personal appearance had been dispensed with), and
    • the restitution petition (where it had not been dispensed with by the High Court).
    Accordingly, the Tirupati court’s insistence on appearance/steps in F.C.O.P.No.176 of 2025 could not, by itself, be portrayed as defiance of High Court orders passed in another matter.
  4. Existing remedies and parallel proceedings: The Court noted that the husband had already filed C.R.P.No.3048 of 2025 challenging orders in F.C.O.P.No.176 of 2025. This undercut the justification for transfer based on those very orders, as supervisory correction (if warranted) was already being pursued.
  5. Convenience and forum pragmatics: The Court also weighed practical convenience:
    • Husband resides in the USA.
    • Wife resides in Tirupati.
    • All three matters were pending at Tirupati.
    Transfer within Chittoor District would not materially enhance convenience and risked multiplying logistical difficulty, especially for the wife who is locally based at Tirupati.

3.3 Impact

  • Higher threshold for “bias-based” transfers: The judgment reinforces that transfer petitions cannot be used as a surrogate appeal against interlocutory directions (including appearance/virtual mode directions), unless the applicant demonstrates objective, prima facie indicators of prejudice or extraneous influence.
  • Clear separation of orders across connected matrimonial proceedings: Litigants often treat exemptions granted in one connected case as implicitly governing all. This order signals that exemptions are case-specific and must be sought/obtained in each proceeding as required.
  • Forum stability in family litigation: By factoring that multiple proceedings are already consolidated at one place (Tirupati), the Court promotes procedural economy and reduces forum-shifting, especially when transfer is sought to another court within the same broader region without a compelling reason.
  • Strategic implication: Parties seeking virtual participation or exemption should pursue appropriate applications in the same case, rather than recasting the dispute as judicial bias to justify transfer.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 24 CPC (Transfer power): A High Court can transfer a case from one court to another competent court. But it is discretionary and typically requires strong reasons (e.g., real risk of unfair trial, convenience of parties/witnesses, interests of justice).
  • “Reasonable apprehension of bias”: Not a party’s subjective fear. It must be supported by circumstances that would make a fair-minded observer think there is a real possibility of unfairness. The Court stressed that unsupported apprehension is insufficient.
  • Prima facie material: Initial, credible material showing something may be true—more than allegation, less than full proof. For transfer on bias allegations, some objective indicia is expected.
  • Restitution of conjugal rights (Section 9, Hindu Marriage Act): A spouse seeks a court order directing the other spouse to resume cohabitation. It is a matrimonial remedy distinct from divorce and maintenance proceedings.
  • Dispensation of personal appearance: Courts may exempt a party from appearing in person (especially if abroad), but such exemption is usually granted by a specific order in a specific case and may come with conditions (e.g., representation through counsel, video appearance for evidence).

5. Conclusion

The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s ruling in Varun Jeeri v. Siddavatam Pujitha alias Pujitha Jeeri reasserts a disciplined approach to transfers under Section 24 CPC: transfer cannot be granted on allegations of bias resting on “mere apprehension”. The applicant must place prima facie material indicating unfairness or extraneous influence. The decision also clarifies that procedural relief (such as exemption from personal appearance) is case-specific and cannot be assumed to apply across connected matrimonial proceedings. In a landscape where multiple family disputes often proceed in parallel, the judgment prioritizes forum stability, evidentiary rigor in bias allegations, and pragmatic convenience.