Adoptive Maternity Benefit Cannot Be Age-Capped: Section 60(4) Read Down to Remove the Three-Month Limit

I. Introduction

In HAMSAANANDINI NANDURI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. (2026 INSC 246), the Supreme Court (J.B. Pardiwala, J. and R. Mahadevan, J.) examined the constitutionality of an age-based restriction on maternity benefit for adoptive mothers under India’s social security framework.

The petitioner—an adoptive mother of two children—invoked Article 32 in public interest, initially challenging Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (as inserted by the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017). During the pendency of the proceedings, the Code on Social Security, 2020 came into force; the challenge was accordingly amended to target the pari materia provision: Section 60(4).

The core controversy was narrow but consequential: Section 60(4) granted 12 weeks’ maternity benefit to an adoptive mother only if she adopted a child “below the age of three months”. The petitioner argued that this carve-out arbitrarily excluded adoptive mothers of older infants/children, undermining equality and dignity, and disregarding adoption’s practical timelines under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the Adoption Regulations, 2022.

Key Issues Framed by the Court

  1. Whether the three-month age cap in Section 60(4) violates Article 14 by discriminating against women adopting children aged three months or above.
  2. Whether the same cap violates Article 21 by impairing adoptive mothers’ reproductive/decisional autonomy and the adopted child’s right to holistic care and development.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held that Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, to the extent it limited maternity benefit for adoptive mothers to cases where the adopted child is below three months, is unconstitutional for violating Articles 14 and 21.

Rather than striking down the provision wholesale, the Court adopted a “meaningful reading” / reading down approach, deleting the age limit and directing that Section 60(4) be read as:

“(4) A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be.”

Additionally, in an important policy-facing observation, the Court urged the Union to introduce paternity leave as a social security benefit, with a duration responsive to the needs of the parent and the child.

Notably, although the petition pleaded violation of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21, the operative constitutional findings were grounded in Articles 14 and 21.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Court’s Approach)

1) Foundational equality doctrine and classification review

  • State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) 1 SCC 1
    Influence: The Court reaffirmed the classic two-prong test: (i) intelligible differentia; and (ii) rational nexus with the object of the law. This case provided the baseline for assessing whether adoptive mothers on either side of the “three-month” line were meaningfully distinguishable for maternity benefit purposes.
  • State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656
    Influence: The Court relied on the articulation of reasonable classification as one that includes “all who are similarly situated” and avoids under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness. This became decisive: the “adoptive mothers” class was split, leaving similarly situated mothers excluded.
  • State of T.N. v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Assn., (2021) 15 SCC 534
    Influence: The judgment was used to situate the degree of judicial deference. While economic policy ordinarily attracts restraint, classification that burdens substantive rights—especially where under-inclusiveness is stark— invites closer scrutiny. The Court also used the decision’s discussion on rational nexus (classification review) versus proportionality (non-classification arbitrariness) to clarify the analytical lane it would travel.
  • Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 6-A, In re, (2024) 16 SCC 105
    Influence: The Court drew from its structured explanation of under-/over-inclusiveness and the requirement that the State justify exclusion of similarly situated persons—especially where individual rights are at stake. Maternity benefit, though a welfare measure, directly touches dignity, equality, and family life.
  • Pravinsinh Indrasinh Mahida v. State Of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine Guj 1293
    Influence: While a High Court decision, it was cited for its crisp explanation of under-inclusiveness and the idea that “active exclusion” of a sub-category from an existing genus may violate Article 14. It supported the conclusion that carving out adoptive mothers based solely on the child’s age was “artificial”.

