DV Act Jurisdiction at Temporary Shelter: Section 482 CrPC Maintainable and “Economic Abuse” Creates a Continuing Cause of Action

1. Introduction

In RANI BIBI v. SK NURULLAH AND ORS (Calcutta High Court, 18-02-2026), the wife (petitioner) challenged an appellate order directing return of her application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) for presentation before a “proper” court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The petitioner asserted that after being driven out, she had taken shelter at a rented accommodation within Taltala P.S., Kolkata, and filed her DV Act application there seeking reliefs under Sections 17, 18, 20, 21 and 22. The husband contended that she was actually a resident of Purba Medinipur and that the Kolkata address and supporting documents were a “fleeing address” used to create jurisdiction.

The High Court addressed two core issues: (i) whether a petition under Section 482 CrPC was maintainable to challenge the appellate order; and (ii) whether the Kolkata Magistrate had jurisdiction under Section 27 DV Act based on temporary residence and/or cause of action.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The High Court held the petition under Section 482 CrPC to be maintainable, relying on the Supreme Court’s clarification that while DV Act proceedings are predominantly civil, the High Court’s inherent power under the second part of Section 482 (to prevent abuse of process/secure ends of justice) can be invoked.
  • On merits, the Court held that the Magistrate at Kolkata had territorial jurisdiction under Section 27 DV Act because: (a) the petitioner’s Kolkata shelter qualified as temporary residence (not shown to be merely casual/fleeting); and (b) allegations of economic abuse disclosed a continuing cause of action, supporting jurisdiction where the deprivation was suffered.
  • The appellate order returning the DV application was found perverse, set aside, and the Magistrate’s order affirming jurisdiction was restored.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

(A) Maintainability of Section 482 CrPC in DV Act proceedings

  • Sourabh Kumar Tripathi Vs. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC Online SC 1158:
    This was the fulcrum precedent. The Supreme Court distinguished the two parts of Section 482: the first part (giving effect to an order “under this Code”) may not apply because DV Act relief orders under Sections 18–23 are not “under CrPC”; however, the second part preserves inherent power to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice. The Calcutta High Court treated this as settling prior High Court divergence and used it to uphold maintainability of the present Section 482 challenge.
  • Akankha Arora Vs. Tanaya Maben, 2024 SCC Online SC 3688:
    Cited by the petitioner to counter objections about “nomenclature” and maintainability; the principle invoked was that the High Court may treat a petition under Section 482 as one under Sections 397/401 where appropriate, and should not defeat relief on technical labelling. Although the Calcutta High Court ultimately grounded maintainability more directly on Sourabh Kumar Tripathi, this case reinforced the “substance over form” approach to procedural route.
  • P. Pathmanathan and others Vs. V Monica and another, 2021 SCC Online Mad 8731:
    Relied upon by the husband to argue DV Act proceedings are civil and thus challenges must lie under Article 227 rather than Section 482. The Calcutta High Court noted the existence of such views, but held that the Supreme Court in Sourabh Kumar Tripathi clarified that Section 482’s second limb can apply notwithstanding the predominant civil character.

(B) Interlocutory nature and revisability—contextual support

  • Amar Nath Vs. State of Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 137:
    Used to explain “interlocutory order” as purely interim/temporary orders not touching important rights; orders substantially affecting rights are not interlocutory. The Calcutta High Court applied this to characterise the order returning the DV application as not interlocutory (akin to return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC).
  • Madhu Limai Vs. State of Maharastra (1997) 4 SCC 551:
    Cited for the “middle category” of orders—neither final nor interlocutory—where revisional control is not barred. This supported the Court’s view that the impugned return order finally impacted the forum and could not be insulated as interlocutory.

(C) Territorial jurisdiction under DV Act—temporary residence and cause of action

  • Sarod Kumar Pandey Vs. Mamta Pandey, 2010 (118) DRJ 625:
    Quoted for the meaning of “temporary residence” under the DV Act: it must be a real dwelling place adopted as a home “for the time being,” not a casual visit or a “fleeing” address used merely to file litigation. The Calcutta High Court applied this test and found no material to conclude that the Kolkata address was only for contesting cases.
  • Rupali Devi Vs. State of UP and others (2019) 5 SCC 384:
    Cited by the petitioner for the broader protective approach that allows a woman to initiate proceedings at a place she takes refuge (paternal place), emphasising that law must respond to the realities of displacement caused by matrimonial cruelty. Though primarily invoked in argument, it harmonised with the Court’s purposive reading of Section 27.
  • Prabin Kumar Ghosh & others Vs. Jharna Ghosh and another, 2016 (2) Cal.L.J 154:
    Relied upon to hold that economic abuse can be continuing; even where cohabitation/shared household is no longer ongoing, continued deprivation can sustain relief under Section 12. The Calcutta High Court used this to reinforce that maintenance-related deprivation is a continuing wrong, supporting jurisdiction through continuing cause of action.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Why Section 482 CrPC was held maintainable

