Delegation Does Not Bar Revision: Housing Societies Must Grant Succession-Based (Deemed) Membership Without Adjudicating Title

1) Introduction

This Bombay High Court decision (Amit Borkar, J.) in THE MALAD CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. AND ANR. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. (18 April 2026) addresses how a co-operative housing society should process a post-death claim for membership/transmission and whether a revisional authority can entertain revision when the initial order was made by a Deputy Registrar exercising delegated powers.

The dispute concerned Flat No. 31, Building No. 4, in Malad Co-operative Housing Society, with the share certificate in the joint names of (i) Pannadevi (wife of D.R. Dhanuka) and (ii) late Ramlal Dhanuka. Respondent No. 4 (Radheshyam Dhanuka), one of Ramlal’s sons and the flat’s occupant, applied for membership after the earlier title suit filed by Pannadevi was unconditionally withdrawn by her heirs. When the Deputy Registrar rejected Respondent No. 4’s “deemed membership” claim, the Divisional Joint Registrar allowed revision and granted deemed membership. The Society challenged that revisional order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Key issues

  • Society’s role: Must a housing society adjudicate title/succession disputes before recognizing a claimant for membership purposes?
  • Transfer vs transmission: Does use of an allegedly “wrong form” or “transfer language” defeat a succession-based claim?
  • Deemed membership: Can Section 22(2) deeming be denied on technicalities after prolonged inaction by the society?
  • Revisional jurisdiction: Does delegation under Sections 3/158 make a Deputy Registrar’s order an order of “the Registrar” so that revision is barred before the Registrar/Joint Registrar?

2) Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the Divisional Joint Registrar’s order dated 13 November 2014 granting Respondent No. 4 deemed membership. The Court held that:

  • A co-operative housing society is not a forum to decide title; it must make only a prima facie administrative determination of who “appears” to be the heir/legal representative for society purposes.
  • Section 30 (pre-2019) supports recognition/transmission on a prima facie “may appear” standard and protects the society under Section 30(4) when it acts in accordance with the provision.
  • Minor defects in form/nomenclature (transfer vs transmission wording) cannot defeat a substantively succession-based request when the basis is inheritance.
  • Delegation of Registrar’s powers does not erase the statutory distinction between Registrar and subordinate officers; therefore, revisional scrutiny is not ousted merely because the Deputy Registrar exercised delegated powers.
  • Coordinate Bench decisions relied upon by the Society were not followed to the extent they conflicted with Supreme Court and Division Bench authority.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Society not to adjudicate title; membership recognition is administrative

  • Usha Jhaveri v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No. 659 of 2011 decided on 4 July 2011): relied upon by Respondent No. 4 to reinforce that a co-operative housing society should not adjudicate inter se title disputes; it only recognizes a person for the limited purpose of society administration. The present judgment adopts the same functional separation: membership entry does not confer or extinguish proprietary title.

(B) Delegation and revisional power: delegate remains subordinate; revision is not barred

  • Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1966 Bom LR LXIX 150: cited for the proposition that even when powers of the Registrar are delegated, subordinate officers remain subordinate and act under the Registrar’s guidance/superintendence/control. The judgment uses this to reject the Society’s “delegate equals Registrar” argument.
  • Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Coop. Society Ltd. v. Secretary (Food and Agriculture), Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1977)4 SCC337: treated as directly on point. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that an order by a Deputy Registrar exercising delegated powers becomes an order of the Registrar, emphasizing statutory schemes that preserve superintendence and distinct identity of subordinate officers. The present judgment applies this ratio to Sections 3, 158 and 154.
  • Yogendra Prasad v. Additional Registrar, Co operative Societies, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 720: reaffirmed that exercise of delegated powers by a subordinate officer does not divest the Registrar of supervisory/revisional authority under a scheme that preserves hierarchy and control. Used as additional Supreme Court support.
  • Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503: discussed as a commonly-invoked delegation doctrine (“act of delegate is act of delegator”) but distinguished (following Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Coop. Society Ltd. v. Secretary (Food and Agriculture), Government of Andhra Pradesh) where the statute maintains superintendence/control and distinct roles.
  • Cipla Limited v. Competent Authority and the District Deputy Registrar, Co operative Society and Others, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 622: Division Bench reaffirming that delegated powers do not make the Deputy District Registrar “at par” with the Registrar; supports maintaining hierarchy and revisional oversight.

(C) The coordinate-bench line relied upon by the Society (not accepted here)

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) The society’s function: administration, not adjudication

The Court reframed the dispute: it was not a title contest requiring ownership determination, but an internal society issue arising from death of a holder and a request for recognition as member. A society lacks civil-court powers to decide succession/partition/title. Grant of membership is an administrative step enabling billing, repairs, and dealings with one recognized person; it neither creates title nor extinguishes title. If heirs dispute beneficial ownership, they must approach a competent civil court.

