False Promise to Marry and “Misconception of Fact” Under Section 90 IPC: Conviction for Rape Cannot Stand Without Proof of Deceptive Intent From Inception, Especially Where Subsequent Marriage/Consensual Relationship Is Admitted

1. Introduction

The Calcutta High Court (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction), by judgment dated 27.03.2026 in MITHUN PAUL v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL (CRA 76 of 2009), set aside the appellant’s conviction under Section 376 IPC and the sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment (with fine) imposed by the Fast Track Court, Krishnanagar, Nadia (judgment dated 29.11.2008).

The prosecution case was that on 23.07.2005 the accused allegedly called the victim to his house on the assurance of marriage, forcibly had sexual intercourse, and thereafter confined her until 31.07.2005; she lodged the FIR on 01.08.2005. The defence emphasized that the parties admittedly had a love relationship, later married (including a stated marriage under the Special Marriage Act), cohabited for about two months, and that the victim’s complaint was driven by matrimonial discord and grievance.

The core issue before the High Court was whether a conviction for rape could be sustained on the theory that consent was vitiated by “false promise to marry”/“misconception of fact” when the record reflected a prior romantic relationship, an admitted subsequent marriage, delayed reporting, hostile independent witnesses, and inconclusive medical opinion.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. It held that:

  • Although it is settled that a conviction in sexual offences can rest on the sole testimony of the victim if it inspires confidence, the victim’s evidence here did not.
  • The record did not establish that the accused had, from the inception, an intention to deceive the victim by a false promise of marriage.
  • The victim’s admitted subsequent marriage to the accused (suppressed in the written complaint and not stated in examination-in-chief), the admitted love affair, two months’ cohabitation, absence of corroboration for alleged confinement, the conduct of not complaining during alleged confinement, hostile witnesses, and inconclusive medical evidence cumulatively created reasonable doubt.
  • Consequently, the trial court’s inference that consent (if any) was given under “misconception of fact” under Section 90 IPC was unsustainable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite any specific prior case-law by name. Instead, it relies on a “settled law” proposition stated in general terms: in sexual assault cases, the sole testimony of the victim can found conviction if it inspires confidence.

As no named precedents are referenced in the text, the Court’s reasoning is principally anchored in:

  • the evidentiary assessment of the witnesses on record; and
  • the statutory framework—especially Section 90 IPC (consent under fear or misconception).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The “confidence test” for sole testimony

The Court reaffirmed the doctrinal position that a victim’s testimony may suffice without independent corroboration—provided it is credible and inspires confidence. It then applied that test to the facts and found multiple credibility deficits:

  • Suppression of a material fact: The victim admitted in cross-examination that she had married the accused and lived as husband and wife for two months, but this was not disclosed in the written complaint and was not stated in examination-in-chief.
  • Motive/animus emerging from the victim’s own admissions: The victim admitted she filed the case so she could live with the accused as husband and wife, and that she would not have filed it if he had led conjugal life with her. The Court treated this as supportive of a grievance-driven complaint.
  • Delay and implausibility regarding confinement: The alleged confinement for 8/9 days was not supported by independent evidence, and the Court noted that despite family awareness, no complaint was lodged during that period.
  • Hostile/unsupportive independent witnesses: P.W.4, P.W.5, and P.W.6 denied hearing about rape or seeing the alleged circumstances, weakening the prosecution’s narrative of immediate disclosure and community intervention.
  • Medical evidence not confirming rape: The doctor found the hymen not intact but could not opine whether rape was committed, and noted the victim reported sexual exposure without attributing it to a specific person.

(b) False promise to marry, Section 90 IPC, and the requirement of “intention from inception”

A pivotal part of the judgment is its rejection of the trial court’s reasoning that consent was vitiated by misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC. The High Court held that—even assuming sexual intercourse occurred—the evidence did not show that:

  • there was a prior promise that induced the victim to visit the accused’s house; and
  • the accused had an intention, from the very beginning, to deceive the victim by making a promise of marriage he never intended to fulfil.

In effect, the Court required a clear evidentiary foundation linking (i) a promise, (ii) reliance/inducement, and (iii) deceptive intent at the inception, before treating consent as legally invalid under Section 90 IPC.

(c) Consequence: failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt

The Court emphasized the criminal law standard: the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Given the contradictions, suppression, lack of corroboration for confinement, hostile witnesses, and inconclusive medical opinion, the Court held that the conviction could not stand.

3.3 Impact

This judgment’s practical significance lies in its fact-sensitive clarification of when “false promise to marry” can (and cannot) vitiate consent:

  • Higher evidentiary threshold for Section 90-based theories: Courts must look for proof of deceptive intent from inception, not merely a later breakdown of the relationship or non-performance of a contemplated marriage.
  • Suppression of material facts affects credibility: Non-disclosure of subsequent marriage/cohabitation in the initial complaint may substantially undermine reliability and invite heightened scrutiny of the complainant’s narrative.
  • Confinement allegations require credible support: Where prolonged confinement is alleged, the absence of contemporaneous complaint or independent support may be treated as materially damaging.
  • Trial courts cautioned against inferential leaps: The judgment warns against automatically equating a promise of marriage (or later marriage disputes) with “misconception of fact” without a careful chain of proof.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Consent” and Section 90 IPC (“misconception of fact”)

Section 90 IPC says that consent is not valid (for purposes of offences requiring consent) if it is given under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact, and the person obtaining it knows (or has reason to believe) that the consent was given because of that fear/misconception.

In “promise to marry” cases, the legal question is not simply whether marriage did not happen or later turned sour, but whether: (i) the promise was the real reason the person agreed, and (ii) the promise was dishonest from the start.

4.2 “Sole testimony of the victim”

Courts can convict even without independent witnesses if the victim’s testimony is coherent, natural, and trustworthy. But if the testimony contains material contradictions, suppressed facts, or is inconsistent with surrounding evidence and conduct, the Court may require corroboration or may find reasonable doubt.

4.3 “Beyond reasonable doubt”

This is the highest standard of proof in law. If the evidence leaves the Court with a reasonable doubt about the accused’s guilt—based on gaps, contradictions, improbabilities, or missing links—the accused must be acquitted.

5. Conclusion

MITHUN PAUL v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL underscores that the “false promise to marry” route to vitiating consent under Section 90 IPC demands proof of deception from the inception and a credible evidentiary narrative. Where the complainant admits a prior love relationship, later marriage and cohabitation, suppresses those facts in the initial complaint, and key surrounding allegations (such as prolonged confinement) lack corroboration, a conviction for rape cannot be sustained merely on broad inferences. The judgment thus operates as a caution against converting relationship or matrimonial disputes into penal findings without the strict proof criminal law requires.