The Court acknowledged the doctrinal tension: DV Act proceedings are “predominantly civil,” leading some High Courts to channel supervisory challenges through Article 227. However, applying Sourabh Kumar Tripathi Vs. Vidhi Rawal, it held:

  • The first limb of Section 482 (giving effect to CrPC orders) may not fit DV Act reliefs.
  • The second limb—prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice—is sufficiently wide to permit interference where a court’s process is being misused or where justice demands correction, even in DV Act proceedings.
  • An order directing return of the DV application is not interlocutory; it effectively denies the chosen statutory forum and resembles an appealable “return of plaint” logic in civil law.

(B) Territorial jurisdiction under Section 27 DV Act: “temporary residence”

The Court reproduced and applied Section 27 DV Act, highlighting that jurisdiction lies where the aggrieved person temporarily resides or where the cause of action arises. Confronted with allegations of fabricated documents and a “fleeing address,” the Court applied Sarod Kumar Pandey Vs. Mamta Pandey to frame the test: temporary residence must be a real shelter, not a token address used to institute proceedings.

On facts, the Court found that receipt of court notices at the Kolkata address and official records referring to it undermined the “mere fleeing address” narrative, and there was no clear basis to hold that the petitioner visited Kolkata only for litigation while otherwise not residing there.

(C) Cause of action via “economic abuse”: continuing wrong and forum connection

The Court placed special weight on the DV Act’s definition of domestic violence under Section 3, especially economic abuse, which includes deprivation of financial resources, maintenance, and rental-related expenses. It reasoned:

  • The petitioner’s pleadings asserted non-maintenance and deprivation despite the husband’s means, which prima facie discloses “economic abuse.”
  • Economic abuse is capable of being a continuing deprivation “from day to day,” giving rise to a continuing cause of action.
  • Citing Prabin Kumar Ghosh & others Vs. Jharna Ghosh and another, the Court reiterated that continued economic abuse can sustain proceedings even absent continuous joint residence.

This reasoning is significant because it decouples jurisdiction from a narrow, one-time event location and ties it to the ongoing harm suffered by the aggrieved woman where she is compelled to live.

3.3. Impact

  • Procedural access in DV Act matters: The judgment strengthens the availability of Section 482 CrPC (second limb) to correct jurisdictional and process errors in DV Act proceedings, reducing the risk that litigants are turned away on forum-selection technicalities.
  • Forum protection for displaced survivors: By applying a purposive interpretation of “temporary residence” and recognising the lived reality of shelter-taking after being driven out, the decision discourages respondents from weaponising territorial objections to delay relief.
  • Continuing cause of action for economic abuse: Treating maintenance deprivation as a continuing wrong broadens and stabilises jurisdictional anchors under Section 27, especially where the woman’s residence shifts due to violence.
  • Document disputes at jurisdiction stage: The Court implicitly cautions appellate courts against conducting a “mini trial” on contested facts while deciding maintainability/jurisdiction, particularly where statutory objectives demand speedy, accessible remedies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 482 CrPC (Inherent powers): A High Court’s reserved power to intervene to prevent misuse of court process or to ensure justice, even where no specific procedural remedy fits neatly. Here, it was used not because the DV order was a “CrPC order,” but because denying jurisdiction on flawed premises could defeat justice.
  • Interlocutory order: A purely interim order that does not substantially affect rights. Returning a case for filing elsewhere materially affects a party’s ability to proceed and is not merely interim.
  • Temporary residence (DV Act): Not a tourist stay or a litigation-only address; it is a genuine shelter adopted as a home “for the time being,” often due to being forced out of the matrimonial home.
  • Cause of action: The bundle of facts giving a person the right to seek judicial remedy. In DV Act cases, ongoing denial of maintenance can create a continuing cause of action.
  • Economic abuse: A form of domestic violence that includes depriving the aggrieved woman of money/resources she is entitled to (maintenance, household necessities, rent, etc.). It can be ongoing.

5. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision establishes two practically important principles: (i) following Sourabh Kumar Tripathi Vs. Vidhi Rawal, a petition under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable in DV Act-related matters under the provision’s second limb to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice; and (ii) under Section 27 DV Act, an aggrieved woman’s temporary residence—if it is a genuine shelter—and the continuing cause of action arising from economic abuse can validly confer territorial jurisdiction.

By setting aside the appellate order that returned the DV application, the Court reaffirmed the DV Act’s remedial purpose: ensuring accessible, effective, and non-technical protection for survivors, especially where displacement and ongoing financial deprivation are integral to the harm.