Erroneous Adoption Referrals Cannot Override Eligibility Rules or Create a Deemed NOC

Case: SAHIL GUPTA v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

Citation: 2026 DHC 9354
Court: Delhi High Court
Judge: Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma
Decision: 15 October 2026
Proceedings: W.P.(C) 4937/2026 and CM APPL. 24285/2026

1. Introduction

This judgment addresses a difficult intersection of statutory adoption requirements, administrative error and the emotional expectations of prospective adoptive parents. The Central Adoption Resource Authority (“CARA”) referred an infant to a couple who were legally ineligible to adopt a child in her recorded category. After the couple accepted the referral and began preparing for her arrival, CARA discovered its mistake and withdrew the referral.

The Delhi High Court held that an erroneous referral, even after acceptance and subsequent interaction with the child, cannot override the eligibility requirements in the Adoption Regulations, 2022. Nor does CARA’s failure to issue a No Objection Certificate (“NOC”) within the prescribed period produce a deemed approval.

The judgment also makes an important interpretive contribution concerning “hard to place” children: time spent awaiting administrative processing or the resolution of litigation does not, by itself, bring a child within that category when eligible families are available. While dismissing the petition, the Court imposed institutional safeguards intended to prevent similar errors and their consequences for children and families.

2. Background and Principal Issues

The adoption application

Sahil Gupta and his spouse, residing in Singapore, registered for inter-country adoption on 21 December 2020 under the Non-Resident Indian category. They then had one biological son. Because Singapore was not a signatory to the Hague Adoption Convention, 1993, the Indian Diplomatic Mission facilitated the process, including their Home Study Report (“HSR”).

The couple’s second biological son was born on 17 March 2022. Subsequently, the Adoption Regulations, 2022 came into force on 23 September 2022. Regulation 5(7) restricted couples with two or more children to consideration for special-needs or hard-to-place children, subject to exceptions for relatives and stepchildren. The corresponding restriction under the 2017 Regulations had applied to couples with three or more children.

The original HSR expired in December 2023. Its revalidation in 2025 expressly disclosed both biological sons. Nevertheless, CARA approved the revalidation and generated a referral of Baby K, whose medical report classified her health status as “Normal.” CARA subsequently acknowledged that the family’s ineligibility had been overlooked during initial scrutiny.

The referral and its withdrawal

Baby K was born on 3 November 2025 and abandoned at birth. Following difficulties accessing the referral on the portal, the petitioner reserved and accepted her on 23 January 2026. He supplied documents, received repeated communications that the NOC was being processed, travelled to India to meet her, and maintained contact through family video calls.

On 30 March 2026, the application’s portal status abruptly changed to “Application Rejected - Withdrawn,” although neither the petitioner nor the Indian Diplomatic Mission had withdrawn it. CARA’s communication of 2 April 2026 explained that Regulation 5(7) prevented the proposed adoption because the couple already had two biological children.

The petitioner sought restoration of his application and Baby K’s referral, together with a direction requiring CARA to issue the NOC. An interim order dated 13 April 2026 maintained the status quo concerning the child.

The questions before the Court

  1. Was the petitioner eligible to adopt Baby K under the 2022 Regulations?
  2. Could Baby K qualify as a special-needs or hard-to-place child?
  3. Did referral, acceptance, administrative assurances or delay create an enforceable entitlement to an NOC?
  4. Did legitimate expectation, promissory estoppel or the child’s best interests justify restoring the referral?
  5. What safeguards were necessary to address CARA’s administrative failures?

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court dismissed the petition and pending applications. Its principal conclusions were:

  • The 2022 eligibility requirements applied: Earlier registration did not preserve eligibility under the superseded regulations.
  • The petitioner was ineligible for this referral: With two biological children, he could be considered only for the categories permitted by Regulation 5(7). Baby K did not fall within those categories on the evidence.
  • Medical risk did not establish special-needs status: Both the original and updated medical assessments classified Baby K as “Normal.”
  • Administrative or litigation delay did not make her hard to place: She had been accepted by the petitioner and subsequently reserved by other eligible prospective adoptive parents.
  • No vested entitlement arose from the erroneous referral: Acceptance and subsequent processing could not require CARA to complete an adoption prohibited by the Regulations.
  • No deemed NOC arose: The ten-day processing requirement did not dispense with substantive eligibility.
  • Administrative accountability remained necessary: CARA was directed to improve verification, portal accuracy, communication, processing and internal responsibility.

