No Statutory “Recency” Requirement for a Civil Stalking “Course of Conduct” Under RSA 633:3-a; Passage of Time Goes to Reasonable Fear

Introduction

In T.S. v. G.W. (N.H. Aug. 12, 2026) (order issued under Sup. Ct. R. 20(3)), the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed a final civil stalking protective order entered by the Circuit Court under RSA 633:3-a. The plaintiff, T.S., sought protection from the defendant, G.W., an acquaintance. After a final hearing in July 2025 (plaintiff in person; defendant by video), the trial court found stalking by a preponderance of the evidence and issued a one-year order (July 2025–July 2026).

The appeal centered on sufficiency of the evidence and, critically, the defendant’s contention that the alleged “course of conduct” was too remote in time to support the statutory requirement that the plaintiff be “actually placed” in fear. The Supreme Court rejected the invitation to read a “recency” requirement into the stalking statute, while recognizing that time may matter as part of the factual inquiry into the reasonableness of fear.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court applied the civil stalking definition in RSA 633:3-a, I(a) and the “course of conduct” definition in RSA 633:3-a, II(a), and held the record supported the trial court’s findings that the defendant engaged in at least two qualifying acts evidencing continuity of purpose.
  • The Court rejected the defendant’s “stale course-of-conduct” argument: RSA 633:3-a does not explicitly require temporal proximity between the acts and the petition, and the Court declined to insert such a requirement in the absence of authority and developed argument.
  • The Court emphasized that the passage of time can still be relevant to whether a reasonable person would fear for safety, but that issue is factual and therefore largely insulated on appeal given the statutory finality of factual findings in these proceedings.
  • The Court also affirmed on an appellate-record ground: because the defendant failed to provide key documents (including the petition the plaintiff reaffirmed at hearing), the Court presumed the missing materials supported the trial court’s order.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Despres v. Hampsey, 162 N.H. 398 (2011)

Despres supplied the governing appellate lens: sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are reviewed as a matter of law, but the trial court’s findings and rulings are upheld unless they lack evidentiary support or are erroneous as a matter of law. The Court reiterated that it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and gives considerable weight to credibility determinations and the weight assigned to testimony. It also relied on Despres to explain that even if some trial-court findings were disputed or unnecessary, the order can stand if other supported findings suffice—here, the statute requires only “2 or more acts” to establish a course of conduct.

Anna H. Cardone Revocable Trust v. Cardone, 160 N.H. 521 (2010)

The Court used Anna H. Cardone Revocable Trust v. Cardone for a procedural and institutional point: it will not undertake judicial review of adverse rulings where the appellant provides no developed legal argument. That principle was decisive against the defendant’s request to add a temporal-proximity element to RSA 633:3-a without supporting authority.

State v. Gubitosi, 152 N.H. 673 (2005)

State v. Gubitosi was cited to classify the “reasonable fear” determination as a question of fact. This supported the Court’s approach: while time can affect whether fear is reasonable, deciding that effect is for the factfinder, and appellate review is constrained—especially in civil stalking proceedings where the legislature has made factual findings final.

Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248 (2004)

Bean supplied the rule that the appellant bears the burden of furnishing a record sufficient to decide the issues on appeal. When critical materials are missing, the Court assumes they support the trial court’s order. This rule independently fortified affirmance because the defendant did not provide copies of the stalking petition (reaffirmed by the plaintiff at hearing) or certain exhibits.

K.M. v. A.M., No. 2023-0631 (non-precedential order at 1), 2024 WL 2106442 (N.H. April 1, 2024)

Although explicitly non-precedential, K.M. v. A.M. reinforced the application of Bean in the stalking-order context: where a petition is reaffirmed at hearing but omitted from the appellate record, the Court will assume it supports the trial court’s conclusion.

State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47 (2003)

State v. Blackmer was invoked to dispatch remaining arguments as unpreserved or inadequately developed. The citation underscores that preservation and adequate appellate briefing are threshold requirements, even in protective-order appeals.

Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993)

Vogel v. Vogel supported the Court’s choice not to discuss arguments that do not warrant further analysis, a common practice in summary dispositions when existing law clearly resolves the issues.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Statutory framework and burden: The Court applied RSA 633:3-a, I(a) (stalking elements) and RSA 633:3-a, II(a) (course of conduct). It emphasized that civil stalking proceedings adopt the same procedures and burdens as RSA 173-B (RSA 633:3-a, III-a), including the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
  2. Two-or-more-acts requirement satisfied: The trial court identified at least two acts—alleged explosive devices and alleged poisoning of food/drink. The Supreme Court held the record supported these findings based on the plaintiff’s testimony. Consistent with Despres v. Hampsey, the Court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations.
  3. No implied “recency” element: Addressing the core appellate claim, the Court read the text of RSA 633:3-a as requiring “2 or more acts over a period of time, however short,” evidencing continuity of purpose, but not requiring that those acts occur within a specified time before the petition is filed. The Court contrasted this with the domestic violence statute’s express recency language (RSA 173-B:1, I), treating that contrast as evidence that the legislature knows how to impose a recency limitation when it intends to.
  4. Time remains relevant—just not as a statutory bar: The Court drew a careful distinction: even without a filing-window requirement, the passage of time can undermine whether fear is reasonable. But that assessment is fact-bound. Here, evidence that the defendant was on conditional discharge after incompetency-related commitment in another matter, coupled with the plaintiff’s testimony about fearing renewed conduct upon possible release, provided evidentiary support for the trial court’s reasonable-fear and actual-fear findings.
  5. Appellate record presumption: Independently, the defendant’s failure to provide key documents required the Court (under Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt.) to presume the missing items supported the trial court’s decision.

Impact

  • Clarifies the statutory elements of civil stalking: The decision signals that New Hampshire courts should not add an extra-textual “recency” element to RSA 633:3-a. Parties arguing staleness must frame it as part of the reasonable-person and actual-fear analysis—not as a categorical statutory defect.
  • Shifts litigation focus to factual context: Respondents facing older allegations will likely emphasize intervening events (no contact, changed circumstances, protective measures, treatment, incarceration, etc.) to argue fear is not reasonable; petitioners will emphasize ongoing risk indicators (e.g., release status, continuing threats, unresolved fixation).
  • Reinforces appellate discipline in protective-order cases: The record-adequacy holding incentivizes appellants to include petitions, exhibits, and other key filings in the appellate record; omission may be outcome-determinative.
  • Legislative signal: By contrasting RSA 633:3-a with RSA 173-B:1, I, the Court implicitly indicated that any filing-window rule must come from legislative amendment, not judicial construction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preponderance of the evidence
The civil standard of proof: more likely than not.
Course of conduct
At least two acts over time (even a short time) showing a continuing purpose, such as threats, approaching, appearing at a residence, placing objects, or communicating.
Reasonable person fear vs. actual fear
The statute requires both: the conduct must be the type that would make an ordinary reasonable person fear for safety, and the petitioner must in fact have been placed in fear.
Finality of factual findings on appeal
In these proceedings (by incorporation of RSA 173-B), appellate review is limited: factual determinations largely stand, while legal questions are reviewed.
Developed legal argument / preservation
Appellate courts generally require that arguments be raised properly below (preserved) and supported with authority and reasoning in the brief. Unsupported assertions are commonly rejected.
Record on appeal
The appellant must provide the documents and transcripts needed for review; missing materials are presumed to support the trial court.

Conclusion

T.S. v. G.W. affirms a civil stalking protective order and, most importantly, clarifies that RSA 633:3-a contains no explicit temporal-proximity (recency) requirement between the alleged course of conduct and the filing of the petition. The passage of time may still be powerful evidence on whether fear is reasonable, but it is treated as a factual consideration, not a statutory bar. The decision also underscores two recurrent appellate themes: deference to trial-court credibility assessments under Despres v. Hampsey, and the appellant’s obligation under Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt. to provide a complete record.