Lockdown Prosecutions under IPC Sections 188/269/270/336 Require Proof of Promulgation, Knowledge, and Endangerment
1. Introduction
In ANUPAM SHAHU v. THE STATE (2026 DHC 5771), the Delhi High Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR arising from alleged lockdown violations during the early COVID-19 period.
The petitioner, Anupam Sahu, sought quashing of FIR No. 105/2020 (PS Kishangarh) registered for offences under
Sections 188, 269, 270, and 336 IPC.
The FIR alleged that on 28.03.2020 the petitioner was found walking during lockdown and stated he had come out because he could not
pass time at home. The case later added Sections 269, 270, and 336 IPC in the chargesheet, which relied only on police witnesses and contained no
medical testing or public witnesses. The petitioner asserted he had stepped out for medical follow-up for severe back pain, supported by a medical
certificate later verified as genuine by the State.
Key issues before the Court were whether the FIR/chargesheet materials disclosed the essential ingredients of:
(i) Section 188 IPC (disobedience of an order duly promulgated), and (ii) Sections 269/270 IPC (acts likely to spread
infection), and (iii) Section 336 IPC (rash/negligent act endangering life/personal safety)—and whether continuation of prosecution would
be an abuse of process.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings. It held that:
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Section 188 IPC was not made out because the record did not show promulgation of the order, the petitioner’s
knowledge of it, or the legally required consequence (obstruction/annoyance/injury/danger/riot/affray).
Mere presence on a road, without more, was insufficient.
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Sections 269 and 270 IPC were inapplicable absent any allegation/material that the petitioner was infected or knew/ had
reason to believe he was infected; he was never tested.
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Section 336 IPC was misconceived because no specific endangerment to any person was alleged or supported by material.
The Court also clarified that a Section 482 petition remains maintainable even after cognizance/summoning, and it located the case within
categories (1) and (3) of State Of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, MANU/SC/0115/1992.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706
The Court relied on this decision to reject any objection that proceedings had progressed beyond FIR stage. It reaffirmed that the inherent power under
Section 482 CrPC survives filing of the chargesheet and can be exercised even when allegations have “hardened” into prosecution, because abuse of process
may become more acute after investigation and cognizance.
(b) Bhoop Singh Tyagi v. State, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 277
This case was pivotal to the Court’s approach to Section 188 IPC. It was cited for the proposition that:
(i) actual knowledge of the promulgated order is a pre-requisite; (ii) knowledge may sometimes be presumed, but only where the
complaint/FIR provides at least an “inkling” that the accused knew of the order and knowingly disobeyed it.
Applying this, the Court found the FIR/chargesheet silent on knowledge and silent on how the order was made known publicly. The absence was fatal.
(c) Mohd. Anwar & Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4951
This coordinate bench decision provided direct contextual guidance for lockdown-era Section 188 prosecutions based on similarly worded ACP orders.
The Court drew from it to emphasise the legal meaning of “promulgation” and the need for some demonstrated public mode of making the order known.
Quoted (via Mohd. Anwar) for the definition of “promulgate”: to make known by public declaration; publication; dissemination; proclamation.
Crucially, it underscores that private information is not promulgation, and that while no single mode is mandatory, there must be something
done openly and publicly.
(e) Hla Shwe & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 959
Cited (and noted as followed in Mohd Anwar) to support quashing of proceedings under Sections 269/270 IPC where there is no material that the accused
was infected or that the accused’s acts were likely to spread infection based on such infection. The present Court applied the same logic, finding the
absence of testing/allegation of infection dispositive.
(f) Sidak Singh Sandhu v. U.T. Chandigarh and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4394
Used to bolster the point that failure to conduct a COVID-19 test can be fatal to prosecution under Sections 269/270 IPC, as it deprives the
prosecution of the necessary factual foundation that the accused was suffering from an infectious disease dangerous to life.
The Court expressly held the case fell within Bhajan Lal categories:
(1) allegations even if taken at face value do not constitute any offence; and
(3) uncontroverted allegations and evidence collected do not disclose commission of any offence.
This provided the doctrinal basis for quashing as an abuse of process.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
A. Section 188 IPC: Promulgation, Knowledge, and Consequence as Non-Negotiable Elements
The Court treated Section 188 as the “fulcrum” of the case and identified five essentials:
(i) a lawful order by a competent public servant;
(ii) knowledge of that order;
(iii) disobedience;
(iv) disobedience causing/tending to cause;
(v) specified consequences (obstruction/annoyance/injury/risk; or danger to life/health/safety; or riot/affray).
The Court’s decisive findings were evidentiary-structural:
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Order not on record: The alleged order dated 24.03.2020 did not even accompany the chargesheet.
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No pleaded promulgation: FIR/chargesheet/witness statements contained no assertion of proclamation/publication/affixation/newspaper/media circulation.
