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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (a mortgagee claiming under the original Inamdars) in November 1920 gave the defendant (a tenant of the mortgagors) notice to vacate the lands in suit, requiring surrender of possession by 31 March 1921. The defendant pleaded that he was a permanent tenant, that the mortgagors were necessary parties, and that the plaintiff was neither entitled to possession nor to enhance the rent.

The principal procedural issue was whether the plea of permanent tenancy was res judicata as a consequence of prior litigation between the same parties (Suit No. 48 of 1915 / S.A. No. 459 of 1919). At trial the court held that the plea of permanent tenancy was not open to the defendant because the matter had been heard and finally decided in the earlier suit; it also held that the mortgagee could determine the tenancy and granted a decree for possession and mesne-profits (Rs. 306-9-0) for a prior period, and future mesne-profits under O. 20, R. 12 CPC. The District Court affirmed. The defendant brought a second appeal to this Court, pressing principally that the plea of permanent tenancy was still open because in the prior suit the plaintiff's claim for possession had been disallowed.

The prior suit (No. 48 of 1915) involved the mortgagee suing the present defendant and joining the original mortgagor, seeking possession and damages for cutting babul trees. In that earlier litigation Issue No. 8 asked whether the defendant was a permanent tenant and whether he had rights to the trees. The trial Court and the District Court found the defendant was not a permanent tenant and not owner of the trees; on second appeal (S.A. No. 459 of 1919) this Court held the defendant failed to prove permanent tenancy and left open whether a mortgagee could evict tenants of the mortgagor because no decree for possession had been passed in that earlier suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plea that the defendant was a permanent tenant is res judicata by reason of the prior suit between the same parties (i.e., whether the question was "heard and finally decided" within the meaning of s. 11 CPC).
  2. Whether a mortgagee can, without the consent of the mortgagor, determine the tenancy of an annual tenant occupying part of the mortgaged property.
  3. From what date mesne-profits are recoverable (specifically whether mesne-profits are due for the period prior to the notice of November 1920 and prior to 1 April 1921).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant) Arguments

  • The lower Courts were wrong to hold that the plea of permanent tenancy was not open to him in the present suit; even though the question had been heard, it was not finally decided for the purposes of res judicata because there was no decree for possession in the earlier suit and the plaintiff's claim for possession had been disallowed.
  • Relied upon authorities (Midnapur Zamindari Company v. Naresh Narain Roy; Daudbhai Allibhai v. Daya Rama; Ramasami Reddi v. Marudai Reddi) to support the proposition that a finding on permanent tenancy in the earlier suit could not be treated as final where the earlier decree did not grant the possession relief relied upon.
  • The defendant also maintained (in the earlier litigation) that he was owner of the trees, in part because he was a permanent tenant.
  • Argued that a mortgagee could not, contrary to the wishes of the mortgagor, determine the tenancy of an annual tenant (i.e., that mortgagor's consent was necessary for eviction or rent enhancement).

Respondent (Plaintiff / Mortgagee) Arguments

  • The plaintiff asserted title as mortgagee and sought possession and recovery of enhanced rent; in the prior suit he also claimed that the babul trees belonged to him and sought an injunction restraining the tenant from cutting trees.
  • The plaintiff's position (adopted by the trial and appellate Courts) was that the plea of permanent tenancy had been heard and finally decided in the earlier litigation and therefore was not open to the defendant in the present suit.
  • The plaintiff implicitly maintained that a mortgagee in possession has the right to manage lands, including determining what rent to demand from an annual tenant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harban Lal v. The Maharaja of Benares Principle that a permanent tenant is the owner of the trees growing on the land. The Court relied on this principle to show that a determination whether a defendant was a permanent tenant was necessary to determine the ownership of trees in the earlier suit; thus the prior finding was material and not unnecessary.
Sitabai v. Sambhu Sonu Establishes that a permanent tenant has ownership rights over trees on the land. The Court used this authority to support the conclusion that the question of permanent tenancy was necessarily connected to the tree-ownership question in the prior litigation, rendering the prior finding necessary to the earlier decision.
Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd. v. Naresh Narain Roy Invoked by appellant to support the proposition that a finding on tenancy may not be final where it was unnecessary to the prior decision. The Court distinguished this authority: in Midnapur it was unnecessary to decide permanent tenancy, whereas in the present case the finding was necessary because tree ownership turned on tenancy; therefore Midnapur did not assist the appellant.
Daudbhai Allibhai v. Daya Rama Relied upon by appellant concerning whether a prior finding on tenancy is final when the relief sought was disallowed. The Court distinguished the case: in Daudbhai the decree would have been the same if the tenant had been held permanent, but here the decree (including damages for cutting trees) would not have followed if the defendant had been held a permanent tenant; thus Daudbhai is inapplicable.
Ramasami Reddi v. Marudai Reddi Another authority cited by appellant on whether a prior finding as to tenancy was necessary to the decision. The Court treated it similarly to Midnapur and Daudbhai: it was distinguishable because in those cases the finding was unnecessary, but here the finding was necessary to determine tree ownership and therefore was final.
S.A. No. 459 of 1919 (this Court, prior appeal arising from Suit No. 48 of 1915) Previous decision by this Court holding defendant failed to prove permanent tenancy; left open question whether mortgagee could evict tenants because no decree for possession had previously been passed. The earlier decision was described and relied upon as part of the prior litigation record showing that the issue of permanent tenancy had been heard and decided against the defendant; the Court treated that prior ruling as supporting res judicata on the question of permanent tenancy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a focused analysis addressing the three main contested points.

