Timothy Mayberry v. Ron Neal

burden imposed by RLUIPA on Mayberry's claim related to halal-certified meat, the district court erred in denying injunctive relief on this record. We therefore vacate and remand on that claim. In all other respects, we affirm.

Mayberry is a Muslim who believes that Islam requires him to regularly consume halal-certified meat and meals prepared with halal ingredients and water. While the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"), through its contractor Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, provides religious diets, it does not serve meals containing halal-certified meat to Muslim prisoners.¹Muslim prisoners who wish to eat halal-certified meat must purchase it through the commissary or settle for kosher-certified meals containing meat. Otherwise, Muslim prisoners must eat vegan meals or lacto-ovo vegetarian meals containing halal-certified ingredients. Mayberry sued warden Ron Neal and various other prison officials and moved for injunctive relief under RLUIPA against Neal to obtain a diet that includes halal- certified meat and halal ingredients. Mayberry said that his current diet substantially burdens his Islamic beliefs because he is required to eat meat but is not being provided with halal-certified meat and cannot afford to purchase it at the commissary. He does not believe that kosher-certified meals containing meat satisfy the halal requirement, and so he is forced instead to consume meatless meals, peanut butter and jelly sandwiches containing haram²ingredients, and meals prepared with haram water. He pointed out that other prisons provided halal-certified meat to Muslim prisoners. Mayberry also asserted several other constitutional claims but because Mayberry's appeal only concerns his claims under RLUIPA, we limit our discussion to those claims. Neal responded by attacking Mayberry's sincerely held religious beliefs, arguing that Mayberry professed a belief in Islam only as a ploy to get fresh foods and clean water. Neal contended that the court should infer insincerity because Mayberry listed his religious preference as "other" until April 2022, when he changed the official name

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of his religion to "Islam (for the sake of argument)" and requested a diet containing halal-certified meat. Neal pointed out that Mayberry changed his religious affiliation during the pendency of another lawsuit where Mayberry sued a different prison for serving him rotten food. See Mayberry v. Pulley, No. 3:23-CV-1023-TLS-APR, 2024 WL 1435406, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 2, 2024). Neal also argued that Islam does not require Muslims to eat meat, and that the lacto-ovo vegetarian meals containing halal-certified ingredients satisfy Islam's tenets.

Neal also disputed that the prison's policies substantially burdened Mayberry's religious exercise and submitted a declaration from David Liebel, the Director of Religious Services at IDOC. Liebel asserted that kosher and halal meat have

"remarkable similarities," and that kosher meat is a sufficient substitute for halal meat. Liebel confirmed that Muslim prisoners who want halal-certified meat can purchase it from the commissary. Liebel also contended that Mayberry was the only Muslim prisoner (out of about 1,300 Muslim prisoners) in IDOC who requested halal-certified meat, and it was thus cost prohibitive to satisfy Mayberry's "highly specific and truly unusually alleged religious diet requests." Liebel asserted, without reference to any other evidence, that to provide Mayberry with halal-certified meat, the prison would have the develop a new menu, bulk order products, build a halal kitchen, and hire only Muslims to work in that kitchen.

In his response, Mayberry argued that there was a less restrictive alternative:

provide him with prepackaged halal-certified meals containing meat. Mayberry contended that this would not require the prison to build a new kitchen staffed only by Muslims, and the prison already provides kosher-certified prepackaged meals containing meat through Aramark. And Mayberry reaffirmed his sincere belief in Islam, stating that he did not self-identify as a Muslim earlier because he feared retaliation by IDOC. He also asserted that he wrote "Islam (for the sake of argument)" because the chaplain at his previous prison would not provide him with Islamic literature if he did not designate one of IDOC's approved religions.

With leave of the court, Neal filed a sur-reply and a supplemental declaration from Liebel. Neal expressly declined to analyze whether Mayberry's proposed alternative was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest because he believed that Mayberry's religious exercise was insincere. Liebel did not address in his declaration whether it was cost-prohibitive for the prison to provide prepackaged halal-certified meals containing meat just like it did for kosher-certified meals.

