RLUIPA Requires Record Evidence—not Conclusory Cost Assertions—to Reject Prepackaged Halal-Meat Alternatives at the Preliminary-Injunction Stage

Case: Timothy Mayberry v. Ron Neal, et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date: August 26, 2026
Posture: Appeal from denial of preliminary injunction under RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1)
Disposition: Vacated and remanded as to halal-certified meat claim; affirmed as to haram water and peanut butter and jelly sandwiches
Note: Nonprecedential disposition (FED. R. APP. P. 32.1)

1. Introduction

Timothy Mayberry, an Indiana prisoner and practicing Muslim, sought a preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to provide a religious diet that includes halal-certified meat and meals prepared with halal ingredients (and, separately, to avoid haram water and haram ingredients in certain foods). The Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC), through Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, offered religious diets but did not provide halal-certified meat to Muslim prisoners; inmates could purchase halal meat at commissary or choose vegan/lacto-ovo vegetarian meals (or kosher meat meals as an asserted substitute).

The central legal issue was the burden-shifting framework under RLUIPA: whether Mayberry showed that IDOC’s policy substantially burdened his sincerely held religious exercise, and, if so, whether the warden (Ron Neal) carried the statutory burden to show that denying halal-certified meat was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest—especially in light of Mayberry’s proposed alternative of prepackaged halal-certified meals containing meat.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit held that Mayberry satisfied his initial RLUIPA burden for his halal-certified meat claim: his beliefs were sincere on this record and limiting halal meat to commissary purchases substantially burdened an indigent prisoner. The court further held that the warden failed to meet RLUIPA’s “exceptionally demanding” least-restrictive-means requirement because the defense relied on conclusory assertions about cost and operational burden and declined to analyze Mayberry’s proposed alternative (prepackaged halal meals with meat), while supplying no record evidence comparing costs to existing prepackaged kosher meat meals.

The court therefore vacated and remanded the denial of preliminary injunctive relief as to the halal-certified meat claim for the district court to consider appropriate, narrowly tailored relief (including the constraints of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)). It affirmed the denial as to claims about haram water and peanut butter and jelly sandwiches because Mayberry provided insufficient evidence to show a likelihood of success on those claims.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is built around established RLUIPA and preliminary-injunction doctrine, drawing on multiple Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit decisions to police the evidentiary rigor required of prison officials once a substantial burden is shown.

  • Wisconsinites for Alternatives to Smoking & Tobacco, Inc. v. Casey, 172 F.4th 976 (7th Cir. 2026) (citing Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2019)): Provided the standards of review (clear error for fact findings, de novo for legal conclusions, abuse of discretion for balancing) and set out the four preliminary-injunction factors as applied by the Seventh Circuit.
  • Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty., 47 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2022): Reinforced the four-factor preliminary-injunction framework the panel applied to Mayberry’s motion.
  • Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411 (2022): Anchored the RLUIPA burden-shifting framework and confirmed that it applies in the preliminary-injunction context: the plaintiff shows substantial burden on sincere beliefs; the government must then prove compelling interest and least restrictive means.
  • Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Loc. 365 v. City of East Chicago, 56 F.4th 437 (7th Cir. 2022): Supported presuming irreparable harm in First Amendment cases, which the court extended by analogy given RLUIPA’s enhanced protection of religious exercise.
  • Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012)): Used to resolve the public-interest and balance-of-harms factors once likelihood of success is established in cases protecting religious/First Amendment freedoms.
  • Landor v. La. Dep't of Corr. & Pub. Safety, 146 S. Ct. 1931 (2026): Emphasized RLUIPA’s core command—prisons must refrain from substantial burdens outside exceptional circumstances.
  • Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014): Supplied interpretive principles: religious exercise is construed broadly in favor of protection, a theme the panel used when assessing Mayberry’s claimed beliefs.
  • Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2019): A direct analogue on halal meat in IDOC: acknowledged scholarly and IDOC-imam support for the view that Islam can require meat consumption; also held that forcing an indigent prisoner to spend scarce funds to comply with religious diet requirements can be a substantial burden.
  • Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)): Central to the opinion’s reasoning in two ways: (1) RLUIPA protects even idiosyncratic religious views; and (2) the least-restrictive-means test is “exceptionally demanding,” requiring application of the compelling-interest test to the particular claimant and record.
  • Neely-Bey Tarik-El v. Conley, 912 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2019): Rejected “mere incantation” of penal interests; officials must produce record evidence rather than conclusory claims.
  • Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2015): Undercut unsupported cost arguments, especially when prisons make other religious-diet accommodations; also cautioned against crediting cost assumptions “on an empty record.”
  • Bilal v. Lehman, No. C04-2507 JLR, 2006 WL 3626808 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006); Gill v. Aramark Corr. Servs., No. 18-cv-540-pp, 2018 WL 4233011 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 5, 2018); Robinson v. Cate, No. 2:11-cv-2555 MCE AC P, 2017 WL 3421987 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2017): Cited as examples that other prisons provide halal meat; under Holt v. Hobbs, widespread accommodations elsewhere heighten the need for “persuasive reasons” to refuse similar accommodations.
  • Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013): Used twice: (1) to explain uncertainty in demand when an option is unavailable (cannot infer only one inmate would opt in), and (2) to support affirmance where the plaintiff lacked evidence (haram water and sandwich-ingredient claims).
  • United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000): Reinforced that courts must hold the government to its burden and not assume less restrictive alternatives would fail.
  • Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 1997)): Informed the remedy discussion: mandatory injunctions are cautiously viewed and sparingly issued—important given Mayberry sought affirmative provision of halal meat meals.
  • Mayberry v. Pulley, No. 3:23-CV-1023-TLS-APR, 2024 WL 1435406 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 2, 2024): Background context for the warden’s sincerity attack (religious change during other litigation), which the panel ultimately did not find dispositive.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Preliminary-injunction framework integrated with RLUIPA burdens.
The court treated likelihood of success as the pivotal gateway: once Mayberry showed a likelihood of success under RLUIPA, irreparable harm and public interest largely followed from the religious-liberty context (Ramirez v. Collier; Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Loc. 365 v. City of East Chicago; Korte v. Sebelius).

