Article 324 Is Not a Licence for Blanket Mobility Bans: Calcutta High Court Limits Election-Era Motorcycle Restrictions to Statutory/SOP-Consistent, Proportionate Measures

Case: RITANKAR DAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. (WPA No. 9958 of 2026, with CAN No. 1 of 2026)
Court: Calcutta High Court (Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction, Appellate Side)
Judge: Krishna Rao, J.
Date: 24-04-2026

1. Introduction

The writ petitioner, Ritankar Das, challenged an order dated 20 April 2026 issued by the Chief Electoral Officer (respondent no. 3) imposing election-period restrictions on motorcycles from “Polling day-2 onward” and on polling day, purportedly to ensure “free, fair, peaceful and violence free Election-2026”. The petitioner contended that the order (particularly the restrictions on ordinary motorcycle riding and pillion riding) was issued without authority of law and infringed fundamental rights by imposing an overbroad, blanket prohibition.

After the petitioner’s representation, the authority modified the order on 21 April 2026, exempting certain service providers (e.g., Ola/Uber/Zomato/Swiggy) and office-going riders with identity cards. The petitioner maintained that the core illegality persisted: restrictions on general motorcycle movement and pillion riding were not traceable to any statutory provision, and were disproportionate.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Calcutta High Court held the writ petition to be maintainable because the petitioner did not challenge the election or its outcome, but only the jurisdictional legality of a restrictive executive communication.

On merits, the Court accepted that the Election Commission’s powers under Article 324(1) are wide, but emphasized they must conform to existing laws and cannot create sweeping restrictions where the statutory scheme and the SOP instead contemplate targeted enforcement (e.g., vehicle checking via NAKAS).

The Court found:

• Motorbike rallies could justifiably be prohibited near elections to prevent violence and intimidation.
• A blanket restriction on ordinary motorcycle riding from polling day-2 onward was not justified and lacked statutory/SOP support.
• Pillion-riding restrictions could be sustained only in a narrower, time-bound form closer to polling, with stated exceptions.

The Court therefore modified the impugned order (20 April 2026, read with 21 April 2026) to allow a narrower, more proportionate regime:

• (a) Polling day-2 onwards: No motor bike rally.
• (b) 12 hours before polling day: no pillion riding except for medical emergency/family function/essential needs (e.g., school children).
• (c) Polling day (6 a.m. to 6 p.m.): family pillion riding allowed for voting and essential needs.
• (d) Exemptions retained for service providers and office-going riders with proper identification.

The writ petition was disposed of on these terms; the connected application (CAN No. 1 of 2026) was dismissed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the outcome)

(i) Bhagyoday Janparishad v. State of Gujarat (AIR 2013 GUJ 2014)

The petitioner relied on this decision to underscore that Article 324(1) confers wide power on the Election Commission, but the exercise of that power is “not without a check” and must be undertaken with “legal circumspection”. The Calcutta High Court’s approach echoes this restraint-oriented framing: it did not deny the need for strong election management, but insisted that restrictions must be legally grounded and calibrated.

(ii) R. Rajangam Secretary, Communist Party of India (Marxists), Puducherry v. Union Territory of Puducherry (AIR OnLine 2021 Mad 265)

This authority was cited by the petitioner to argue that “prohibition should not be regarded as a blanket prohibition of movement of motorcycle.” While the Calcutta High Court did not reproduce detailed reasoning from it, the final relief—striking down the “polling day-2 onward” riding curbs while retaining limited pillion/rally constraints—aligns with the principle that election-related restrictions should avoid sweeping bans and focus on the mischief to be prevented.

(iii) Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

The Advocate General invoked this case in the context of misuse of power, distinguishing bona fide exercise from bad-faith misuse and emphasizing judicial readiness to restrain improper exercise of statutory power. Even though the High Court did not make a finding of mala fides, the citation reinforced the Court’s supervisory posture: executive action affecting liberties during elections must remain within lawful bounds and be capable of justification.

(iv) Mohindhr Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. (1978 1 SCC 405)

This was the pivotal constitutional authority for the respondents. The High Court extracted and relied on the core proposition: Article 324(1) is wide and includes residuary power to address unforeseen contingencies, but the Commission must “conform to the existing laws and rules” and the residuary space operates in a “vacuous area” where enacted law is silent and action is “reasonably called for”.

The Court used this to test the CEO’s restrictions against the actual legal landscape: the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the ECI SOP already provide mechanisms (e.g., NAKAS/vehicle checking) and do not authorize a general “no riding” regime from poll day-2 onward. Thus, the “residuary power” logic could not justify a disproportionate and non-traceable restriction when the regulatory field was not truly “vacuous” and when narrower tools existed.

(v) Election Commission of India v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (1995 Supp (3) SCC 379)

The respondents cited this to emphasize the Election Commission as a “high constitutional authority” with “incidental and ancillary powers” to ensure free and fair elections. The High Court did not dispute the Commission’s stature, but read these ancillary powers as functional and bounded: they enable effective conduct of elections, yet do not license measures that are untethered to law or unnecessary in breadth.

(vi) Kanhiya Lal Omar (supra)

Though not fully set out in the judgment text, the High Court invoked this authority for the proposition that Article 324(1) powers are “subject to any law” made under Article 327 or Article 328. This supplied the doctrinal bridge to invalidate/trim restrictions that went beyond the statutory scheme and the SOP’s contemplated enforcement methods.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Maintainability despite Article 329

The Court drew a practical and doctrinal distinction between:

• Challenges that “call in question” an election (typically barred and relegated to an election petition), and
• Challenges to administrative orders on the ground of lack of jurisdiction that do not seek to derail or adjudicate the election process itself.

Because the petitioner targeted the legality of the restrictive communication (and not the election, candidature, polling, counting, or result), the writ was held maintainable.

B. The scope—and limits—of Article 324(1)

The High Court accepted that election authorities may need strong preventive tools to secure peace and fairness. But it insisted on two limiting principles, derived from the Supreme Court’s Article 324 jurisprudence:

• Conformity principle: where laws/rules/SOP occupy the field (even partially), election directions must operate consistently with them rather than invent new prohibitions.
• Necessity/proportionality principle: even if some residuary space exists, restrictions must be reasonably called for and not be a “blanket restriction” in the name of free and fair polls.

C. Statutory provisions relied upon did not support the impugned restrictions

• Section 126 of the Representative of the People Act, 1951 (as argued) deals with prohibition of public meetings within 48 hours of polling/conclusion; it does not create a power to restrict general motorcycle riding.
• Section 130 of the said Act prohibits canvassing “in or near polling station”; again, it does not justify a constituency-wide riding curtailment.
• The SOP for last 72 hours (notably Clause 5.5.5) emphasizes checking of vehicles and persons through NAKAS at entry points, with movement/rotation to preserve surprise—indicating a model of targeted enforcement, not a generalized ban.

D. Why the Court preserved some restrictions but struck/trimmed others

The Court’s remedy shows a calibrated approach:

• It found “some justification” for no motor bike rally, as rallies can amplify intimidation, muscle power, and disorder.
• It rejected the idea that ordinary riding by “any person” should be curtailed for 48 hours merely because elections require peace—especially when adequate forces and SOP mechanisms (NAKAS/checking) were already in place.
• It converted a multi-day, broad pillion/riding restraint into a narrow 12-hour pillion restriction before polling day, while preserving enumerated exceptions and allowing family pillion travel for voting on polling day.

In effect, the Court aligned the direction with the legitimate aim (peaceful polling) while minimizing intrusion into everyday mobility and livelihood.

3.3 Impact

(i) Constraining “blanket” election-period executive restrictions

This judgment is likely to be cited for the proposition that Article 324(1) cannot be used as a standalone basis for sweeping, constituency-wide restrictions on ordinary movement—especially where the statute/SOP provides narrower, enforcement-focused alternatives such as vehicle checks, surveillance teams, and policing.

(ii) Preference for targeted enforcement tools

By contrasting the impugned “restriction on motorcycle riding” with SOP-mandated NAKAS and checking protocols, the Court signals that election administration should generally prefer:

• screening and interdiction of suspicious movement,
• checking vehicles/persons from outside constituencies, and
• focused action against rallies and intimidation,

rather than restricting the mobility of the general public.

(iii) Drafting discipline for election directions

Authorities issuing election-time directions may now be expected to:

• identify the precise legal source (statute/rules/SOP clause/ECI directive) for each restriction,
• state the specific mischief (e.g., intimidation, transport of voters, arms, cash) and why existing tools are inadequate, and
• demonstrate narrow tailoring (time-bound, area-bound, category-bound).

(iv) Maintaining access to judicial review during elections

The maintainability holding reinforces that Article 329 does not create a blanket immunity for all election-adjacent administrative action. Orders alleged to be ultra vires and not directly “calling in question” the election can remain open to writ scrutiny, particularly where immediate civil liberty burdens arise.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 324(1): Gives the Election Commission constitutional authority over the “superintendence, direction and control” of elections. It is broad, but not limitless.
• Articles 327 and 328: Enable Parliament/State Legislatures to make election laws. When such laws exist, election authorities generally must act consistently with them.
• Residuary power / “vacuous area” (from Mohindhr Singh Gill): If a situation arises that election laws do not address, the Commission can act to ensure free and fair elections—but only to the extent necessary and not contrary to existing law.
• Article 329 bar: Courts typically avoid interference that questions an election itself; however, administrative actions that do not challenge the election outcome/process may still be reviewable.
• Blanket restriction: A broad, indiscriminate prohibition affecting everyone, regardless of whether they pose the targeted risk. Courts often view such restrictions skeptically when narrower measures exist.
• NAKAS (check-posts): On-ground vehicle/person checking points used to intercept illegal cash, arms, outsider influx, or coordinated intimidation—an enforcement tool less intrusive than a general travel ban.

5. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision in RITANKAR DAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS. crystallizes a practical constitutional limit: even during elections, broad restrictions on ordinary mobility must be anchored in law and proportionate to the threat addressed. While affirming the Election Commission’s wide mandate to secure free and fair polls, the Court rejected an overbroad “polling day-2 onward” restriction on motorcycle riding and replaced it with a narrower framework—prohibiting rallies, restricting pillion riding only in the immediate pre-poll window, and preserving essential exemptions.

The broader significance lies in reasserting that election integrity and civil liberties are not competing absolutes; election administration must pursue integrity through legally grounded, targeted measures rather than sweeping prohibitions that burden the general public without demonstrated necessity.