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  • provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • provisions of Sections 76(a) and 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Rent Control and Eviction Act (U.P Act 3 of 1947).5.
  • Section 111(C) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • SECTION 76 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rent Control and 4. Eviction Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947,
  • provisions of Sections 76(a) and 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act
  • Rent Control and Eviction Act (U.P Act 3 of 1947).5.
  • Section 111(C) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • SECTION 76 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rent Control and 4. Eviction Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Malik, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Srimati Hardei, had mortgaged a house and an appurtenant shop to one Nandlal by a mortgage with possession. During the continuance of the mortgage the mortgagee let out the shop and the adjoining room to Wahid Khan (defendant 1) as a month-to-month tenant; defendant 2 is his son. The mortgage was redeemed in 1948. The mortgagor (plaintiff) treated defendant 1 as a trespasser and served him with a notice to quit dated 13-3-1948. When the defendant did not comply, the plaintiff sued in Suit No. 422 of 1948 in the Court of the Munsif, West Allahabad, for ejectment of the western shop and the room appertaining thereto in house No. 46 situate in Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad. The plaintiff also claimed damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 25 per month from 27-11-1946, the date when she claimed to have regained possession.

The defendants' written statements raised multiple pleas which produced ten issues at trial; the critical first issue was whether the tenancy of defendant 1 had terminated as alleged. The learned Munsiff found that defendant 1 remained a tenant and did not become a trespasser on redemption, and dismissed the suit without deciding other issues. The lower appellate court agreed on that finding but remanded under Order 41, Rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code for decision of the other issues. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court under Order 43 of the CPC. Because there was a conflict of authority in the reported cases on the central point, the matter had been referred to a Division Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When a mortgage is redeemed, does a tenant to whom the mortgaged house or shop had been let out by the mortgagee become a trespasser from the date of redemption and therefore subject to ejectment as a trespasser?
  2. Whether a mortgagee in possession has the right to let the mortgaged premises on a month-to-month tenancy under Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, and if so, whether such a tenancy automatically terminates ipso facto on redemption of the mortgage (with reference to Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and relevant tenancy law)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on a set of authorities (listed in the opinion) that were said to be in the appellant's favour—i.e., supporting the proposition that a tenancy created by a mortgagee during possession ends on redemption and the occupant becomes a trespasser.
  • It was urged that cases dealing with agricultural tenancies were distinguishable and did not apply to houses or shops let out to tenants.
  • The consequence asserted for the appellant's contention was that if the defendant became a trespasser on redemption the Rent Control and Eviction Act would not apply to him.