  1. Res judicata on permanent tenancy:
    • The Court examined the pleadings and judgments in the earlier suit (No. 48 of 1915 and the subsequent appeals). In that earlier litigation the defendant had pleaded permanent tenancy and had asserted ownership of the babul trees in part on the ground that he was a permanent tenant.
    • The trial Judge and the District Judge both explicitly dealt with and decided Issue Nos. 7/8 (and later Nos. 3/4 on appeal) on whether the defendant was a permanent tenant and whether he had rights to the trees, finding against the defendant.
    • The Court reasoned that those findings were necessary to the prior judgment because tree ownership turned on tenancy rights: authorities (Harban Lal and Sitabai) establish that permanent tenants own trees on the land. Consequently, the finding that the defendant was not a permanent tenant was not surplus or unnecessary; it was material to the outcome (including the grant of damages for cutting trees and an injunction).
    • The Court distinguished the appellant's cited authorities (Midnapur, Daudbhai, Ramasami) on the ground that in those cases the earlier courts did not need to decide tenancy to dispose of the suit (i.e., the tenancy finding was unnecessary), whereas in the present facts the finding was necessary and therefore final in the sense of s. 11 CPC.
    • The Court also emphasized procedural differences: here the prior decree was one from which the defendant could and did appeal; it was not a situation where the suit was dismissed as against him so he could not appeal and thereby challenge the finding.
    • On this basis the Court concluded that the plea of permanent tenancy was res judicata — the question had been heard and finally decided between the parties in the previous suit — and was therefore not open to the defendant in the present action.
  2. Whether a mortgagee can determine tenancy without mortgagor's consent:
    • No authority was cited by the defendant to support the contention that a mortgagee cannot determine a tenancy of an annual tenant without the mortgagor's consent.
    • The Court considered the point on principle and concluded that the contention was untenable. A mortgagee in possession has the right to manage the lands and to determine reasonably what rent to seek and which tenants to retain; the mortgagee is not dependent on the mortgagor's consent for such management decisions.
    • Accordingly, the defendant's argument that the mortgagee could not determine the tenancy without mortgagor's consent was disallowed.
  3. Mesne-profits and the relevant period:
    • The Court reviewed the chronology: the prior second appeal was decided on 15 July 1920; the plaintiff gave notice in November 1920 calling upon the defendant to pay Rs. 300 as enhanced rent and to vacate by 31 March 1921; the present suit was filed in August 1921.
    • The Court held that possession up to 31 March 1921 could not be treated as wrongful because the earlier notice (and the timing) did not amount to a valid determination of tenancy under s. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to mesne-profits for any period before the effective date on which the defendant was required to vacate (i.e., before 1 April 1921).
    • For the period from 1 April 1921 the lower Courts had found extra profits at Rs. 225 per year, with the tenant having paid Rs. 121-14-0 per year; the net difference for one year was about Rs. 104. Considering the short period between 1 April 1921 and the suit date, the Court exercised its discretion and fixed mesne-profits at Rs. 40 for the period in question.
    • Accordingly the Court varied the trial Court's larger mesne-profit award (Rs. 306-9-0) downward to Rs. 40, while confirming other aspects of the decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the plea of permanent tenancy was res judicata and therefore not open to the defendant in the present suit; that a mortgagee in possession may determine tenancy and require reasonable rent without the mortgagor's consent; and that mesne-profits prior to 1 April 1921 were not recoverable. The decree was varied by substituting Rs. 40 for the sum of Rs. 306-9-0 awarded by the trial Court; in all other respects the lower appellate decree was confirmed, with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The defendant must deliver possession to the plaintiff (as ordered by the lower courts), and the amount recoverable by way of mesne-profits for the prior period was reduced to Rs. 40 (instead of Rs. 306-9-0); other parts of the lower Courts' decrees were affirmed.
  • Res judicata application: The decision affirms that, where a prior finding on a matter (here, permanent tenancy) was necessary to the disposition of the earlier case (for example because tree ownership turned on tenancy), that finding may operate as res judicata under s. 11 CPC even if some relief (such as possession) was not granted in the earlier suit.
  • No broader legal innovation was announced beyond the application of existing principles of res judicata, mortgagee rights in possession, and the rule that mesne-profits are recoverable only from the date on which possession becomes wrongful; the opinion did not purport to set a novel precedent beyond these applications.

