Article 21 “Right to Be Forgotten” Applied to Online Judicial Records: De-indexing (Global) and Masking as Privacy-Compatible Limits to Open Justice

Case: LAKSH VIR SINGH YADAV v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS, 2026 DHC 4891
Court: Delhi High Court
Date: 29-05-2026
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Datta
Proceeding: Batch of writ petitions (W.P.(C) 1021/2016 & connected matters; also W.P.(Crl.) 1861/2022)

1. Introduction

This Delhi High Court judgment addresses a recurring digital-age problem: judicial orders and news reports—lawful at the time of publication—remain permanently searchable by a person’s name on search engines and legal databases, producing enduring reputational and dignity harms long after the legal system has concluded the underlying dispute.

The petitioners were varied: individuals acquitted/discharged; matters quashed; disputes settled/compounded; purely private matrimonial and civil disputes; incidental references to non-parties; a victim of sexual offences whose identity appeared unredacted online; and also petitions by public figures and convicted persons. Respondents included Union of India (MEITY and others), Google (search), iKanoon Software Development Private Limited (“Indian Kanoon”), media houses, X Corp, Microsoft, and the Registrar General, Delhi High Court.

The key issue was whether informational privacy under Article 21 entitles an individual to seek (a) de-indexing/de-linking of judicial records and related content from name-based search results, and (b) masking of personal identifiers from publicly accessible digital versions of judicial records—while still respecting the principle of open justice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Privacy and informational privacy under Article 21

• K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
  The judgment’s constitutional foundation. It supplies: (i) privacy as intrinsic to dignity under Article 21; (ii) informational privacy as a protected facet; (iii) enforceability against both State and non-State actors (paras quoted in the judgment); and (iv) the legality–legitimate aim–proportionality test. Justice Kaul’s passages were used to conceptualise the right to be forgotten in the internet era (“Humans forget, but the internet does not forget…”).
• R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632
  Provided the early articulation of privacy, and the “public records including court records” exception to privacy. The Delhi High Court did not treat R. Rajagopal as a complete bar; rather, it distinguished between (a) the existence and accessibility of court records and (b) the digital amplification of those records through name-based search.
• PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z', (1998) 8 SCC 296, Sharda v. Dharmpal ., (2003) 4 SCC 493, District Registrar And Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496
  Cited to show privacy’s constitutional trajectory, its non-absolute nature, and balancing where competing rights/public interest exists. These authorities support the Court’s move from “privacy exists” to “privacy requires calibrated limits on dissemination”.

B. “Right to be forgotten” and comparative materials

• Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Mario Costeja González [C-131/12]
  Used not as binding law but as persuasive analysis of search engines as active processors that “collect, retrieve, record, organise, store and make available” personal data, and whose role in making information “ubiquitous” heightens privacy interference. The Delhi High Court relied on this to rebut Google’s “passive library index” characterisation.
• Hurbain v. Belgium (Grand Chamber, Application No. 57292/16)
  Used to support de-indexing as a proportionate remedy: preserve archives but reduce search prominence/accessibility.
• NT 1 v. GOOGLE LLC4
  Cited (via Karnataka HC quotation) for a “delisting not deletion” approach and for treating search engine processing as not “solely journalistic”.
• Vysakh K.G. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7337
  Used for taxonomy of right-to-be-forgotten forms (delisting, erasure, obscurity, rehabilitation) and for articulating exceptions. The Delhi High Court distinguished its more hesitant approach and held constitutional courts can act despite legislative gaps.
• Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court (W.A.(MD) No. 1901 of 2021) and iKanoon Software Development Pvt. Ltd. v. Karthick Theodore (SLP(C) No. 15311 of 2024)
  The Court noted the Madras HC’s complete takedown order but distinguished this case: it largely preferred the narrower remedy of de-indexing/limited search disablement rather than removal of the judgment itself; it also acknowledged the Supreme Court stay/pending adjudication in the SLP.

C. Open justice, transparency, and balancing with privacy

• Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India, (2018) 10 SCC 639 and Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India(2016) 5 SCC 1
  Cited (via Kerala HC) for transparency/open court values and public confidence. The Delhi High Court accepted the premise but confined its operational reach in the digital context.
• Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012) 10 SCC 603 and Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1
  Central to the proposition that open justice is the cornerstone, yet not absolute; courts have inherent power to carve exceptions where administration of justice/dignity requires.
• Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 48
  Relied upon to emphasise balancing: “in public interest” vs “of interest to the public”, and privacy’s weight even in transparency regimes.
• Assn. for Democratic Reforms (Electoral Bond Scheme) v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 1
  Invoked by Indian Kanoon to stress the right to information; the Delhi High Court nevertheless treated the requested remedy as narrowly tailored and not a general censorship mechanism.

