No Severance Prejudice Where Other-Act Evidence Is Cross-Admissible and Lay Identification by an Intimate Partner Is Proper Under Rule 701 (Seventh Circuit Anders Dismissal)

Introduction

In United States v. Haris Matchalovas (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026) (nonprecedential order), Haris Matchalovas appealed his jury convictions for seven bank robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and his 170-month within-Guidelines sentence. Appointed counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, asserting the appeal was frivolous. The court’s key issues were whether any nonfrivolous arguments existed regarding: (1) severance of the seven robbery counts; (2) admission of lay opinion identification testimony from Matchalovas’s ex-fiancée; (3) sufficiency of the evidence; (4) denial of a new trial (including a claimed Brady violation); and (5) sentencing reasonableness.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying the Seventh Circuit’s Anders procedure, the panel limited its review to the issues counsel discussed, found counsel’s analysis thorough, granted the motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal as frivolous. The court agreed that (i) severance was properly denied because evidence of each robbery would have been admissible in trials of the others to prove identity/modus operandi and any residual prejudice was addressed by a limiting instruction; (ii) the ex-fiancée’s identifications were admissible lay opinions under Rule 701; (iii) the evidence was ample for conviction; (iv) denial of judgment of acquittal and a new trial fell well within discretion; and (v) the within-Guidelines sentence was presumptively reasonable and adequately explained under § 3553(a).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967):

    The backbone of the disposition. Under Anders, appointed counsel may seek to withdraw by identifying potential issues and explaining why they are frivolous, allowing the appellate court to confirm that no nonfrivolous issues exist. The panel followed this model, ultimately dismissing the appeal.

  • United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014):

    The court relied on United States v. Bey for the Seventh Circuit’s approach to reviewing an Anders brief: when counsel’s submission is adequate and thorough, the court limits its review to the issues counsel addresses. That framing explains why the order focuses on severance, evidentiary rulings, sufficiency, post-trial motions, and sentencing.

  • United States v. Coley, 137 F.4th 874 (7th Cir. 2025):

    Coley supplies the key severance principle: a defendant cannot show prejudice from joinder when the evidence on severed counts would be admissible in separate trials of the other counts; and limiting instructions further mitigate spillover risk. The panel treated this as decisive because the robberies were highly similar.

  • United States v. Edwards, 26 F.4th 449 (7th Cir. 2022):

    Edwards supports the proposition that other-act evidence may be admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove identity and modus operandi. The district court’s severance denial rested heavily on the view that the other robberies would be admissible in any single-robbery trial for those purposes.

  • United States v.  Bard, 73 F.4th 464 (7th Cir. 2023):

    United States v.  Bard articulates the three-part test for lay opinion testimony under Rule 701. The panel used that framework to affirm admission of the ex-fiancée’s identifications from surveillance footage and related observations (cars, clothing, backpack), emphasizing that her familiarity with Matchalovas made her perceptions helpful to the jury.

  • United States v.  Scott, 150 F.4th 929 (7th Cir. 2025):

    United States v.  Scott provided the sufficiency standard: evidence is insufficient only if no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel concluded that the combination of surveillance, cell-site data, vehicle registrations, glove evidence, and identification testimony easily cleared that bar.

  • United States v. Friedman, 971 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2020):

    Friedman sets the demanding standard for a new trial: granted only to avoid a miscarriage of justice where the evidence against the verdict is so strong that the verdict cannot stand. With multiple corroborating strands of evidence and no meritorious evidentiary or joinder error, the panel agreed a new trial argument would be frivolous.

  • Brady v.  Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963):

    The defendant claimed suppression of body-camera footage. The district court found no suppression and no prejudice. The panel accepted counsel’s assessment that a Brady argument would be frivolous on this record—illustrating that Brady claims fail without both suppression and materiality (prejudice).

  • United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370 (7th Cir. 2022):

    Major supports two sentencing propositions applied here: within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable, and appellate review focuses on whether the judge adequately explained the sentence in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The sentencing judge’s explanation—seriousness, criminal history, escalation, and deterrence—was therefore sufficient.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Severance and “spillover” prejudice

    Matchalovas sought severance under FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a), arguing that trying seven robberies together would invite propensity reasoning and unfair prejudice (echoing FED. R. EVID. 403 concerns). The district court reasoned, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that severance would not meaningfully reduce prejudice because the evidence of the other robberies would be admissible anyway under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) to prove identity and modus operandi given the strong pattern: dark clothing, surgical mask, distinctive gloves, black backpack, and (often) a knife, plus consistent travel patterns and vehicles linked to the family. Under United States v. Coley, that cross-admissibility defeats a showing of prejudice. A limiting instruction to consider each count separately further addressed the risk of improper inference.

