High Threshold for Writ Interference in Sports Selections: MER Criteria Must Be Applied as Written; Post-Selection Bias Objections Can Be Waived
1. Introduction
The Delhi High Court, in SUDIPTI HAJELA v. EQUESTRIAN FEDERATION OF INDIA & ORS. (2026 DHC 5180, decided on 29-06-2026),
addressed two writ petitions challenging the Dressage selection list dated 16 June 2026 issued by the Ad-hoc Committee of the
Equestrian Federation of India (“EFI”) for the 20th Asian Games 2026 (Japan).
Both petitioners were placed in the Reserve List (Reserve No. 1 and Reserve No. 2) rather than among the top four.
Their challenges raised three core issues:
- MER computation dispute (Anush Agarwalla): whether a rider can “swap” a test score (PSG) from one event into another MER set when the event already had all three tests.
- Merit-ranking method dispute (Sudipti Hajela): whether rankings had to be based on “Team MERs” first (PSG-focused), and only thereafter on individual scores.
- Alleged bias/conflict of interest (Anush Agarwalla): whether a Selection Committee member’s presence vitiated selection, despite the petitioner’s participation without pursuing timely remedies.
The Court’s decision turns on judicial restraint in sports selections, strict application of published selection criteria, and waiver/acquiescence principles
when bias objections are raised belatedly.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Court dismissed both writ petitions, holding that:
- EFI applied the published Selection Criteria (Version 4.0, amended 17 April 2026) rationally; there was no manifest arbitrariness, perversity, or procedural impropriety warranting writ interference.
- A rider based abroad cannot discard a PSG score from an event that already contained all three required tests (PSG, Intermediate I, Intermediate I Freestyle) and replace it with PSG from another event merely to improve ranking.
- The Selection Criteria required ranking by cumulative percentage scores across the best two valid MER results, without the “Team MER first, then individual” sequencing suggested by the petitioner.
- The absence of additional “inter se” competitions among the six probables (Clause 15(b)) did not vitiate the selection, particularly given logistical impracticability and the Selection Committee’s authority under Clause 15(e) to decide unforeseen matters.
- Bias allegations were rejected: the petitioner’s conduct showed acquiescence/waiver, and the process was otherwise not arbitrary.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The judgment is anchored in a consistent line of Delhi High Court and Supreme Court authority limiting Article 226 intervention in technical sports selections.
(a) Swastika Ghosh Versus Table Tennis Federation of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1817
- Rule relied upon: Writ review targets the decision-making process, not the merits of selection; interference only where the decision is illogical, procedurally improper, shocking to conscience, or manifestly arbitrary/perverse.
- Influence here: The Court used this as the controlling “scope of review” frame: even if petitioners identify arguable errors, that is insufficient unless it crosses the threshold of manifest arbitrariness or perversity.
(b) Shumel v. Union of India, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4706
- Rule relied upon: Relative sporting merits and the “best candidate” assessment are for experts; courts avoid re-evaluating performance or selection methodology, with emphasis on current consistent form.
- Influence here: The Court treated MER-based ranking and “current form” requirements (including the mandatory post-17 April MER) as expert-designed features not to be re-written through litigation.
(c) Sushil Kumar v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3660 and Karamjyoti v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6766
- Rule relied upon: Courts do not substitute their judgment for National Sports Federations; interference only if discretion is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or contrary to settled practices.
- Influence here: The Court positioned EFI’s application of its Selection Criteria as a discretionary/expert determination insulated from merits-based judicial replacement.
(d) Paralympic Committee of India v. Naresh Kumar Sharma, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8443 (and reference to Manika Batra v. Table Tennis Federation of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4479)
- Rule relied upon: Review is confined to preventing manifest arbitrariness/mala fides; selection involves multifactor judgments (form, exposure, logistics), and courts lack “wherewithal” to second-guess policy/expert choices.
- Influence here: The Court treated EFI’s explanation about feasibility (athletes across Europe, tight timelines) and the continued “probables” framework as legitimate administrative factors supporting non-interference.
- Rule relied upon: Selection criteria evolved by experts is not to be treated as perverse unless it violates the Wednesbury standard; writ court is not an appellate forum over expert decisions taken in good faith.
- Influence here: The Court expressly applied this restraint: since the criteria and its application were reasonable and in good faith, the petitioners could not convert interpretive disagreements into writ relief.
- Rule relied upon: Alleged bias does not invalidate proceedings if the party knew relevant facts and the right to object but chose not to timely object—waiver/acquiescence may bar later challenge.
- Influence here: The Court found the petitioner’s single WhatsApp objection (08 April 2026) followed by continued participation without pursuing reconstitution/representation/legal remedy amounted to acquiescence; bias was raised only after non-selection.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
A. Strict application of MER structure; no “cherry-picking” when a full three-test event exists
The Selection Criteria (notably Clause 8(e) as amended on 17 April 2026) allows riders based abroad to combine tests from different competitions
only where a competition does not have all three prescribed tests (PSG, Intermediate I, Intermediate I Freestyle).