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The district court denied Mayberry's motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court first determined that Mayberry demonstrated the sincerity of his religious beliefs and that the prison's policy of not providing halal-certified meat substantially burdened his religious exercise. But the court concluded that Neal met his burden under RLUIPA because "the record at this time does not include any other less restrictive alternative accommodations that would address Mayberry's concerns." The district court understood Mayberry to be requesting, as a reasonable alternative, prepacked halal-certified meals containing meat. But the court determined that Mayberry could not show a likelihood of success on the merits based on Neal's general assertion that halal-certified meat would incur significant burden and expense. The district court also concluded that Mayberry did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims about haram water and peanut butter and jelly sandwiches because Mayberry did not provide evidence related to those assertions. On appeal, Mayberry argues that the district court erred by denying injunctive relief. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error, its legal conclusions de novo, and its balance of the factors for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Wisconsinites for Alternatives to Smoking & Tobacco, Inc. v. Casey, 172 F.4th 976, 984 (7th Cir. 2026) (citing Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686, 693 (7th Cir. 2019)). Mayberry had to show that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he will suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities are in his favor, and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. Id. at 983-84 (citing Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty.,

47 F.4th 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2022)). We can easily dispose of the second and fourth prongs: Congress enacted RLUIPA to ensure more expansive protection for religious exercise than is available under the First Amendment. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 424 (2022). Under our precedent, we presume irreparable harm in First Amendment cases. See Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Loc. 365 v. City of East Chicago, 56 F.4th 437, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2022). And once the moving party establishes a likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of harms favors a preliminary injunction because "injunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest." Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2012)) (discussing RLUIPA's sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1).

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RLUIPA "requires prison systems to refrain from imposing 'substantial burden[s] on the religious exercise[s]' of state prisoners outside exceptional circumstances." Landor v. La. Dep't of Corr. & Pub. Safety, 146 S. Ct. 1931, 1938 (2026) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). To establish a likelihood of success under RLUIPA, Mayberry bore the initial burden of showing that IDOC's policy substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs. Ramirez, 595 U.S. at 424-25. The burden then shifted to the warden to demonstrate that the current policy is the "least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest." Id. at 425. This burden-shifting standard applies in the preliminary injunction context. Id.

Neal argues on appeal—as he did below—that Mayberry failed to meet his initial burden. But we agree with the district court that Mayberry did. Neal first argues that Mayberry did not make out a prima facie case under RLUIPA because he identified as a Muslim only as a ploy to get better food, and Islam does not require adherents to regularly eat meat. But we must construe the exercise of religion "in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 714 (2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). And Mayberry offered persuasive reasons for why he did not earlier designate Islam as his religion, including his fear of retaliation. Further, in Jones v. Carter, we noted that "[s]ome Muslim scholars" support Mayberry's position that Islam requires him to eat meat, and that the "Imam employed by the [I]DOC agreed that [this] view is a 'valid opinion.'" 915 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 2019). Moreover, while Liebel asserted in the district court that kosher-certified meat is a sufficient substitute for halal-certified meat, Mayberry disagreed, and we have recognized that there are differences between kosher and halal requirements. See id.; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 362 (2015) (RLUIPA protects even idiosyncratic views not "shared by all of the members of a religious sect." (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981)).

Neal also argues that because Mayberry can purchase halal-certified meat through the commissary, Mayberry's current diet does not substantially burden his religious beliefs. But Mayberry alleges that he is indigent, and therefore the availability of halal-certified meat only through the commissary is a substantial burden on his religious exercise, not an adequate accommodation. See Jones, 915 F.3d at 1150. A review of the documents attached to Mayberry's motions to proceed in forma pauperis reveal that he is in a significant amount of debt, does not have regular employment, and does not receive regular deposits into his trust account. And "there can be no doubt that when the state forces a prisoner to give away his last dime so that his daily meals will not violate his religious practice, it is imposing a substantial burden." Id.