(ii) Section 30 (pre-2019) imposes a “prima facie” recognition duty

Since the controversy pre-dated the introduction of Chapter VIIIB by the Maharashtra Act of 2019, the Court applied Section 30 as it stood earlier. The crucial phrase “to such person as may appear to the committee to be the heir or legal representative” was read as requiring only a prima facie administrative satisfaction, not a conclusive adjudication. This also harmonizes with Section 30(4), which protects the society when it makes transfers/payments duly under Section 30 against later demands by others.

The Society’s stance—“multiple heirs exist, therefore we cannot recognize anyone”—was rejected as inconsistent with Section 30’s design: the statute anticipates that societies must proceed on prima facie material and are protected if they act duly.

(iii) “Transfer vs transmission” and form defects: substance prevails

The Society argued Respondent No. 4 used Form No. 23 under Bye Law No. 38(e)(ii) (transfer) instead of proceeding under Bye Law No. 35 (transmission), and that the application was incomplete (affidavit/share certificate issues; Rule 19 compliance). The Court treated these as non-fatal in the circumstances:

  • The application’s foundation was inheritance through late Ramlal Dhanuka, not an inter vivos transfer—hence in substance it was transmission.
  • Procedural forms exist to facilitate administration; they should not become tools of injustice where the intent and basis are clear.
  • Where a society keeps an application pending without timely communicating deficiencies, it cannot later rely on technical defects to defeat a substantive, succession-based claim.

(iv) Jurisdiction: delegation does not collapse hierarchy; revision is maintainable

The core jurisdictional holding is that under Sections 3 and 158, even when powers are conferred/delegated, the delegate “shall work under the general guidance, superintendence and control of the Registrar” and remains “subordinate.” Section 154 structures revision by officer-rank, reflecting that orders of “subordinate officers” remain revisable. Relying heavily on Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Coop. Society Ltd. v. Secretary (Food and Agriculture), Government of Andhra Pradesh and Yogendra Prasad v. Additional Registrar, Co operative Societies, and supported by Krishnarao Bakaramji Hadge v. State of Maharashtra and Cipla Limited v. Competent Authority and the District Deputy Registrar, Co operative Society and Others, the Court rejected the argument that a delegated order becomes an order of the Registrar so as to bar revision.

Practically, the judgment treats the Maharashtra scheme as one where delegation enables performance of functions but does not immunize subordinate orders from statutory supervision/revision.

3.3 Impact

  • Operational clarity for housing societies: Societies cannot stall post-death membership/transmission by insisting on civil-court level adjudication of title. They must make a prima facie administrative choice under Section 30 (pre-2019) and proceed, leaving substantive ownership disputes to civil courts.
  • Reduced leverage for “procedural obstruction”: Applicants should not be denied recognition on minor form/nomenclature defects where the claim is clearly succession-based, especially if the society did not promptly point out curable deficiencies.
  • Revisional supervision preserved despite delegation: The judgment strengthens the proposition that delegated decision-making in the co-operative department remains subject to hierarchical revision, and that the “delegate equals delegator” doctrine is context-dependent and constrained by statutory design.
  • Doctrinal hierarchy reaffirmed: Where coordinate-bench decisions conflict with Supreme Court/Division Bench authority on delegation and supervision, the latter governs.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Transmission vs Transfer: “Transfer” is a voluntary transaction between living persons (sale/gift/assignment). “Transmission” is automatic devolution by law on death (inheritance/nomination route). The Court looked at the real basis (inheritance), not labels.
  • Deemed membership: A statutory mechanism (referred to in arguments via Section 22(2)) where, if a society fails to act within prescribed norms, membership can be treated as granted by legal fiction—preventing endless inaction.
  • Delegation of powers: The State/Registrar may authorize a Deputy Registrar to exercise Registrar’s powers. But if the statute says the Deputy remains “subordinate” and under “superintendence and control,” the Deputy’s order remains the Deputy’s order—hence it can be revised by a superior authority if the Act provides.
  • Society recognition is not title: Entering someone’s name in society records enables management (maintenance collection, permissions, notices). It does not decide who legally owns the property.

5) Conclusion

The decision establishes a clear administrative-law and co-operative-law principle: co-operative housing societies must not withhold succession-based membership by demanding adjudication of title; they must act on a prima facie “may appear” standard under Section 30 (pre-2019), with the understanding that membership entry does not determine ownership. Simultaneously, it reaffirms that delegation of powers does not bar revision where the statute preserves hierarchy, superintendence, and revisional oversight—aligning Maharashtra practice with Supreme Court authority and Division Bench precedent.