Final Lease Decrees Cannot Be Stalled by Vague Section 118 Objections: Article 227 Intervention Requires Perversity or Jurisdictional Error
| Case | SUBASH CHAND AND OTHERS v. COMPETENT AUTOMOBILES CO. LTD. |
| Citation | 2026 HHC 37495 |
| Court | High Court of Himachal Pradesh |
| Date | 3 September 2026 |
| Judge | Justice Virender Singh |
| Jurisdiction | Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India |
| Result | Petition dismissed; execution proceedings and appointment of the Local Commissioner upheld. |
1. Introduction
The judgment concerns the execution of a final decree directing the execution and registration of a lease deed. M/s Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd., the decree-holder, had obtained a decree for specific performance against Subhash Chand and the other judgment-debtors. The judgment-debtors sought to resist execution principally on the ground that the transaction required permission under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and that the proposed 99-year lease was legally impermissible.
The Executing Court rejected the objections and appointed an advocate as Local Commissioner to execute the lease deed. The judgment-debtors challenged that order under Article 227, alleging that the Executing Court had travelled beyond the decree and had failed to verify compliance with mandatory statutory requirements.
Central holding: Where the record states that permission under Section 118 has already been granted, and the judgment-debtors identify no concrete defect in that permission, vague objections cannot obstruct execution of a final decree. The High Court will not interfere under Article 227 merely because the Executing Court’s reasons are brief, unless the order is perverse, jurisdictionally defective, or results in grave injustice.
2. Background and Procedural History
Original suit
Competent Automobiles filed Civil Suit No. 160 of 2006 for specific performance of a lease agreement and for injunction. On 24 April 2012, the trial court partly decreed the suit by granting permanent prohibitory injunction against forcible or illegal dispossession, but declined specific performance.
First appeals
Both sides appealed. On 30 October 2014, the First Appellate Court dismissed Ram Piari’s appeal and allowed the company’s appeal. It directed the defendants to execute and register a lease deed concerning the suit property in accordance with the lease agreement dated 10 December 2003 and the compromise agreement dated 22 March 2005.
Finality of the decree
RSA No. 62 of 2015, filed by Ram Piari, was dismissed for want of prosecution on 16 August 2017. The decree for specific performance consequently attained finality.
Execution proceedings
The decree-holder instituted execution proceedings under Order XXI Rules 32 and 34(5), read with Section 151 CPC, and submitted a draft lease deed. The judgment-debtors objected on grounds including:
- absence of permission under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act;
- the decree-holder’s status as a non-agriculturist;
- estoppel, lack of locus standi and non-joinder of necessary parties;
- alleged arrears of rent; and
- the alleged statutory prohibition against a lease exceeding 30 years.
On 5 August 2026, the Executing Court rejected the objections and appointed Mr. Ashwani Kaushal, Advocate, as Local Commissioner to execute the lease deed.
3. Issues Before the High Court
- Whether the Executing Court had travelled beyond or enlarged the decree.
- Whether execution could proceed without proof of permission under Section 118.
- Whether the objections to the 99-year lease and draft deed required reconsideration.
- Whether the brevity of the Executing Court’s reasoning made its order perverse.
- Whether any ground existed for supervisory interference under Article 227.
4. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court dismissed the petition. It found that the execution application and draft lease deed expressly referred to government permission dated 6 February 2015 under Section 118. Counsel for the judgment-debtors could not identify any specific non-compliance or legal defect in that permission.
The Court held that questions of estoppel, locus standi, non-joinder and the underlying contractual relationship could not be reopened after the decree had attained finality. The parties’ rights were governed by the lease agreement and compromise upon which the appellate decree was based.
The procedure under Order XXI Rule 34 was substantially followed: a draft was filed, objections were invited, and those objections were considered. Since the contractual documents contemplated a 99-year lease, the Executing Court was justified in rejecting an objection inconsistent with the final decree.