Respondent / Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendants (as reflected by the trial court's finding) maintained that the tenant did not become a trespasser on the date of redemption and therefore remained entitled to tenancy protections.
  • Counsel for the respondents relied on the proposition that a mortgagee in possession acting as a person of ordinary prudence may validly let the premises on a monthly tenancy under Section 76(a) and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that such a tenancy does not automatically lapse on redemption unless the mortgagor exercises the option to terminate it.
  • The parties debated the effect of Section 111(c) (that a lease determines on the happening of an event which terminates the lessor's interest) and whether that produced automatic termination on redemption; the court records the argument but does not attribute finer points of statutory argument to one side or the other beyond the above positions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Collector of Basti v. Sarnam Charak, 8 All LJ 802 (Piggott, J.) Held there was no difference between an ordinary tenancy and an agricultural tenancy. Noted by the Court as an authority taking the view that tenancies are not distinguishable; cited among conflicting authorities prompting reference to a larger Bench.
Ram Chand v. Raj Hans, 3 All LJ 517 One of several authorities identified as favourable to the appellant's position (that tenancy terminates on redemption). Cited as being in favour of the appellant; the Court considered the body of authorities but found the exact point not necessarily decided in the cited cases.
Adjoodhya Singh v. Girdharee, 2 N.W.P (H.C.R) 199 Cited in support of appellant's position. Cited by the Court as part of the appellant's authorities but regarded as not directly deciding the precise point.
Alagiriswami Mudali v. Akkulu Naidu, AIR 1921 Mad 393 Cited in support of appellant's case. Listed among cases relied on by the appellant; Court held the exact issue did not truly arise for decision in the cases cited.
Jhagru Mian v. Raghunath Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 630 Cited in favour of the appellant's position. Included by the Court among the appellant's authorities but regarded as not turning on precisely the same point.
Bhup Singh v. Sheo Shanker, AIR 1931 All 743 Cited among authorities taking the opposite view (that tenancy may survive redemption). Noted by the Court as part of the conflicting body of authority; the Court held the exact point did not necessarily arise in those cases.
Pramatha Nath v. Sashi Bhusan, AIR 1937 Cal 763 Cited as authority taking the other view. Listed by the Court but not treated as directly decisive of the present question.
Chinnappa Thevan v. Pazhaniappa Piilai, AIR 1916 Mad 911 Cited as authority on the other side of the question. Recorded among the conflicting authorities; Court considered the cited cases not to have exactly decided the precise point here.
Barjorji Shapurji… v. Shripatprasadji Viharilalji Acharya, AIR 1927 Bom 145 Cited among cases taking the opposite view. Included in the list of authorities but the Court found the precise question in the present case was not decided in the cited cases.
Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh, AIR 1952 S.C. 205 (Supreme Court) Principle that a mortgagee cannot act in a way detrimental to the mortgagor (e.g., grant a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights and defeat the mortgagor's right to khas possession); but a permissible settlement in course of prudent management is a different matter and may give rise to statutory rights. Treated by the Court as the recent and authoritative decision that made it unnecessary to discuss earlier conflicting cases at length; the Court applied its reasoning to hold that a month-to-month tenancy created by a mortgagee in prudent management is permissible and does not ipso facto lapse on redemption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by acknowledging a conflict of opinion in the authorities and referred the matter to a Division Bench. On examination of the cited cases, the Court observed that the exact point raised in this case did not in fact arise for decision in the reported authorities relied on at the Bar.

The Court summarised the material facts (mortgage with possession; mortgagee let the shop and appurtenant room on a month-to-month basis; mortgage redeemed in 1948; notice to quit given on 13-3-1948; suit for ejectment and for damages). The trial Court had held that the defendant was a tenant and did not become a trespasser on redemption; the lower appellate court agreed but remanded other issues for further decision.

Statutory framework considered by the Court:

  • Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act: when the mortgagee takes possession he must manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own — authorising management steps including letting the property.
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act: a month-to-month tenancy is the usual tenure for houses or shops in the absence of contract to the contrary, and ordinarily the mortgagor on redemption may terminate such a tenancy by giving the notice required by the statute (noted in the opinion as 15 days' notice).
  • Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act (lease determines on happening of event terminating lessor's interest): this provision was relied upon by counsel to argue that a lease granted by a mortgagee would determine on redemption because the mortgagee's right extended only to the period of the mortgage.

The Court reconciled these provisions with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh. It observed that while a mortgagee may not act detrimentally to the mortgagor by granting a lease which could enable a tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights (an act falling within Section 76(e)), a permissible lease created in the course of prudent management is an exception. Applying that reasoning, the Court found that the mortgagee in this case had merely created a month-to-month tenancy in accordance with Sections 76(a) and 106. Such action was within the mortgagee's powers and consistent with acting as a person of ordinary prudence.

The Court therefore rejected the view that the tenancy automatically and ipso facto terminated on the date of redemption of the mortgage. The Court emphasised that the mortgagor, after redemption, ordinarily had the right to terminate the tenancy by giving the statutory notice (15 days under Section 106). The Court noted that whether the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act 3 of 1947), restricts the mortgagor's rights was not argued before them and need not be decided in this opinion. Finally, the Court held that the earlier courts' finding that the defendant did not automatically become a trespasser was correct.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding (core ruling): The Court held that a tenancy created by a mortgagee in possession on a month-to-month basis under Sections 76(a) and 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not automatically terminate ipso facto on the redemption of the mortgage. The defendant did not become a trespasser on the date of redemption.

Implications (direct consequences as stated in the opinion):

  • The mortgagor, on redemption, ordinarily retains the right to terminate such a month-to-month tenancy by giving the statutory notice (noted in the opinion as 15 days under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act).
  • The trial Court should decide only those issues that remain relevant after the finding that defendant 1 did not automatically become a trespasser on redemption.
  • The opinion did not decide whether the Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 applies in the circumstances; the Court explicitly stated that point was not argued and was not decided.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs. The Court applied the Supreme Court decision in Mahabir Gope as authoritative in resolving the issue and did not treat the decision as creating a novel broader rule beyond the specific holdings applied to the facts.
B/V.S.B

This summary is confined to the facts, arguments, authorities and conclusions explicitly contained in the provided opinion and does not infer or add material beyond the text of the opinion.

