False Self-Disclosure in Form 26 Is Not “Publication” and Does Not Constitute Corrupt Practice under Section 123(4) RP Act
1. Introduction
This Delhi High Court Division Bench decision arose from a reference made by a learned Single Judge while hearing an election petition
filed by Yogender Chandolia (petitioner) challenging the election of Vishesh Ravi (returned candidate/respondent no. 1)
from Assembly Constituency-23, Karol Bagh, in the 2020 Delhi Legislative Assembly elections.
The election petition alleged that the returned candidate furnished false/misleading information about his educational qualifications
in the affidavit/Form 26 filed with the nomination paper. The petitioner sought (i) declaration that the 2020 election was void, (ii) prosecution
under Section 125A RP Act and IPC provisions, and (iii) consequential disqualification under Section 8A RP Act.
During the hearing, the Single Judge questioned whether the petition had become infructuous because fresh elections had already been held in 2025.
The petitioner argued the matter should continue because the alleged false disclosure amounted to corrupt practice, which could trigger disqualification.
Doubting the correctness of the earlier Delhi High Court view in Nand Ram Bagri v. Jai Kishan, especially after the Supreme Court decision in
Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laksmi & Ors., the Single Judge referred the issue to a larger bench (the present Division Bench).
The reference was narrowly framed: whether non-disclosure/false disclosure of educational qualification in the candidate’s affidavit/Form 26
attracts Section 123 RP Act—particularly Section 123(4)—so as to keep the petition alive despite the 2025 elections.
2. Summary of the Judgment
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The Division Bench held that the petitioner’s pleadings were confined to Section 123(4) (false statement “published” about
personal character/conduct of “any candidate” to prejudice that candidate’s election), and not to Section 123(2) (undue influence).
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On a plain reading of Section 123(4), a candidate’s allegedly false statement about himself in Form 26/affidavit does
not satisfy the statutory ingredients—most importantly, the false statement must concern another candidate and be calculated to
prejudice that other candidate’s prospects.
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The Court added that a declaration in a nomination form/affidavit would not, by itself, amount to “publication” for Section 123(4).
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Consequently, even if the allegations were assumed true, no corrupt practice under Section 123(4) could be made out on the pleaded case.
With the Assembly term already over and fresh elections held in 2025, the election petition was liable to be treated as infructuous.
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The Court expressly held that Nand Ram Bagri v. Jai Kishan, to the extent it treated wrong/incorrect statements in a candidate’s own nomination form
as corrupt practice under Section 123(4), is not good law.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The reference pivoted on how Nand Ram Bagri v. Jai Kishan had earlier been read to support the proposition that an incorrect declaration
about educational qualification in Form 26 could amount to corrupt practice. The petitioner relied on the reasoning (as described in the present judgment)
that the expression “statement of fact which is false” could include a statement by the candidate “with respect to his own self.”
The Division Bench distinguished Nand Ram Bagri on pleadings and statutory fit:
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It noted that Nand Ram Bagri involved consideration of Section 123(2) as well as Section 123(4),
whereas in the present case the petitioner’s affidavit and pleadings were pegged specifically to Section 123(4).
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It held that the Section 123(4) rationale in Nand Ram Bagri (treating false self-statements in nomination documents as falling within 123(4))
cannot stand with a plain-text reading of the provision.
Most significantly, the Court made a doctrinal correction: Section 123(4) is structurally aimed at false statements about “any candidate” (i.e., an opponent),
intended to prejudice “that candidate’s” election; it does not naturally extend to “self-puffery” or misstatements about oneself.
The judgment therefore narrows the operative scope of Nand Ram Bagri and declares it “not good law” to the extent it holds that
wrong/incorrect statements in one’s own nomination form are corrupt practice under Section 123(4).
(B) Judgment dated 26.08.2013 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court (Civil Appeal no. 6790/2013)
The Division Bench referred to the Supreme Court’s decision arising from Nand Ram Bagri to underscore that the earlier litigation’s focus was materially tied
to the impact of incorrect educational qualification disclosures, and that it was examined in the context of Section 123(2) as well.