D. Maintainability and enforcement against private parties

• Radhey Shyam & Anr. v Chabbi Nath & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 423
  Cited for the general proposition that mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging public duty. The Court distinguished it in the privacy context because K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India recognises privacy claims against non-State actors.
• Kaushal Kishore v. Sate of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 1 and DejoKappan v. Deccan Herald, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494
  Used to reinforce that fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced against non-State actors.
• Sanchit Gupta v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5880
  Cited as a counterpoint where a writ against X Corp was held not maintainable in that fact pattern; the present judgment carved a different path due to the nature of Article 21 informational privacy harms and the scale of private digital intermediaries’ impact.
• ABC v. Commissioner of Police, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 449
  Used to support the proposition (in an appropriate context) that media can be treated as performing public functions and thus be amenable to writ scrutiny where fundamental rights, especially victim identity, are implicated.
• Shreya Singhal v. Union Of India., (2015) 5 SCC 1
  Used primarily to describe intermediary “actual knowledge” and the order-based takedown architecture under Section 79(3)(b) IT Act. The Delhi High Court aligned its directions to operate as court orders triggering intermediary duties.

E. Reputation as part of Article 21

• Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P.,(2013) 10 SCC 591, State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani, (2003) 8 SCC 361, Vinod Kumar Bindal v. CIC, (2025) 2 HCC (Del) 459, DejoKappan v. Deccan Herald, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6494
  Relied on to ground reputational protection within Article 21, supporting the conclusion that post-acquittal/discharge continued name-based digital stigma is constitutionally disproportionate.

F. Legislative vacuum and judicial guidelines

• Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 2 41
  Invoked to justify judicially framed principles where fundamental rights demand protection amid statutory gaps (the Court emphasised it was applying constitutional principles, not legislating).

G. Additional balancing and “collective interest” language

• Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397
  Used to articulate balancing between competing rights and the “paramount collective interest”/public confidence approach—adapted here to assess when public interest justifies continued accessibility.
• Sunil Sachdeva v. Owner of Domain Name WWW.CJR7.COM, 2019 SCC OnLineDel 11168
  Used for the “public interest vs public curiosity” distinction and to reinforce that transparency cannot become absolute to the point of privacy destruction.

H. Masking/erasure in Indian High Courts and Supreme Court directions

• XXXX v. High Court of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 18, State of H.P. v. X2, 2024 SCC OnLine HP 3169, XXXXX v. YYYY2, 2022 SSC online SC 1123
  Used to demonstrate operational feasibility of masking and the judicial trend toward enabling “internet forgetting” without erasing court history.

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3.2 Legal Reasoning and the Doctrinal Framework

(i) Maintainability: privacy harms in the digital domain justify writ directions to private intermediaries

The Court accepted the general rule against mandamus to purely private bodies, but held that it cannot defeat enforcement of Article 21 informational privacy where (a) K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India explicitly recognises privacy claims against non-State actors, and (b) intermediaries have concrete statutory obligations under the IT Rules, 2021 (the Court specifically referenced Rule 3(1)(d)).

(ii) The Court’s key conceptual move: “open justice” ≠ unlimited name-based digital discoverability

The judgment draws a crucial distinction:

• Open justice requires: records exist, are maintained, and remain accessible through purposeful search (case number/citation/court/date).
• Open justice does not require: a private individual’s name functioning as a perpetual “unlimited retrieval key” via commercial search engines.

The Court treated name-based digital search as a qualitatively different phenomenon: search engines aggregate, rank, and “serve” results to satisfy user queries, often amplifying stigma. This amplification was described as driven by engagement/commercial logic rather than juridical completeness.

(iii) Search engines as “active processors” of personal data; limits of Article 19(1)(a) defences

Rejecting Google’s “neutral library” analogy, the Court adopted the reasoning in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Mario Costeja González [C-131/12] that search engines actively collect, organise, and present a structured profile about individuals.

On rights balancing, the Court underscored that Article 19 fundamental rights are available to citizens; it also treated algorithmic search-result serving as not equivalent to “speech” in the human constitutional sense. For Indian Kanoon (a legal database), the Court recognised it is closer to a publication function, but found the ordered remedy narrowly tailored: disable name-based search for specified judgments while leaving access by legal identifiers intact.

(iv) The proportionality framework and the “right to be forgotten” outcome-based approach

Applying K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India (legality–legitimate aim–proportionality), the Court held that in common eligible categories (acquittal/discharge/quashing/settlement/compounding/private matrimonial and civil disputes), continued unlimited name-based searchability is constitutionally disproportionate.

The judgment formulates guiding considerations and then crystallises them into “tests”:

• Test One: The character of the information and the outcome of concluded proceedings — acquittal/discharge/quashing/settlement/compounding strongly favour de-indexing.
• Test Two: The public role of the individual — public figure status increases transparency obligations, but only for conduct relevant to public role (not intimate private life).
• Test Three: Accuracy and continuing relevance — outdated/misleading/partial disclosures lose justification over time; falsehoods have no sustainable claim to continued amplification.

