FSSAI Cannot Regulate Animal Feed Under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; BIS Certification Cannot Be Mandated Without Central Government Order Under the BIS Act, 2016

Case: GODREJ AGROVET LTD v. FOOD SAFETY AND STANDARDS AUTHORITY OF INDIA & ANR.
Court: Delhi High Court (Division Bench)
Date: 07-04-2026
Citation: 2026 DHC 2861-DB

1. Introduction

This writ petition under Article 226 was filed by Godrej Agrovet Ltd, an animal-feed manufacturer, challenging:

• the validity of Note (c) appended to Regulation 2.5.2 of the Food Safety and Standards (Food Products Standards and Food Additives) Regulations, 2011, as substituted by the Fifth Amendment Regulations, 2021; and
• FSSAI directions dated 10.12.2019, 27.01.2020 and 01.01.2021 issued under Section 16(5) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“FSS Act, 2006”).

The amended Note (c) broadened its scope to apply to all products listed in Regulation 2.5.2 and required that certain food-producing animals not be fed feed containing meat/bone meal etc. of bovine/porcine origin (subject to limited exceptions), and further mandated that commercial feeds comply with BIS standards and carry the BIS certification mark.

Key issues framed by the Court

• Whether Note (c) is ultra vires the FSS Act, 2006 because “food” under the Act excludes animal feed.
• Whether FSSAI can mandate BIS standards/certification for commercial feeds absent a Central Government order under the BIS Act, 2016.
• Whether FSSAI’s Section 16(5) “directions” can extend to animal feed regulation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and:

• quashed Note (c) appended to Regulation 2.5.2 (as amended in 2021);
• quashed the FSSAI directions dated 10.12.2019, 27.01.2020 and 01.01.2021.

The Court held that the impugned Note (c) and directions sought to regulate animal/cattle feed, which lies outside the scope of the FSS Act, 2006 because the Act’s definition of “food” is limited to substances intended for human consumption and expressly excludes animal feed. The BIS compliance requirement was also held beyond FSSAI’s competence, particularly in light of the BIS regime where standards are primarily voluntary and become mandatory only through specified legal routes (e.g., Government orders).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. P Krishnamurthy & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 517

The Court treated this decision as a leading authority on judicial review of subordinate legislation. It extracted and applied the structured grounds on which delegated legislation may be invalidated, including:

• lack of legislative competence;
• failure to conform to the enabling statute / exceeding delegated authority;
• repugnancy to other laws;
• manifest arbitrariness.

The High Court used P Krishnamurthy to justify a close scrutiny of whether Note (c) “conforms to” and stays “within the scope” of the FSS Act, 2006.

(B) Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1985 (1) SCC 641

Quoted (through P Krishnamurthy) for the proposition that subordinate legislation:

• does not enjoy the same immunity as plenary statutes; and
• can be challenged for inconsistency with the parent statute or other statutes, and for manifest arbitrariness.

This reinforced the Court’s approach that an FSSAI regulation must “yield” to the parent statute’s limits and to the BIS statutory framework.

(C) Kerala State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Thomas Joseph alias Thomas M.J. & Ors. (2023) 11 SCC 700

Relied upon for reaffirming the doctrine of ultra vires in delegated legislation: the rule-maker has no inherent power and must remain within the statute’s purview; if it travels beyond, it is void.

The High Court invoked paragraph 71 to underscore that courts must keep administrative rule-makers within legal confines.

(D) Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India & Ors. [(2024) 13 SCC 241]

This case supplied the Court’s modern framework for assessing whether a regulation is within delegated authority, particularly:

• the three-step test (identify source of power → interpret subordinate instrument → assess consistency with delegated scope);
• the “generality versus enumeration” principle, i.e., enumerated heads are illustrative, but general delegated power still cannot be used to expand the Act’s substantive scope.

The Court used Naresh Chandra Agrawal to reject any attempt to justify Note (c) by relying on the generality of FSSAI’s regulation-making power under Section 92(1): general power exists only to carry out the Act, not to extend it to non-food (animal feed).

(E) Petitioner-cited procedural-maxim precedents

• Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Limited & Ors. [(2010) 13 SCC 336]
• Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253]
• Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, (1975) 1 SCC 559

These were cited for the principle that where law prescribes a manner for doing an act, it must be done in that manner or not at all. While the Court’s ultimate reasoning turned primarily on lack of enabling power, the judgment’s treatment of BIS compulsion echoes the same structural idea: if BIS standards are to be made mandatory, the BIS Act route (Central Government order) must be followed rather than an indirect FSSAI regulation/direction.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Textual and scheme-based limits of the FSS Act, 2006

The Court’s central holding rests on the FSS Act’s definition of “food” in Section 3(1)(j):

• “food” means a substance intended for human consumption; and
• it does not include any animal feed.

The Court then aligned the Act’s operative provisions (Long Title, Section 16 duties/functions; Section 92 regulation power) with this definitional boundary: when the Act repeatedly uses “food”, it refers to food for humans; therefore, FSSAI’s regulatory domain cannot be expanded to animal feed through subordinate legislation.

(B) Note (c) regulates animal feed and therefore exceeds delegated power

Note (c) required that milk/meat producing animals not be fed particular categories of feed (meat/bone meal etc.). The Court treated this as direct regulation of animal feed—a field the FSS Act excludes. Hence, Note (c) was held to “travel beyond the purview” of the parent Act and was quashed as ultra vires.

(C) BIS standards/certification cannot be made mandatory through the FSS Act route

The Court separately found that Note (c)’s BIS requirement was legally infirm because:

• Under Rule 24 of the Bureau of Indian Standards Rules, 2018, Indian Standards are generally voluntary.
• They become binding only if stipulated in a contract, referred to in legislation, or made mandatory by specific Government orders.
• The respondents could not produce a Central Government order/notification under the BIS Act, 2016 (including the mechanism contemplated by Section 16) making BIS certification mandatory for commercial feeds.

The Court rejected reliance on an RTI response suggesting “mandatory BIS certification” for IS 2052:2023 cattle feed, noting the absence of the requisite Government notification/order that would legally underpin such mandatoriness.

(D) The “generality versus enumeration” argument fails because the parent Act’s subject-matter is confined

Applying Naresh Chandra Agrawal, the Court accepted that enumerated regulation topics do not necessarily restrict general rule-making power. However, it stressed the critical limit: the general power under Section 92(1) exists only to “carry out the provisions of the Act,” and cannot be used to create substantive obligations in a domain the Act excludes (animal feed).

(E) Section 16(5) “directions” cannot extend beyond “food” (human) safety and standards

The Court held that Section 16(5) empowers FSSAI to issue directions to Commissioners of Food Safety on matters relating to “food safety and standards”, which must be read with the statutory definitions of “food” and “food safety” (both anchored to human consumption). Therefore, the impugned directions compelling BIS compliance for animal feed were also beyond FSSAI’s authority and were quashed.

(F) The Court’s institutional note: legality does not foreclose policy, but requires the correct statutory route

Importantly, the Court clarified that BIS standards can be made mandatory for commercial feeds—but only by “appropriate recourse” to the BIS Act, 2016 and rules (i.e., through the competent Central Government mechanism), not by FSSAI regulations under the FSS Act, 2006.

3.3 Impact

(A) Immediate regulatory impact

• FSSAI’s attempt to regulate animal feed via food-product standards regulations has been invalidated, requiring the regulator to reassess the legal basis of any feed-related mandates.
• Enforcement actions premised solely on the quashed Note (c) or the quashed directions lose legal footing.

(B) Structural impact on delegated legislation

• The judgment is a clear reaffirmation that delegated legislation cannot be used to expand the subject-matter of a statute, even when broad regulation-making language exists.
• It operationalises the Supreme Court’s modern delegated-legislation approach (especially Naresh Chandra Agrawal) in a concrete regulatory setting.

(C) Inter-statute coordination: FSS regime vs BIS regime

• The decision strengthens the boundary between (i) food safety regulation for human consumption under the FSS Act, 2006 and (ii) standards and certification mandatoriness under the BIS Act, 2016.
• It signals that “BIS compliance” obligations must be grounded in BIS mechanisms (and evidence of the requisite Government order), not inferred from regulatory preference or administrative communications.

(D) Federal and sectoral governance

Although the petitioner invoked Entry 15, List II (animal husbandry/stock protection), the Court decided the case primarily on ultra vires grounds (scope of FSS Act definitions and delegated power). Even so, the judgment will likely influence future disputes about which statutory framework (and level of government) can regulate animal feed—especially where human-food safety is asserted as the justification.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Ultra vires” (beyond legal power)

A regulation is “ultra vires” when the authority making it lacks legal power under the parent statute. Here, because the FSS Act defines “food” as meant for human consumption and excludes animal feed, FSSAI cannot regulate animal feed through FSS regulations.

4.2 Delegated/subordinate legislation

Parliament makes the primary law (the Act). The regulator (FSSAI) can make regulations only within the limits that Parliament allowed. Regulations cannot create new domains of control not contemplated by the Act.

4.3 “Generality versus enumeration”

When an Act gives a broad rule-making power and then lists specific topics, the list is usually illustrative. But the broad power still cannot be used to change what the Act is fundamentally about. It can fill details, not rewrite boundaries.

4.4 Voluntary vs mandatory BIS standards

BIS standards are generally voluntary. They become mandatory only if the law (or a valid Government order under the BIS Act framework) makes them compulsory. A different regulator cannot make them mandatory merely by referencing BIS standards in its own regulations, unless its parent statute authorises it and the legal conditions are met.

5. Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision establishes a clear precedent that:

• The FSS Act, 2006 is confined to regulation of “food” intended for human consumption; because “animal feed” is expressly excluded from the definition of “food”, FSSAI cannot regulate animal feed through regulations or Section 16(5) directions.
• Mandating BIS compliance/certification for commercial feeds cannot be achieved through FSSAI’s delegated powers absent the appropriate Central Government action under the BIS Act, 2016 and its rules.

In broader legal terms, the judgment is a robust application of the ultra vires doctrine to modern regulatory action: policy concerns (even if legitimate) must be pursued through the correct statutory instrument and competent authority, not by stretching delegated power beyond the parent Act’s design.