Article 226 Cannot Be Used as a Disguised PIL to Compel FIR Registration in Long-Running Commercial/Contractual Disputes; Bona Fides, Public Law Element, and Hearing to Proposed Accused
1. Introduction
In JITENDRA P MARU v. THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ANR
(Bombay High Court, Criminal Writ Petition No. 5542 of 2025, decided on 27-03-2026),
the petitioner sought a writ directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to
register an FIR and investigate alleged offences of theft, criminal breach of trust, receiving stolen property,
and conspiracy (among others) under the IPC against Reliance Industries Limited (RIL), its directors, and unknown persons.
The petition was grounded in allegations that RIL, operating under a Production Sharing Contract for the KG-D6 block,
had allegedly extracted (including by “sideways drilling”) gas allegedly belonging to ONGC.
The factual backdrop overlapped with a long-standing contractual/arbitral dispute between the Union of India and RIL
and related litigation before the Delhi High Court, including FAO(OS) (COMM) 201/2023 titled “Union of India v. Reliance Industries Limited & Ors.”,
with a pending Supreme Court challenge noted as Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.17584 of 2025.
Key issues
- Whether the High Court should direct the CBI to register an FIR under Article 226 based on the petitioner’s allegations.
- Whether the petition, framed as public-spirited, was in substance a disguised PIL/abuse of process lacking bona fides and public law element.
- Whether RIL (a proposed accused) was entitled to be heard at the stage of a writ seeking FIR registration against it.
- What significance attaches to delay, suppression of facts, and existence of parallel commercial/arbitral proceedings.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Division Bench (Shree Chandrashekhar, CJ and Suman Shyam, J) dismissed the writ petition, holding that:
- The petition was an abuse of process, masked as a public cause but lacking bona fides and a genuine public law element.
- Directing registration of an FIR in such circumstances would have serious consequences and could not be premised on “observations” in other proceedings or newspaper-derived allegations.
- The petitioner offered no satisfactory explanation for approaching the Court after an inordinate delay (well over a decade).
- Given that the prayer sought FIR registration against specific persons/entities, the Court had earlier added RIL as respondent no.4 and overruled the objection that RIL had no right of hearing at that stage.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The petitioner relied on “Anju Chaudhary v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.” to argue that a proposed accused has
no right of hearing at the stage of FIR registration. The Bombay High Court closely examined the cited portions
(including the Supreme Court’s discussion on Section 154 CrPC and the general exclusion of pre-FIR audi alteram partem)
but emphasized that the decision itself contains a crucial qualification in paragraph 35: where a complaint/application is directed
against a particular person for a specific offence and a higher court is asked to direct registration, the court
may need to grant hearing to that person depending on facts.
Applying this nuance, the Bombay High Court treated the petitioner’s prayer—explicitly seeking an FIR against RIL and its directors—as
one that warranted hearing the targeted party, and thus added RIL as respondent and heard it.
This case was referenced within the extracted discussion from Anju Chaudhary for the proposition that,
though Section 154 CrPC generally obliges FIR registration upon information of a cognizable offence, there may be
limited space for preliminary inquiry in certain contexts. The Bombay High Court’s use of this line of authority
was indirect: it did not order an FIR and instead examined the broader institutional consequences of compelling criminal process
through writ jurisdiction on disputed, old, commercially entangled facts.
Cited (again via Anju Chaudhary) for the principle that giving prior notice/hearing to an accused “in every criminal case”
before investigative steps would frustrate investigation and defeat justice. The Bombay High Court accepted the general logic
but distinguished the present procedural posture: it was not merely an investigative step by police, but a judicial direction sought from the High Court
to compel FIR registration against identified targets—where the court’s discretion to hear becomes more salient.
Also cited within Anju Chaudhary for the proposition that there is no statutory right of hearing to a “suspect” before FIR registration
or before pre-registration inquiry. The Bombay High Court treated this as part of the general rule, but consistent with paragraph 35 of Anju Chaudhary,
held that a court directing registration against a specific proposed accused may grant hearing depending on the case.
This Delhi High Court matter (FAO(OS) (COMM) 201/2023) was pivotal as the petitioner candidly admitted that
all facts stated in the writ petition were derived from it. The Bombay High Court treated this dependence as a red flag:
the writ court should not be converted into a forum where third parties, relying on observations in commercial/arbitral litigation,
attempt to trigger criminal prosecution—particularly when the underlying dispute is actively litigated and appealed.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
-
Hearing to the proposed accused in a writ seeking FIR against identified targets:
The Court rejected the petitioner’s objection to hearing RIL, noting that Anju Chaudhary itself contemplates situations
where a higher court, before directing registration of a case against a specific person, may have to grant hearing.
On this basis, RIL was added as respondent and heard.
-
Article 226 is not a tool to operationalize private or oblique motives:
The Court reiterated that Article 226 is exercised in public interest, requiring the petitioner to establish bona fides
and to come with “clean hands.” The Court found the petition’s “public cause” to be a pretentious projection, not a genuine public law grievance.
-
Public law element and institutional caution in directing criminal process:
The judgment stresses that directing FIR registration is a serious matter with “drastic consequences.”
The Court cautioned against entertaining petitions that seek criminal investigation based on “observations” in other proceedings,
as that can generate “serious consequences and repercussions.”
-
Delay and credibility of the petitioner’s explanation:
The Court treated the long delay (the dispute having erupted years earlier) as damaging to the petition’s credibility.
It rejected the explanation that the petitioner approached only after the Delhi High Court’s later decision, noting the intervening procedural history,
including an arbitral award (24 July 2018), Section 34 dismissal (9 May 2023), and subsequent Section 37 appellate interference, with the matter pending in the Supreme Court.
-
Abuse-of-process lens in “PIL-like” criminal writs:
The Court explicitly noted a broader pattern: such petitions are often filed at the behest of competitors/rivals/disgruntled persons and can cause
reputational and commercial harm, including an “inbuilt threat” affecting business relationships.
3.3 Impact
-
Higher threshold for third-party FIR directions under Article 226:
The decision signals that when a private individual (unconnected to the underlying contractual relationship) asks the High Court to compel FIR registration
against a named corporate entity, the court will closely scrutinize locus, bona fides, delay, and public law element.
-
Guardrail against “criminalization” of commercial disputes via writ petitions:
Where the gravamen is intertwined with PSC obligations, expert reports, quantification disputes, and arbitration/appeals,
the Court is reluctant to allow criminal process to be initiated through a collateral writ—particularly by a stranger to the transaction.
-
Procedural fairness in court-directed FIR requests:
By relying on paragraph 35 of Anju Chaudhary, the judgment reinforces that while police ordinarily need not hear a suspect pre-FIR,
a court asked to direct registration against identified persons may, depending on circumstances, hear them to prevent misuse.
-
Reputational-protection rationale acknowledged in public law analysis:
The Court’s explicit recognition of reputational/commercial harm may influence future benches to treat such petitions with heightened skepticism,
especially where allegations track media reports or selective extracts from other litigation.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Article 226 (writ jurisdiction)
-
A constitutional power allowing High Courts to issue directions/orders for enforcement of rights and to ensure lawful public administration.
It is discretionary and typically demands bona fides and a public law dimension.
- FIR and Section 154 CrPC
-
The First Information Report is the starting point of police investigation for cognizable offences. Section 154 generally mandates registration
upon receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence, though limited preliminary inquiry may be permissible in certain contexts.
- Section 156(3) CrPC
-
A Magistrate’s power to order investigation. The Supreme Court in Anju Chaudhary discussed when hearing may be relevant
if a higher court is asked to direct registration against a particular person.
- Audi alteram partem
-
“Hear the other side.” In criminal investigation, pre-FIR hearing is generally excluded to avoid frustrating investigation;
however, in court-driven directions targeting identified persons, courts may still consider hearing to prevent abuse.
- Suppressio veri and suggestio falsi
-
Suppression of truth and suggestion of falsehood—i.e., misleading the court by omitting vital facts or presenting a distorted narrative.
- PIL (Public Interest Litigation) vs. disguised private interest
-
PIL is meant for genuine public wrongs where affected persons cannot approach the court. Courts reject “PILs” that are in reality private vendettas,
publicity-seeking, or competitor-driven actions.
- PSC (Production Sharing Contract) and arbitration (Sections 34/37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996)
-
PSCs are contractual frameworks for resource exploration/production. Disputes commonly go to arbitration; Section 34 allows challenge to an award,
and Section 37 provides for appeal in specified circumstances. The Court treated the pending arbitral/litigation landscape as relevant to assessing
whether the writ was a collateral attempt to criminalize a commercial dispute.
5. Conclusion
The Bombay High Court’s decision is a clear caution that criminal writ petitions seeking court-directed FIR registration—especially by
third parties relying on media reports or observations in commercial/arbitral litigation—will be tested against stringent public law standards:
bona fides, clean hands, credible timing, and a genuine public interest element.
It also clarifies a procedural point with practical significance: while police processes generally exclude pre-FIR hearing,
when a High Court is asked to direct registration of an FIR against specific identified persons, it may (and in appropriate cases should)
hear the proposed accused to prevent misuse of constitutional jurisdiction as a tool of reputational or commercial warfare.