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No pleaded knowledge: Nothing suggested the petitioner knew of the order; knowledge could not be presumed “in a vacuum,” particularly on the
fourth day of a novel nationwide lockdown.
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No pleaded consequence: The petitioner was a solitary pedestrian; no obstruction, annoyance, injury, danger, riot, or affray was alleged.
“Mere presence” on a road was held insufficient.
Additionally, the Court noted the lockdown regime did not impose an absolute prohibition on movement and permitted essential movement, including medical needs.
On facts, the petitioner’s medical certificate (verified as genuine by the State) lent contemporaneous support to a medical explanation.
B. Sections 269 and 270 IPC: Infection-Linked “Knowledge” as the Foundation
The Court read Sections 269 and 270 IPC (in a COVID-19 setting) as requiring at least:
(i) infection (or factual basis to assert infection);
(ii) the accused’s knowledge or reason to believe they were infected; and
(iii) an act likely to spread infection.
Since there was no test, no allegation of infection/suspicion/symptoms, and the only act was walking alone,
the “very foundation” for invoking these sections was absent.
C. Section 336 IPC: Concrete Endangerment, Not Abstract Risk
The Court held Section 336 requires an act so rash/negligent as to endanger human life or personal safety of others.
Here, the chargesheet did not identify any person endangered, nor any material indicating endangerment.
The invocation was therefore “wholly misconceived.”
D. Section 195 CrPC: Left Open as Unnecessary Once Offences Fail on Ingredients
Although the petitioner argued cognizance was barred by Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC and that an ACP complaint was a belated lacuna-filler,
the Court declined to decide the point because the prosecution failed at the more basic level: the offences themselves were not made out on ingredients.
This signals a methodological point—courts may avoid adjudicating procedural bars when the substantive offence is absent.
3.3 Impact
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Stricter scrutiny of lockdown-era IPC prosecutions: The judgment reinforces that “lockdown violation” is not a stand-alone offence; prosecution
must plead and support each statutory ingredient, especially for Section 188 IPC.
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Operational guidance to police/prosecution: For Section 188, investigative records should demonstrate:
(i) the actual order; (ii) proof/mode of promulgation; (iii) how knowledge can be attributed; and (iv) the legally required consequence.
For Sections 269/270, medical/testing linkage becomes practically indispensable.
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Constraint on overbroad charging: The Court’s rejection of Sections 269/270/336 on foundational grounds discourages “add-on” penal sections
unsupported by factual allegations (e.g., endangerment without identifying an endangered person; infection-spread provisions without infection evidence).
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Section 482 as a corrective even post-cognizance: By relying on Anand Kumar Mohatta, the judgment strengthens the proposition that
the High Court’s abuse-of-process jurisdiction remains available even after summoning, particularly where the case is a summons trial with limited pre-trial filtering.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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“Promulgation” (Section 188 IPC): The order must be made known publicly—through publication, proclamation, affixation, gazette, announcements, etc.
It is not enough that an order exists; it must be communicated in a manner the public can access.
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“Knowledge” (Section 188 IPC): The accused must know about the order they allegedly disobeyed.
Courts may infer knowledge in some settings, but not where the complaint is entirely silent on how the accused would have known.
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“Tends to cause” consequences (Section 188 IPC): The law requires more than technical disobedience; it must cause or be likely to cause
obstruction/annoyance/injury/risk or danger to life/health/safety, etc. The judgment treats this as a substantive requirement, not a formality.
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Sections 269/270 IPC and COVID-19: These are not “lockdown breach” provisions; they target conduct likely to spread a dangerous disease.
Without infection (or credible basis to allege it) and awareness connected to that infection, these sections do not fit.
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Section 336 IPC: “Rash or negligent” conduct must concretely endanger others; generalized or speculative risk is insufficient without supporting facts.
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Bhajan Lal categories: Judicially recognised situations where High Courts can quash criminal proceedings—especially where allegations, even if accepted,
do not constitute an offence, or where collected material still does not disclose an offence.
5. Conclusion
The decision in ANUPAM SHAHU v. THE STATE crystallises a clear limiting principle for pandemic-era prosecutions:
criminal liability under Sections 188/269/270/336 IPC cannot be sustained on the bare assertion that a person was “out during lockdown.”
The State must show promulgation and knowledge of the relevant order (Section 188), must plead and support the statutorily required
consequences/endangerment (Sections 188/336), and cannot invoke infection-spread offences (Sections 269/270) without a factual foundation
connecting the accused to infection and the required mental element.
By applying State Of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and reaffirming post-cognizance quashing power via Anand Kumar Mohatta,
the Court positions Section 482 CrPC as a meaningful safeguard against prosecutions that are ingredient-deficient, evidentiary-bare, and disproportionate—
particularly when continued long after the alleged incident.