    Barjorji Shapurji v. Shripatprasadji Viharilalji Acharya

    Shah, J.:— The plaintiff in this case gave notice to the defendant to vacate the lands in suit in November 1920. According to that notice, he was required to give up the lands on March 31, 1921. The plaintiff claimed to be a mortgagee from the original Inamdars. The defendant was on the land as a tenant of the mortgagors. The defendant pleaded that he was a permanent tenant; that the mortgagors were necessary parties; and that the plaintiff was neither entitled to possession nor to enhance the rent. The first issue raised was whether the plea that the defendant was a permanent tenant was res judicata in consequence of the finding in the previous litigation between the same parties in Suit No. 48 of 1915.

    2. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the plea of permanent tenancy was not now open to the defendant as that question was heard and finally decided in the previous suit be wean the same parties. The further question raised in the issues was whether it was not open to the mortgagee, contrary to the wishes of the mortgagor, to determine the tenancy of the defendant. That issue also was decided against the defendant. In the result a decree was passed against the defendant directing him to deliver possession of the plaint lands to the plaintiff, and to pay Rs. 306-9-0 for mesne profits prior to the date of the suit. This sum was arrived at on the basis of the annual profits having been determined at Rs. 225, out of which the defendant had already paid Rs. 121-14-0 a year as rent to the plaintiff. The sum represented the difference between the full rent payable for three years and the amount paid at the old rate. There was also a decree for future mesne profits from the date of suit until delivery of possession, to be determined under O. 20, R. 12 of the CPC. The defendant appealed to the District Court, and the same points were raised before the learned District Judge, who, on a consideration of the pleadings and the findings in the previous suit, came to the conclusion that the plea of permanent tenancy was not open to the defendant, as that question was heard and finally decided in the previous suit between the same parties. On the other points also he affirmed the view taken by the trial Court, with the result that the appeal was dismissed and the decree was confirmed. The defendant has preferred this second appeal, and the principal point argued in support of this appeal is that the lower Courts are wrong in their view that the plea of permanent tenancy is not open to him in this suit.

    3. In order to test this point, it is necessary to refer to the previous suit between the same parties. In that suit (No. 48 of 1915) the plaintiff-mortgagee sued the present defendant and also joined the original mortgagor as a party to the suit. The claim was for possession of the land, and also to recover a certain amount as damages from the defendant for having cut certain Babul trees on the land. The plaintiff's case was that the trees belonged to him and not to the tenant, and he asked for an injunction restraining the Defendant No. 1, that is, the tenant, from cutting or dealing in any way with the trees situated on the land. The defendant's answer, so far as it is material to the present point, was that he was a permanent tenant, and secondly, that he was the owner of the trees. Though it is not stated in terms in the written statement in that form, the issue framed shows that at least one of the grounds upon which he claimed the ownership of the trees was that he was a permanent tenant. Accordingly, Issue No. 8 was framed in this way:

    Is the defendant in possession of the lands as a permanent tenant? Has he any right to the trees in the lands?

    4. The learned Judge dealt with this issue at considerable length in a companion suit in which the same points had arisen and which was filed on the same basis against another tenant. He came to the conclusion that Defendant No. 1 was not a permanent tenant, and he also found that he was not the owner of the trees. It may be mentioned that in the judgment in dealing with Issues Nos. 7 and 8 the learned Judge, who decided the suit, observed as follows:

    The defendants resist the claim by asserting their own title to the trees. They say that they are permanent tenants of the lands and as such entitled to the tress growing therein.