The interim order was vacated, and CARA was directed to take all necessary steps forthwith for Baby K’s placement in adoption according to law. The Court expressly clarified that the decision did not reflect adversely upon the petitioner’s or his spouse’s bona fides or suitability as adoptive parents.

4. The Statutory Framework

The judgment reads the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“JJ Act”) and the Adoption Regulations, 2022 as an integrated framework:

Provision Significance
Section 56(1), JJ Act Places adoption within the objective of securing a family for orphaned, abandoned and surrendered children.
Section 57, particularly subsection (5) Prescribes eligibility requirements and expressly authorises additional criteria through adoption regulations.
Section 59 Governs inter-country adoption and requires compliance with the prescribed regulatory process.
Sections 61 and 68 Provide for final adoption scrutiny and CARA’s regulatory functions respectively.
Regulation 5(7) Restricts couples with two or more children to special-needs and hard-to-place children, unless the relative or stepchild exception applies.
Regulations 5(8) and 16(5) Require periodic HSR revalidation and scrutiny of eligibility and suitability.
Regulation 17(1) Requires issuance of the NOC within ten days after receipt of acceptance and the applicable receiving-country approval or permission.
Regulation 2(13) and 2(25) Define hard-to-place and special-needs children.
Sections 2(9) and 3, and Regulation 3(a) Make the child’s best interests a governing consideration throughout the process.

The petitioner’s reliance on Section 59’s absence of an express family-size restriction could not displace Regulation 5(7). Section 57(5) expressly permits additional regulatory eligibility criteria, while Section 59 itself contemplates compliance with the adoption regulations. Similarly, CARA’s statutory responsibility for inter-country adoption supported the regulatory NOC requirement.

Importantly, the validity of Regulation 5(7) was not challenged in this petition. The Court therefore applied the existing rule rather than deciding a comprehensive constitutional challenge to it.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Debarati Nandee v. Union of India — 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1075

This coordinate-bench decision supplied the principal foundation for applying the 2022 eligibility rule to previously registered applicants. It concerned prospective adoptive parents with two biological children who had registered under the 2017 Regulations and challenged the application of Regulation 5(7) to their pending cases.

The earlier decision held that registration or recognition as suitable prospective adoptive parents did not create a vested right to consideration for a child in a particular category. Applicants remained within the adoption framework but were subject to the categories permitted by the revised eligibility criteria. It also identified the policy objective of increasing adoption opportunities for children with special needs.

The petitioner sought to distinguish that case because it concerned the pre-referral stage, whereas Baby K had already been referred and accepted. The Court rejected that distinction as insufficient. It relied on the earlier judgment’s broader reasoning that statutory eligibility may be examined at successive stages before the final adoption order, and that no right to insist upon a particular child arises merely from progress through the process.

The present judgment therefore carries that reasoning into a post-referral setting. The earlier decision was reportedly under challenge, but no stay of its operation was shown.

5.2 Union of India v. Ankur Gupta — (2019) 18 SCC 276

This Supreme Court decision provided particularly relevant authority because it also involved a child who had been offered to, accepted by and communicated with prospective adoptive parents.

There, one applicant’s acquisition of foreign citizenship affected the applicable adoption route. Despite the applicants’ bona fides and competence, the Supreme Court held that the statutory procedure and regime could not be disregarded. The applicants could, at most, receive the priority available within the category for which they were legally eligible.

The Delhi High Court used this decision to establish that acceptance and personal interaction do not override statutory requirements. It also noted a material difference: the petitioner’s ineligibility in the present case did not emerge from a later change. It already existed when the HSR was revalidated and the referral generated.

The judgment did not, however, grant the petitioner a fresh priority entitlement analogous to the observation in that Supreme Court case.

5.3 Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala — (2024) 3 SCC 799

The petitioner relied on this decision concerning legitimate expectation. The Court drew from it the requirement that an expectation must possess legal legitimacy: a representation or practice must be supported by law, custom or an established procedure.

CARA’s conduct understandably generated a genuine expectation of adoption. Nevertheless, the Court held that an expectation founded on a referral contrary to Regulation 5(7) could not support an order compelling completion of that referral. Emotional authenticity was not equivalent to legal enforceability.

5.4 Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation

This authority appeared within the passage quoted from Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala, rather than through a separate factual examination. It explained that legitimate expectation can provide standing for judicial review and commonly supports procedural fairness, but does not automatically establish an entitlement to the substantive benefit claimed.

Its significance is that a public authority’s representation may remain relevant to scrutiny of its conduct without authorising a court to require an unlawful result.

