Acquittal Where Injured Witness Is Not a “Sterling Witness”: Conviction Under Sections 307/324/34 IPC Cannot Rest on Inconsistent Ocular Evidence Amid Investigative Lapses

Case: NABA KUMAR KOLEY v. STATE OF WB (with CRA 588 OF 2010, GUNADHAR KOLEY v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL)

Court: Calcutta High Court (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)

Date of Judgment: 08-04-2026

Judge: Hon’ble Justice Chaitali Chatterjee (Das)

1. Introduction

The Calcutta High Court decided two connected criminal appeals arising from the conviction of two brothers—Naba Kumar Koley and Gunadhar Koley—for offences under Sections 307/324/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), on allegations that they assaulted their brother Balai Koley with a hensua (sickle) and a lathi over a property/til-plant dispute.

The prosecution case was initiated on a written complaint by another brother, Shibshankar Koley, and rested primarily on (i) the testimony of the injured witness (Balai), (ii) family witnesses, and (iii) medical evidence. The defence highlighted prior litigations, political rivalry, non-examination of independent neighbours, contradictions on the place and manner of occurrence, and investigative omissions (seizure irregularities, no FSL, no controlled earth).

Core issue before the High Court: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants committed an assault amounting to attempt to murder and voluntarily causing hurt with common intention—especially when the injured witness’s account was materially inconsistent and not corroborated in key particulars by medical and investigative evidence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed both appeals and set aside the conviction. It held that the prosecution evidence suffered from glaring discrepancies and that the injured witness’s testimony did not meet the standard of a “sterling witness”. The Court found that:

  • The occurrence emerged against a background of deep intra-family hostility and political differences.
  • Material contradictions existed regarding the place of occurrence, weapon used, and sequence of events.
  • Medical evidence and the recorded history did not robustly support the prosecution narrative of a sickle attack as alleged.
  • Investigation and seizure suffered from procedural infirmities (including unclear/blank seizure place, no FSL forwarding, no blood-stained earth sampling).
  • An alternative version—of a scuffle/push leading to a fall on bamboo/sharp objects—could not be ruled out.

Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and directed that the appellants be released from their bail bonds.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court relied substantially on the Supreme Court’s articulation of the “sterling witness” standard in Rai Sandeep @ Deepu vs The State (NCT) of Delhi (2012) 8 SCC 21.

In paragraph 22 (quoted in the judgment), the Supreme Court laid down that a “sterling witness” must be of such high calibre that the court can accept the testimony at face value without hesitation; the version must remain consistent from inception to deposition; it must withstand rigorous cross-examination; and it must correlate with recoveries, weapons, scientific/expert evidence, and other supporting material, with no missing links.

How the precedent influenced the outcome: The High Court used this standard as the evaluative lens for determining whether the injured witness (PW2) could, by himself, safely sustain conviction. Finding that PW2’s testimony was inconsistent internally and also misaligned with medical history and surrounding evidence, the Court concluded that PW2 was not a “sterling witness”; therefore, conviction could not be sustained on his sole testimony.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Weight of injured testimony—accepted principle, but conditional application

The prosecution correctly invoked the general principle that an injured witness is ordinarily accorded greater weight. However, the High Court emphasised that such weight is not automatic: the testimony must still be reliable, consistent, and materially corroborated where circumstances demand.

(B) Material contradictions undermining the prosecution story

  • Place of occurrence not fixed with certainty: The evidence varied between (i) khamar of Shibshankar (FIR), (ii) khamar of a cousin (PW2), (iii) bamboo shrub behind village club (PW4), and (iv) IO’s sketch/index not clarifying ownership; the Court treated this as a significant gap because it affected the plausibility of the alleged assault, witness presence, and recovery narrative.
  • Seizure doubts: The seizure list had the place blank; PW3’s testimony suggested signatures were taken at the police station and that police had already visited the village. This weakened the evidentiary value of the alleged recovery of the weapon and blood-stained clothes.
  • Who took the injured to hospital: The narrative fluctuated (rickshaw van, police station first, then hospital), while medical papers indicated PW5 (Iqbal) brought the patient; these inconsistencies were treated as symptomatic of an unreliable prosecution reconstruction.
  • Injury narrative vs medical record: PW2 claimed injuries including the hand and alleged senselessness; the doctor did not find hand injury and noted that the patient himself gave history. Further, the recorded short history stated assault by “hard object,” with the doctor explaining hard objects as lathi/iron rod and that the patient did not disclose assault by hensua.
  • Family witness exaggeration: PW4 alleged he suffered a cut injury by hensua, while the doctor found only a small abrasion, leading the Court to infer exaggeration and heightened animus within the family.

