Expert Report Not Cited as Witness Is Not Fatal at Discharge Stage; Forgery Allegations Based on Post-Signature Alteration Must Go to Trial

Court: Calcutta High Court (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Appellate Side)
Case: CRR 541 of 2025 (arising out of GR Case No. 678 of 2022, Bolpur)
Date of Judgment: 27.02.2026
Judge: Dr. Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee

1) Introduction

The revision arose from an order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Bolpur dated 09.01.2025 refusing to discharge the petitioners (Gopal Banerjee & another) from charges under Sections 420/468/471/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Opposite Party No. 2 (the complainant) alleged that she had signed two draft money receipts on receiving demand drafts pursuant to a settlement in a pending civil dispute, but later discovered that additional text had been inserted above her signature to convert the receipts into acknowledgments of “advance consideration” for a different land transaction (Dag No. 226, Mouza Goalpara). The prosecution case, therefore, centered on post-signature alteration/addition to the receipts amounting to forgery and allied offences.

2) Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed CRR 541 of 2025 and affirmed the Magistrate’s refusal to discharge. It held that, at the stage of Sections 227/228 CrPC (principles applied by analogy to discharge consideration), the court is not to conduct a mini-trial and must only see whether the record discloses a prima facie case or “grave suspicion.”

On facts, the Court relied on (i) seizure of the two receipts from the conscious possession of Petitioner No. 1 and (ii) the questioned document examiner’s observation that disputed texts (Q/1, Q/2) were “added later on” to the original texts (S/1, S/2). These materials, taken at face value, were considered sufficient to proceed to trial, including on common intention (Section 34 IPC) against Petitioner No. 2 as an alleged joint beneficiary.

Crucially, the Court rejected the contention that the expert report could not be proved because the expert was not cited as a witness in the charge-sheet, noting that Section 311 CrPC empowers the trial court to summon material witnesses at any stage.

The Court clarified that its observations were limited to discharge and that the trial judge remains free to evaluate evidence independently during trial.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Md. Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and another (2009) 8 SCC 751

The High Court invoked this decision to structure the legal understanding of “making a false document” under Section 464 IPC, which is foundational to proving “forgery” under Section 463 IPC. The cited passage (para 14) classifies false documents into three categories:

• First category: making/executing a document to make it appear it was made by someone else or under someone else’s authority.
• Second category: altering a document in a material part “by cancellation or otherwise” without lawful authority after it has been executed.
• Third category: obtaining a signature/execution by deception or from a person not in control of senses.

This taxonomy directly supported the Court’s identification of the prosecution’s theory as falling primarily within the second category: a material alteration/addition to an already executed receipt (i.e., after the complainant signed). In short, the precedent supplied the doctrinal “fit” for the allegation: post-signature addition above the signature can constitute “making a false document” through alteration.

(B) Sajjan Kumar Vs. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 368

The High Court relied on the well-known principles summarized in Sajjan Kumar regarding the scope of scrutiny at the stage of framing charge/discharge (Sections 227/228 CrPC). The core takeaways applied here were:

• The judge may sift and weigh evidence only for a limited purpose—whether a prima facie case/grave suspicion exists.
• No roving enquiry; no evaluation as if conducting a trial.
• If materials disclose that the accused might have committed the offence, charge may be framed; proof beyond reasonable doubt is for trial.
• Where two views are possible and only mere suspicion arises, discharge may follow; where “grave suspicion” exists, discharge should be refused.

Using Sajjan Kumar, the High Court justified why contested factual questions—who inserted the text, when, and with what intent—were matters for trial rather than discharge.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Mapping Sections 463 and 464 IPC to the allegation

The judgment methodically anchored the prosecution case in statutory text:

• Section 463 IPC defines forgery as making a false document with requisite intent (damage/injury, supporting a claim/title, causing a person to part with property, committing fraud, etc.).
• Section 464 IPC explains when a person is said to “make a false document.”

The Court emphasized that to sustain punishment for forgery (the judgment refers to the general structure culminating in punishment), the prosecution must show that a “false document” within Section 464 was made, thereby meeting Section 463’s definition. The “key” clause for the present dispute was the Secondly limb of Section 464: dishonest/fraudulent alteration “by cancellation or otherwise” of a document “in any material part” after it has been executed, without lawful authority.