5.5 Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra — (2014) 16 SCC 623

CARA invoked this decision for judicial discipline and adherence to binding precedent. Its role was procedural and precedential, not an independent source of adoption eligibility rules. It supported CARA’s submission that the coordinate-bench ruling should be followed while it remained unstayed; the judgment also independently examined its reasoning and applicability.

5.6 Temple of Temple Of Healing Petitioner(s) v. Union Of India (s). — 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1590

The Court cited this Supreme Court decision for the mismatch between children legally available for adoption and prospective parents awaiting referrals. The quoted passage recorded CARA’s estimate that the process could take three to four years.

This authority supplied systemic context. It supported consistent administration of eligibility requirements and recognition of the interests of other waiting families. It did not itself determine the petitioner’s eligibility or establish that administrative error could be excused.

6. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Earlier registration did not freeze eligibility

The relevant scrutiny occurred after the 2022 Regulations had taken effect. The petitioner had two biological children when his HSR was revalidated in 2025 and when Baby K was referred in January 2026. The Court accordingly applied Regulation 5(7).

NRI status created no exemption. The regulatory eligibility requirements applied across the relevant categories of prospective adoptive parents, and statutory priority in inter-country adoption remained conditional upon eligibility.

6.2 Special-needs classification required medical evidence

The petitioner relied on Baby K’s history of respiratory distress syndrome, septicaemia and other medical concerns to argue that she might qualify as a special-needs child. Regulation 2(25), however, connects that category to disability under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Both medical assessments before the Court classified her status as “Normal.” The later assessment recorded age-appropriate development and no identified developmental or neurobehavioural disorder of the kind discussed in the judgment.

The Court declined to substitute judicial speculation for expert medical assessment. A history requiring monitoring, or the possibility of a future diagnosis, did not establish current eligibility within the special-needs category. This was an evidence-specific conclusion, not a declaration that a child’s medical classification can never change.

6.3 “Hard to place” did not mean merely delayed in placement

Regulation 2(13)(a) refers to a child under five in the normal category who has not been placed with the specified categories of prospective adoptive parents within sixty days after referral. The Court interpreted that language in light of its purpose: identifying children who fail to find an eligible family despite referral.

Baby K had been promptly accepted by the petitioner and, after her release into the referral pool, reserved by other eligible applicants. Her continued institutional stay therefore did not demonstrate an absence of willing families. It reflected administrative delay followed by litigation.

The resulting distinction is important: a child who is difficult to match is not equivalent to a child whose accepted placement is delayed. Counting the latter delay automatically would allow an erroneous referral and ensuing proceedings to generate the very eligibility missing at the outset.

6.4 The NOC was substantive scrutiny, not a mechanical formality

The petitioner argued that CARA’s duty to verify eligibility before referral prevented reconsideration at the NOC stage. The Court agreed that the earlier scrutiny had been deficient, but rejected the suggested consequence.

The NOC represents CARA’s approval of the proposed inter-country adoption and precedes the final adoption proceedings. An error discovered before that approval and the final order could still be corrected. Otherwise, an initial administrative mistake would compel subsequent authorities to perpetuate non-compliance.

This reasoning does not authorise arbitrary reconsideration. It permits correction of an identified statutory disqualification while leaving the authority responsible for proper scrutiny and communication.

6.5 The ten-day requirement did not create deemed approval

The Court distinguished a duty to process matters promptly from an entitlement to approval regardless of eligibility. Regulation 17(1)’s use of “shall” and its ten-day period did not mean that an ineligible applicant acquired an NOC automatically when the period expired.

Neither the JJ Act nor the Regulations provided for deemed approval in those circumstances. The Court strongly disapproved of the delay and expressly directed future adherence to the timeline. Its conclusion therefore should not be read as making the deadline optional.

6.6 Mandamus and estoppel could not require an unlawful adoption

A writ of mandamus requires an enforceable legal right and a corresponding legal duty. Because Regulation 5(7) prohibited this placement, CARA had no duty to issue the requested NOC.

Similarly, promissory estoppel could not compel CARA to perform an act prohibited by statutory regulations. The authority’s assurances and conduct remained relevant to its administrative failures, but could not create substantive eligibility.

6.7 Best interests required an independent, child-centred assessment

The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s affection, personal visit, family preparations and distress. Nevertheless, the child’s welfare could not be equated with the expectations of adults seeking to adopt her. Any asserted bond had to be considered in light of the child’s age and the limited interactions.