    5. In the end, on a consideration of the evidence in the case, he found that the defendant did not hold the lands as a permanent tenant and had no right to the trees in the land. When Defendant No. 1 appealed to the District Court, no doubt, he made a point in his memorandum of appeal that the question of permanent tenancy should not have been gone into at all, and that, even apart from his being a permanent; tenant, he was owner of the trees. But when the matter came before the learned District Judge, that position does not seem to have been adhered to or maintained; and again the following issues were raised: Issue No. 3 “Whether defendant is a permanent tenant?” Issue No. 4 “Is he entitled to the babul trees in the land?” The learned District Judge observes in his judgment that closely connected with the question of permanent tenancy is the right of the tenants to the Babul trees.

    6. He agreed with the findings of the trial Court on both these issues and confirmed the decree of the trial Court. I may add here that the decree passed by the trial Court on the findings was that the claim for possession was disallowed, but a decree for the price of the babul trees found to have been cut by the defendant was passed, and also an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the trees was granted against the defendant. The defendant preferred a second appeal, and in second appeal the principal point argued appears to have been whether he was a permanent tenant or not. In the judgment of this Court in S.A No. 459 of 1919, it was held that Defendant No. 1 failed to prove that he was a permanent tenant. The question whether a mortgagee had a right to evict the tenants of the mortgagor was left open in view of the fact that there was no decree for possession passed by the lower Court, and in other respects the decree already passed against the defendant was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

    7. This was the result of the previous litigation between the parties. It is urged on behalf of the appellant now that the view taken by all the three Courts with regard to his plea as to permanent tenancy is not res judicata, because, though the question was heard, it could not be said to have been finally decided within the meaning of section 11 of the cpc, as there was no decree for possession against him, and as the plaintiff's claim in that suit for possession was disallowed. Though the finding was recorded against the defendant, it cannot be said to have been finally decided. In support of this contention reliance has been placed upon Midnapur Zamindari Company v. Naresh Narain Roy(1); Daudbhai Allibhai…Plaintiff v. Daya Rama…Defendant .(2); and Ramasami Reddi v. Marudai Reddi(3).

    8. It may be mentioned here that the claim for possession was disallowed in the suit on the ground that, under S. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, a notice to determine the annual tenancy of the defendant was necessary. The position is plain that if the decision as to the plea of permanent tenancy was on any ground unnecessary in the previous suit, even though a finding be recorded, it could not be said to have been finally decided. But the pleadings in the previous litigation, so far as the present case is concerned, are perfectly clear, and leave no doubt that the finding was necessary. There was undoubtedly the plaintiff's claim with regard to the trees which were said to have been cut by the defendant, and the defendant pleaded that he was the owner of the trees because he was a permanent tenant, though, as I have said, he did not say so in the written statement. But that is the view which I take of the grounds as disclosed in the judgment upon which he really proceeded in that litigation. Though I recognize that he based his claim to the trees on grounds other than that of permanent tenancy, it is clear that he also claimed to be the owner of the trees on the ground that he was a permanent tenant. It is clear, according to the decisions in Harban Lal v. The Maharaja of Benares(4) and Sitabai v. Sambhu Sonu(5), that a permanent tenant is the owner of the trees growing on the land.

    9. It seems to have been so understood, as both the Courts observed that closely connected with the question of the ownership of the trees, was the question of the permanent tenancy of the defendant. Therefore, in the present case, it cannot be said that the finding as to permanent tenancy was unnecessary. Further, the present case is distinguishable from the other decisions which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the present case there was a decree passed against the defendant from which it was possible for him to prefer an appeal and to raise the question of permanent tenancy, which was negatived by the trial Court, if he was minded to do so, and in fact he did so. It was not a case where, after the finding was recorded against the defendant, the suit was dismissed as against him, with the result that he could not appeal from the decree and could not question the correctness of the finding against him. Therefore, it seems to me, that, on the facts of this case relied upon by the learned counsel are quite distinguishable, and do not help him in any way.

