THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2025-0161, Jeffrey C. Spear & a. v. Richard J. Waite & a., the court on February 26, 2026, issued the following order:
The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The plaintiffs, Jeffrey C. Spear and Jennifer C. Kernan, appeal an order of the Superior Court (St. Hilaire, J.) denying their motion to enforce prior judgment against the defendants, Richard J. Waite and Heidi M. Waite. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
This is the second appeal of this case. See Jeffrey C. Spear & a. v. Richard J. Waite & a., No. 2022-0063 (non-precedential order), 2023 WL 5447689 (N.H. Aug. 24, 2023). The following facts are drawn from our order in the first appeal or are otherwise supported by the record. At issue in this case is a 30-foot-wide strip of land that runs alongside the parties' properties (the 30' Parcel). Id. at 1. The 30' Parcel contains grassy areas and a shared driveway, which is used by the parties and a third neighbor. Id. The plaintiffs' front yard abuts the western edge of the 30' Parcel, and a portion of their front walkway sits within the 30' Parcel. Id.
In 2015, the plaintiffs planted decorative groundcover in the grassy area of the 30' Parcel abutting their front yard. Id. at 4. The defendants, claiming they owned the land, tore out the plantings. Id. The plaintiffs then filed a petition to quiet title and the defendants filed cross-claims. Id. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the Trial Court (Tucker, J.) ruled that the defendants own the 30' Parcel and that the plaintiffs have an easement to use it. Id. at 4-5. The court also determined that the purpose of the plaintiffs' easement was to provide "the right to pass and repass" and thus, the plaintiffs could not plant groundcover in the 30' Parcel as the plantings were "decorative in nature" and "not reasonable and necessary" to the plaintiffs' use of the easement. Id. at 5 (quotation omitted).
In December 2021, upon the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider and clarify, the trial court amended its order to add that:
[A]s holders of the dominant estate, the plaintiffs have the right and the duty to maintain the easement so that it can be used for the purpose for which it was granted. Permitted maintenance is
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that necessary to prevent unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the servient estate (here, the right to pass and repass). . . . In order to avoid future conflicts of the sort presented in this case, it is ordered that maintenance of the portion of the easement at issue shall be performed by or at the direction of the plaintiffs only, for the purposes described.
(Citations, quotations, and brackets omitted.)
The plaintiffs then filed their first appeal. Id. After examining the relevant deeds, we affirmed the trial court's ruling that the defendants owned the 30' Parcel. Id. at 6-8. We also affirmed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiffs' easement did not permit them to plant decorative groundcover. Id. at 8-9. We did not address the maintenance provision of the December 2021 order.
Thereafter, the defendants dug within the 30' Parcel and installed an irrigation system. In response, in March 2024, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the December 2021 order. The Trial Court (St. Hilaire, J.) initially granted the plaintiffs' motion without a hearing, but then granted the defendants' motion for reconsideration and held a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce.
Following the hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the December 2021 order. It found that the defendants' acts of digging land and installing an irrigation system within the 30' Parcel were acts of improvement of the property, rather than maintenance. The trial court also determined that it would be inequitable to enforce the provision in the December 2021 order mandating that maintenance be performed by or at the direction of the plaintiffs only. The trial court accordingly vacated the maintenance provision of the December 2021 order and ruled that both parties
"have the right to maintain the area."
The plaintiffs filed two motions to reconsider challenging the court's denial of their motion to enforce the December 2021 order, as well as its authority to vacate the maintenance provision of the December 2021 order. The trial court denied the motions, explaining in part that its modification of the December 2021 order fell within its equitable powers. This appeal followed. We first address the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs failed to provide a full record on appeal. The defendants contend that because the plaintiffs provided neither a hearing transcript nor the trial court's initial order on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce, the trial court order should be affirmed. We agree with the plaintiffs, however, that these materials are not "relevant and necessary for the court to decide the questions of law presented by the
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case." Sup. Ct. R. 13(2). We conclude that the plaintiffs have provided the
"relevant and necessary" portions of the record for us to resolve their appeal. Id.
We next turn to the plaintiffs' arguments on appeal. In reviewing a trial court's decision rendered after a trial on the merits, we uphold its factual findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. Stowell v. Andrews, 171 N.H. 289, 297 (2018). Nevertheless, we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the December 2021 order and applying its equitable powers to vacate part of it. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the defendants' installation of an irrigation system within the 30' Parcel did not violate the December 2021 order. The trial court found that the defendants' act of digging land and installing an irrigation system within the 30' Parcel was an act of "improvement of the property rather than maintenance." The court thus determined that, because the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants' acts unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to pass and repass for any significant time, the defendants' improvements were lawfully made.
Maintenance of property and improvement to property are distinct activities. Compare Great Am. Dining v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 164 N.H. 612, 625 (2013) (defining "maintenance," in part, as '[t]he care and work put into property to keep it operating and productive; general repair and upkeep"
(citation omitted)), with Phaneuf Funeral Home v. Little Giant Pump Co., 163 N.H. 727, 731 (2012) (defining "improvement" as "an alteration to or development of real property that either (1) enhances or is intended to enhance its value or (2) improves or is intended to improve its use for a particular purpose").
Although the December 2021 order mandated that the "maintenance of the portion of the easement at issue shall be performed by or at the direction of the plaintiffs only," the plaintiffs were only permitted to perform maintenance necessary to "prevent unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the servient estate (here, the right to pass and repass)." (Quotation and citation omitted.) We conclude that while the December 2021 order prohibits the defendants from performing maintenance of the at-issue portion of the easement, it does not preclude the defendants from making improvements to the 30' Parcel. We accordingly agree with the defendants that the trial court did not err in finding that the December 2021 order did not prohibit them from installing the irrigation system.
We next address the plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erred in vacating the maintenance provision of the December 2021 order. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court's broad equity power to award or modify pre-
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judgment relief does not apply to final judgments, and that the December 2021 order was a final judgment. As the plaintiffs note, however, the maintenance provision was an injunction. Injunctions are "different from other judgments because the parties are often subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court." Town of Durham v. Cutter, 121 N.H. 243, 246 (1981). Courts may modify an injunction for "changed circumstances" or "[a] change in the law."
Id. (quotation omitted); see also 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 287, at 868-69 (2010) (providing that generally, "a court may modify or dissolve an injunction, whether permanent or preliminary, . . . based upon changed circumstances,"
which includes "both a change in the applicable law . . . and a change in the facts of the case").
We do not read the trial court's December 21 order to make a finding as to whether there was a change in the law or circumstances that would allow it to vacate the injunction. See Choquette v. Roy, 167 N.H. 507, 513 (2015) ("The interpretation of a trial court order is a question of law, which we review de novo."). Neither party requested that the trial court change the December 2021 order or amend its language based upon a change in law or circumstance. Thus, the parties have not yet had a full opportunity before the trial court to address whether there was a change in law or circumstance that supports modification of the injunction.
Having clarified that the applicable standard for a trial court's modification of an injunction is whether there has been a change in the law or circumstances, see Cutter, 121 N.H. at 246, we remand for the trial court to make this determination in the first instance. We express no opinion as to whether the facts of this case would support such a finding. In light of our decision, we need not address the plaintiffs' remaining arguments. See Antosz
v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298, 302 (2012) (declining to address parties' other arguments where holding on one issue was dispositive). Affirmed in part; vacated in
part; and remanded.
DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ., concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk