Buggs v. McNulty: No Fourth Amendment Claim When a Visitor Remains on School Property After Being Told to Leave

Introduction

In Robert Buggs v. Paige McNulty and Gary Community School Corporation (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 2026), the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a public school corporation and its state-appointed emergency manager after a former advisory-board president was removed from a high school and briefly detained in a police vehicle.

The case arose against the backdrop of Indiana’s state takeover of the Gary Community School Corporation due to financial concerns, leaving the elected advisory board with reduced responsibilities under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-20.3-6.8 (2017). The State later vested operational control in an emergency manager, Dr. Paige McNulty, under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-20.3-8.5.

The central federal issues were whether Buggs could establish constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, chiefly under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, based on (1) his escort from the building and (2) his temporary detention. A procedural issue also featured prominently: whether the district court properly converted a Rule 12(c) motion into one for summary judgment.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Procedure: The court upheld the district court’s discretion to convert defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion into a summary judgment motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), and reviewed the summary-judgment ruling de novo.
  • Fourth Amendment: No reasonable jury could find an unreasonable seizure because Buggs remained on school property after being told his presence was no longer permitted; the school had authority to control access and remove him.
  • Fourteenth Amendment: Buggs waived his due process arguments on appeal by presenting them in a perfunctory, underdeveloped way without supporting legal analysis.
  • Leave to amend: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because Buggs failed to identify proposed allegations that would cure the defects in his claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Procedural posture and summary judgment framework

  • Mark I, Inc. v. Gruber, 38 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. 1994): Cited to confirm the parties’ consent to magistrate-judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636, validating the adjudicative authority of the trial court that entered judgment.
  • Bostic v. Murray, 160 F.4th 831 (7th Cir. 2025): Supplied the familiar lens for review—construing facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.
  • Breyley v. Fuchs, 156 F.4th 845 (7th Cir. 2025): Reinforced de novo appellate review of summary judgment.
  • Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470 (7th Cir. 2023): Supported the proposition that district courts ordinarily have discretion to convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings to summary judgment.
  • Ellison v. U.S. Postal Serv., 84 F.4th 750 (7th Cir. 2023): Framed what qualifies as a “genuine dispute of material fact”—one on which a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.

2) Section 1983 essentials

  • Est. of Himelstein v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 898 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1990): Provided the foundational § 1983 requirement—allegations must show a state actor deprived the plaintiff of a federal right. Because state action was uncontested, the dispute turned on whether a constitutional violation occurred.

3) Fourth Amendment in the public-school setting

  • Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977): Used to situate the Fourth Amendment historically as a check on law-enforcement misconduct, while recognizing its reach beyond traditional policing contexts.
  • New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985): Anchored the proposition that Fourth Amendment protections extend to searches and seizures by public-school officials, not only police.
  • Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007): Cited for the overarching “reasonableness” baseline in the school context.
  • Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995): Reinforced that the operative Fourth Amendment inquiry in schools is reasonableness.
  • Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Michigan City Area Schs., 978 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1992): Supplied a key access principle—members of the public have no constitutional right of access to public schools.
  • Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995): Provided the doctrinal basis for schools’ “custodial and tutelary responsibility,” supporting their heightened authority to maintain safety and order.
  • Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch. Dist., 673 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2012): Connected Vernonia’s premise to control over “people on school property,” supporting removal of nonstudents/visitors when school authorities deem it necessary.
  • Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Sawyer, 929 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2019): Bolstered the court’s dispositive move—once a person is a trespasser (wrongfully present), that wrongful presence “forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge,” making removal objectively reasonable in the circumstances presented.

4) Fourteenth Amendment waiver and due process standards

  • Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty., 47 F.4th 587 (7th Cir. 2022): Identified the two components of due process—procedural and substantive.
  • Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2003): Supplied the substantive due process rational-basis standard absent a fundamental right.
  • Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2016): Provided the waiver rule for perfunctory, underdeveloped appellate arguments lacking legal authority and application to facts.

5) Leave to amend

  • Circle Block Partners, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 1014 (7th Cir. 2022): Supported the requirement that a litigant seeking amendment must identify how the proposed allegations would cure the problem.
  • Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472 (7th Cir. 2024): Reinforced deference to the district court’s discretion in denying leave to amend where amendment would not salvage the claims.

