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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an officer in the Indian Navy, filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in 1996, pending before the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar. The petitioner is stationed in Bombay and faces difficulty appearing personally due to naval duties. The respondent filed a related case under Section 125 Cr. P.C. Both cases are pending before the same court. An order dated 26-4-97 consigned the divorce case to the record but directed that the case proceed only upon the petitioner's personal appearance. Subsequently, the petitioner applied to be allowed to appear through counsel, leading to the present legal consideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to appear through his counsel before the Family Court in a divorce proceeding.
  2. The proper interpretation and application of Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, regarding legal representation in Family Courts.
  3. The scope and limits of judicial discretion in permitting legal representation before Family Courts.
  4. The court's authority to set timelines for expeditious disposal of divorce and family cases.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Leela Mahadeo Joshi v. De. Mahadeo Sitaram Joshi, AIR 1991 Bom. 105 Section 13 of the Family Courts Act does not impose a total bar on legal representation before Family Courts. Used to support the interpretation that lawyers do not have an absolute right to appear but may be permitted at the court's discretion.
Smt. Lata Pimple v. Union of India Followed the principle that legal representation before Family Courts is discretionary. Reinforced the discretionary nature of legal representation under Section 13 of the Family Courts Act.
Sarojini Ramaswatni v. Union of India Recognition of judicial law-making and the role of judges in evolving law. Supported the court's approach to fill gaps in the law regarding legal representation in Family Courts through judicial interpretation.
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs, 1989 2 SCC 754 Nature and scope of judicial review and the acceptance that judges make law. Used to justify the court's law-making role in clarifying discretionary legal representation.
Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, 1994 23 ALR 31 SC Judicial law-making and the role of judges in interpreting and shaping law. Supported the court's stance on judicial discretion and law-making authority.
State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation, 1980 4 SCC 697 Judicial interpretation and law-making authority. Reinforced the acceptance of judicial law-making in India.
Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Rajappa, 1978 2 SCC 213 Judicial discretion and law-making functions of courts. Supported the principle of judicial law-making and discretion.
Seaford Court Estates v. Asher, 1951 2 All. ER 839 Judicial role in interpreting statutes and filling gaps without usurping legislative function. Quoted to justify judicial law-making as ironing out creases in the law.
Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation, 1951 2 All. ER 839 Judicial law-making as usurpation of legislative function. Not followed by the Supreme Court; cited to contrast judicial approaches.
Rylands v. Fletcher Creation of new law (strict liability) by judiciary. Used as an example of judicial law-making under the first stage of judicial law-making theory.
Donoghue v. Stevenson Judicial creation of the modern law of negligence. Illustrated judicial law-making as accepted common law practice.
Rookes v. Barnard Judicial law-making in tort law. Further example of judge-made law cited to illustrate judicial law-making.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the order dated 26-4-97, concluding that consigning the case to the record does not amount to dismissal but rather an adjournment sine die. It set aside the subsequent order dated 4-11-97 and directed continuation and expeditious disposal of the divorce and related proceedings.

Regarding legal representation, the court interpreted Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which denies an absolute right to legal representation before Family Courts but vests discretion in the court to permit it. The court rejected the Bombay High Court's subjective test of permitting lawyers only when complicated questions arise, deeming it vague and impractical.

Instead, the court proposed a clear, objective guideline: lawyers should not ordinarily be allowed during the reconciliation phase under Section 9 of the Family Courts Act or in mutual consent divorce cases under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, once reconciliation fails and adjudication is necessary, lawyers should ordinarily be permitted due to the complexity of family law and procedural requirements.

The court acknowledged that judicial law-making is well established and used this principle to fill the gap left by Section 13 regarding the circumstances for permitting legal representation. It relied on established jurisprudence to justify this approach.

The court also emphasized the psychological trauma caused by prolonged divorce litigation and issued a general mandate for expeditious disposal of divorce and family cases, recommending decisions within one year of filing.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the petitioner and respondent No. 1 are entitled to be represented by their lawyers before the Family Court. It set aside the order consigning the case to the record and directed that both the divorce petition and the related proceeding under Section 125 Cr. P.C. continue and be decided expeditiously.

The court further directed that both cases be decided within six months of production of a certified copy of the order. Additionally, a general mandamus was issued directing all Family Courts and District Judges in Uttar Pradesh to decide divorce and family cases within one year of filing.