While the present judgment does not extract the Supreme Court’s ratio in detail, it uses the appellate context to support its reading that the earlier line of cases
cannot be mechanically transplanted onto a petition pleaded only under Section 123(4).
(C) Ajmera Shyam v. Smt. Kova Laksmi & Ors. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1723)
This Supreme Court decision was central to the Single Judge’s doubt and the Division Bench’s framing of the modern approach to disclosure defects.
The Division Bench reproduced the Supreme Court’s “CONCLUSION” section, which:
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Recognises judicially mandated disclosure requirements (criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities, educational qualifications) as tools to
“invigorate” the electoral process, but draws a distinction between criminal antecedents (core to electoral purity) and
assets/education (supplementary, with scope to treat some non-disclosures as non-substantial).
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Warns against unreasonably stretching disclosure requirements on assets/education to invalidate elections over
minor technical non-compliances not of “substantial character.”
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Holds, on the facts there, that the non-disclosure defect was not substantial; hence, nomination could not have been rejected under Section 36(2),
election could not be invalidated under Section 100(1)(d)(i), and the conduct did not amount to corrupt practice under Section 123(2).
In the present case, Ajmera Shyam reinforces the Court’s reluctance to expand corrupt practice grounds beyond statutory text and to invalidate mandates
on disclosure-related defects without a tight statutory fit. Though the present Court decides primarily on the textual scope of Section 123(4) and pleadings,
it signals that the broader trajectory after Ajmera Shyam is against expansive invalidation based on education/asset disclosure disputes.
The Court cited this seminal decision to explain why courts historically treated disclosure obligations seriously: the jurisprudential objective was to
sanitise elections through voter information. The Division Bench notes that, at one point, false declaration about educational qualification
was treated as capable of influencing voters, consistent with the ethos of Association for Democratic Reforms.
However, it juxtaposes that earlier “serious view” with the “significant change” signalled in Ajmera Shyam, suggesting a more calibrated approach
to whether such defects justify election invalidation or constitute corrupt practice—especially in the absence of a clear statutory hook.
(E) M.J. Jacob v. A. Narayanan and Ors. (Civil Appeal 3611/2008)
The returned candidate relied on M.J. Jacob v. A. Narayanan and Ors. to argue that elections should not be set aside lightly and that the
ingredients of Section 123(4) must be strictly established. Although the present judgment does not quote the decision, it adopts the same underlying
principle: strict compliance with statutory ingredients in corrupt practice allegations and a strong presumption in favour of the
electoral mandate unless the petition is squarely within the Act.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(A) The “pleadings-first” approach in election law
The Court placed decisive weight on how the petition was pleaded. It found that, despite a stray mention during argument, the petitioner had not set up
a case under Section 123(2) and had verified allegations specifically as corrupt practice under Section 123(4).
Invoking the strict nature of election adjudication, the Court emphasised:
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Corrupt practice allegations are quasi-criminal (as the Single Judge had noted in the reference order).
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The RP Act requires full particulars of corrupt practice (the Court referenced Section 83 RP Act).
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The High Court cannot “suo moto” reframe the case by discovering an alternative provision (e.g., Section 123(2)) to unsettle the electorate’s mandate.
(B) Textual deconstruction of Section 123(4): four ingredients
The Division Bench articulated four ingredients of Section 123(4):
- Publication by a candidate/agent (etc.).
- The statement is false/known or believed to be false/not believed to be true.
- The statement relates to the personal character or conduct of any candidate.
- The statement is intended (reasonably calculated) to prejudice the prospects of that candidate’s election.
Reading these together, the Court concluded Section 123(4) presupposes a false statement about an opponent, designed to harm the opponent’s electoral prospects.
A false claim about one’s own education, even if made to improve one’s own prospects, does not match this design.
(C) “Publication” and nomination documents
The Court fortified its conclusion by examining the word “publication,” adopting a dictionary meaning (Black’s Law Dictionary) as making something public, known,
disclosed, or revealed. It then held that a declaration given in the nomination form/affidavit would not “by itself” amount to publication.
This is an important additional strand: even before asking about whom the statement is made, the Court questions whether the act of filing Form 26/affidavit
satisfies the “publication” element under Section 123(4).
