Modification of Easement-Related Injunctions Requires Changed Law or Circumstances; “Maintenance” Does Not Bar Servient-Owner Improvements

1. Introduction

In Jeffrey C. Spear & a. v. Richard J. Waite & a. (N.H. Feb. 26, 2026), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire addressed a recurring post-judgment dispute over a 30-foot-wide strip of land (the “30' Parcel”) containing grassy areas and a shared driveway used by the parties and a third neighbor. The plaintiffs, Jeffrey C. Spear and Jennifer C. Kernan, hold an easement over the parcel for the purpose of passing and repassing. The defendants, Richard J. Waite and Heidi M. Waite, own the parcel.

After earlier litigation established ownership in the defendants and limited the plaintiffs’ easement use (notably rejecting decorative groundcover), a later order added an injunction-like “maintenance” directive stating that maintenance of the disputed portion “shall be performed by or at the direction of the plaintiffs only.” When the defendants later installed an irrigation system by digging within the 30' Parcel, the plaintiffs moved to enforce that maintenance provision.

The key issues on this second appeal were:

  • Whether the defendants’ irrigation work violated the prior “maintenance” provision.
  • Whether the trial court could vacate/modify the “maintenance” provision based on equitable considerations, or whether a stricter injunction-modification standard applied.
  • Whether the appeal should fail for an incomplete record.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the denial of enforcement as to the irrigation installation, holding that the prior order’s restriction on “maintenance” by the defendants did not preclude the defendants from making improvements to the 30' Parcel.

However, the court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order that vacated/rewrote the maintenance provision and remanded because the trial court did not apply the correct standard for modifying an injunction—namely whether there has been a changed circumstance or change in law.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Jeffrey C. Spear & a. v. Richard J. Waite & a., No. 2022-0063 (non-precedential order), 2023 WL 5447689 (N.H. Aug. 24, 2023)
    The court drew the factual and procedural posture from the first appeal: defendants’ ownership of the 30' Parcel, the plaintiffs’ easement limited to “pass and repass,” and rejection of “decorative” plantings as beyond the easement’s scope. This backdrop constrained what “maintenance” could mean in the later enforcement dispute.
  • Stowell v. Andrews, 171 N.H. 289, 297 (2018)
    Provided the review standard: factual findings upheld unless unsupported or legally erroneous, while application of law to facts is reviewed de novo—important here because classifying conduct as “maintenance” versus “improvement,” and selecting the legal test for modifying an injunction, are legal determinations.
  • Great Am. Dining v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 164 N.H. 612, 625 (2013)
    Supplied a definition of “maintenance” as care and work to keep property operating/productive; general repair and upkeep. The court used this to contrast routine upkeep with affirmative changes to property.
  • Phaneuf Funeral Home v. Little Giant Pump Co., 163 N.H. 727, 731 (2012)
    Supplied a definition of “improvement” as an alteration/development enhancing value or improving use for a particular purpose. This supported treating irrigation installation as an improvement rather than maintenance.
  • Town of Durham v. Cutter, 121 N.H. 243, 246 (1981)
    The controlling authority on modifying injunctions: because injunctions entail continuing jurisdiction, they may be modified for “changed circumstances” or “a change in the law.” The court held this standard, not general equitable discomfort, governs modification of the maintenance provision because it functioned as an injunction.
  • Choquette v. Roy, 167 N.H. 507, 513 (2015)
    Reinforced that interpretation of a trial court order is a question of law reviewed de novo, supporting the Supreme Court’s close reading of what the December 2021 order did (and did not) decide about modification grounds.
  • Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298, 302 (2012)
    Used for the doctrine of judicial restraint: once remand was required on the injunction-modification standard, remaining arguments need not be reached.
  • 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 287, at 868-69 (2010)
    Cited for the general principle consistent with Cutter: modification/dissolution may rest on changed law or changed facts.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Record adequacy on appeal

The defendants argued affirmance should follow from the plaintiffs’ failure to include a hearing transcript and the initial enforcement order. The court rejected this, invoking Sup. Ct. R. 13(2): the appellants must provide what is “relevant and necessary” to decide the legal questions. Because the issues were legal (order interpretation; proper standard for injunction modification), the missing items were not deemed necessary.

2) Enforcement: “maintenance” vs “improvement”

The Supreme Court agreed the irrigation installation did not violate the December 2021 maintenance directive because:

  • The December 2021 order restricted only maintenance of the easement area to work “necessary to prevent unreasonable interference” with pass-and-repass.
  • Using Great Am. Dining and Phaneuf Funeral Home, the court treated irrigation installation as an improvement, not routine upkeep.
  • The order’s text did not say defendants were barred from making improvements on their own land; it addressed who performs “maintenance.”
  • The court noted the plaintiffs did not allege the installation unreasonably interfered with pass-and-repass “for any significant time,” supporting the conclusion that enforcement relief was unwarranted on these facts.

Practical doctrinal point: the decision separates (i) who may perform certain easement-related “maintenance” to preserve the easement’s function from (ii) the servient owner’s ability to improve the servient estate, absent unreasonable interference with the easement’s limited purpose.

3) Modification/vacatur of the maintenance provision: injunction doctrine controls

The trial court vacated the maintenance provision as “inequitable” and replaced it with a rule that both parties “have the right to maintain the area.” The Supreme Court held this was the wrong lens. Because the maintenance provision functioned as an injunction, Town of Durham v. Cutter supplies the governing standard: modification requires changed circumstances or a change in law.

Critically, the Supreme Court did not decide whether such a change existed; it found the trial court’s order did not make that finding, and the parties had not litigated the point. The case was remanded for the trial court to apply the correct standard in the first instance.

C. Impact

  • Sharper boundary between “maintenance” restrictions and property “improvements”: Easement disputes often involve landscaping, utilities, drainage, or irrigation. This decision signals that an order allocating “maintenance” authority will not automatically bar servient owners from making improvements, especially where the easement is limited to pass-and-repass and interference is minimal.
  • Injunction-modification discipline in post-judgment land-use conflicts: Trial courts cannot rewrite injunction-like provisions simply because they later appear inequitable or difficult to administer; they must ground modification in changed law or facts under Cutter. This constrains ad hoc “equity” rebalancing after final orders.
  • Litigation roadmap: Parties seeking to alter easement-related injunction terms should develop an evidentiary record on what has changed (physical conditions, usage patterns, new conflicts, or legal developments), rather than relying on generalized fairness arguments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Dominant vs. servient estate: The dominant estate benefits from the easement (plaintiffs’ right to use the strip for access). The servient estate bears the burden (defendants’ land is subject to that access right).
  • “Pass and repass” easement: A narrow easement allowing travel across land, not general landscaping control or aesthetic alterations.
  • Maintenance vs. improvement: “Maintenance” is upkeep/repair to keep something functioning; “improvement” is an alteration or development intended to enhance value or use. The court treated installing irrigation as the latter.
  • Injunction and continuing jurisdiction: An injunction is a court order commanding or forbidding conduct over time. Because it operates into the future, courts can modify it, but only under defined conditions—here, changed circumstances or a change in law.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire clarified two key points: (1) an easement “maintenance” directive does not necessarily bar a servient owner’s property improvements absent unreasonable interference with the easement’s limited purpose; and (2) when a prior order operates as an injunction, a trial court may modify it only upon a showing of changed circumstances or a change in law under Town of Durham v. Cutter. The remand places the focus where injunction doctrine requires—on what has materially changed, not on free-floating notions of inequity.