This decision clarifies the discretionary nature of legal representation in Family Courts, providing practical guidelines for when lawyers may be permitted. While the ruling directly affects the parties involved, it also establishes procedural expectations for timely disposal of family law matters without creating binding precedent beyond the scope of the case.

    Prabhat Narain Tickoo v. Smt. Mamta Tickoo And Others

    M. Katju, J.:— Heard Sri Sunil Ambwani for the petitioner, Sri P.K Srivastava for respondent No. 1 and learned Standing Counsel.

    2. The petitioner is an officer in the Indian Nevy and he has filed a Divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act which is pending before the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar being Divorce petition No. 750 of 1996. Learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument only to the third prayer in the petition viz. that the petitioner should be allowed to appear through his counsel before the Family Court.

    3. The petitioner is an officer in the Indian Navy. He was married to respondent No. 1 in 1992. Presently he is posted in Bombay and he has difficulty in getting leave as he is in the Naval service. The petitioner filed the aforesaid Divorce case No. 750 of 1996 against respondent No. 1, and respondent No. 1 filed Misc. Case No. 603 of 1995 under Section 125 Cr. P.C against the petitioner and both these cases are pending before respondent No. 3. On 26-4-97 the court concerned passed the following order:

    4. Thereafter the petitioner moved an application dated 3-11-97 which is Annexure-14 to the writ petition and in that application he prayed that a date in the case be fixed and he may be heard through his counsel. On this application the following order was passed on 4-11-97:—

    5. A perusal of the above order shows that on 26-4-97 the court concerned had ordered that the case be consigned to the record but it further directed that it shall proceed when the petitioner personally appears. In our opinion this does not mean that the petition was rejected on 26-4-97. As a matter of fact no court can pass an order consigning a judicial case to the record. The court can either allow the petition or dismiss it or dispose it off in some other manner or adjourn the case, but it cannot pass an order finally consigning the case to the record. If the petitioner is not appearing, the court can dismiss the petition for default, but the court cannot finally consign a case to the record. Such an order can only be passed in an administrative proceeding, not in a judicial proceeding. In our opinion if such order consigning the case to the record is passed it is to be treated as an order adjourning the case sine die, but it will not amount to dismissal of the case. Hence, we set aside the order dated 4-11-97 and direct that the Divorce petition and the petition under Section 125 Cr. P.C shall continue and be decided expeditiously.

    6. The question remains as to whether the petitioner is entitled to appear through counsel. In this connection Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 states:—

    “Right to legal representation.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no party to a suit or proceeding before a Family Court shall be entitled, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner:

    Provided that if the Family Court considers it necessary in the interest of justice, it may seek the assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae.”

    7. In our opinion the correct interpretation of Section 13 of the Act is that a lawyer has no absolute right to appear on behalf of a party before the Family Court, but it is the discretion of the Family Court to permit the lawyer to appear or not. This interpretation becomes evident when we notice the words ‘as of right’ in Section 13 of the Act. If the intention of the Parliament was to debar the advocates absolutely from appearing in the proceedings of the Family Courts the words ‘as of right’ would not have been there. The presence of the aforesaid words indicates that the intention of the Parliament was that it should be left to the discretion of the Family Court to allow lawyers to appear or not. As regards the proviso to Section 13 this only deals with the appointment of amicus curiae, and it has nothing to do with the representation of the parties. In fact the Bombay High Court in Leela Mahadeo Joshi v. De. Mahadeo Sitaram Joshi . AIR 1991 Bom. 105, has held in para 17 that Section 13 does not prescribe a total bar to representation by a legal prectioner. This view had been followed by Bombay High Court in Smt. Lata Pimple v. Union of India.

    8. The question then arises as to how the Family Court should exercise its discretion in this connection, in other words when should the court permit representation by lawyers and when it should not. The Bombay High Court has taken the view that the Family Court should permit representation by lawyers where complicated questions of law and facts are involved. In our opinion this approach will lead to unnecessary wrangles in almost every case on the question whether complicated questions of law and fact are involved or not, and this will take a lot of time, and parties will very often go upto the higher courts on this preliminary point, causing great delay. Morever, the criterion laid down by the Bombay High Court is, in our humble opinion, vague and subjective. Whether complicated questions are involved or not will differ from Judge to Judge. Hence, a simpler, clearer, and more objective guideline is required.