(v) Remedial architecture: “De-indexing” + “Masking” (not “takedown”) as the Court’s preferred equilibrium

The Court treated de-indexing as the primary, narrow relief: it preserves the judicial record but removes it from name-based search results. It treated masking as complementary: the public digital copy redacts identifiers while preserving an unredacted internal record.

The Court explicitly avoided (as a general approach) ordering complete takedown of judgments from legal databases—distinguishing Karthick Theodore v. Registrar General, Madras High Court (W.A.(MD) No. 1901 of 2021).

(vi) Exceptions: where de-indexing/masking may not be appropriate

The judgment carved out notable “no-relief” categories, including:

• Conviction for offences against women or children (continuing protective public interest).
• Conviction involving breach of public trust (public accountability).
• Public figure conduct in public domain where public interest persists.
• Insufficient material (e.g., petition without status of underlying proceedings).

(vii) Territorial scope: global de-indexing

A significant rule: de-indexing limited to an India domain (e.g., google.co.in) would be ineffective, so the Court directed that de-indexing operate globally across domains to protect Article 21 rights meaningfully.

(viii) Statutory override in sexual offence victim identity cases

For the petition by a sexual offence victim, the Court grounded relief in the statutory prohibition on identity disclosure (noted as Section 228A IPC), treating it as an absolute mandate, and directed systemic steps to prevent recurrence.

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3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Digital-Public-Record Governance

• Operationalising “right to be forgotten” in India without a comprehensive statute: The judgment provides a concrete, court-administered framework for de-indexing and masking, thereby filling the gap flagged in other High Court approaches.
• A new equilibrium for “open justice” in the internet era: By separating “record accessibility” from “name-based algorithmic amplification,” the judgment recalibrates transparency in a way likely to influence future disputes involving court portals, legal databases, and search engines.
• Platform obligations through court orders + IT Rules: The judgment aligns relief with an order-driven compliance model (referencing IT Rules, 2021), potentially standardising how litigants seek relief: obtain a court order → intermediaries comply → MEITY monitors.
• Global de-indexing as a constitutional remedy: The explicit global scope is likely to be contested in future cases (especially by platforms), but it is framed here as essential to remedy effectiveness.
• Category-based outcomes guide litigation strategy: The Court’s detailed “application to petitions” section functions as a quasi-matrix: acquittal/discharge/quashing/settlement/private matrimonial matters → strong entitlement; conviction/public-figure conduct → weak/denied entitlement.
• Institutional change within courts: The endorsement of masking software and liberty to apply to originating courts may accelerate anonymisation practices at e-filing stage and at publication stage.

Category	Default approach in this judgment	Rationale
Acquittal / discharge / quashing	De-indexing; name-search disablement; liberty to seek masking	Presumption of innocence + reputational/dignity protection
Settlement / compounding	De-indexing typically granted	Proceedings extinguished by consent; reduced public interest
Purely private civil / matrimonial disputes	De-indexing typically granted	Core privacy zone (family, marriage); minimal public interest
Public figure conduct / public-domain behaviour	Relief may be denied	Transparency expectations persist; not a tool for image curation
Conviction (serious offences)	Relief denied (especially recent/serious)	Continuing public interest & accountability
Victim identity in sexual offences	Immediate relief; systemic directions	Statutory non-disclosure + Article 21 privacy

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Informational privacy: the right to control how personal information about you is collected, organised, and circulated—especially online.
• Right to be forgotten: not a right to “erase history,” but a right to stop outdated/irrelevant personal-data linkage from being easily surfaced, particularly by name-based searches.
• De-indexing / de-linking: removing specific URLs/results from appearing when someone searches your name. The underlying document remains online and accessible by case number/citation.
• Masking: redacting/replacing your name and identifiers in the publicly accessible digital copy of a judgment (e.g., “X” or “ABC”), while keeping the unredacted official record intact for legitimate legal use.
• Open justice: courts operate transparently; judgments are public. This judgment clarifies that transparency does not require that every person’s name remain a perpetual “search key” producing instant stigma.
• “In public interest” vs “of interest to the public”: a crucial distinction: people may be curious (interest), but constitutional justification requires a public-welfare reason (public interest).
• Global de-indexing: restricting results only on google.co.in is ineffective if google.com still shows them; hence the remedy must work across domains to be meaningful.

5. Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision is a landmark operationalisation of Article 21 informational privacy in the context of digitised judicial records. It recognises the “right to be forgotten” as a facet of informational privacy, rejects a simplistic “public record therefore no privacy” stance, and introduces a calibrated remedies framework: de-indexing (global) and restricted name-based search, alongside masking as a complementary court-record measure.

The judgment’s enduring significance lies in its synthesis: it preserves open justice by keeping judgments available through purposeful legal identifiers, while preventing disproportionate, permanent reputational harm caused by name-based algorithmic amplification—thereby aligning constitutional dignity with digital reality.