Robert Buggs v. Paige McNulty

McNulty, who ordered his removal. The district court converted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. For the reasons provided, we affirm.

I. B ACKGROUND

We construe the record in the light most favorable to Buggs, the nonmoving party, and construe all reasonable inferences from the evidence in his favor. Bostic v. Murray, 160 F.4th 831, 836 (7th Cir. 2025).

Gary Community School Corporation is the public school district in Gary, Indiana. Buggs was elected to the Gary Community School Corporation's advisory board ("Gary School Advisory Board") in 2016. After concerns arose with the financial health of the school corporation, the State of Indiana took operational control of the district in 2017, leaving the Gary School Advisory Board with reduced responsibilities. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-20.3-6.8 (2017). And the State appointed Dr. McNulty as the emergency manager of the Gary Community School Corporation in 2020, with both executive and operational control.

Gary Community School Corporation operates West Side Academy. On August 12, 2021, Buggs visited the high school to investigate parent concerns, in light of his position as then-president of the Gary School Advisory Board. After completing the check-in process and entering the administrative section, an area with administrative offices including Dr. McNulty's office and that adjoins the high school, Buggs attempted to pass through and enter the high school. Dr. McNulty, however, encountered Buggs and instructed him that he could not enter the high school portion of the building. Dr. McNulty demanded that Buggs leave the premises. Buggs responded by identifying himself as president of the Gary School Advisory Board. A few moments later, the school resource officer, a City of Gary employee, arrived at Dr. McNulty's request and escorted Buggs outside. The officer then temporarily detained Buggs inside a police vehicle. After a short period, Buggs was released. Buggs was not charged with any criminal violations or citations.

Buggs filed this lawsuit pro se against Dr. McNulty, individually and in her official capacity, and the Gary Community School Corporation in state court. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he asserted Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments claims against Dr. McNulty and the Gary Community School Corporation. The defendants timely removed this case to federal court in August 2023, and the case proceeded

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through the preliminary pretrial conference under Federal Rule 16 before Buggs retained counsel.

At the close of discovery, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. After the motion was fully briefed, the district court converted the defendants' motion into a motion for summary judgment and provided the parties with time to respond to the court's proposed findings of fact, pursuant to Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See F ED R. CIV. P. 12(d). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

This appeal followed.

II. D ISCUSSION

Buggs challenges the district court's decision by attacking the procedural conversion of the defendants' Rule 12(c) motion into a motion for summary judgment and the substantive reasoning applied to each of his constitutional claims. We briefly visit the standards for summary judgment before examining each constitutional claim.

A. Summary Judgment

We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Breyley v. Fuchs, 156 F.4th 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). "The district court ordinarily has discretion to convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment …." Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023). A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute of material fact when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Ellison v. U.S. Postal Serv., 84 F.4th 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2023).

B. Section 1983 Liability

When bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the complaint must allege "that some state actor deprived a plaintiff of a federal right." Est. of Himelstein v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 898 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1990). It is uncontested that Dr. McNulty and the Gary Community School Corporation are state actors, so next, there must be an actual

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violation of a federal right. Id. Here, Buggs has identified the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ²

C. Constitutional Claims

1. Fourth Amendment

Beginning with Buggs's Fourth Amendment claim, he argues genuine disputes of material fact precluded the district court from granting summary judgment because he was lawfully present at the West Side Academy and was never told he was trespassing before his encounter with Dr. McNulty. Put simply, he argues it was objectively unreasonable for Dr. McNulty to order his removal from the high school and cause his temporary detention. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It was originally applied to prevent law enforcement misconduct during criminal investigations. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977). Now, the Fourth Amendment's protections have been expanded to reach searches and seizures by non-law enforcement officers and public-school officials. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334-37 (1985). The baseline for a Fourth Amendment violation is reasonableness, regardless of the context, including in public schools. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406 (2007) (collecting cases); Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1995). In the public-school context, we determine reasonableness with two general overlapping principles:

(1) "[m]embers of the public have no constitutional right of access to public schools[,]"

Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Michigan City Area Schs., 978 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1992); and (2) public schools have "custodial and tutelary responsibility" for their students, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995), meaning the schools have "the authority and the responsibility … to protect students and [to] control people on school property." Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch. Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 757 (7th Cir. 2012).

Here, no reasonable jury could find in favor of Buggs on his Fourth Amendment claim because he remained on public school property after being told that his presence was no longer permitted. Even crediting his account that he properly checked in, Buggs

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alleges he was "stopped by [Dr. McNulty]," "accused [] of having no right to be in the school," and told to leave by Dr. McNulty's "demand[]." These allegations demonstrate Dr. McNulty was exercising the authority given to her by the State of Indiana. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-20.3-8.5. And Buggs has not identified, either below or on appeal, any statute or constitutional provision giving him the right to investigate operations at West Side Academy. Accordingly, based on these facts, we cannot conclude it was objectively unreasonable for Dr. McNulty to ask Buggs to leave or to have him escorted out when he refused. See Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 515-16 (7th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases for the proposition that a "trespasser's wrongful presence forestalls a Fourth Amendment challenge" (quoting United States v. Sawyer, 929 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 2019))).

2. Fourteenth Amendment

On appeal, Buggs argues genuine disputes of material fact precluded the district court from granting summary judgment on his Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause has a substantive and procedural component. Lukaszczyk v. Cook Cnty., 47 F.4th 587, 599 (7th Cir. 2022). Under the procedural due process component, it "requires that before a government body deprives a person of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property, it must conduct some type of hearing accompanied by notice and an opportunity to be heard." Vukadinovich, 978 F.2d at 410. The substantive due process component, on the other hand, requires that,

"[u]nless a governmental practice encroaches on a fundamental right, … the practice [must] be rationally related to a legitimate government interest, or alternatively phrased, that the practice be neither arbitrary nor irrational." Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

Here, Buggs has offered no legal argument regarding his Fourteenth Amendment claim other than genuine disputes of material fact exist. Such an argument without legal authority or attached to the relevant facts is perfunctory and underdeveloped and as a result is waived. See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

D. Leave to Amend

Buggs also argues the district court abused its discretion by denying him leave to amend his complaint because his amendment would have added additional claims

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against the defendants and clarified his theories. But Buggs has failed to identify any allegations, in his opening brief, at oral argument, or below, that he would add that would salvage his claims. See Circle Block Partners, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 1014, 1023 (7th Cir. 2022). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472, 481 (7th Cir. 2024). After considering Buggs's remaining arguments, we find them equally unavailing and do not merit further discussion.

III. C ONCLUSION

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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