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Having concluded that Mayberry satisfied his burden, we must determine whether Neal satisfied his. Neal must show that the current policy is the "least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest." Ramirez, 595 U.S. at 425. "The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding." Holt,

574 U.S. at 364 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 728). Neal must "demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged [policy]" to Mayberry. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726). Mayberry asserts that Neal failed to meet his burden of showing that Mayberry's current diet was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. We agree. Neal explicitly declined to analyze Mayberry's proposed alternative that the prison could feasibly provide prepackaged halal-certified meals containing meat, which would not require building a halal kitchen staffed by only Muslim workers. Instead, Neal responded by providing only Liebel's conclusory declarations, which stated that the proposed alternative would be cost-prohibitive. But those declarations did not provide any information about the cost of providing halal-certified prepackaged meals containing meat. See Neely-Bey Tarik-El v. Conley, 912 F.3d 989, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019) (warden "cannot rely on the mere incantation of a penal interest but must come forward with record evidence"). Moreover, the declarations did not explain how the cost of the halal-certified meals would differ from the prepackaged kosher meals containing meat that IDOC already was providing through Aramark. See Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2015) (where prison has not estimated cost of accommodating request and has made other accommodations for religious diets, it is

"hard to credit an argument that any culinary accommodation will bring the prison's administration to its knees"). We cannot credit Neal's assumption about cost "on an empty record." Id.

Further, Neal did not address Mayberry's assertion that several prisons provide halal-certified meat without incurring a substantial, prohibitive cost. See Bilal v. Lehman, No. C04-2507 JLR, 2006 WL 3626808, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006); Gill v. Aramark Corr. Servs., No. 18-cv-540-pp, 2018 WL 4233011, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 5, 2018); Robinson

v. Cate, No. 2:11-cv-2555 MCE AC P, 2017 WL 3421987, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2017). And "when so many prisons offer an accommodation, a prison must, at a minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes that it must take a different course." Holt,

574 U.S. at 369.

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Neal urges this court to affirm the district court's determination that providing prepackaged halal-certified meals containing meat would impose substantial burden and expense because Mayberry is the only Muslim prisoner who has requested them. But without any evidence about the actual cost, we cannot credit this assumption. In any event, IDOC does not offer prepackaged halal-certified meals containing meat, so we do not know how many of the 1,300 Muslim prisoners in IDOC would opt to receive them if they were available. Cf. Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2013) ("We cannot tell, on the record as it stands, if more inmates would have designated atheism if it had been an option on the preference form.").

Neal's bare assertion that it would cost too much to offer halal-certified meals containing meat is insufficient to meet his burden. RLUIPA "may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise." Holt, 574 U.S. at 358 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c)). And the district court was required to "hold [Neal] to [his] statutory burden" and not "assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective." Id. at 369 (quoting United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000)). On this record, Mayberry has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that Neal violated RLUIPA by failing to provide a diet containing halal-certified meat. Nevertheless, mandatory injunctions—requiring an affirmative act by the defendant—are "ordinarily cautiously viewed and sparingly issued." Mays v. Dart,

974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997)). And in the prison context, injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn and

"the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The district court is thus best situated to address these issues and determine whether injunctive relief is required and if so, how to narrowly tailor any injunctive relief accordingly.

The district court correctly determined, however, that Mayberry failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims about haram water and peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. Mayberry did not provide evidence that his food was being prepared with unclean water and that his sandwiches contained haram ingredients. See Kaufman, 733 F.3d at 699-700.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's order denying Mayberry's motion for preliminary injunctive relief on his claims related to haram water and peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. We VACATE the district court's order denying Mayberry's

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motion for preliminary injunctive relief on his claim related to a diet containing halal- certified meat and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.

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