Deemed-Decree Land Acquisition Awards under the WB 1948 Act: Section 38 CPC Inapplicable; Execution Maintainable on High Court Original Side Without Transfer, and Multiple Executions Permitted Until Satisfaction

1. Introduction

The Calcutta High Court (Division Bench: Debangsu Basak, J. and Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J.) decided an appeal by The State of West Bengal challenging an order dated 11 September 2025 passed in EC 7 of 2025. The underlying dispute arose from acquisition proceedings under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (“Act of 1948”) concerning Premises No. 96, Narkeldanga Main Road, Kolkata.

After the Collector’s award (February 1997) and enhancement in reference (August 2001), the High Court further enhanced compensation (December 2024). The State’s SLP was dismissed (the judgment mentions 29 August 2025 in one place and 29 August 2024 in another, suggesting a typographical inconsistency).

The key controversy in this appeal was procedural: whether the award-holders could (i) file a second execution petition, and (ii) pursue execution on the Original Side of the High Court even though the “decree” was not “passed” by that High Court within the meaning of Section 38 CPC.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  1. Second execution petition: Maintainable. The Court held that so long as the awarded amount remains unsatisfied, more than one execution petition is permissible.
  2. Execution on High Court Original Side: Maintainable. The award is a deemed decree by legal fiction (Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, applied mutatis mutandis), and therefore Section 38 CPC does not apply. Consequently, no “transfer” requirement (as with ordinary civil decrees) defeats execution on the High Court’s Original Side where the judgment-debtor has assets.
  3. Quantum/adjustments: The Court expressly left issues of adjustment (including deposits with the Collector/Registrar General) and the exact amount payable to be determined by the executing court.

The appeal was dismissed and the executing court’s directions for payment were not interfered with.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) AIR 1976 Calcutta 341 (Gopal Krishna Mukherjee and Others Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others)

The Division Bench treated this authority as establishing that, because the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to reference proceedings under the Act of 1948, the reference court has procedural powers (there, the power of review of its award). In the present case, this supported the broader proposition that reference proceedings are procedurally assimilated to civil-court processes, without necessarily converting the underlying acquisition award into a “decree passed by a civil court” for Section 38 CPC purposes.

(b) 2003 1 CHN 323 (Rama Kanta Das & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors)

This case was relied on for the principle that an award (and the resulting determination on reference) is executable because Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 creates a legal fiction treating the award “as a decree.” The present judgment uses it to emphasize a crucial distinction: the award is not inherently a civil court decree; it is clothed with decree-like enforceability to avoid an execution lacuna.

(c) 2006 Volume 8 SCC 457 (Gurpreet Singh Vs. Union of India)

The State invoked this decision on adjustment and the mechanics of working out what remains payable after deposits/part payments in land acquisition compensation matters. The Division Bench did not decide adjustment on merits; instead, it held such accounting should be left to the executing court, thus limiting the appeal to maintainability/jurisdiction.

(d) 2018 3 SCC 622 (Sundaram Finance Limited Versus Abdul Samad and Another)

Cited by the respondents, this decision was applied for the execution principle that where an instrument is executable as a decree by legal fiction (there, an arbitral award), execution can be initiated where enforcement is sought and is not necessarily constrained by “transfer” requirements rooted in the notion of a decree “passed by” a particular court. The present Bench drew on its logic to support maintainability of execution on the High Court Original Side despite the “decree” not being “passed” there.

(e) 2022 14 SCC 417 (Gurpreet Singh Versus Union of India)

The respondents cited this to reinforce that not all “deemed decrees” are to be treated identically to CPC decrees for all procedural purposes; a “deemed decree” may be enforceable, yet not attract the full apparatus premised on a decree being “passed by” a civil court. The High Court’s reasoning aligns with that approach in carving out Section 38 CPC as inapplicable.