(C) Medical evidence as a check, not a cure

The Court did not treat medical evidence as fully demolishing the prosecution case, but used it as a critical check where ocular evidence was wavering. The doctor’s testimony that certain injuries could arise from contact with sharp objects (and that one injury could be caused by glass/pieces) supported the possibility of a fall during scuffle rather than a targeted sickle attack as alleged.

(D) Alternative hypothesis and the “reasonable doubt” threshold

The testimony of PW7 (though hostile) introduced an alternative account: a confrontation where Balai came with a hensua, Gunadhar pushed him, and Balai fell onto bamboo causing injury. The High Court did not adopt PW7’s version as the sole truth, but treated it as sufficient to demonstrate that the prosecution’s version was not the only plausible narrative—thereby generating reasonable doubt.

(E) Investigative lapses amplified doubt

The Court specifically noted: no blood-stained earth seized; no controlled earth sampling; no FSL examination of seized articles; and absence of independent seizure witnesses. While any single lapse might be curable, cumulatively they prevented the prosecution from supplying the missing corroborative links demanded when the primary witnesses were unreliable.

3.3 Impact

  • Reinforced screening of injured testimony: The judgment underscores that “injured witness = reliable witness” is not a rule of universal application; courts will still test whether the injured witness is of “sterling” quality, particularly in intra-family disputes with proven animosity.
  • Place of occurrence and seizure integrity as trial-critical facts: Uncertainty about the location and irregular seizure documentation (blank place, station-house signing) can materially weaken weapon-based assault prosecutions.
  • Medical history entries matter: Where the injury report records the patient’s history (e.g., “hard object”), inconsistency with later testimony (“hensua attack”) may be treated as a serious credibility impairment.
  • Section 307 prosecutions need stronger linkage: Attempt to murder charges demand careful proof of the act, weapon, intention/knowledge and causation; where evidence allows a plausible “scuffle and fall” hypothesis, courts may decline to sustain conviction.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 307 IPC (Attempt to murder): Punishes an act done with intention/knowledge and under circumstances that, if death had resulted, would amount to murder. It is not enough that an injury occurred; the prosecution must show the nature of act, weapon, and surrounding circumstances indicating the required intention/knowledge.
  • Section 324 IPC (Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons): Applies when “hurt” is caused using an instrument for cutting or a weapon likely to cause death. Proof of the weapon’s use and causation is central.
  • Section 34 IPC (Common intention): Creates joint liability when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. It requires credible evidence of shared intention and participation.
  • “Sterling witness”: A witness whose testimony is so consistent, natural, and corroborated by surrounding material that a court can safely rely on it without hesitation (as explained in Rai Sandeep @ Deepu vs The State (NCT) of Delhi).
  • Hostile witness: A prosecution witness who does not support the prosecution version in court; their evidence is not automatically discarded, but must be carefully assessed for what, if anything, is reliable.
  • Controlled earth / FSL: “Controlled earth” is a neutral sample from the scene used for comparison with blood-stained earth; FSL testing can scientifically connect blood, weapon, and scene. Absence of such steps can weaken corroboration.
  • Proof beyond reasonable doubt: The criminal standard requiring moral certainty; if a plausible alternative explanation exists (e.g., injury by fall during scuffle), the accused receives the “benefit of doubt.”

5. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision is significant for its disciplined application of the “sterling witness” doctrine to an injured witness in a bitter intra-family dispute. By foregrounding inconsistencies on the place of occurrence, the weapon narrative, medical-history mismatch, and flawed seizure/investigation, the Court held that the prosecution did not prove the charges under Sections 307/324/34 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

The key takeaway is doctrinal and practical: even an injured witness’s testimony cannot sustain conviction unless it is consistent, corroboratively aligned with medical and investigative material, and resilient to reasonable alternative hypotheses.