2) Maternity benefit as beneficial legislation; purposive interpretation

  • B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1977) 4 SCC 384
    Influence: Anchored the interpretive principle that beneficial legislation must be read to advance its social-justice object. The Court used this lens to stress that maternity benefits are not narrowly biological; they protect maternal/child welfare and equal workplace participation.
  • Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224
    Influence: Reinforced maternity benefit as dignity-protecting, anti-victimization support for working women, grounded in constitutional values (Articles 39, 42, 43). The Court borrowed its humane, equality-forward framing to reject a cramped notion of maternity tied only to childbirth physiology.
  • Deepika Singh v. Pgimer, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 SCC 681
    Influence: Provided a modern, rights-sensitive understanding of “family” and warned against disadvantaging atypical familial structures. This directly buttressed the Court’s view that adoption-based motherhood must receive full social-welfare recognition without biological essentialism.
  • K. Umadevi v. State of T.N., (2025) 8 SCC 263
    Influence: Cited for harmonizing welfare entitlements with broader policy goals and for emphasizing Directive Principles support for maternity relief (Article 42) and respect for international obligations (Article 51(c)).

3) Adoption/commissioning motherhood and child-centric welfare (comparative and domestic)

  • Rama Pandey v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 10484
    Influence: The Delhi High Court’s reasoning that motherhood-related challenges extend beyond physiology and must consider the “best interest of the child” supported the Court’s refusal to treat adoptive caregiving as second-order.
  • Dev Shree Bandhe v. C.G. State Power Holding Co. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Chh 1763 and Chanda Keswani v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine Raj 3274
    Influence: These decisions were referenced for recognizing motherhood and child development as facets of Article 21, and for rejecting discriminatory denial of leave based on the mode of becoming a parent.
  • Pratiba Himral v. State of H.P., 2021 SCC OnLine HP 9295
    Influence: Strongly aligned with the present holding: bonding and caregiving rationales apply equally to adoptive mothers, and adoption is not a legitimate basis to deny maternity benefit.
  • State v. Ravina Yadav, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4987
    Influence: Emphasized maternity leave’s role in emotional bonding and child welfare; the judgment’s reference to research on early deprivation supported the Supreme Court’s child-centric analysis of adoption adjustment needs.
  • Lata Goyal v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 5572
    Influence: Reinforced a mode-neutral view of motherhood and constitutional participation of women in the workforce (Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21). The Supreme Court echoed its idea that discrimination based on the “mode” of bringing a child is impermissible.
  • Susan K. John v. National Board of Examinations in Medical Sciences, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 1333
    Influence: Cited for the proposition that maternity leave is a right, not a matter of administrative discretion—consistent with the Supreme Court’s insistence on real, accessible entitlements rather than paper benefits.
  • Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244
    Influence: Anchored the adoption jurisprudence in “best interests of the child” and the child’s right to a loving family, making it difficult to justify a rule that discourages adoption of older or special-needs children by withholding leave support.
  • Dasari Anil Kumar v. Child Welfare Project Director, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1689
    Influence: Demonstrated the Court’s operational use of JJ Act principles (best interest, family responsibility, safety) and the importance of bonding in adoptive placements—supporting the conclusion that leave must facilitate integration, not impede it.

4) Reproductive autonomy and decisional privacy under Article 21

  • Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., (2009) 9 SCC 1
    Influence: Used to ground reproductive choice in Article 21 and to emphasize State duties to enable, not frustrate, the exercise of such autonomy. The Court extended this conceptual frame to adoption as a constitutionally meaningful route to parenthood.
  • K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy- 9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
    Influence: Provided the doctrinal platform for “decisional autonomy” over reproduction and family life. The judgment uses this to reject a biologically narrow view of reproductive autonomy.
  • X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433
    Influence: Reinforced reproductive rights as a “bouquet” that includes decisions around having children and family formation, strengthening the Court’s conclusion that adoption is within the orbit of Article 21 decisional autonomy.

5) Workability/unworkability as a constitutional concern

  • State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365
    Influence: The Court used this to validate an additional line of attack: if a legal standard is practically unimplementable, it can become illusory and vulnerable. Here, adoption timelines under the JJ Act/CARA Regulations make it unlikely that many legally adoptable children can be handed over below three months—exposing the cap as functionally self-defeating.
  • Temple of Healing v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 1003/2021
    Influence: The Court invoked its own observations about systemic adoption delays and CARINGS data, reinforcing the realism of the petitioner’s “otiose provision” critique.