On the facts, the petitioner’s Belgium event contained all three tests; therefore, he could not ignore the PSG score from that event and substitute a PSG score from Hagen.
The Court’s reasoning is fundamentally textual and purposive:
- Text: Clause 8(e) is a conditional accommodation (“in case the competitions do not have any of these three tests”).
- Purpose: The accommodation prevents disadvantage to overseas riders due to event formats; it is not a discretionary tool to optimize rankings.
The Court also rejected the equality argument (that other athletes were allowed to mix events), distinguishing those cases factually because their relevant competitions
lacked one of the tests, thus legitimately triggering Clause 8(e).
B. Merit ranking is by cumulative scores across the three tests within best two MERs; “Team MER first” sequencing rejected
The second petitioner argued that the process should prioritize Team MERs (notably PSG threshold) for ranking and only then consider individual scores.
The Court rejected this, emphasizing Clause 8(f): riders are ranked on the highest cumulative percentage scores across the best two valid MER results.
The clause “makes no distinction” in the mechanics of cumulative scoring between Team and Individual MERs for ranking purposes.
Importantly, the Court harmonized this with the criteria’s internal hierarchy:
- While cumulative scoring across three tests decides merit, Individual MER achievers are placed higher in merit over Team-only MER achievers when considering team composition.
C. No vitiation due to absence of further inter se competitions among “probables”
Petitioners claimed Clause 15(b) required the six probables to compete inter se to determine final four, and the lack of such trials invalidated the list.
The Court held otherwise:
- Clause 15(b) is geared to maintaining fitness/form and enabling the Selection Committee to finalize order of merit.
- Here, order of merit was already determined through best two MERs (including the mandatory recent MER requirement), meeting the objective of “current form, fitness, soundness, and readiness.”
- EFI’s explanation—athletes stationed across Europe, infeasibility of further trials, and tight administrative timelines—was accepted.
- Clause 15(e) authorized the Selection Committee/Executive Committee to address unforeseen matters, making their collective decision “final and binding” within the scheme.
D. Bias/conflict allegation defeated by waiver/acquiescence and absence of arbitrariness
Applying Manak Lal, Advocate Versus Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi and Others, the Court found:
- The petitioner knew the committee’s composition and raised a limited objection via WhatsApp on 08 April 2026.
- He did not follow through with formal representations or legal remedies seeking reconstitution.
- Participation through the process without timely action amounted to acquiescence/waiver; the challenge post-results was impermissible.
- In any event, since the selection was found consonant with the Selection Criteria and not manifestly arbitrary, the bias allegation did not gain traction.
3.3 Impact
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Reinforced deference in sports selection disputes: The judgment strengthens the “process-only” review approach: petitioners must demonstrate
manifest arbitrariness/perversity, not merely a preferable interpretation or performance comparison.
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Constrains strategic reinterpretation of selection clauses: Overseas-rider accommodations (like combining tests from different events) will be applied
strictly to their triggering conditions, reducing opportunistic score-optimization claims.
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Operational flexibility for federations: By accepting logistical infeasibility and relying on Clause 15(e), the Court validates federation governance mechanisms
for unforeseen circumstances—provided decisions remain tethered to published criteria.
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Higher bar for bias challenges after participation: The waiver/acquiescence holding signals that athletes must promptly and formally pursue
conflict-of-interest objections; silence or continued participation may forfeit the claim.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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MER (Minimum Eligibility Requirement): A qualifying benchmark. Here, one “MER” effectively required performance across three tests
(PSG, Intermediate I, Intermediate I Freestyle) under the EFI criteria, with additional FEI capability requirements.
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Team MER vs Individual MER: Different minimum thresholds for being eligible in team context versus individual context.
The judgment clarifies that ranking is by cumulative scores across MERs, while priority may still be given to those who achieved Individual-category MERs.
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Judicial review vs appeal: The Court does not re-select athletes or re-score performance. It only checks if the process was lawful, fair,
and not irrational/perverse.
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Wednesbury Principle: A decision is reviewable if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it.
The Court found EFI’s approach did not meet this high threshold.
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Waiver/Acquiescence (bias context): If you know the facts suggesting bias and have the right to object, but still proceed without timely action,
you may lose the right to complain later—especially after an adverse result.
5. Conclusion
The judgment consolidates two practical rules in Indian sports-law litigation under Article 226:
(i) courts will not interfere with expert sports selections unless the process is manifestly arbitrary, perverse, or procedurally improper; and
(ii) selection criteria—especially MER frameworks—will be enforced as written, without permitting score “cherry-picking” beyond the criteria’s conditional allowances.
Additionally, bias objections must be raised promptly and pursued meaningfully; participation without timely challenge can amount to waiver.