People v. Hollman: Out-of-State Child Concealment Can Support Second-Degree Kidnapping Despite a Custodial Parent’s Participation; “Sole Purpose” Relative Defense Narrowly Construed and New York Territorial Jurisdiction Sustained

1. Introduction

People v Hollman (2026 NY Slip Op 04236 [App Div, 3d Dept July 2, 2026]) arises from a joint trial in Sullivan County in which Mary Jane Hollman (the child’s grandmother) and her daughter (the child’s mother and codefendant) were convicted of kidnapping in the second degree (Penal Law § 135.20) and endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]).

The prosecution alleged that the defendants took the toddler from New York and concealed her for months—ultimately being found in Washington—without the knowledge or consent of the child’s father. The appeal centered on three primary issues:

  • whether the evidence was legally sufficient and the verdict supported by the weight of the evidence (including the affirmative defense under Penal Law § 135.30);
  • whether New York had territorial jurisdiction over crimes that culminated out of state; and
  • whether counsel was ineffective for not seeking a territorial-jurisdiction instruction or objecting during summations.

The Third Department affirmed, while a dissent (Powers, J.) would have reversed the kidnapping conviction based on the affirmative defense. The court repeatedly referenced the companion appeal, People v Four-Rosenbaum (___ AD3d ___ [3d Dept 2026] [decided herewith]).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The majority (Ceresia, J.) held:

  • the evidence was legally sufficient to prove second-degree kidnapping and endangering the welfare of a child;
  • the kidnapping verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, including the jury’s rejection of the Penal Law § 135.30 affirmative defense;
  • New York territorial jurisdiction was established for both crimes (intent/conspiracy manifested in New York for kidnapping; continuing course of conduct beginning in New York for endangering); and
  • counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a territorial-jurisdiction instruction or objections that would have had little chance of success given the proof.

The dissent argued that the proof (including defendant’s communication to her son describing a “plan” and that they were “tucked away, safe and sound”) established by a preponderance that defendant’s sole purpose was to assume control over the child (as she believed the child needed “saving”), satisfying Penal Law § 135.30 and making the jury’s rejection against the weight of the evidence.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Preservation, legal sufficiency, and weight review

  • People v Gomez (244 AD3d 1382 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 936 [2026]) and People v Gardner (243 AD3d 955 [3d Dept 2025]): The court relied on these to hold that defendant’s legal sufficiency argument, insofar as it attacked proof negating her affirmative defense, was unpreserved because it was not raised in the motion for a trial order of dismissal.
    Practical effect: appellate review of sufficiency can be narrowed substantially by how the dismissal motion is framed.
  • People v Reinfurt (241 AD3d 1015 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1067 [2026]) and People v Williams (43 NY3d 1030 [2025]): These supplied the familiar standard: view evidence in the light most favorable to the People and ask whether a rational jury could find each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • People v James (245 AD3d 1102 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 946 [2026]) and People v Scott (219 AD3d 1572 [3d Dept 2023]): These framed weight-of-the-evidence review: consider whether a different finding would be unreasonable, then weigh conflicting proof and inferences while deferring to credibility findings.
  • People v Noble (244 AD3d 1499 [3d Dept 2025]): Cited in a footnote to emphasize that weight review requires no preservation, enabling review even when trial motions were incomplete.

2) Kidnapping involving a child; when “custody” stops being lawful

  • People v White (231 AD3d 1429 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1082 [2025]), People v Petit (230 AD3d 1337 [2d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1054 [2024]), and People v Barnette (150 AD3d 1136 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1123 [2017]): Used as supporting authority that evidence of concealment and restraint of a child can satisfy kidnapping elements, including secreting the child where not likely to be found.
  • People v Leonard (19 NY3d 323 [2012]) (and the intermediate decision People v Leonard (83 AD3d 1113 [3d Dept 2011], affd 19 NY3d 323 [2012])): This was the opinion’s central substantive precedent. The majority invoked Leonard’s principle that a custodial parent’s control over a child’s movements can become “so obviously and unjustifiably . . . harmful to the child as to be inconsistent with the idea of lawful custody,” reaching “a point where even a custodial parent’s control over a child’s movements is unlawful, and indeed obviously so.”
    How it influenced Hollman: even if the mother “seemingly acquiesced,” the totality—secret flight, untraceability measures, extended concealment—supported that the restraint was unlawful and could constitute abduction.
  • People v Cole (140 AD3d 1183 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 970 [2016]) and People v Hall (247 AD3d 1254 [3d Dept 2026]): The majority cited these in its weight analysis, positioning the case among decisions upholding kidnapping verdicts on similar evidentiary patterns, while distinguishing circumstances (via “cf.”) where proof may cut the other way.

