A Scheduled Ingredient Alone Does Not Create a Drug Ceiling Price: Formulation-Specific Price Fixation Under DPCO 1995 Is Mandatory

Case: M/S PHARMED LIMITED AND ANR v. UNION OF INDIA AND 3 ANR

Court: Bombay High Court, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction

Coram: Manish Pitale and Shreeram V. Shirsat, JJ.

Date: 22 September 2026

Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:20781-DB

1. Introduction

The judgment examines whether the National Pharmaceuticals Pricing Authority (“NPPA”) could treat a pharmaceutical formulation as subject to an existing ceiling price merely because it contained one or more scheduled bulk drugs. The petitioners, M/s. Pharmed Limited and one of its shareholders and directors, manufactured and marketed “Cartigen Forte,” a formulation used for treating osteoarthritis.

Before January 2010, Cartigen Forte contained small quantities of vitamin C and vitamin E, both of which were scheduled bulk drugs under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 (“DPCO 1995”). From January 2010 onward, those vitamins were no longer part of the formulation. The NPPA nevertheless applied a 2007 notification fixing ceiling prices for “multivitamin and mineral tablets/capsules,” together with a broad 2009 notification extending existing ceilings to any unlisted formulation containing a scheduled drug.

On that basis, the authorities alleged overcharging and raised demands which, with interest, eventually exceeded ₹13 crore. The principal issue was whether the presence of a scheduled ingredient automatically attracted a ceiling price fixed for a materially different formulation, without independently calculating and notifying a ceiling price for Cartigen Forte under paragraphs 7 and 9 of DPCO 1995.

Central holding: Although the presence of a scheduled bulk drug may make a product a “scheduled formulation,” it does not by itself impose a ceiling price. The Government or NPPA must calculate and notify a formulation-specific ceiling price in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 9 of DPCO 1995.

2. Background and Procedural History

Date Event
4 September 1997 The Central Government authorised the NPPA to exercise specified functions under DPCO 1995.
27 September 2007 The NPPA fixed ceiling prices for specified multivitamin and mineral tablets and capsules.
30 January 2009 The NPPA declared that any unlisted formulation containing a scheduled drug would be subject to the ceiling price appearing in the relevant existing notification unless a specific price was subsequently fixed.
13 October 2010 A show-cause notice alleged that Cartigen Forte had been sold above the applicable ceiling price and proposed recovery of approximately ₹10.97 crore.
26 November 2014 onward Successive demands were issued, including interest, despite the petitioners’ objections regarding price fixation and procedural fairness.
3 February 2016 In Writ Petition No. 2804 of 2015, the High Court remanded the matter after the NPPA agreed to grant a fresh hearing and pass a speaking order.
7 March and 12 May 2016 Fresh demands were issued for approximately ₹12.73 crore and ₹12.93 crore respectively.
21 November 2016 The revenue authorities initiated recovery under Section 267 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 for approximately ₹13.41 crore.
22 September 2026 The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the relevant notifications and consequential demands.

3. Issues Before the Court

  1. Whether the 27 September 2007 notification concerning multivitamin and mineral tablets/capsules could be applied to Cartigen Forte.
  2. Whether the NPPA’s notification dated 30 January 2009 was ultra vires DPCO 1995.
  3. Whether the presence of vitamin C or vitamin E was sufficient to attract an existing ceiling price without a separate calculation under paragraph 7.
  4. Whether the consequent overcharging and revenue-recovery demands were legally sustainable.
  5. Whether interest could be imposed for periods of delay attributable to the authorities.
  6. Whether the proceedings also violated natural justice and the earlier remand order.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held:

  • Cartigen Forte was neither a multivitamin nor a mineral tablet or capsule.
  • Before January 2010, its vitamin C and vitamin E content could bring it within the definition of a “scheduled formulation,” but that classification did not automatically impose a ceiling price.
  • A ceiling price had to be separately calculated under paragraph 7 and notified under paragraph 9 of DPCO 1995 for the relevant formulation.
  • No such exercise had been undertaken for Cartigen Forte.
  • The notification dated 27 September 2007 could not be applied to Cartigen Forte and was quashed to that limited extent.
  • The notification dated 30 January 2009 was overbroad, arbitrary and ultra vires DPCO 1995 because it bypassed the mandatory price-calculation mechanism. It was quashed in its entirety.
  • All consequential demand and recovery notices, including proceedings under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, were quashed.
  • Delay attributable to the NPPA could not be used to increase the petitioners’ interest liability.