Although the Executing Court’s reasons were brief, this deficiency alone did not establish perversity. There was no unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, or flagrant violation of law justifying intervention under Article 227.
5. Analysis
5.1 Limited scope of Article 227
The Court began by emphasizing that Article 227 confers supervisory—not appellate—jurisdiction. It does not authorize the High Court to reconsider the entire case, reweigh facts, or substitute its preferred conclusion merely because another view is possible.
In K. Valarmathi & Ors. versus Kumaresan, the Supreme Court held that supervisory power cannot be used to usurp original jurisdiction or supplant statutory remedies. This authority established the starting point for examining the challenge.
Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. versus B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors. was relied upon for the proposition that interference is ordinarily justified only where there is:
- an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction;
- a gross abuse of jurisdiction; or
- an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
In M/s Garment Craft versus Prakash Chand Goel, the Supreme Court explained that Article 227 is corrective rather than appellate. It is intended to remedy grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse, or violation of fundamental principles of law and justice. That decision, in turn, quoted Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. .) Ltd.2 on the duty of High Courts to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority without correcting every alleged error.
5.2 Meaning of “perversity”
The judgment-debtors could succeed only if the Executing Court’s conclusion was shown to be perverse or jurisdictionally unsustainable. The High Court relied extensively on Arulvelu and another versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and another, which describes a perverse finding as one based on no evidence, wholly unreliable evidence, disregard of relevant material, consideration of irrelevant material, or reasoning that outrageously defies logic.
The authorities discussed within Arulvelu and another versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and another included:
- Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others—a finding unsupported by evidence, contrary to law, or affected by procedural irregularity may be perverse.
- Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others—a perverse finding is not merely against the weight of evidence but against the evidence itself.
- Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin—a conclusion is not perverse merely because another view is possible.
- M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another—an order consciously violating pleadings and law may be perverse.
- Moffett v. Gough and devina jula godfrey. v. ian michael godfrey—perversity denotes departure from what is right, proper or supported by the evidence.
- Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P.—appellate interference is improper where the lower court’s view is reasonable.
- Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others—a finding based on no evidence or wholly unreliable evidence is reviewable as perverse.
- H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992—judicial review may intervene where relevant material is ignored, irrelevant material is considered, or the conclusion is irrational.
The same principles were reaffirmed in S.R. Tewari versus Union of India and another, which referred to Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner Of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary, and Babu v. State of Kerala.
Applying these authorities, the High Court found that the Executing Court’s decision was supported by the final decree, the draft deed and the assertion that statutory permission had been obtained. It therefore did not meet the high threshold of perversity.
5.3 Executing court cannot go beyond the decree
The Court accepted the general rule that an executing court must execute a decree as it stands and cannot enlarge, vary or rewrite it. It may, however, construe the decree and settle the form of the document necessary to give effect to it.
Here, the First Appellate Court had expressly directed execution and registration of a lease deed in accordance with the parties’ agreements. The objection to the agreed lease period would effectively require the Executing Court to reopen or modify the final decree, which it had no authority to do.
5.4 Order XXI Rule 34 and the draft lease deed
The Court relied on Rajbir versus Suraj Bhan and another. That case explains the procedure where a decree requires execution of a document:
- the decree-holder prepares a draft conforming to the decree;
- the draft is submitted to the court;
- the court serves it upon the judgment-debtor and invites written objections;
- the court approves or alters the draft; and
- the document is then executed by the court or its authorized officer and registered.
In Rajbir versus Suraj Bhan and another, the process was defective because objections to the draft had not been invited before execution. By contrast, the present judgment-debtors had filed objections both to execution and to the draft deed, and those objections were adjudicated. The essential procedural safeguard was therefore satisfied.
5.5 Section 118 permission
Section 118 restricts transfers of land in Himachal Pradesh to non-agriculturists unless the required government permission exists. The High Court did not hold that permission was unnecessary. Rather, it held that the record expressly referred to permission granted through letter Rev. B F (10)-237/2005, Part-II, dated 6 February 2015.