(f) Bhagyoday Cooperative Bank Limited (supra)

The judgment invoked this authority for the specific proposition that Sections 38 and 39 CPC do not apply to certain deemed decrees that were not “passed by the Court” (the judgment gives examples such as deemed decree regimes under cooperative societies law and execution of arbitral awards). This authority directly underpins the core jurisdictional holding: the absence of a decree “passed” by the High Court does not bar execution on its Original Side where the decree-character arises by legal fiction.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Statutory architecture: Act of 1948 + Act of 1894

  • The acquisition was under the Act of 1948. Under Section 8(1), an aggrieved owner can seek a reference to the “Court” defined in Section 2(b).
  • Section 8(2) of the Act of 1948 applies the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 mutatis mutandis to such references.
  • The Court stressed that Section 8A of the Act of 1948 applies the CPC to an award made by the court on reference, but this does not automatically transform the award into a CPC decree for purposes of Section 38 CPC.

(ii) Award is not a civil-court decree; it is a “deemed decree” for execution

The Court reasoned that acquisition proceedings are not civil suits under Section 9 CPC, and the Collector is not a civil court determining a lis under Section 9. Hence, the Collector’s award is not a “decree passed by a civil court.” Yet, because neither the Act of 1948 nor the Act of 1894 provides a self-contained execution code, the law treats the award as executable “as a decree” (via the legal fiction recognized in the judgment with reference to Section 26(2) of the Act of 1894).

(iii) Maintainability of a second execution petition

The Court applied a practical execution-law principle: until satisfaction, repeated execution attempts are not barred merely because one execution application was filed earlier and did not yield satisfaction. Since the State did not establish that the award stood satisfied, the second execution petition was held maintainable.

(iv) Why Section 38 CPC does not bar execution on the High Court Original Side

Section 38 CPC presupposes a decree “passed by” a court. The Court held that where enforceability arises by legal fiction (a “deemed decree”), and no civil court actually “passed” the decree in the ordinary sense, Section 38 CPC is not attracted.

On facts, the State also did not contend that it had no assets within the High Court’s ordinary original civil jurisdiction. That factual aspect supported the maintainability of execution there.

3.3 Impact

  • Broader execution forum for land acquisition award-holders (WB context): Award-holders executing compensation awards arising under the Act of 1948 (with Act of 1894 machinery applied) gain stronger footing to pursue execution on the High Court Original Side, without being defeated by a “transfer of decree” objection grounded in Sections 38–39 CPC.
  • Clarification of “deemed decree” consequences: The judgment reinforces that decree-like enforceability does not import every CPC concept tied to decrees “passed” by courts, especially jurisdictional gateways like Section 38.
  • Execution strategy: The confirmation that multiple execution petitions are permissible until satisfaction reduces procedural vulnerability for decree-holders where earlier executions stall (e.g., because of stay orders, appellate proceedings, or partial/non-adjusted deposits).
  • Deposits and adjustment disputes are execution matters: By leaving adjustment to the executing court, the judgment signals that appellate review in such challenges should focus on maintainability/jurisdiction rather than undertake first-instance accounting.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Deemed decree”: A decision is treated like a decree for enforcement even though it is not a decree in the ordinary CPC sense. It is a legal tool to make an otherwise unenforceable determination executable.
  • Legal fiction: The law “pretends” something is true for a limited purpose. Here, it “pretends” the award is a decree so it can be executed.
  • Section 38 CPC: Normally tells you which court can execute a decree—typically the court that “passed” it or the court to which it is sent for execution. The Court held it does not govern deemed decrees where no court “passed” the decree in the ordinary way.
  • Mutatis mutandis: “With necessary changes.” Provisions of the 1894 Act apply to 1948 Act references with adaptations required by context.
  • Reference court: The civil court to which compensation disputes are referred when an owner challenges the Collector’s award.

5. Conclusion

This judgment crystallizes two execution-facing rules in the land acquisition framework under the Act of 1948 (with the 1894 Act applied): (i) multiple execution petitions are permissible until the award is satisfied; and (ii) because the award is enforceable as a deemed decree, Section 38 CPC does not restrict execution to the court that “passed” the decree—supporting maintainability of execution on the High Court’s Original Side where the judgment-debtor has assets. The decision is significant for shifting the focus from formalistic “transfer” objections to substantive enforcement, while reserving accounting/adjustment disputes for the executing court.