    Hardei v. Wahid Khan

    Malik, C.J:— This case raises a very short point, that when a mortgage is redeemed, does the tenant, to whom the house had been let out by the mortgagee, become a trespasser from the date of redemption and can he be ejected as a trespasser, or must the mortgagor after redeeming the property take steps to eject him as a tenant? There is conflict of opinion on the point. It has been urged that the cases dealing with agricultural tenancies are distinguishable and do not apply to houses which have been let out to tenants. Piggott, J. however, in — ‘Collector of Basti v. Sarnam Charak’, 8 All LJ 802 at p. 805(A), held that there was no difference between an ordinary tenancy and an agricultural tenancy. In view of the conflict of decisions on the point it is desirable that this case may be decided by a larger Bench. I, therefore, refer it to a Bench for decision.

    2. The cases which have been quoted and which appear to be relevant and in favour of the appellant are: — ‘Ram Chand v. Raj Hans’, 3 All LJ 517 (B); — ‘Adjoodhya Singh v. Girdharee’, 2 N.W.P (H.C.R) 199 (C); — ‘Alagiriswami Mudali v. Akkulu Naidu’, AIR 1921 Mad 393 (D); and — ‘Jhagru Mian v. Raghunath Singh’, AIR 1929 Pat 630 (E). The cases in which the other view seems to have been taken, besides the case decided by Piggott, J. which I have already mentioned are: — ‘Bhup Singh v. Sheo Shanker’, AIR 1931 All 743 (1) (F); — ‘Pramatha Nath v. Sashi Bhusan’, AIR 1937 Cal 763 (G); — ‘Chinnappa Thevan v. Pazhaniappa Piilai’, AIR 1916 Mad 911 (H) and — ‘Barjorji Shapurji…Defendant v. Shripatprasadji Viharilalji Acharya…Plaintiff .’, AIR 1927 Bom 145 (I).

    Malik, C.J:— This case has been referred to a Division Bench by reason of some difference of opinion, but on an examination of the cases cited at the Bar, we do not think that the exact point raised in this case in fact arose for decision in the cases cited. The plaintiff, Srimati Hardei, had mortgaged a house and a shop appertaining thereto to one Nandlal; the mortgage was with possession. During the continuance of the mortgage the mortgagee let out the shop and the room appertaining thereto to Wahid Khan, defendant 1, as a month to month tenant. Defendant 2 is his son. The mortgage was redeemed in 1948. There is some dispute as to the date on which the mortgagor took possession of the property but the exact date of her having taken possession of the mortgaged property is not of much importance for the purpose of decision of this appeal. The mortgagor, treating defendant 1 as a trespasser, gave him a notice to quit on 13-3-1948. As the defendant did not comply with the notice she brought the suit No. 422 of 1948 in the Court of the Munsif, West Allahabad, out of which this appeal has arisen, for his ejectment from “the western shop and the room appertaining thereto in house No. 46 situate in Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad,” and impleaded his son Shaukat as defendant 2, so that there may be no complication after she had obtained the decree. The plaintiff also claimed damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month from 27-11-1946, the date when she claimed to have got back possession of the property.

    3. The defendants in their written statements raised various pleas which gave rise to ten issues which were framed by the learned Munsiff. The first issue was

    “Whether the tenancy of defendant 1 has terminated as alleged?”

    4. The importance of this issue, according to learned counsel, lies in the fact that, if defendant 1 became a trespasser on the redemption of the mortgage by the plaintiff, the Rent Control and 4. Eviction Act will not apply to him. That if, on the other hand, his position was not that of a trespasser but of a tenant on the date of the redemption of the mortgage, he was entitled to the benefit of the Rent Control and Eviction Act (U.P Act 3 of 1947).

    5. The learned Munsif held that the defendant was a tenant and that he did not become a trespasser on the date of the redemption of the mortgage and, on that finding, he dismissed the suit without recording any finding on the other issues raised in the case.