The judgment-debtors did not demonstrate how that permission was invalid, insufficient or inapplicable. Their objection was therefore treated as vague and incapable of defeating execution.
Important limitation: The judgment does not dispense with Section 118 or authorize execution where permission is genuinely absent. Its conclusion is tied to the recorded fact that permission had been obtained and to the failure of the judgment-debtors to identify a specific defect.
5.6 Brevity of reasons
The judgment-debtors argued that the Executing Court had merely narrated the facts and summarily rejected their objections. The High Court acknowledged the brevity of the reasoning but held that lack of elaborate reasons, by itself, did not make the order perverse where the result was supported by the record and governing law.
This should not be read as permitting unreasoned judicial orders generally. The narrower principle is that Article 227 is not attracted by every deficiency in drafting where no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice is established.
6. Ratio Decidendi
- A final decree directing execution of a lease deed cannot be obstructed by objections that seek to reopen matters already concluded between the parties.
- Where Section 118 permission is recorded as having been granted, the judgment-debtor must identify a concrete legal or factual defect; a vague denial is insufficient.
- Order XXI Rule 34 is satisfied when the draft document is placed before the court, the judgment-debtor is allowed to object, and those objections are considered before execution.
- Supervisory interference under Article 227 requires perversity, jurisdictional excess, gross procedural illegality or grave injustice—not merely brief reasoning or the possibility of another view.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
| Concept |
Meaning |
| Decree-holder |
The party in whose favour the court has granted enforceable relief. |
| Judgment-debtor |
The party legally required to comply with the decree. |
| Specific performance |
A remedy compelling a party to perform the promised contract rather than merely pay damages. |
| Execution |
The process through which a court enforces its final decree. |
| Section 47 CPC |
Requires questions concerning execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree to be determined by the Executing Court. |
| Order XXI Rule 34 CPC |
Provides the procedure for preparing and executing a document when the judgment-debtor refuses to sign it. |
| Local Commissioner |
A person appointed by the court to perform a specified judicially supervised act, such as executing a document. |
| Article 227 jurisdiction |
The High Court’s limited supervisory power to correct serious jurisdictional or legal failures by subordinate courts. |
| Perversity |
A conclusion based on no evidence, irrelevant material, disregard of decisive material, or reasoning that no reasonable person could accept. |
| Executing court cannot go beyond the decree |
The court must enforce the decree as made; it cannot revise the parties’ substantive rights during execution. |
8. Potential Impact
- Stronger finality of decrees: Judgment-debtors cannot use execution proceedings as a second opportunity to contest contractual or statutory issues already concluded.
- Guidance on land-transfer objections: A Section 118 objection must be specific and supported; a general assertion of non-compliance will not automatically suspend execution.
- Order XXI Rule 34 compliance: Executing courts should place draft documents before judgment-debtors, invite objections and expressly approve or alter the drafts.
- Restricted Article 227 challenges: Parties must show more than an arguable legal error or inadequate reasoning; they must establish perversity, jurisdictional failure or serious injustice.
- Protection against delayed enforcement: The ruling discourages repeated technical objections aimed at frustrating specific-performance decrees.
The judgment leaves open the evidentiary question of what proof would be necessary if permission under Section 118 were genuinely disputed or shown to have expired, been conditional, or related to a different transaction. It also does not independently determine the validity of every 99-year lease; its conclusion rests on the terms underlying the final decree.
9. Conclusion
The Himachal Pradesh High Court upheld the execution of the lease decree because the judgment-debtors failed to show any perversity or jurisdictional error. The decree had attained finality, the draft lease deed had been subjected to objections, and statutory permission was recorded as having been obtained.
The decision reinforces three principles: final decrees must be obeyed, execution cannot become a retrial, and Article 227 is reserved for serious failures of jurisdiction or justice. At the same time, it preserves the mandatory character of Section 118 by confining its ruling to a case where permission was stated to exist and no specific defect was demonstrated.