    10. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to examine further the position whether, if the plaintiff's suit had been dismissed, and if it was merely a case where relief by way of possession was claimed, and if it had been definitely found that in consequence of the defendant not being a permanent tenant but an annual tenant, a notice, as required by S. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, was necessary, the finding that he was an annual tenant, as distinguished from a permanent tenant, could be said to be necessary for the decision of the suit or not. That point does not arise in the present case.

    11. Thus, I am satisfied that both the lower Courts are right in holding that the plea of permanent tenancy is not open to the defendant in the present suit, as that question has been heard and finally decided between the parties in the previous suit.

    12. As regards the second question that a mortgagee cannot determine the tenancy of an annual tenant in respect of land which forms part of the mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagor, no authority has been cited. On principle the contention seems to be untenable. A mortgagee in possession has his own right of managing the lands; and he is not in any sense dependent upon the consent of the mortgagor in determining as to what rent he should reasonably seek from an annual tenant in respect of a particular land and what tenant he should keep. Though that question was left open in the previous litigation, it seems to me that contention of the defendant must be disallowed.

    13. As regards the question of mesne profits for three years prior to the date of the suit, the position is that in the previous litigation the plaintiff's claim for possession was disallowed, and the second appeal to this Court was decided on July 15, 1920. Thereafter in November 1920, he gave a notice calling upon him to pay Rs. 300 as enhanced rent. It seems to us, under the circumstances, that, up to March 31, 1921, possession of the defendant cannot be said to be wrongful in any way. The previous notice, such as it was, was not considered good notice, according to the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and under the circumstances the plaintiff is not entitled to anything by way of mesne-profits prior to the date of this notice, that is, prior to the date on which, if he was not prepared to comply with the notice, he would be expected to vacate, that is, before March 31, 1921. The suit was filed in August 1921. Therefore, the plaintiff is really entitled to the extra profits, as found by the lower Courts at the rate of Rs. 225 a year from April 1, 1921, and deducting therefrom the amount which the defendant has admittedly paid, namely, Rs. 121-14-0 a year, he would be entitled to about Rs. 104 for one year. We think that, having regard to the short period between that date and the date of the suit, we would roughly fix the mesne profits at Rs. 40, having, regard to the amount which would be due for one whole year.

    14. Accordingly, we vary the decree under appeal by substituting Rs. 40 for the sum of Rs. 306-9-0 in the decree of the trial Court. In other respects we confirm the decree of the lower appellate Court with costs.

    15. Fawcett, J.:— I agree on all the three points discussed in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother. As to the point of res judicata, the case is certainly different from that of Daudbhai Allibhai…Plaintiff v. Daya Rama…Defendant .. In Pratt, J.'s judgment in that case, he puts his conclusion mainly on the view that the contention about the plaintiff's right ta enhancement of rent was consistent with the defendant in that suit being a permanent tenant. The same cannot be said here, because the finding that the defendant was a permanent tenant would certainly not be consistent with that part of the decree which allows the plaintiff damages for cutting babul trees. The decision of this Court in Sitabhai v. Sambhu Sonu, that a permanent tenant has rights of ownership over trees on land, of which he is a permanent tenant, shows that, if the defendant was a permanent tenant, he would have right over the trees such as he asserted. That was a decision in 1914, prior to Suit No. 48 of 1915, and obviously, therefore, the claim of the defendant to ownership over the trees could not be disposed of without a finding whether he was or was not a permanent tenant. The same distinction applies to the remarks of Heaton, J., in Daudbhai Allibhai…Plaintiff v. Daya Rama…Defendant . that the decree passed “is precisely the decree which would follow if the Court had held that the tenant was a permanent and not a yearly tenant,” etc. Here the same decree would not have been passed, if the defendant had been held to be a permanent tenant. Then, in regard to the Privy Council decision in Midnapur Zamindari Company, Ld. v. Naresh Narayan Roy and the Madras decision in Ramasami Reddi v. Marudai Reddi, the test there laid down is whether it is necessary or not to come to a finding such as this one whether the defendant is or not a permanent tenant. In those two cases it was not necessary to come to a finding upon that question. In the present case, as my learned brother has clearly shown, it was necessary to have such a finding.

    16. As regards the question of mesne profits, those can only be recovered from the time that the defendant was “in wrongful possession” of the land, I do not think it can fairly be said that he was in wrongful possession, until he was given notice to quit according to S. 84 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.

    17. Decree varied.

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    Comments

    Barjorji Shapurji v. Shripatprasadji Viharilalji Acharya
    (Aug 2, 1926)