The Court treated the eligibility framework as part of the system designed to secure lawful and suitable family placements. Allowing an erroneous referral and subsequent attachment to override that framework would create unequal treatment for other eligible families and undermine the policy supporting adoption of special-needs and hard-to-place children.

The decision did not turn on accepting CARA’s separate submissions about Singapore’s medical costs or making a blanket finding that infants cannot form attachments. Its operative reasoning rested on statutory eligibility, the evidence concerning Baby K and the integrity of the placement process.

7. Administrative Accountability and Institutional Safeguards

The Court separated the legality of withdrawing the referral from the quality of CARA’s administration. A legally necessary correction did not erase the consequences of defective scrutiny, misleading assurances and an inaccurate portal status.

Its directions required CARA, in coordination with the relevant agencies and diplomatic missions where applicable, to implement:

  1. Repeated eligibility verification: Record eligibility at registration, HSR revalidation and before referral, including checks under Regulation 5(7). Configure the portal, to the extent technically feasible, to prevent inconsistent referrals.
  2. A migration-period audit: Examine profiles revalidated or updated during portal migration and rectify discrepancies.
  3. Timely NOC processing: Follow Regulation 17(1) and communicate documentary deficiencies in writing, preferably through a consolidated communication.
  4. Accurate status and meaningful responses: Do not label applications “withdrawn” without actual withdrawal. Communicate rejection or closure with brief reasons and avoid unsupported assurances.
  5. Accountability and operational reform: Examine the identified lapses, take corrective measures, fix responsibility where necessary, issue instructions and standard operating procedures, and sensitise staff.

These directions are a substantial part of the judgment’s practical contribution. They recognise that administrative reliability is itself important to child welfare: errors can prolong institutional care and affect both the original applicants and a subsequently matched family.

8. Impact and Limits of the Decision

  • Post-referral disputes: Acceptance will not defeat correction of a demonstrated statutory ineligibility before final approval.
  • Pending applications: Earlier registration does not necessarily preserve superseded eligibility criteria.
  • Classification disputes: Medical evidence and the regulatory definitions remain central; delay alone does not establish hard-to-place status.
  • Timeline litigation: Delay may establish administrative failure without producing an approval that legislation does not provide.
  • Digital administration: Portal migration and automated processing do not relieve the authority of responsibility for verification, accuracy and reasoned communication.

The holding should not be overstated. It does not establish that prospective adoptive parents lack procedural rights before a final adoption order, or that every late cancellation is lawful. The petitioner raised absence of notice and hearing, but the judgment did not separately formulate a comprehensive prior-hearing rule. Its express directions require accurate status and communication of reasons.

Nor did the Court award compensation, finally order adoption by the subsequently referred family, or determine the validity of Regulation 5(7). CARA’s statement that the petitioner’s profile had been revived for permissible categories did not amount to an order granting him Baby K or a new priority entitlement.

9. Complex Concepts Simplified

Home Study Report
An assessment of the applicants’ home, family circumstances and capacity to adopt. Approval does not eliminate separate statutory eligibility requirements.
Referral and acceptance
Stages through which applicants are offered information about a child and agree to proceed. They are not the final adoption order.
No Objection Certificate
CARA’s approval of the proposed inter-country adoption. It is a substantive safeguard, not merely a receipt or portal formality.
Vested right
A legally secured entitlement. Here, progress through an erroneous process did not secure a right to adopt the particular child.
Legitimate expectation
An expectation arising from public-authority conduct that the law may protect. It cannot require an outcome prohibited by the governing regulations.
Promissory estoppel
A principle restraining departure from certain relied-upon promises. It cannot compel breach of a statutory prohibition.
Mandamus
A court order requiring performance of a legal duty. It cannot require an authority to act unlawfully.
Deemed approval
Approval treated as granted automatically, usually because legislation expressly provides that consequence. No such consequence applied here.
“Normal” and “special needs”
Regulatory and medical classifications used in the judgment, not descriptions of a child’s worth or entitlement to a loving family.

10. Conclusion

The judgment establishes that administrative error cannot create adoption eligibility, an accepted referral cannot override statutory restrictions, and an expired processing deadline cannot manufacture an NOC. It also distinguishes genuine difficulty in finding a family from delay caused by administration or litigation.

Its broader significance lies in pairing statutory compliance with administrative accountability. CARA could correct the unlawful referral, but it was required to address the failures that produced it. The governing objective remained a timely, lawful and child-centred placement—not the preservation of either an administrative mistake or an adult expectation.