    6. The lower appellate court agreed with the learned Munsif on the decision of the first issue but remanded the case under O. 41, R. 23 of the CPC, for decision of the other issues raised. It is against the order that this appeal has been filed under O. 43 of the CPC.

    7. The short point in the case is whether the mortgagee in possession had a right to let out the shop and the room appertaining thereto on a monthly tenancy and whether on the redemption of the mortgage the tenant ceased to have any tenancy rights and from the date of the redemption became a trespasser.

    8. Under Section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act, (4 of 1882)

    “when, during the continuance of the mortgage, the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property (a) he must manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own……….”

    9. If the property mortgaged is a shop which is let out to tenants, the mortgagee is not bound either to keep the shop vacant or to occupy it himself. He is authorised under the provisions quoted above to let it out to a tenant and in the case of a house or a shop a month to month tenancy, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, would be the usual tenure under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the mortgagee lets out the premises on a month to month tenancy it cannot be said therefore that he was doing anything beyond the powers conferred on him by S. 76(a) quoted above.

    10. Reliance is placed on Section 111(C) of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that

    “A lease of immoveable property determines — (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happenings of any event — by the happening of such event;

    and it is urged that as the mortgagee's right to grant the lease extended only up to the period when the mortgage was in existence the tenant became a trespasser on the date the mortgage was redeemed.

    11. No doubt, on the redemption of the mortgage, the mortgagor is not bound by the transfers made by the mortgagee or by contracts entered into by him unless his action can be supported on the ground that it was authorised by law or that he was empowered to act under some power or authority, express or implied, conferred on him by the mortgagor. The mortgagor in such a case may be entitled to claim back possession of the property free from any liability created by the mortgagee after the redemption of the mortgage, but this does not mean that, if in the exercise of his powers of due management as a person of ordinary prudence he has entered into an agreement of tenancy, on the mere redemption of the mortgage without the mortgagor exercising his option of putting an end to the tenancy the tenancy automatically and ‘ipso facto’ lapses on the date of the redemption.

    12. Learned counsel have cited some cases relating to agricultural land and have urged that, though in cases of agricultural land by reason of the Tenancy Act those decisions may have been justified, the principle laid down in those cases does not apply. A number of rulings has also been cited for the proposition that a mortgagee has no right to create a title beyond the continuance of a mortgage and on the redemption of the mortgage the title of the transferee from the mortgagee ceases. In view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in — ‘Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh’, AIR 1952 S.C 205 (J), it is no longer necessary for us to discuss the cases relied on by learned counsel. Dealing with the question of a mortgagee creating a lease for a definite period and the lessee claiming that the mortgagor even after the redemption of the mortgage was bound and could not claim back possession of the property before the expiry of the period for which the mortgagee had granted the lease, their Lordships held that

    “A mortgagee cannot during the subsistence of the mortgage act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagor's interests such as by giving a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights in the land, thereby defeating the mortgagor's right to khas possession; it would be an act which would fall Within the provisions of S. 76, sub-cl. (e).”

    13. Their Lordships, however, pointed out that

    “A permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is a different matter altogether. It is an exception to the general rule.”

    14. In the case before us, the mortgagee had created merely a tenancy from month to month in accordance with the provisions of Sections 76(a) and 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It could not be said that he had done anything contrary to law or usage in letting out the shop, which he could not occupy himself and that he had not acted as a “person of ordinary prudence”. On the redemption of the mortgage, the mortgagor no doubt has the right ordinarily to terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days' notice in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, it is urged, however, restricts the rights of a landlord to eject a tenant and a suit for ejectment can, therefore, be filed only in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. The decision of the lower Courts, that the defendant did not automatically become a trespasser on the date of the redemption of the mortgage is correct. Whether in the circumstances the lower appellate Court should have remanded the case to the trial Court for decision of the other issues and whether in the circumstances the provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act apply are not points that have been argued before us. All that we, therefore, need say is that, while dismissing the appeal, we make it clear that the trial Court will only decide such issues as may call for decision after the finding that defendant 1 did not automatically become a trespasser on the date of redemption of the mortgage. The appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs.

    B/V.S.B

    15. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Hardei v. Wahid Khan
    (Aug 4, 1953)