  2. Lay identification testimony by an ex-fiancée under Rule 701

    The ex-fiancée identified Matchalovas (in four robberies), the cars, and items such as clothing and a backpack. The court treated the identification as classic Rule 701 lay opinion: rationally based on personal perception and familiarity, helpful to deciding identity from surveillance footage, and not reliant on specialized expertise. The “helpfulness” prong mattered: a close acquaintance may notice distinctive features, mannerisms, or contextual cues that jurors lack. Credibility disputes were for the jury.

  3. Sufficiency of evidence and post-trial motions

    The defendant emphasized the absence of teller identifications and lack of recovered physical/biological evidence. But the court, applying United States v.  Scott, focused on whether the total evidence permitted a rational guilty verdict. It did: cell-site location data showing travel to and from robbery areas; cars tied to his parents; matching gloves found at the home; surveillance consistency across robberies; and witness identifications. Given that record, a Rule 29 acquittal or Rule 33 new trial would be improper absent a miscarriage of justice under United States v. Friedman.

  4. Brady claim

    The body-camera footage argument failed on the factual prerequisites: the district court found no evidence of suppression and no showing of prejudice. Without those, Brady v.  Maryland provides no basis for relief.

  5. Sentencing review

    The sentence was within the Guidelines range (offense level 30; CHC V), driven in part by enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1) (financial institution) and § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) (brandishing a dangerous weapon on five counts). Under United States v. Major, the panel treated the sentence as presumptively reasonable and confirmed that the district court tied the sentence to § 3553(a) factors—seriousness, criminal history and escalation, and deterrence—thus foreclosing a nonfrivolous appellate challenge.

Impact

This order is expressly nonprecedential and “to be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1,” so it does not announce binding new law. Its practical significance lies in reinforcing, in a fact-dense bank-robbery pattern case, several recurring Seventh Circuit themes:

  • Joinder/severance: defendants face an especially steep hurdle when the government can plausibly justify cross-admission of similar acts for identity/modus operandi under Rule 404(b), and limiting instructions often seal the analysis.
  • Rule 701 identification: close acquaintances (including intimate partners) remain strong candidates for lay identification from video where familiarity makes the opinion “helpful.”
  • Anders practice: when counsel’s Anders submission is thorough under United States v. Bey, the court will generally confine review to counsel’s identified issues.
  • Sentencing: within-Guidelines sentences accompanied by a concrete § 3553(a) explanation are difficult to attack on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders brief
A filing by appointed counsel stating that, after a careful review, there are no nonfrivolous appellate issues. Counsel identifies possible arguments and explains why they fail, and the court independently checks for arguable merit before allowing withdrawal.
Severance (FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a))
Splitting charges into separate trials to avoid unfair “spillover” prejudice. Severance is hard to obtain when the same evidence would be used in each trial anyway.
Rule 404(b) (other-act evidence)
Evidence of other acts is generally not admissible to prove “propensity,” but it can be admitted for other purposes such as identity or modus operandi—especially where the acts are distinctive and similar.
Rule 701 (lay opinion)
Non-expert opinion is allowed if it comes from personal perception, helps the jury decide a fact, and is not “expert” analysis. Familiarity-based identification from video often fits this rule.
Brady material
The prosecution must disclose favorable evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. A defendant must typically show suppression and a reasonable probability the result would have been different if disclosed.
Within-Guidelines “presumptively reasonable”
On appeal, a sentence inside the advisory Guidelines range is generally assumed reasonable unless the defendant shows a clear error in reasoning or an inadequate explanation under § 3553(a).

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s order in United States v. Haris Matchalovas illustrates a familiar but important appellate reality: when multiple highly similar crimes are joined and the evidence is mutually admissible to prove identity/modus operandi, severance arguments rarely present a viable appellate issue; and when a close associate offers familiarity-based video identification meeting Rule 701, exclusion is unlikely. Coupled with ample corroborating evidence and a well-explained within-Guidelines sentence, these features left no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal, warranting dismissal under Anders v. California.