Company Must Be Arraigned for Section 66 FSS Act Vicarious Liability; Statutory Timelines and Authorization Under Sections 46/37/42 as Jurisdictional Preconditions

1. Introduction

In PARTHA SARATHI TRIPATHY v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. (Calcutta High Court, decided on 29-07-2026), the petitioner (arrayed as the “Manager” of the manufacturing concern) invoked the High Court’s revisional and inherent jurisdiction under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashing of C.R. Case No. 384 of 2021 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly.

The prosecution arose from a food safety inspection conducted on 11-03-2021 at the retail stall “La-Fasta” at Bandel Railway Station, where tetra packs of Britannia Winkin Cow Thick Lassi manufactured by M/s. Schreiber Dynamix Dairies Private Limited were sampled. The Public Health Laboratory report (generated on 20-05-2021) declared the product “unsafe food” citing Escherichia coli (E. coli) and elevated coliform counts. The complaint, however, did not implead the manufacturing company; it proceeded against individuals including the petitioner as Manager.

The High Court also dealt with an identity clarification: a supplementary affidavit confirmed that “Partha Tripathi” (as reflected in the FSS licence) and “Partha Sarathi Tripathi” were the same person, thereby removing ambiguity and enabling adjudication on merits.

Key issues framed by the Court

  1. Whether prosecution under Section 59 read with Section 66 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“FSS Act”) can lie against a manager/officer when the company is not arraigned as an accused.
  2. Whether a 59-day delay in generating/delivering the Food Analyst’s report (beyond the 14-day period under Section 46(3)) undermines reliability and prejudices the accused’s rights under Section 46(4), especially for a perishable dairy product.
  3. Whether alleged non-compliance with Section 37 (jurisdictional authorization of the Food Safety Officer) and the procedural workflow under Section 42 vitiated the prosecution.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Calcutta High Court allowed the revisional application and quashed the criminal proceeding in C.R. Case No. 384 of 2021 as against the petitioner, along with the order dated 15-12-2021 taking cognizance against him. The Court held that:

  • Vicarious liability under Section 66(1) of the FSS Act cannot be fastened on an officer/manager in the absence of arraignment of the company as the principal accused; naming an individual as “Manager” does not substitute for impleading the corporate juristic person.
  • The 59-day gap between receipt of sample and report generation created serious concerns about sample integrity for a short-shelf-life perishable dairy product, and potentially impaired the statutory defence right under Section 46(4) to seek re-analysis by a Referral Laboratory.
  • The record indicated procedural and jurisdictional lapses under Sections 37 and 42 that, taken together with the above defects, rendered continuation of the case against the petitioner an abuse of process.

Importantly, the Court clarified that its order would not preclude continuation of proceedings against the remaining co-accused persons in accordance with law.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited [(2012) 5 SCC 661]

The High Court treated Aneeta Hada as the controlling authority on statutory vicarious liability in corporate offences. Though Aneeta Hada arose under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court applied its reasoning to Section 66 of the FSS Act because both provisions share the same structure: (i) an offence by the company, and (ii) deemed guilt of persons in charge alongside the company.

The judgment extracted the essential rule from Aneeta Hada: arraigning the company as an accused is imperative; individuals are brought in only on the “touchstone of vicarious liability.” The High Court used this principle to characterize the non-impleadment of M/s. Schreiber Dynamix Dairies Private Limited as a fatal jurisdictional defect.

(B) Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane [(2015) 12 SCC 781]

Sharad Kumar Sanghi was relied on to reinforce the operational consequence of the Aneeta Hada rule: when the company is not a party, the order taking cognizance against an individual officer is legally unsustainable. The High Court treated this as reaffirmation that the defect is not merely curable by evidence at trial; it goes to the maintainability of the prosecution itself.

(C) A.T. Kannan v. State (2021 SCC OnLine Mad 14094)

The Court noted the Madras High Court’s application of the Aneeta Hada principle specifically to the FSS Act. This case supported the proposition that a prosecution under Section 66 cannot be sustained against a manager/officer where the corporate manufacturer is not arraigned. It provided persuasive, statute-specific confirmation that the ratio is not confined to cheque dishonour prosecutions.

(D) Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram . (AIR 1967 SC 970)

The High Court invoked Ghisa Ram for the evidentiary consequences of delay in prosecutions involving perishable food samples. The principle emphasized is that where delay or decomposition undermines the integrity of the sample, the accused may be prejudiced—especially when the statutory scheme gives a right to challenge the analyst’s finding through re-analysis.

Here, the Court analogized that a fermented dairy product like lassi is susceptible to microbial changes over time; therefore, a long hiatus between receipt of sample and report generation casts a “grey area” over integrity and fairness.

(E) G. Irudhayanathan v. B. Ramakrishnan . 12748)

The Court cited this authority in connection with the accused’s statutory right of re-analysis (under Section 46(4) of the FSS Act) and the concept of prejudice where procedural delays frustrate meaningful exercise of that right.

(F) Sailen Ganguly v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Cal 153

This Calcutta High Court precedent was used to underscore that compliance with the FSS Act’s procedural chain—particularly the mandatory workflow—is not a mere formality. The present judgment relied on it to conclude that lapses under Sections 37 and 42 can vitiate proceedings because they relate to competence, authorization, and statutory preconditions for prosecution.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(I) Section 66 FSS Act: “Company as principal offender” is the gateway to vicarious liability

The Court’s central holding is rooted in the text of Section 66(1), which deems persons-in-charge guilty as well as the company where an offence is committed by a company. The Court treated the company’s arraignment not as a technicality but as a structural prerequisite:

  • Vicarious criminal liability is a statutory fiction; it cannot operate “in a vacuum.”
  • The commission of an offence by the company is the “foundational sine qua non” for proceeding against officers.
  • Not impleading the company deprives the prosecution of its legal anchor and renders cognizance against the officer alone unsustainable.

Crucially, the Court rejected the argument that describing the accused as “The Manager, M/s. Schreiber Dynamix Dairies Pvt. Ltd.” satisfies Section 66. In law, the company is a distinct juristic person and must be formally arraigned as such; designational naming of an employee does not “impliedly” implead the corporation.

(II) Section 46(3) and 46(4): Delay, perishability, and prejudice to statutory defence

The Court treated Section 46(3) (14-day reporting mandate) as a safeguard closely linked to the defence right under Section 46(4) (ability to seek re-analysis through a Referral Laboratory). Even while acknowledging pandemic-era administrative constraints cited by the prosecution, the Court emphasized that:

  • The product involved (lassi) is a perishable fermented dairy commodity.
  • A 59-day interval between laboratory receipt and report generation raises serious concerns about the sample’s integrity and fairness of prosecution.
  • The delay can fracture the statutory workflow and impede effective exercise of re-analysis rights, thereby causing prejudice.

The Court stopped short of a full evidentiary adjudication (which would ordinarily occur at trial) but held that the magnitude and context of delay, coupled with other defects, contributed to the prosecution being legally untenable against the petitioner.

(III) Sections 37 and 42: Authorization and statutory workflow as conditions of valid prosecution

The judgment places significant weight on the FSS Act’s “integrated, time-bound workflow.” Two points are salient:

  • Section 37: the Food Safety Officer must be duly appointed/notified and have territorially defined authority. The Court found a “significant jurisdictional gap” concerning the Food Safety Officer, Eastern Railway, exercising powers at a retail stall within Bandel Railway Station without “seamless integration” into the local statutory framework for Hooghly.
  • Section 42: the Act contemplates a structured process—analysis report, independent application of mind by the Designated Officer, recommendation/sanction, and filing of complaint. The Court viewed the record as reflecting a broken chain and “mechanical transmission of files,” undermining the mandatory nature of compliance and thereby vitiating cognizance.

3.3 Impact

The decision materially strengthens maintainability and procedural compliance requirements in FSS Act prosecutions, especially where corporate manufacturing is involved.

  • Corporate arraignment requirement crystallized for FSS Act: By explicitly applying Aneeta Hada and allied jurisprudence to Section 66, the judgment signals that prosecutions targeting only “managers” or “responsible officers” without impleading the company risk being quashed at the threshold.
  • Timelines under Section 46(3) treated as substantive safeguards: Administrative explanations (including pandemic backlogs) may not suffice where delay threatens sample integrity or undermines the accused’s statutory right under Section 46(4), particularly for perishable foods.
  • Heightened scrutiny of Sections 37 and 42 compliance: Investigating agencies and complainants can expect closer judicial review of territorial authorization and the “application of mind” at each statutory step; non-compliance may be characterized as jurisdictional rather than curable.
  • Railway-premises inspections and jurisdiction: The Court’s observations highlight potential friction between specialized enforcement (e.g., “Eastern Railway” Food Safety Officer) and district/local statutory architecture, suggesting future litigation on jurisdictional notifications and delegation in such contexts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Quashing” (Section 482 CrPC): The High Court’s power to stop a criminal case at the threshold when continuing it would be illegal or an abuse of court process.
  • “Taking cognizance”: The Magistrate’s formal act of recognizing that a complaint discloses an offence and initiating criminal process (e.g., summoning an accused).
  • “Vicarious liability” under Section 66: Liability of officers/people in charge for an offence committed by the company. It is not automatic; it operates only because the statute deems it so, and (as held here) it presupposes that the company is prosecuted as the principal offender.
  • Section 46(3) timeline (14 days): A statutory deadline requiring the analyst’s report to be delivered promptly—important because food samples can degrade and because the accused has procedural rights dependent on timely reporting.
  • Section 46(4) re-analysis right: A protective mechanism allowing an accused to challenge the initial report by seeking testing at a Referral Laboratory. Delay can make this right illusory if the sample deteriorates.
  • Sections 37 and 42 “workflow”: The FSS Act is designed as a compliance chain—authorized inspection, sampling, analysis, designated officer’s scrutiny, sanction/recommendation, then prosecution. Breaks in this chain can invalidate proceedings.

5. Conclusion

This judgment sets out a clear, FSS Act-specific application of the corporate vicarious liability doctrine: without impleading the company, prosecution of a manager/officer under Section 66 is not maintainable. It additionally underscores that statutory timelines in food sample analysis are integral to fairness—particularly for perishable commodities—and that authorization and procedural workflow under Sections 37 and 42 function as jurisdictional preconditions rather than dispensable formalities.

The immediate outcome was the quashing of proceedings against the petitioner while leaving open action against others in accordance with law. The broader significance lies in its message to regulators and complainants: FSS Act prosecutions must be built on correct corporate arraignment, timely statutory compliance, and demonstrable adherence to the Act’s procedural architecture, failing which High Courts may intervene at the inception to prevent abuse of process.