3) The Penal Law § 135.30 “relative” affirmative defense (“sole purpose”)

  • People v Leonard (19 NY3d 323 [2012]): Leonard also informed the meaning of the “sole purpose” requirement. The majority emphasized that a relative who takes a child for something more than custodial control—such as “ransom, extortion or terrorization” of another custodian—remains guilty of kidnapping (as reflected in Donnino’s Practice Commentaries, quoted in the opinion).
  • People v Agan (207 AD3d 861 [3d Dept 2022], lvs denied 38 NY3d 1186 [2022], 39 NY3d 939 [2022]) and People v Lyons (200 AD3d 1222 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1162 [2022]): Cited as comparators in evaluating whether the jury’s rejection of an affirmative defense was against the weight of the evidence. The majority used them to support deference to the jury where the record permits competing inferences about motive.
  • Dissent comparators: People v Gilley (163 AD3d 1156 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 948 [2019]) and Vachon v Pugliese (931 P2d 371, 378 n 7 [Alaska 1996]): The dissent relied on these to argue that the trial proof, viewed neutrally, demonstrated the defense by a preponderance and therefore the jury’s rejection should be set aside on weight review.

4) Endangering the welfare of a child

  • People v Hitchcock (98 NY2d 586 [2002]): Provided the governing sufficiency framework for Penal Law § 260.10 (1), supporting that conduct “likely to be injurious” can be established without a showing of actual injury.
  • People v Stanley (246 AD3d 1218 [3d Dept 2026]) and People v Engelsen (92 AD3d 1289 [4th Dept 2012]): Supported both legal sufficiency and weight affirmance as to endangering, reinforcing the breadth of “likely to be injurious” conduct.

5) Territorial jurisdiction

  • People v McLaughlin (80 NY2d 466 [1992]) and People v Callahan (186 AD3d 943 [3d Dept 2020]): These set the baseline rule: New York has jurisdiction if either conduct or a consequence occurred in New York.
  • People v Kassebaum (95 NY2d 611 [2001], cert denied 532 US 1069 [2001]): Used to support jurisdiction where an element—here, intent to abduct—was manifested within New York (CPL 20.20 [1] [a]).
  • People v Zorrilla (242 AD3d 497 [1st Dept 2025]) and People v Bernardo (84 AD3d 1717 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 813 [2011]): Cited for the proposition that endangering the welfare of a child can be a continuing course of conduct, permitting jurisdiction where it began in New York.
  • Ineffective-assistance/jurisdiction instruction: People v Carvajal (14 AD3d 165 [1st Dept 2004], affd 6 NY3d 305 [2005]) and People v Paige (289 AD2d 872 [3d Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 759 [2002]): The majority relied on these to reject ineffectiveness claims premised on counsel’s failure to advance arguments with little to no chance of success.

6) “This may be another crime, but it’s not the charged crime” (dissent footnote)

In emphasizing that reversal on the kidnapping charge would not foreclose criminal liability, the dissent pointed to custodial interference authorities: People v Sharp (104 AD3d 1325 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1009 [2013]), People v Wyne (200 AD2d 779 [2d Dept 1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 973 [1994]), People v Morel (164 AD2d 677 [2d Dept 1991], lvs denied 78 NY2d 971 [1991]), People v S.W. (81 Misc 3d 299 [Genesee County Ct 2022]), and Matter of Schrotenboer v Soloff (74 NY2d 597 [1989]). The majority did not adopt that framing, but the dissent’s discussion underscores charging-choice consequences.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Kidnapping elements satisfied by evidence of deliberate concealment and untraceability

The majority applied Penal Law definitions: kidnapping requires “abduct[ing]” another person (Penal Law § 135.20), which requires “restrain[t]” plus intent to prevent liberation by “secreting or holding” in a place not likely to be found (Penal Law § 135.00 [2] [a]). “Restrain” includes moving a person without consent with knowledge the restriction is unlawful (Penal Law § 135.00 [1]). For a child under 16, restraint is “without consent” when the lawful custodian has not acquiesced (Penal Law § 135.00 [1] [b]).

The court found the evidence legally sufficient because the toddler could not control her own movements, was taken out of state, and the defendants allegedly acted to remain untraceable (burner phones, cash withdrawals, cash hotel payments, no notice of whereabouts). Those circumstances supported an inference of secreting the child where not likely to be found.

2) Custodial-parent “acquiescence” did not bar kidnapping where conduct was plainly inconsistent with lawful custody

A notable feature was the mother’s participation. The court nevertheless relied on People v Leonard (19 NY3d 323 [2012]) to hold that the totality of actions demonstrated conduct so harmful that it became inconsistent with lawful custody—making even a custodial parent’s control “unlawful” and “obviously so.” This analysis prevents “custody” from operating as an absolute shield when the child is effectively vanished for an extended period under circumstances suggesting risk and intentional obstruction.

3) The Penal Law § 135.30 relative affirmative defense turned on motive—and the jury could find mixed motives

Penal Law § 135.30 provides an affirmative defense in kidnapping prosecutions where (a) the defendant is a relative and (b) the “sole purpose” was to assume control of the abducted person. The majority agreed the grandmother qualified as a “relative,” but emphasized the defendant bore the burden by a preponderance (Penal Law §§ 25.00 [2]; 135.30).