    9. In our opinion, the correct approach should be that the Family Court should not permit lawyers to appear before it when it is trying to seek reconciliation between the parties under Section 9 of the Family Courts Act. It may be mentioned that it is the first duty of the court hearing matrimonial cases to try to reconcile the parties as envisaged by Section 9 of the Act. At this stage lawyers are not at all necessary, and it is for the court to try to persuade the husband and wife to get reconciled. Lawyers may also not be allowed to appear in cases under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act (divorce by mutual consent). However, if the reconciliation attempt fails, and the matter has to be adjudicated, in our opinion the court should ordinarily allow lawyers to appear on behalf of the parties. This is necessary because Divorce law and other Family law has now become a complicated branch of law, and an ordinary layman cannot be expected to know this law. It may be mentioned that there is a catena of decisions both in England and India on this branch of law, and without a knowledge of the same a party cannot properly represent himself/herself in the case, and only a trained lawyer can do so. For example, Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindi Marriage Act provides that separation for two years is a ground for divorce. A layman would probably think that proof of two years of physical separation alone is required for divorce on this ground, but the case law on this point is that mere physical separation for 2 years is not sufficient and the petitioner has also to prove animus deserendi i.e intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. Similarly, cruelty is ground for divorce, and the layman would ordinarily regard cruelty to mean physical cruelty, but by judicial decisions it has been interpreted to mean mental cruelty also. There is a catena of case law on this subject, and no layman can be expected to know this case law as it takes years, to study and understand it. Moreover, a layman would be ignorant of procedure/rules, also. Hence, it is obvious that a layman cannot ordinarily represent himself properly in such cases. Representation by lawyers will not only be of great assistance to the parties, it will also be of great assistant to the court to do justice expeditiously. Some people say that lawyers will cause delay in the proceedings. In our opinion far from delaying the proceedings, a lawyer will greatly expedite it because by his knowledge of law and procedure and his training he can quickly come to the relevant points. Moreover, lawyers know the art of the cross-examination, and the rules of procedure, which a layman does not. Hence we are of the opinion that the discretion in granting/refusing representation by lawyers must be exercised in the manner aforementioned, namely that at the stage when the court is trying to reconcile the parties or when divorce is sought by mutual consent no lawyer should ordinarily be permitted, but otherwise when the matter is being adjudicated lawyers should ordinarily be allowed to represent the parties.

    10. The view we are taking may appear to be judicial legislation. However, it is now well settled in India, England, America, Australia etc. that Judges do legislate. The 19th Century positivist jurisprudence of Bentham and Austin has been largely replaced in the 20th Century by the sociological jurisprudence of Jhering, Roscoe Pound, Julius Stock which permits legislative activity by the judiciary.

    11. Thus in the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Sarojini Ramaswatni v. Union of India, it was observed in paragraph 92;

    “In this context, it is also useful to recall the observations of R.S Pathak, C.J speaking for the Constitution Bench in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. . 1989 2 SCC 754, about the nature and scope of judicial review in India. The learned Chief Justice stated thus:—

    “…..It used to be disputed that Judges make law. Today, it is no longer a matter of doubt that a substantial volume of the law governing the lives of citizens and regulating the functions of the State flews from the decisions of the superior Courts.” There was a time, observed Lord Reid, “when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law—they only declare it …….. But we do not believe in fairy tales any more.”

    12. In fact even in England with its Parliamentary Supremacy the theory that Judges do not legislate was really a fiction. What is the entire British Common Law but Judge made law? What is Rylands v. Fletcher, Donoghue v. Stevenson, Rookes v. Barnard? These epoch making judgments were law creating judgments, as everyone recognizes today. In our own country Keshavanand Bharti's case, Maneka Gandhi's case, the cases in which new dimensions have been given to Articles 14 and 21, etc. are all law making judgments.

    13. The dispute today in all countries following the Common Law System is net whiter Judges can legislate (everyone accepts that they can and do) but to what extent, in what circumstances, in what manner, etc? Thus Prof, Friedmann of Columbia University in his article ‘Limits of Judicial Law Making’ (29 MLR Ne. 6, 1996) writes:

    “The Blackstonian doctrine as the ‘declaratory’ function of the courts, holding that the duty of the court is not to pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one, has long been little more than a ghost. From Holmes and Geny to Pound and Cardozo, contemporary jurists have increasingly recognised and articulated the law making functions of the courts …. It is therefore time to turn from the stale controversy over whether Judges make law to the much more complex and controversial question of the limits of judicial law making.”