6) Comparative constitutional and human rights influence (persuasive authorities)

  • Werner Van Wyk & Ors. v. Minister of Employment and Labour, [2025] ZACC 20
    Influence: Closely analogous: the South African Constitutional Court struck down an age cap (under two years) for adoptive leave, emphasizing adjustment/integration needs of adopted children and adoption’s discouragement effects when leave is denied. The Supreme Court adopted similar logic, including the child-centric dimension and the irrationality of an unexplained bright-line cap.
  • Topčić-Rosenberg v. Croatia, Application no. 1939/11
    Influence: The European Court of Human Rights found unjustified differential treatment between adoptive and biological mothers regarding maternity leave, stressing bonding and integration. This supported the Supreme Court’s equality-and-family-life framing.
  • MIA v. State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd., [2015] ZALCD 20
    Influence: Used to demonstrate that leave entitlements must be interpreted with the “best interests of the child” in view, including in non-traditional parenting arrangements (surrogacy; caregiving role allocation).
  • In re P & Ors., [2008] UKHL 38
    Influence: Cited for the proposition that “bright-line” exclusions can contradict child welfare and best interest standards by blocking case-sensitive assessment and privileging adult-centric status conditions over child-centric outcomes.
  • Suzanne Du Toit and Vos v. Minister for Welfare and Population Development, (2002) 13 BHRC 187
    Influence: Supported the view that adoption law must evolve with changing family forms and that excluding capable parents undermines children’s best interests—resonating with the Court’s inclusive constitutionalism.

B. Legal Reasoning (How the Court Reached Its Conclusions)

1) Maternity protection as a human-rights and social-justice guarantee

The Court positioned maternity benefit as a basic human right and an equality-enabling institution. It drew from international materials (UDHR, ICESCR, ILO conventions, CEDAW, CRC) to emphasize that maternity protection: (i) safeguards maternal and child health; (ii) prevents workplace exclusion due to reproductive choices; and (iii) advances substantive gender equality.

Crucially, the Court reframed maternity benefit as protection tied to motherhood and caregiving realities, not a privilege attached only to pregnancy’s physiology.

2) Article 14: the three-month cap as an arbitrary, under-inclusive classification

Applying the two-stage classification test, the Court held:

  • No intelligible, purpose-linked distinction: The State’s justification—that children older than three months are less dependent— was rejected as an overly narrow view of adoption and caregiving. The Court emphasized that adoption requires emotional adjustment, reassurance, stability, and integration support irrespective of age.
  • No rational nexus to the statute’s objective: The social-security objective is to support motherhood and child welfare while enabling workforce participation. Those objectives do not disappear at three months.
  • Under-inclusiveness: Adoptive mothers as a class are the intended beneficiaries, yet the cap excludes similarly situated mothers (including single adoptive mothers and those adopting children with disabilities who often face longer adoption timelines).

The Court also noted the “either-or” harshness: a woman adopting a child even a day older than three months receives zero benefit, which further exposed the arbitrariness.

3) Article 21: adoption within reproductive/decisional autonomy; dignity for mother and child

Building on Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy- 9J.) v. Union of India, and X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that reproductive autonomy cannot be reduced to biological procreation. Adoption is a constitutionally protected expression of decisional autonomy in family formation.

The cap was thus found to impair dignity in two linked ways:

  • It denies adoptive mothers meaningful institutional support to transition into motherhood (a dignitary harm).
  • It undermines the adopted child’s right to holistic care and development during the critical integration period (a child-welfare harm).

4) “Best interests of the child” as a continuing standard beyond handover

Drawing from Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India and the statutory definition in the JJ Act, the Court stressed that best interests are not exhausted by the legality of adoption; they persist through the child’s adjustment into the new family. Denial of maternity benefit to adoptive mothers of older children disregards that integration period.

5) Workability: a benefit that is practically unattainable becomes illusory

The Court accepted the petitioner’s submission that, given the JJ Act/CARA timelines to declare a child “legally free for adoption”, many lawful adoptions (especially of orphaned/abandoned/surrendered children) cannot realistically be completed with the child under three months. Relying on State of Kerala v. Unni, it treated such illusory design as a serious constitutional defect in a welfare entitlement.

6) Remedy: reading down to preserve benefit while removing discrimination

The Court chose a restrained, surgical remedy: it read down Section 60(4) by removing the three-month limit, preserving the legislative grant of 12 weeks to adoptive mothers but eliminating the unconstitutional exclusion.

7) Paternity leave: an equality-forward institutional nudge

While not part of the dispositive holding, the Court’s discussion is a significant constitutional signal: caregiving should not be presumptively feminized, and paternity leave can reduce gendered burdens, promote bonding, and serve the child’s welfare. The Court referenced existing provisions under the CCS (Leave) Rules and a proposed private member bill to show feasibility and policy momentum.

C. Impact (What This Judgment Changes)

  • Immediate legal effect: Adoptive mothers are entitled to maternity benefit for 12 weeks from handover regardless of the adopted child’s age (Section 60(4) as “meaningfully read”).
  • Strengthened Article 14 scrutiny of welfare exclusions: Age-based bright lines in social security—especially where they exclude similarly situated beneficiaries—must be justified by a clear nexus to statutory purpose, not assumptions.
  • Expansion of Article 21’s reproductive autonomy discourse: By treating adoption as an expression of decisional autonomy, the Court integrates adoption into the constitutional grammar of privacy, dignity, and family life.
  • Child-centric constitutionalism in labour welfare: The judgment explicitly connects maternity benefit to the adopted child’s integration and development—likely influencing how courts assess parental leave, crèche substitutes, and “best interest” claims in employment contexts.
  • Policy pressure for paternity leave: The Court’s urging may shape future legislative design under the social security code framework, particularly towards gender-neutral caregiving supports.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Pari materia
A provision in a new law that is materially the same as a provision in an older law. Here, Section 60(4) of the 2020 Code corresponds to Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act as amended in 2017.
Permissible classification (Article 14 test)
The State may treat groups differently, but only if (i) the grouping is based on a real difference, and (ii) that difference is logically connected to the law’s purpose.
Under-inclusiveness
When the law grants a benefit to some people who need it but wrongly leaves out others who are similarly placed. The three-month cap left out adoptive mothers who still needed bonding/integration time and economic security.
Reading down
A constitutional technique where the court preserves a provision by interpreting it in a narrower, constitutional manner— here, by removing the unconstitutional age limitation while keeping the entitlement framework intact.
Best interests of the child
A legal standard requiring that decisions affecting children prioritize their holistic welfare—basic rights and needs, identity, and physical, emotional, and intellectual development—especially during transition phases like adoption integration.
Reproductive/decisional autonomy
The constitutional freedom to make intimate choices about family life. The Court held this includes adopting a child, not only biological procreation.
Commissioning mother
A woman who becomes a mother through surrogacy arrangements as recognized by law; Section 60(4) covers commissioning mothers as well.

V. Conclusion

This decision establishes a clear constitutional rule: adoptive maternity benefit cannot be conditioned on an arbitrary infant-age threshold when the statutory objective is to support motherhood, protect dignity, and secure the child’s welfare.

By holding the three-month cap unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 21 and by reading down Section 60(4), the Court transforms maternity benefit for adoptive mothers from a narrow, biologically shadowed concession into a mode-neutral caregiving entitlement—one aligned with substantive equality, reproductive autonomy, and the best interests of the child.

The accompanying call for paternity leave underscores the judgment’s broader constitutional vision: caregiving is a shared social function, and social security must evolve to reflect modern families, modern work, and children’s developmental needs.