Legal Reasoning

1) Conversion to summary judgment

The Seventh Circuit treated the conversion question as straightforward: Rule 12(d) expressly allows conversion when matters outside the pleadings are considered, and Lisby v. Henderson recognizes district courts’ discretion to do so. The district court also afforded time for the parties to respond to proposed findings of fact, which supported the fairness of the conversion.

2) The Fourth Amendment claim turned on reasonableness and school authority to exclude

Buggs emphasized that he checked in and had not been told he was trespassing before encountering Dr. McNulty. The panel treated those points as immaterial to the dispositive fact: Buggs remained after Dr. McNulty demanded that he leave. Under Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Michigan City Area Schs., the public has no constitutional right of access to schools; under Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton and Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch. Dist., school officials have heightened authority and responsibility to control the premises.

Against that framework, the court concluded that Dr. McNulty—vested with state authority as an emergency manager—acted reasonably in denying access to the high school area and directing Buggs to leave. When he did not comply, escorting him out was not objectively unreasonable. The court’s citation to Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC (quoting United States v. Sawyer) encapsulates the operative logic: once presence becomes “wrongful” (i.e., after permission is revoked), Fourth Amendment reasonableness largely favors the property controller’s effort to remove the person.

Notably, the panel also relied on what Buggs did not supply: any statute or constitutional provision giving him a right—by virtue of his advisory board role—to access and “investigate operations” at the school despite the emergency manager’s contrary instruction.

3) The Fourteenth Amendment claim failed by waiver, not by a merits ruling

The opinion explained procedural and substantive due process standards (with citations to Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty., Vukadinovich, and Lee v. City of Chicago), but did not apply them in depth because Buggs did not develop a due process argument on appeal. Under Crespo v. Colvin, merely asserting factual disputes—without legal authority and tailored analysis—waives the claim.

4) Leave to amend required a concrete, curative proposal

The Seventh Circuit treated amendment as futile in the absence of a proffer identifying what new allegations would fix the legal deficiencies. Citing Circle Block Partners, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. and Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., the panel held the district court acted within its discretion.

Impact

  • Reinforcement of school exclusion authority: The decision strengthens the practical rule that a visitor’s lawful entry (e.g., checking in) does not create an ongoing entitlement to remain. Once a school official with authority revokes permission and orders departure, continued presence is wrongful, and removal will typically be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
  • Limits on “official capacity” as a pass to access: Individuals affiliated with governance bodies (here, an advisory board whose powers were reduced during a state takeover) should not assume their status confers a constitutional access right to school facilities. Absent a specific statutory entitlement, access remains subject to school control.
  • Litigation practice—conversion and waiver: The opinion underscores that Rule 12(c) motions can become summary judgment with appropriate notice/opportunity to respond, and that appellate courts will enforce waiver where constitutional labels are asserted without developed legal argument.
  • Nonprecedential but instructive: As a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” citable only under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, the decision is not binding precedent, but it signals how the Seventh Circuit is likely to analyze similar school-removal encounters.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1983
A vehicle for suing state or local officials/entities for violating federal constitutional or statutory rights. State action alone is not enough; an actual federal-right violation must be shown.
Rule 12(c) vs. Summary Judgment (Rule 56)
Rule 12(c) tests the pleadings; summary judgment tests the evidence. If the court considers evidence outside the pleadings, it may convert to summary judgment under Rule 12(d), provided the parties have a fair chance to respond.
Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” in schools
The school setting changes the practical application: schools have custodial responsibility for students and authority to control the campus. The question becomes whether the school official’s action (e.g., excluding and removing a visitor) was objectively reasonable in context.
No constitutional “right of access” to schools
Public buildings are not all open public forums. Under Seventh Circuit law, the general public does not have a constitutional entitlement to enter or remain in public schools.
Procedural vs. substantive due process
Procedural due process concerns process (notice and a hearing) before deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Substantive due process concerns whether government action is fundamentally arbitrary—typically measured by rational-basis review unless a fundamental right is implicated.
Waiver on appeal
Appellate courts may treat an issue as abandoned if it is asserted without meaningful legal development—citations, standards, and application to facts.

Conclusion

Buggs v. McNulty affirms a pragmatic Fourth Amendment rule in the school context: when a visitor is told by an authorized school official to leave, the visitor has no constitutional right to remain, and removal—followed by brief detention tied to that removal—will generally be deemed reasonable. The decision also illustrates two recurring appellate realities: courts will uphold Rule 12(d) conversion when parties have an opportunity to respond, and constitutional claims will be lost through waiver when not supported by developed legal argument.