5. Analysis

5.1 “Scheduled formulation” and “ceiling price” are distinct concepts

The respondents argued that a formulation becomes a scheduled formulation as soon as it contains any bulk drug specified in the First Schedule to DPCO 1995. The Court substantially accepted this interpretation of paragraph 2(v). Accordingly, Cartigen Forte could be regarded as a scheduled formulation before January 2010 because it contained vitamin C and vitamin E.

The Court, however, drew a crucial distinction between:

  1. Classification: whether a product is a scheduled formulation; and
  2. Price control: whether a legally enforceable ceiling price has been calculated and notified for that formulation.

Classification under paragraph 2(v) does not dispense with the statutory procedure for price fixation. A ceiling price must still be determined under paragraph 9 in accordance with paragraph 7.

5.2 Mandatory application of the paragraph 7 formula

DPCO 1995 prescribed the following formula:

R.P. = (M.C. + C.C. + P.M. + P.C.) × (1 + MAPE/100) + E.D.

The components are:

  • M.C.: material cost;
  • C.C.: conversion cost;
  • P.M.: packing-material cost;
  • P.C.: packing charges;
  • MAPE: maximum allowable post-manufacturing expenses, including trade and manufacturer margins; and
  • E.D.: excise duty.

Paragraph 9 expressly required ceiling prices to be fixed “in accordance with” this formula. The Court treated that requirement as mandatory rather than optional. The NPPA could not apply the price of one formulation to another merely because they shared an ingredient.

No calculation using the above factors had been undertaken for Cartigen Forte. The absence of that exercise destroyed the legal foundation of the overcharging allegation.

5.3 Why the 2007 notification did not cover Cartigen Forte

The 2007 notification fixed prices for complete formulations described as “multivitamin and mineral tablets” and “multivitamin and mineral capsules.” Cartigen Forte was principally an osteoarthritis drug whose active pharmaceutical ingredients were:

  • Glucosamine Sulfate Potassium Chloride;
  • Chondroitin Sulfate Sodium; and
  • Methyl Sulfonyl Methane.

The ceiling price in the 2007 notification reflected the cost structure of the complete multivitamin/mineral formulation, not separate prices for vitamin C or vitamin E. The NPPA could not extract or segregate those two ingredients from the notified combination and transplant the resulting price onto Cartigen Forte.

The Court also noted that the quantities of vitamin C and vitamin E in Cartigen Forte were lower than those specified in the notified formulations. More importantly, both vitamins were removed from Cartigen Forte from January 2010. The notification therefore lacked both compositional and functional correspondence with the petitioners’ product.

5.4 The 2009 notification was ultra vires

The 30 January 2009 notification purported to make any unlisted formulation containing a scheduled drug subject to the ceiling price specified in an existing notification. In effect, it created a deemed ceiling price without requiring a separate calculation for the actual formulation.

The Court held that this notification:

  • eliminated the paragraph 7 calculation;
  • dispensed with formulation-specific price fixation under paragraph 9;
  • allowed prices fixed for one combination to govern materially different products;
  • amounted to an abdication of the NPPA’s statutory responsibility; and
  • exceeded the authority conferred by DPCO 1995.

This is an application of the principle that delegated or subordinate legislation cannot override, amend or bypass the parent legal instrument. The NPPA’s notification could implement DPCO 1995, but it could not replace its mandatory pricing method with an automatic deeming rule.

5.5 Scope of paragraphs 4 and 11

The Court accepted that paragraphs 4 and 11 empower the authorities to act where a manufacturer fails to provide required information or submit an application for price fixation. In that situation, the Government may fix a price on the basis of information available to it.

However, these provisions do not authorise the Government or NPPA to avoid paragraphs 7 and 9. Even when acting on available information, the authority must calculate and notify a legally valid price for the particular formulation.

5.6 Consequential recovery under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code

The Collector and Tehsildar had no independent basis for recovery. Their notices under Section 267 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code were entirely dependent upon the NPPA’s demands. Once the underlying notifications and demands failed, the revenue-recovery proceedings necessarily failed as well.

The Court additionally observed that one recovery notice relied on an earlier NPPA demand which had already been displaced in the previous writ proceedings. It was therefore independently defective.

5.7 Natural justice and speaking orders

The petitioners alleged that the NPPA failed to consider their written submissions, did not disclose the material used for price calculation, and did not issue a proper speaking order even after the matter had been remanded. They also complained that the person who heard the matter was not the person who issued the demand.

The Court found sufficient substance in these complaints to criticise the process. Nevertheless, it did not finally adjudicate them because the invalidity of the notifications was enough to dispose of the petition. The ruling therefore rests principally on lack of substantive authority rather than solely on procedural unfairness.