    14. It seems that judicial law making has passed through three stages. The first stage was where the Judges would make law while pretending not to. The classic example of this can be given of the decision of Blackburn, J. in Rylands v. Fletcher, where in fact the Judge created a new law (the law of strict liability) while pretending to follow existing law. This approach was adopted particularly by British Judges since in England there is no written Constitution and Parliament is Supreme, and hence the Judges had to maintain the fiction that they are not legislating, otherwise there would be violation of the principle of Parliamentary Supremacy.

    15. In the second stage, while giving up the fiction that Judges do not make law, it was proclaimed that they make law only interstitially. The classic statement in this connection is of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who said “I recognize without hesitation that judges must and do legislate, but they do so only interstitially, they are confined from molar to molecular motions” (see ‘The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes’). Thus, while accepting that Judges make law, the intersitial theory permitted judicial legislation on a modest and limited scale.

    16. A similar view was taken by Lord Denning in England. In Seaford Court Estates v. Asher, he observed: “It would certainly save the Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. A Judge must not alter the material of which it (the law) is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.”

    17. This view was no doubt overruled by the House of Lords in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation . 1951 2 All. ER 839., which declared it as ‘a naked usurpation of the legislative function’ but our own Supreme Court has preferred the view of Lord Denning to that of the House of Lords vide Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan . 1994 23 ALR 31 SC Sum.., State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation . 1980 4 SCC 697; Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Rajappa . 1978 2 SCC 213.

    18. In his book ‘The Nature of the Judicial Process’ Mr. Justice Cardozo of the U.S Supreme Court said, “He (the Judge) legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law.”

    19. This ‘interstitial’ theory proceeds on the basis that the legislative draftsman is also a human being and hence there are bound to be some omissions and other defects in the statute he has drafted. Hence the gaps in the law have to be filled in by the Judges.

    20. The third stage of judicial law-making has best been described by Mr. Justice Murphy, former Judge of the Australian High Court who said “Now it is the function of the Judges, I believe to bring the laws uptodate with the expectations and the needs of our changing society. They should produce laws which are rational, humane, just and simple” (see ‘Judging the World’ by Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb, p. 17). Roscoe Pound expresses the same idea when he says “Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still” (see Pound's Jurisprudence’).

    21. This third stage or dynamic theory (which is still in the process of formation) is based on the view that modem society is dynamic and fast changing, and it cannot be expected of the legislature to conceive of every situation which may develop in the future and cater to it. Hence the Judges have to play the role of social engineers, they have to help society in its onwards progress and not just remain as by-standers. In fact sometimes the Judge should make a law which is not in accordance with the predominant opinion in society (as some jurists advocate) but one step ahead of it, so as to pull society forward. This third stage (or dynamic) theory is bolder and more socially conscious than the interstitial theory, and gives greater scope to the Judges for making law.

    22. In the present case the interstitial theory can be adopted. According to our interpretation, Section 13 of the Family Court Act gives a discretion to the Judge to permit or not to permit representation by lawyers. However, Section 13 does not mention as to when and in what circumstances, permission should be granted and when it should not. Hence this gap in the law has to be filled in by Judge made law, which we have tried to do as best as we could.

    23. In our opinion, therefore, the petitioner as well as respondent No. 1 are both entitled to representation by lawyers and we direct accordingly. We further direct that both the cases shall be decided within six months of the production of a certified copy of this order before the court concerned. Before parting with this case, we would like to say that divorce cases usually cause a great deal of psychological trauma to the parties and hence they must be decided expeditiously. It is evident that if divorce cases take ten years or more to decide (as it often happen) it would lead to the parties becoming psychological wrecks. Hence, such cases must be decided quickly. We, therefore, issue a general mandamus that all divorce and other family cases must be decided within a year of filing of the same by the court concerned.

    24. Let a copy of this order be sent by the Registrar of this Court to all the Family Courts and District Judges in U.P Copies of this judgment shall also be sent to the President/Secretary of all District Bar Associations in U.P as well as to the President/Secretary, High Court Bar Association.

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    Prabhat Narain Tickoo v. Smt. Mamta Tickoo And Others
    (May 5, 1998)