The majority concluded the jury could reasonably find that the defendants were motivated, at least in part, by retribution toward the father for alleged infidelity, thereby defeating the “sole purpose” requirement. Critically, the majority acknowledged the record might also support other asserted motivations (e.g., unsubstantiated sexual-abuse fears or beliefs about demonic possession) but held the jury could reject the defense and that rejection was not against the weight of the evidence.

The dissent took the opposite view: the contemporaneous communication admitted at trial showed a plan to keep the child safe and away from the father due to defendant’s beliefs, which the dissent interpreted as satisfying “sole purpose” (assuming control to “save” the child). Under the dissent’s weight-of-evidence framing, “infidelity” functioned not as retribution but as another reason the defendant believed control was necessary.

4) Endangering the welfare of a child sustained under a “likely to be injurious” standard

Without extensive factual recitation (given People v Four-Rosenbaum), the majority held the conduct met Penal Law § 260.10 (1) and was sufficient under People v Hitchcock (98 NY2d 586 [2002]) and related appellate authority. The court also treated the verdict as weight-supported despite the possibility a contrary result could have been reasonable.

5) Territorial jurisdiction: intent/conspiracy in New York for kidnapping; continuing course for endangering

Applying People v McLaughlin (80 NY2d 466 [1992]), the majority held jurisdiction existed even though the child was found in Washington. For kidnapping, proof supported that intent to abduct was manifested in New York (CPL 20.20 [1] [a]) and/or that defendant conspired in New York (CPL 20.20 [1] [c]), with support from People v Kassebaum (95 NY2d 611 [2001]) and People v Callahan (186 AD3d 943 [3d Dept 2020]).

For endangering, the court characterized the crime as a continuing course of conduct and held it began in New York, supported by People v Zorrilla (242 AD3d 497 [1st Dept 2025]) and People v Bernardo (84 AD3d 1717 [4th Dept 2011]).

C. Impact

  • Reinforcement of Leonard’s “limits of custody” principle: The decision underscores that a custodial parent’s participation does not necessarily preclude kidnapping liability where the overall conduct resembles a disappearance—extended concealment, intentional untraceability, and deprivation of the other parent’s ability to locate the child.
  • Narrowing pressure on Penal Law § 135.30 (“sole purpose”): Hollman highlights that the defense is fragile where the People can argue any additional purpose beyond assuming control—such as retribution or “terrorization” of the other custodian. Future cases may turn on granular motive proof (texts, emails, contemporaneous statements), and juries may be permitted to infer mixed motives from circumstantial conduct.
  • Jurisdictional clarity for interstate child cases: The court’s reasoning provides a prosecution roadmap: prove New York-based intent formation, steps in furtherance, or conspiracy for kidnapping; prove the offense began in New York for continuing-course crimes like endangering.
  • Charging-choice significance (raised by dissent): The dissent’s emphasis on custodial interference in the first degree (Penal Law § 135.50 [1]) signals that borderline kidnapping/custodial interference fact patterns may produce appellate friction—especially where motive evidence supports “control” but the charged offense requires proof negating the “sole purpose” defense.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence: Sufficiency asks whether any rational jury could convict when viewing evidence most favorably to the People. Weight review is broader: the appellate court “weighs” proof and inferences in a neutral light, while still deferring to credibility determinations.
  • “Abduct,” “restrain,” and “secrete” (kidnapping terms): “Restrain” means unlawfully restricting movement (including moving someone) without consent; “abduct” adds an intent to prevent liberation, including by hiding (“secreting”) the person where they are not likely to be found.
  • Consent when the victim is under 16: The “consent” focus is not the child’s (a toddler cannot meaningfully consent), but whether the person with lawful custody acquiesced. Hollman illustrates that “lawful custody” has limits—conduct may become so harmful that it is treated as inconsistent with lawful custody (per Leonard).
  • Affirmative defense (Penal Law § 135.30) and “sole purpose”: An affirmative defense means the defendant bears the burden (here, by a preponderance). “Sole purpose” is strict: if the jury finds any additional purpose—punishing, frightening, retaliating against the other parent—the defense fails.
  • Territorial jurisdiction: New York can prosecute if key conduct, an element (like intent), a consequence, conspiracy formation, or the start of a continuing offense occurred in New York, even if later acts happen elsewhere.

5. Conclusion

People v Hollman affirms that second-degree kidnapping can be sustained where a young child is taken out of state and deliberately concealed under circumstances suggesting intentional untraceability, even when a custodial parent participates—because custody does not remain “lawful” when conduct becomes obviously harmful and inconsistent with lawful control (drawing heavily from People v Leonard). The decision also illustrates the tight constraints of the Penal Law § 135.30 affirmative defense: a relative must prove the sole purpose was to assume control, and evidence supporting mixed motives may be enough for a jury to reject the defense on weight review.

Finally, Hollman strengthens the jurisdictional framework for interstate child concealment prosecutions by approving New York territorial jurisdiction where intent or conspiracy is manifested in New York and by treating endangering the welfare of a child as a continuing course of conduct that began within the state.