(D) Consequence: infructuousness after fresh elections
The Court framed the practical question: if on the pleaded case no corrupt practice can be found even if all facts are proved, there is no point in a trial
that could only culminate in dismissal. Since the Assembly term had ended and a new election had occurred in 2025, the petition (whose survival was argued mainly on the
disqualification consequence of corrupt practice) was held liable to be treated as infructuous.
3.3 Impact
(A) Narrowing Section 123(4) to “attacks on opponents,” not “false self-portrayal”
The most direct doctrinal impact is the Court’s clarification that false self-declarations in Form 26/affidavit (educational qualification) do not constitute corrupt practice
under Section 123(4). This restricts Section 123(4) to its classic mischief: defamatory/false factual attacks on an opponent’s character/conduct calculated to harm that
opponent’s prospects.
By declaring Nand Ram Bagri v. Jai Kishan “not good law” to the extent it treated wrong nomination statements as Section 123(4) corrupt practice, this judgment reshapes
Delhi High Court authority. Future petitioners in Delhi can no longer safely rely on Nand Ram Bagri to plead Section 123(4) based solely on a candidate’s false self-disclosure.
(C) Higher pleading discipline and reduced judicial re-characterisation
The decision reinforces that election petitions are not ordinary civil pleadings: if the petitioner does not plead the correct corrupt practice provision (and particulars), the Court
will not “convert” the case into a different statutory theory. This will likely drive more carefully structured pleadings (or more threshold dismissals) in disclosure-based challenges.
(D) Post-Ajmera Shyam caution against invalidating elections for non-criminal disclosure defects
Though the ratio here is anchored in Section 123(4) text and pleading limits, the Court’s reliance on Ajmera Shyam signals a wider judicial posture:
education and asset disclosure defects should not readily become grounds for nullifying elections or branding conduct as corrupt practice absent clear statutory coverage and
substantiality.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Corrupt practice (Section 123 RP Act): Statutorily defined wrongful election conduct. Because the consequences can include voiding an election and disqualification,
courts treat allegations as quasi-criminal—requiring strict pleading and proof.
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Section 123(4): Targets false factual statements published about an opponent’s personal character or conduct, intended to harm the opponent’s election prospects.
It is not a general “falsehood” provision for all incorrect statements in nomination papers.
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Section 123(2) (“undue influence”): A different corrupt practice head dealing with interference with free exercise of electoral rights. The Court noted that even if the
facts might arguably implicate undue influence, it cannot be invoked unless properly pleaded.
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Improper acceptance of nomination (Section 100(1)(d)(i)): A ground to void an election if the Returning Officer illegally accepted a nomination; however, the defect must
be of a kind that legally required rejection. Ajmera Shyam stresses “substantial character” in certain disclosure contexts.
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Infructuous election petition: A petition becomes practically pointless when the term is over and no surviving statutory consequence remains achievable on the pleaded case.
Here, the petitioner’s main attempt to keep the case alive was the potential disqualification for corrupt practice—which failed because Section 123(4) was not attracted.
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“Publication”: Making a statement public. The Court held that merely filing Form 26/affidavit does not, by itself, amount to “publication” for Section 123(4).
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Section 83 RP Act (pleading particulars): Requires an election petition to state material facts and full particulars of corrupt practice; vague or misdirected pleadings are fatal.
5. Conclusion
The Division Bench decisively clarifies that false statements by a candidate about his own educational qualifications in Form 26/affidavit do not constitute corrupt practice under Section 123(4).
Section 123(4) is confined to false published attacks on other candidates calculated to prejudice their election prospects. The Court further indicates that nomination affidavits are not “publication”
in themselves for Section 123(4).
By holding Nand Ram Bagri v. Jai Kishan “not good law” to the extent it expanded Section 123(4) to self-statements in nomination papers, and by insisting on strict statutory pleading and textual fidelity,
the judgment strengthens predictability in election jurisprudence and curbs attempts to repackage disclosure disputes as corrupt practice without a precise statutory fit—particularly in the post-Ajmera Shyam landscape.