(B) Why the materials met the discharge threshold

The High Court treated the following as generating sufficient grounds to proceed:

• Seizure from Petitioner No. 1’s conscious possession: The receipts were seized as produced by Petitioner No. 1, allowing an inference (at this stage) of possession and possible involvement.
• Expert observation of later addition: The questioned document examiner noted “fraudulent symptoms” and opined that disputed texts were “added latter on” to the original texts. While not proof beyond reasonable doubt, the report provided a technical basis for “grave suspicion” of alteration.
• Section 34 IPC (common intention): Even if seizure was from Petitioner No. 1, the prosecution’s case alleged acting in furtherance of common intention as “joint beneficiary.” The Court held that the extent of Petitioner No. 2’s role is a trial issue.

(C) Expert not cited as witness: why it did not justify discharge

A significant procedural holding is the Court’s response to the defence argument that the expert was not cited in the charge-sheet, allegedly foreclosing proof of the report and the right of cross-examination. The Court held this was not a ground to discharge because Section 311 CrPC empowers the trial court to summon material witnesses at any stage.

Doctrinally, the Court treated the omission as curable at trial rather than fatal at inception. This reinforces a pragmatic approach: discharge is not granted merely because the prosecution may later face proof/admissibility difficulties, so long as current materials disclose a triable case.

(D) Civil dispute versus criminality

Although the background involved a land transaction and a civil suit for refund/compensation, the Court did not accept the “purely civil” characterization at the discharge stage. The allegation was not merely breach of contract but manipulation of documentary acknowledgments by adding text above a signature—conduct that squarely implicates forgery-related offences if proved. Thus, the coexistence of civil litigation did not immunize alleged acts of falsification.

3.3 Impact

• Discharge jurisprudence in document-forgery cases: The decision reiterates that where an expert report indicates later additions/alterations and the questioned document is seized from an accused, courts are likely to treat the matter as triable rather than dischargeable.
• Section 311 CrPC as a “safety valve”: The judgment strengthens the idea that non-citation of a material witness (including an expert) in the charge-sheet will not necessarily defeat the prosecution at the threshold; trial courts can summon such witnesses later.
• Section 34 IPC in documentary offences: Even absent direct seizure from a co-accused, allegations of common intention and joint benefit may suffice to continue proceedings through trial, leaving role differentiation to evidence.
• Reduced traction for “civil dispute” defence at discharge: Where the gravamen is alleged falsification/alteration of documents, the “civil nature” argument may have limited force at the discharge stage.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Discharge (pre-trial exit): A stage where the court decides whether the accused should face trial. The court does not decide guilt; it checks whether the materials show more than mere suspicion.
• “Grave suspicion”: A strong preliminary inference from the materials that the accused may have committed the offence. It is enough to proceed to trial, even though it is not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Forgery (Sections 463/464 IPC): Not every false statement is “forgery.” Forgery requires making a “false document” with certain fraudulent intents. A document becomes “false” under Section 464 if, among other things, someone materially alters it dishonestly after execution without authority.
• Material alteration: A change/addition that affects the document’s legal meaning or effect—e.g., adding words that transform a receipt into an acknowledgment of a different transaction.
• Section 34 IPC (common intention): A rule of joint liability: if a criminal act is done in furtherance of the common intention of several persons, each may be liable as if they did it alone—subject to proof at trial.
• Section 311 CrPC: Power of the court to summon any witness at any stage if their evidence appears essential to a just decision. This can cure omissions in the charge-sheet witness list.

5) Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision in Gopal Banerjee and Another v. State of West Bengal and Anr consolidates two practical principles for criminal courts dealing with alleged document manipulation: (1) where there is prima facie material suggesting post-execution material alteration (including an expert indication of later additions) and seizure links the document to the accused, discharge is generally inappropriate because the matter requires trial; and (2) non-citation of an expert as a charge-sheet witness is not, by itself, a threshold knockout—Section 311 CrPC allows the court to secure that evidence during trial.

By applying Md. Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and another to classify the alleged conduct as alteration-based falsity under Section 464, and by applying Sajjan Kumar Vs. CBI to restrain discharge-stage adjudication, the judgment reaffirms that disputes with a civil backdrop can still proceed criminally when the core allegation is falsification of documents.