THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2025-0462, T.S. v. G.W., the court on August 12, 2026, issued the following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The defendant, G.W., appeals a final civil stalking protective order, see RSA 633:3-a, I(a) (2016), issued against her by the Circuit Court (Boyle, R., approved by Paine, J.) for the protection of the plaintiff, T.S. On appeal, the defendant challenges, in part, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's decision. We affirm.
The record before us supports the following facts. The plaintiff sought a civil stalking order of protection against the defendant, an acquaintance of the plaintiff. The court held a final hearing on the petition in July 2025. The plaintiff appeared in person and the defendant appeared by video. Both parties testified.
Following the hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiff an order of protection, to run from July 2025 to July 2026. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the offense of stalking pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, I(a) and specifically that she: (1) made
"repeated threats and place[d] . . . explosive devices at the plaintiff's property (and the courthouse)"; (2) "le[ft] poison materials at plaintiff's home in his food stuffs"; (3) "refus[ed] to stay away from plaintiff"; and (4) "has serious mental health issues." The trial court (Boyle, R., approved by Cabrera, J.) denied the defendant's motion to reconsider, and the defendant appealed. In our review of a trial court's grant of a civil stalking order, the trial court's "findings of facts shall be final, but questions of law may be transferred from the circuit court to the supreme court." RSA 173-B:3, VI (2022); see RSA 633:3-a, III-a (2016) (providing that, in civil stalking proceedings, "the procedures and burdens of proof to be applied . . . shall be the same as those set forth in RSA 173-B"). We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law and uphold the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they lack evidentiary support or are erroneous as a matter of law. Despres v. Hampsey, 162 N.H. 398, 401 (2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accord considerable weight to the trial court's judgments on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given testimony. Id.
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A person commits the offense of stalking if, among other things, that person "[p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety or the safety of a member of that person's immediate family, and the person is actually placed in such fear." RSA 633:3-a, I(a).
"Course of conduct" is defined as two or more acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose. RSA 633:3-a, II(a) (2016). A course of conduct may include, among other things: "[t]hreatening the safety of the targeted person or an immediate family member"; "[f]ollowing, approaching, or confronting that person, or a member of that person's immediate family"; "[a]ppearing in close proximity to, or entering the person's residence, place of employment, school, or other place where the person can be found, or the residence, place of employment or school of a member of that person's immediate family"; "[p]lacing an object on the person's property, either directly or through a third person, or that of an immediate family member"; or
"[a]ny act of communication." RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(1)-(3), (5), (7). A course of conduct does not include constitutionally protected activity, or conduct necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person. RSA 633:3-a, II(a). The plaintiff bears the burden to prove "stalking" by a preponderance of the evidence. RSA 633:3-a, III-a. The trial court found that the defendant "[p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly engage[d] in a course of conduct" targeted at the plaintiff. RSA 633:3-a, I(a). The court identified "2 or more acts," RSA 633:3-a, II(a), to support this conclusion, including: (1) that the defendant made "repeated threats and place[d] . . . explosive devices at the plaintiff's property (and the courthouse)" and (2) that she "le[ft] poison materials at plaintiff's home in his food stuffs."1The record supports the trial court's findings. Specifically, the plaintiff described an incident in which, upon returning home from a court proceeding, he discovered that the defendant had entered his house and poured paint thinner in his coffee, kombucha, and gin. He also testified that the defendant placed homemade explosives under his vehicle, and that he learned the defendant had also placed explosive devices at the courthouse. The parties do not dispute that this course of conduct began at least four years prior to the plaintiff filing the petition; the defendant contends that her alleged course of conduct occurred too remotely in time to support the plaintiff's claim of actual fear. See RSA 633:3-a, I(a). RSA 633:3-a, however, does not explicitly require temporal proximity between the course of conduct
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and the filing of the petition. See RSA 633:3-a, I(a), II(a). The statute requires that "2 or more acts" evidence a continuity of purpose but does not state that the acts must occur within a certain period of time prior to the filing of the petition. RSA 633:3-a, II(a); cf. RSA 173-B:1, I (2022) (incorporating recency requirement in definition of "abuse" in domestic violence protection statute). The defendant offers no authority for her stale-course-of-conduct contention, and without developed legal argument from her, we decline to read such a requirement into the statutory scheme. See Anna H. Cardone Revocable Trust
v. Cardone, 160 N.H. 521, 526 (2010) ("Judicial review is not warranted for complaints regarding adverse rulings without developed legal argument."). The passage of time, however, does bear relevance to the question of whether the defendant's course of conduct "would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety." RSA 633:3-a, I(a). Under many circumstances, the passage of time between the conduct and petition may make it unreasonable for a person to be in fear for his or her personal safety. But the issue presents a question of fact. See State v. Gubitosi, 152 N.H. 673, 681 (2005) (ruling that whether the defendant engaged in a course of conduct targeted at the plaintiff that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety is a question of fact). Moreover, as mentioned above, in an appeal of a civil stalking order, the trial court's findings of fact are final. See RSA 173-B:3, VI; RSA 633:3-a, III-a.
The trial court found that the defendant's course of conduct "would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety" and that the plaintiff was "actually placed in such fear." RSA 633:3-a, I(a). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot conclude that these findings lack evidentiary support. See Despres, 162 N.H. at 401. The record demonstrates that at the time of trial, the defendant was on conditional discharge from her commitment after being found incompetent to stand trial in another proceeding. The plaintiff testified that although the course of conduct first occurred four years ago, the defendant may soon be released. He testified that he brought this stalking petition because he does not feel safe and fears that the defendant will again engage in similar conduct when released. And the plaintiff's testimony, which the trial court was free to credit, describes very serious conduct that the trial court could have found would cause the plaintiff to reasonably fear the defendant's post-release conduct.
The trial court had before it the plaintiff's stalking petition — which the plaintiff reaffirmed and adopted as part of his testimony at the hearing — as well as certain exhibits offered by the defendant. The defendant, however, has failed to provide this court with copies of those documents for our review. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004) (holding that "[i]t is the burden of the appealing party . . . to provide this court with a record sufficient to decide [her] issues on appeal"). Absent copies of those documents, our jurisprudence requires us to assume that they support the trial court's
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order. See id.; K.M. v. A.M., No. 2023-0631 (non-precedential order at 1), 2024 WL 2106442 (N.H. April 1, 2024) (stating that where plaintiff swore to and reaffirmed her stalking petition at the hearing and the appealing party failed to provide that petition as part of the record on appeal, we assume the petition supports the trial court's conclusion).
The defendant also challenges the plaintiff's credibility, emphasizes different evidence, and offers alternative explanations and interpretations of the evidence. The consideration and dispatch of all of those arguments, however, fall plainly within the trial court's discretion "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, measure the credibility of witnesses, and determine the weight to be given evidence." Despres, 162 N.H. at 404 (quotation omitted). The defendant's remaining arguments are not preserved, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 48 (2003), are not adequately developed for our review, see id. at 49, or do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H.
321, 322 (1993).
Affirmed.
DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, GOULD, and WILL, JJ., concurred; MACDONALD, C.J., did not participate in the final vote.
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk