United States v. Haris Matchalovas

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).¹We notified Matchalovas of counsel's motion to withdraw, and he did not respond. See 7TH CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel's brief adequately explains the nature of the case and discusses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). Because counsel's analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See id. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Matchalovas with seven counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The charges arose from seven bank robberies carried out by Matchalovas in Chicago and its northern suburbs between November 2021 and August 2022.

Well into the pretrial proceedings, Matchalovas filed a motion in limine to preclude the government from eliciting allegedly prejudicial testimony from his ex-fiancée over the bank robber's identity from surveillance footage. The judge denied the motion, finding that the testimony was admissible as lay witness opinion testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Matchalovas then moved to sever the counts in the indictment, see F ED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a), on grounds that a single trial on all counts might allow a jury to infer— inappropriately—that he had a propensity to commit robberies, see FED. R. EVID. 403. But the judge, citing Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, denied the motion because the similarities between the seven robberies overwhelmed the differences. If the counts were severed and Matchalovas were on trial for just one robbery, the judge noted, evidence related to the other counts would be admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove identity and modus operandi common to all seven robberies. The case proceeded to trial, at which the government presented evidence tying Matchalovas to the seven robberies. In each robbery Matchalovas—donning dark clothes, a surgical face mask, and dark work gloves with white lettering—presented bank tellers with a black backpack and demanded that they fill it with money. In five of

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the robberies, Matchalovas also brandished a knife. Further, according to testimony from an FBI agent, the three getaway vehicles used in multiple robberies were registered to Matchalovas's parents. Another FBI agent testified that he had searched Matchalovas's home and found outside his bedroom an unopened pair of work gloves matching the gloves worn during the robberies. Moreover, cell-site data reflected that on the day of each robbery, Matchalovas left either his home or his ex-fiancée's home, went to the vicinity of the robbery, and returned after each robbery to his or his ex-fiancée's home. Matchalovas's ex-fiancée also testified, identifying from surveillance footage the three cars used in the robberies as well as various items of clothing and a backpack; further, she pointedly recognized Matchalovas as the robber in four of the seven robberies. The jury found Matchalovas guilty.

Matchalovas moved for judgment of acquittal, see F ED. R. CRIM P. 29, or in the alternative, a new trial, see id. R. 33. He first asked the judge to set aside the guilty verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence: He argued that no bank-teller witnesses identified him, no physical items connected to the robberies were recovered, and no biological evidence linked him to the crime. He then asked for a new trial on grounds that (1) the cumulative evidence of multiple bank robberies was highly prejudicial and encouraged the jury to infer his guilt across all counts; (2) his ex-fiancée's identification testimony should have been excluded because it relied on physical descriptions of him that the jury could see for itself; and (3) the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), specifically, body-camera footage from one robbery. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the judge denied the motions. On the motion for judgment of acquittal, the judge determined that the record contained

"ample" evidence—including the "great similarity" of disguises and clothing worn by Matchalovas at each of the robberies—from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On the motion for a new trial, the judge referred to a limiting instruction he gave the jurors advising them to consider each charge separately. Even if the counts had been severed, added the judge, the evidence of each robbery (being as similar as it was) would have been allowed under Rule 404(b). Second, the judge concluded, the testimony from Matchalovas's ex-fiancée was proper because of her intimate relationship with Matchalovas, and the jury was free to weigh her credibility. Third, as to Matchalovas's claim about the body-camera footage, there was no evidence that the government suppressed it, and Matchalovas did not demonstrate that he was in any way prejudiced.

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The judge sentenced Matchalovas to 170 months in prison, within the Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months (based on a total offense level of 30 and criminal history category of V). Significant for the calculation of Matchalovas's offense level was a two- level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1) for each count because he took property from a financial institution, as well as a three-level increase under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) on five of the counts because he brandished a dangerous weapon. As for the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the judge highlighted the seriousness of the offense; Matchalovas's criminal history, lack of employment, and drug addiction; and the need for specific and general deterrence.

In her Anders brief, counsel first considers whether Matchalovas could argue that the judge erred by denying his motion to sever his seven counts of bank robbery. Counsel correctly rejects this argument as frivolous. No prejudice exists when, as here, the evidence on the potentially severed counts would be admissible at trial on the remaining counts. See United States v. Coley, 137 F.4th 874, 883 (7th Cir. 2025). As the judge pointed out, evidence from each robbery would be admissible at trials on the other robberies to prove identity and modus operandi. F ED. R. EVID. 404(b); United States

v. Edwards, 26 F.4th 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2022). And any potential prejudice was cured when the judge instructed the jury to consider all counts separately. Coley, 137 F.4th at

884.

Counsel also considers but rightly declines to challenge the denial of Matchalovas's motion in limine to prevent his ex-fiancée from testifying. Under Rule of Evidence 701, an admissible lay opinion must be (1) rationally based on the witness's perception; (2) helpful to determining a fact in issue; and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. United States v. Bard, 73 F.4th 464, 478 (7th Cir. 2023). The judge properly allowed the ex-fiancée's testimony because her identification was based on her perception of Matchalovas, helped the jury determine the robber's identity, and did not rely on expert knowledge. Counsel next considers and properly rejects an argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict Matchalovas. Evidence is insufficient when no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Scott, 150 F.4th 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2025). But here the government presented ample evidence connecting the robberies to Matchalovas—his clothing, his car, the video surveillance footage, cell-site data, and witness identifications.

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Counsel also rightly rejects any argument that the district judge abused his discretion by denying Matchalovas's motion for a new trial. A new trial should be granted only if the evidence against the verdict is so strong that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. United States v. Friedman, 971 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Matchalovas's arguments would be frivolous for the reasons already mentioned: the judge did not need to sever the counts; the testimony from his ex-fiancée was proper; and ample evidence supported Matchalovas's guilt. Counsel lastly evaluates whether Matchalovas could plausibly challenge his sentence but concludes, correctly, that doing so would be frivolous. Matchalovas's within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, and we will uphold a sentence if the judge adequately explains his reasoning. United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384 (7th Cir. 2022). Here, the judge explained the sentence with reference to the § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense ("The consequences of going in and flashing a knife to a bank teller are not felt in the moment and then forgotten … . They fear for themselves and their coworkers and they keep reliving it."); Matchalovas's criminal history ("You kept doing [crime] over and over and over. And unfortunately, the conduct escalated."); and the need for deterrence ("People need to know if you commit a bank robbery, you'll go to jail.").

We GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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