6. Precedents Cited

Franco Indian Remedies Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.

The petitioners relied on Franco Indian Remedies Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 16344, regarding the computation of interest on alleged overcharged amounts.

Applying that authority, the Court held that the State cannot benefit from delay caused by its own defective proceedings. A substantial period had elapsed because the NPPA delayed granting a hearing and because its earlier demands were procedurally unsustainable. That interval could not be used to increase the petitioners’ interest burden.

The Court stated that, at worst, interest could have been calculated from the demand issued after remand in Writ Petition No. 2804 of 2015, rather than from the initial alleged date of overcharging. The precedent reinforced the principle that interest must not operate punitively where delay is attributable to the authority itself.

Earlier proceedings in Writ Petition No. 2804 of 2015

Although not cited as a separate reported precedent, the earlier order was procedurally important. The NPPA had represented that it would rehear the petitioners and issue a speaking order. The High Court protected the petitioners from enforcement of the earlier demands and remanded the matter.

The subsequent failure to provide a properly reasoned determination strengthened the petitioners’ challenge. It also illustrated that an administrative authority must genuinely comply with a judicial remand and cannot merely reproduce an earlier litigation position.

7. New Legal Principle Established

Under DPCO 1995, the presence of a scheduled bulk drug may classify a medicine as a scheduled formulation, but no enforceable ceiling price arises unless the competent authority calculates the price under paragraph 7 and specifically fixes it by notification under paragraph 9. The ceiling price of another formulation cannot be automatically imported merely because the two products share an ingredient.

A general notification creating such automatic application is ultra vires where it dispenses with the prescribed formulation-specific calculation.

8. Potential Impact

8.1 Protection against formula-free price control

The ruling prevents authorities from recovering alleged overcharges on the basis of broad analogies between pharmaceutical products. Manufacturers remain subject to price control, but only through the procedure prescribed by law.

8.2 Requirement of product-specific analysis

Future price-control disputes will require examination of the actual formulation, composition, dosage, pack size and statutory cost factors. The mere presence of a common scheduled ingredient will not justify applying the price of another combination.

8.3 Limits on delegated administrative power

The judgment is significant beyond pharmaceutical law. It confirms that an administrative notification cannot dilute or circumvent mandatory requirements contained in the governing statutory order.

8.4 Consequential demands cannot survive an invalid foundation

Revenue-recovery authorities must verify the legal existence of the underlying liability. If the primary demand is invalid, coercive recovery under land-revenue legislation cannot independently survive.

8.5 Relevance after repeal of DPCO 1995

DPCO 1995 was repealed by DPCO 2013. The immediate interpretation therefore concerns liabilities arising under the earlier regime. Nevertheless, the broader principles—strict compliance with prescribed price-fixation procedures, limits on delegated legislation and the need for reasoned administrative decisions—remain relevant to later regulatory frameworks.

The Court did not hold that a manufacturer may freely price every formulation containing scheduled drugs. It held that the authority must first impose price control through the legally prescribed calculation and notification process.

9. Complex Concepts Simplified

Scheduled bulk drug
A drug ingredient listed in the First Schedule to DPCO 1995.
Scheduled formulation
A medicine containing one or more scheduled bulk drugs, alone or in combination with other substances.
Ceiling price
The maximum sale price legally fixed for a specified formulation.
Overcharging
Selling a price-controlled medicine above the validly notified maximum price.
Ultra vires
An act done beyond the legal power granted to the authority. The 2009 notification was ultra vires because it departed from DPCO 1995’s mandatory pricing mechanism.
Speaking order
An administrative or judicial decision that states the relevant facts, addresses the parties’ arguments and gives reasons for its conclusions.
Natural justice
Basic procedural fairness, including notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard and an impartial, reasoned decision.
Consequential demand
A demand whose validity depends on an earlier order. If the foundational order is invalid, the consequential demand ordinarily falls with it.

10. Conclusion

The Bombay High Court established that statutory classification and enforceable price fixation are separate legal steps. While Cartigen Forte could have been a scheduled formulation before January 2010 because it contained vitamin C and vitamin E, that fact did not authorise the NPPA to apply a ceiling price fixed for a different multivitamin formulation.

The mandatory formula in paragraph 7 and the notification requirement in paragraph 9 could not be bypassed. The 2009 blanket notification was therefore quashed in its entirety, the 2007 notification was disapplied to Cartigen Forte, and all consequential demands were set aside.

The judgment is an important affirmation that pharmaceutical price control must be exercised strictly within the statutory framework: regulatory objectives, however significant, cannot justify recovery based on a ceiling price that was never lawfully calculated and notified for the product concerned.