People v. Hollman

People v Hollman

2026 NY Slip Op 04236 July 2, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v

Mary Jane Hollman, Appellant.

Decided and Entered:July 2, 2026

CR-24-0867

Calendar Date: February 18, 2026

Before: Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.P., Ceresia, Fisher, Powers And Mackey, JJ. Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for appellant.

Brian P. Conaty, District Attorney, Monticello (Michael J. Puma of counsel), for respondent. [*1]

Ceresia, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (James Farrell, J.), rendered September 30, 2022, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. Following a joint trial, defendant and her daughter, the codefendant, were convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child stemming from a months-long search for the codefendant's toddler child, which ultimately led to their discovery in the State of Washington, where they had been without the consent of and unbeknownst to the child's father. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of five years, to be followed by 2½ years of postrelease supervision, on the kidnapping conviction and to a lesser concurrent jail term on the endangering the welfare of a child conviction. Defendant appeals.^FN1

Defendant claims that her convictions are supported by legally insufficient evidence and, likewise, that the verdicts with respect thereto are against the weight of the evidence. To the extent that defendant's legal sufficiency argument pertains to her affirmative defense, that aspect of her argument is unpreserved as she failed make any argument to that effect in her motion for trial order of dismissal (see People v Gomez, 244 AD3d 1382, 1382 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 936 [2026]; People v Gardner, 243 AD3d 955, 956 [3d Dept 2025]). However, the balance of her legal sufficiency challenge is properly before us.

"In determining whether defendant's convictions are supported by legally sufficient evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the People and examine whether there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Reinfurt, 241 AD3d 1015, 1017 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 44 NY3d 1067 [2026]; see People v Williams, 43 NY3d 1030, 1032 [2025]). "When undertaking a weight of the evidence review, we must first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable and then, if not, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" (People v James, 245 AD3d 1102, 1104-1105 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 946 [2026]; see People v Scott, 219 AD3d 1572, 1573 [3d Dept 2023]). As relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he [or she] abducts another person"

(Penal Law § 135.20). To " '[a]bduct' means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his [or her] liberation by . . . secreting or holding him [or her] in a place where he [or she] is not likely to be found" (Penal Law § 135.00 [2] [a]), and to " '[r[*2]]estrain' means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such [a] manner as to interfere substantially with his [or her] liberty by moving him [or her] from one place to another . . . without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful" (Penal Law § 135.00 [1]). When a child is under the age of 16, such child is restrained without consent if "the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him [or her] has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement" (Penal Law § 135.00 [1] [b]). "In any prosecution for kidnapping, it is an affirmative defense that (a) the defendant was a relative of the person abducted, and (b) his [or her] sole purpose was to assume control of such person" (Penal Law § 135.30). Moreover, "[a] person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when," as pertinent here, "[h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than [17] years old" (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]).

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Inasmuch as the evidence adduced during this joint trial has been heavily detailed in the codefendant's related appeal (see People v Four-Rosenbaum, ___ AD3d ___ [3d Dept 2026] [decided herewith]), we will not reiterate this proof in the context of this decision. With respect to defendant's conviction of kidnapping in the second degree, we find the evidence to be legally sufficient (see People v White, 231 AD3d 1429, 1432 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1082 [2025]; People v Petit, 230 AD3d 1337, 1339 [2d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1054 [2024]; People v Barnette, 150 AD3d 1136, 1136-1137 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1123 [2017]). The proof elicited at trial established that the child, who was of such an age that she could not independently control her own movements, was transported out of state by defendant and the codefendant. They did not notify anyone as to their whereabouts and employed methods that signal an intent to remain untraceable â​​ such as utilizing burner phones, withdrawing large amounts of cash and paying for hotel stays with said cash to avoid the use of credit cards. Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, this proof demonstrates that defendant secreted the child in a place where she was not likely to be found and that, recognizing that the child was under the age of 16, defendant did so without consent of the child's father. It is true that the codefendant, as a custodial parent, seemingly acquiesced to the restraint. Nevertheless, the totality of their actions demonstrates that the codefendant's "conduct [was] so obviously and unjustifiably . . . harmful to the child as to be inconsistent with the idea of lawful custody" and, therefore, had reached "a point where even a custodial parent's control over a child's movements is unlawful, and indeed obviously so" (People v Leonard, 19 NY3d 323, 328, 329

[2012]).