(b) Mayberry met his initial RLUIPA burden: sincerity and substantial burden.
The panel affirmed the district court’s sincerity finding, emphasizing RLUIPA’s broad protection (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.) and the rule that courts do not second-guess theological correctness. It relied on Jones v. Carter to reject the notion that Islam categorically does not require meat (noting “valid opinion” support), and on Holt v. Hobbs/Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div. to confirm that even minority or “idiosyncratic” religious views are protected if sincere.

On substantial burden, the court treated commissary-only access as insufficient where the prisoner is indigent: forcing a prisoner to “give away his last dime” to avoid violating his faith is itself a substantial burden (Jones v. Carter). The court looked to Mayberry’s in forma pauperis financial materials to substantiate indigency.

(c) The warden failed RLUIPA’s compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means showing on this record.
The decisive move was evidentiary. Once the burden shifted, Neal was required to show that denying halal-certified meat was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest as applied to Mayberry (Ramirez v. Collier; Holt v. Hobbs). Instead, Neal:

  • Explicitly declined to analyze Mayberry’s suggested alternative (prepackaged halal meals with meat) because he focused on sincerity rather than least-restrictive means.
  • Offered only conclusory declarations asserting prohibitive cost and operational burden (e.g., needing a new menu, bulk ordering, a halal kitchen, and Muslim-only staff), without quantifying costs or addressing how prepackaged halal meals would compare to already-provided prepackaged kosher meat meals.

Under Neely-Bey Tarik-El v. Conley, that “mere incantation” of penal interests is inadequate; under Schlemm v. Wall, courts cannot accept cost assumptions “on an empty record,” particularly where other religious accommodations exist.

The panel also invoked Holt v. Hobbs to treat cross-jurisdictional practice as relevant: if many prisons offer halal meat accommodations, the refusing prison must provide “persuasive reasons” for divergence. Neal did not meaningfully respond to Mayberry’s citations to Bilal v. Lehman, Gill v. Aramark Corr. Servs., and Robinson v. Cate.

(d) Remedy caution: mandatory injunctions and prison-tailoring constraints.
Even though Mayberry showed likelihood of success on the halal meat claim, the panel underscored that mandatory injunctions are disfavored and must be carefully tailored (Mays v. Dart; Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio) and that prison injunctions must be narrowly drawn and least intrusive (18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)). Accordingly, it remanded for the district court to evaluate scope and implementation rather than ordering specific meals outright on appeal.

(e) Affirmance on haram water and peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.
The court affirmed denial of preliminary relief on these claims because Mayberry presented insufficient evidence that the water was unclean/contaminated or that the sandwiches contained haram ingredients (Kaufman v. Pugh).

3.3. Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order is practically significant for RLUIPA litigation in the Seventh Circuit in at least four ways:

  • Evidence demanded at the least-restrictive-means step: General claims of cost and burden—without numbers, comparisons, or explanation—risk reversal, especially when a plaintiff proposes a concrete alternative (here, prepackaged halal meat meals).
  • Comparators matter: If a prison already provides analogous accommodations (prepackaged kosher meat meals), it becomes harder to claim that a similar halal accommodation is uniquely infeasible without record support.
  • “Only one inmate asked” is a weak record argument: The court treated demand as unknowable when the option is not offered, echoing Kaufman v. Pugh.
  • Remedy will be tailored under the PLRA: Even with a likely RLUIPA violation, district courts remain the primary venue to craft narrowly drawn, least intrusive relief consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1): A federal statute that gives prisoners stronger protection for religious exercise than the First Amendment typically provides. If a prison policy substantially burdens sincere religious exercise, the prison must justify it under strict scrutiny (compelling interest + least restrictive means).
  • “Substantial burden”: Government pressure that meaningfully forces a person to violate religious beliefs or abandon religious practice. Here, requiring an indigent prisoner to buy halal meat to comply can be such a burden.
  • “Sincerely held” belief: Courts ask whether the person genuinely holds the belief, not whether the belief is theologically correct or universally shared.
  • “Least restrictive means”: The government must show there is no other feasible way to achieve its compelling interest that would burden religion less. It is not enough to say “it’s expensive” or “it’s hard” without evidence, especially when an alternative is proposed.
  • Mandatory injunction: A court order requiring the defendant to take affirmative action (e.g., provide specific meals), which courts issue cautiously.
  • PLRA tailoring (18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)): Prison-related injunctions must be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the specific harm.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision turns on disciplined application of RLUIPA’s burden shifting at the preliminary-injunction stage. Mayberry showed (on this record) sincere belief and a substantial burden stemming from the absence of halal-certified meat for an indigent prisoner. The warden, however, did not carry the demanding burden to prove that denying halal-certified meat was the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest because the defense relied on conclusory cost assertions and avoided engaging with a concrete, potentially less restrictive alternative (prepackaged halal meat meals), without meaningful record evidence—especially given existing prepackaged kosher meat offerings. The case now returns to the district court to determine whether and how to craft narrowly tailored relief consistent with prison-injunction constraints, while the evidence-deficient claims about haram water and sandwich ingredients remain denied at the preliminary stage.