Due to the circumstantial nature of the proof presented, a different verdict [*3]would not have been unreasonable. That said, viewing the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's credibility determinations, the weight of the evidence supports the elements of kidnapping in the second degree for the same reasons as outlined above (see People v Cole, 140 AD3d 1183, 1183 [2d Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 970 [2016]; People v Leonard, 83 AD3d 1113, 1115 [3d Dept 2011], affd 19 NY3d 323 [2012]; cf. People v Hall, 247 AD3d 1254, 1256-1257 [3d Dept 2026]). Notwithstanding this conclusion, we must determine whether defendant established the affirmative defense contained in Penal Law §

135.30 and, flowing therefrom, whether the jury's rejection of the affirmative defense is supported by the weight of the evidence.^FN2 As the child's grandmother, defendant was a "relative" under the terms of the statute (Penal Law § 135.30 [a]; see Penal Law § 135.00 [3]). Thus, she was required to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that that she took the child for the sole purpose of assuming control over her (see Penal Law §§ 25.00 [2]; 135.30). A relative who takes a child with the purpose of something more than custodial control â​​ such as "ransom, extortion or terrorization"

of the other custodian â​​ will still be guilty of kidnapping (William C. Donnino, Prac Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Penal Law § 135.00 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Leonard, 19 NY3d at

327).

As set forth in more depth in the related appeal (see People v Four-Rosenbaum, ___ AD3d ___), there was ample evidence before the jury lending itself to a finding that defendant and the codefendant, in absconding with the child, were at least in part motivated by a desire to obtain retribution against the father for his claimed infidelity, such that the jury could reasonably further resolve that defendant failed to prove that her sole purpose in taking the child was to merely assume control over her (see Penal Law § 135.30). Accordingly, while the proof could arguably support other impetuses as well such as defendant believing that she needed to take action to save the child from unsubstantiated sexual abuse or from being possessed by demons we are satisfied that, upon consideration of the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's factual and credibility determinations, its rejection of defendant's affirmative defense was not against the weight of the evidence (cf. People v Agan, 207 AD3d 861, 867 [3d Dept 2022], lvs denied 38 NY3d 1186 [2022], 39 NY3d 939 [2022]; People v Lyons, 200 AD3d 1222, 1225-1226 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1162

[2022]).

Moving on to defendant's conviction of endangering the welfare of a child, upon our review of the record, we find that it is supported by legally sufficient evidence (see People v Hitchcock, 98 NY2d 586, 590-592 [2002]; People v Stanley, 246 AD3d 1218, 1221 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Engelsen, 92 AD3d 1289, 1290 [4th Dept 2012]). Additionally, although a contrary [*4]result may not have been unreasonable, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Stanley, 246 AD3d at 1221-1222; People v Engelsen, 92 AD3d at 1290).

Next, defendant contends that the People failed to establish territorial jurisdiction. "The general rule in New York is that, for the State to have criminal jurisdiction, either the alleged conduct or some consequence of it must have occurred within the State" (People v McLaughlin, 80 NY2d 466, 471 [1992] [citations omitted]; accord People v Callahan, 186 AD3d 943, 945 [3d Dept 2020]). Territorial jurisdiction was demonstrated in connection with both crimes. Regarding kidnapping in the second degree, as explained in the related appeal (see People v Four-Rosenbaum, ___ AD3d at ___), there was proof indicating that defendant and the codefendant turned against the father and took the child out of state as a result. This evidence was sufficient to establish both that defendant manifested her intent to abduct the child in New York, which is an element of the crime (see CPL 20.20 [1] [a]; People v Kassebaum, 95 NY2d 611, 621 [2001], cert denied 532 US 1069 [2001]; People v Callahan, 186 AD3d at 945), and that she conspired to commit the crime in New York (see CPL 20.20 [1] [c]). As for endangering the welfare of a child, this crime operates as a continuing course of conduct and the evidence demonstrated that the conduct in question began in New York (see People v Zorrilla, 242 AD3d 497, 498 [1st Dept 2025]; People v Bernardo, 84 AD3d 1717, 1718 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 813 [2011]). We reject defendant's related claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a territorial jurisdiction jury instruction or to object to County Court's inaccurate statement on the subject during summations. Such actions on counsel's part would have had little to no chance of success, given that territorial jurisdiction was established by the trial evidence (see People v Carvajal, 14 AD3d 165, 173 [1st Dept 2004], affd 6 NY3d 305 [2005]; People v Paige, 289 AD2d 872, 873-874 [3d Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 759 [2002]). Defendant's remaining claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as her argument concerning impairment of the integrity of the grand jury, have been reviewed and found to be unavailing.

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.P., and Fisher, J., concur.

Powers, J. (dissenting).

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