Student Anonymity in Judicial Review: “Very Clear Interests” and “Pressing Circumstances” Required, with Temporary Restrictions Only to Preserve Appeal Rights

1) Introduction

Student A v Trinity College Dublin & Anor [2026] IEHC 54 is a High Court judgment (Simons J., 6 February 2026) dealing solely with whether reporting restrictions (anonymity) should apply to judicial review proceedings.

The applicant (“Student A”) challenged a decision of Trinity College Dublin (and the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland as second respondent) to withdraw him from the postgraduate year of an integrated pharmacy programme (NFQ Level 9), following findings—centrally including admitted plagiarism and an “agglomeration” of code-of-conduct breaches—that he was not fit to practise.

The immediate issue was procedural and constitutional: whether the court should continue to restrict reporting so as to protect the student’s identity, notwithstanding the constitutional requirement that justice be administered in public (Article 34.1).

Key legal questions

  • Who bears the onus when an anonymity order was first made ex parte but is later challenged?
  • When, in the absence of legislation, may a court use its common law power to depart from open justice by granting anonymity?
  • Do the applicant’s asserted interests—good name, livelihood, risk of social media abuse, and mental health—justify anonymity?
  • Is a pharmacy student entitled to protections allegedly analogous to professional disciplinary proceedings under the Pharmacy Act 2007?

2) Summary of the Judgment

The Court refused a permanent anonymisation order and held that Student A had not demonstrated the “very clear interests” and “pressing circumstances” required to justify a derogation from open justice under the court’s common law power (as described in Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd).

However, the Court imposed temporary reporting restrictions (28 days from perfection of the order, continuing if an appeal/leave application is filed) to prevent the applicant’s appellate rights becoming nugatory by immediate identification.

The temporary restrictions were narrow: identification of the student was prohibited, but there was no restriction on naming the respondents, describing the course, the years attended, or reporting the allegations and findings.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

i) Core constitutional framework: open justice and the common law power

Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] IESC 18, [2017] 2 IR 284 was the anchor authority. The Court applied Gilchrist’s formulation that Article 34.1 open justice is a “fundamental constitutional value”, with exceptions strictly construed. Critically, where a departure is sought by common law power alone (no legislation), the interests must be “very clear” and circumstances “pressing”, and courts must be “resolutely sceptical” of any departure, even partial (e.g. anonymisation rather than in camera).

Zalewski v. Workplace Relations Commission [2021] IESC 24, [2022] 1 IR 421 reinforced the Court’s rejection of a “functional necessity” test: open justice does not require proof that identification is “needed”; publicity is an “essence” of justice. This was used to rebut the applicant’s argument that naming him served no protective function for the public because he could not practise as a pharmacist.

ii) Ex parte orders and onus

M.D. v. Board of Management of a Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 was relied on to characterise the High Court’s inherent power to set aside ex parte orders and to clarify that onus depends on the nature of the order. Simons J held that, in reporting restriction disputes, the onus lies on the party seeking anonymity. The initial ex parte order did not give the student a “head start”; the court must decide afresh whether restrictions are justified.

iii) Statutory vs common-law anonymity and “minor adjustment” arguments

The applicant invoked D.F. v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2015] IESC 44, [2015] 2 IR 487 to suggest anonymisation is a “minor adjustment”. The Court distinguished D.F. as a case under section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008, i.e. a statutory exception contemplated by Article 34.1. D.F. therefore could not dilute Gilchrist’s strict threshold where no statute applies.

iv) Professional/academic discipline and when anonymity has been granted

The Court surveyed post-Gilchrist High Court practice and identified limited scenarios where reporting restrictions have been granted:

  • Protecting non-parties or vulnerable persons:
    • A Social Worker v. CORU [2021] IEHC 756 (protecting a witness’s identity where a counter-allegation of sexual assault was made).
    • Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582 (protecting children’s identities in teacher discipline).
    • Medical Council v. Anonymous [2019] IEHC 109 (patients’ privacy; also rehabilitation evidence—see below).
    • M.M. v. A University [2024] IEHC 664, [2026] IEHC 57 (protecting a non-party alleged perpetrator’s identity where the person was apparently unaware of the allegation).
  • Protecting a professional’s health/rehabilitation where supported by cogent evidence:
    • Medical Council v. Anonymous [2019] IEHC 109 (opioid addiction; anonymity to avoid jeopardising recovery).
    • Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582 (no medical-ground restriction without evidence).
  • Preventing prejudice to ongoing disciplinary proceedings:
    • C. v. Panel of the Disciplinary Committee of the Teaching Council [2024] IEHC 54 (risk that reporting would alert the panel to disputed evidence).

Against that backdrop, the Court held the case law does not support “routine” anonymisation to protect the reputation of the person accused of misconduct.

v) Media, scrutiny, and modern dissemination

To address “social media abuse” fears, the Court grounded open justice in classic press-freedom jurisprudence: Irish Times Ltd v. Ireland [1998] 1 IR 359 (media as “eyes and ears” of the public; secrecy is a benign climate for abuse), and Smith v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] IESC 42 (openness enhances the rule of law). The Court acknowledged online dissemination and comments but held that speculative fears of abuse cannot justify pre-emptive restrictions, especially given criminal/civil mechanisms targeting harassment.

vi) Academic discipline context

The Court cited Flanagan v. University College Dublin [1988] IR 724, [1989] ILRM 469 as an example of public judicial scrutiny in plagiarism-related disputes. It also referenced contemporary practice that student applicants are generally named: Igweze v. Dundalk Institute of Technology [2025] IEHC 232 and Khimji v. University College Dublin [2026] IEHC 55.

vii) Statutory professional discipline analogies

In analysing the Pharmacy Act 2007, the Court also invoked the rationale in the medical context from Medical Council v. Bukhari [2022] IEHC 723 to explain why interim suspension applications may be private early in a process (reputational protection before a prima facie sift; and protection of patients/third parties).

B. Legal Reasoning

i) The governing test: Gilchrist applies to anonymisation as much as to in camera

A central contribution of the judgment is its insistence that anonymisation is not governed by a softer standard. Even if it is “less dramatic” than excluding the public, it remains a departure from open justice and must meet Gilchrist’s strict threshold: absent legislation, the interests must be “very clear” and the circumstances “pressing”.

ii) Onus: the requesting party must justify departure from open justice

Although the matter came before the Court as the university’s motion to set aside an ex parte order, the Court held that the student bears the burden of justifying anonymity. The court’s task is not to “defer” to the earlier ex parte order, but to determine whether restrictions are justified as of the inter partes hearing.

iii) Good name and livelihood: open justice is ordinarily the mechanism of vindication

The Court rejected the notion that publicity necessarily destroys reputational rights. As a matter of constitutional structure, reputational rights are ordinarily vindicated by public adjudication: if Student A succeeds, the High Court’s public judgment setting aside findings would constitute public vindication.

The Court additionally held the application was, at least in part, aimed at concealing the undisputed fact of admitted plagiarism. It stated that the right to a good name protects the reputation a person actually possesses; it is not designed to prevent disclosure of facts that are not disputed. Embarrassment arising from admitted misconduct does not provide a constitutionally sufficient basis to derogate from open justice.

iv) “Pharmacy Act analogy” rejected: the statutory architecture is predominantly public

The applicant’s submission that pharmacy students should be treated like practising pharmacists (and supposedly benefit from routine privacy) failed on the facts of the statute:

  • Under Part 6, hearings before the professional conduct committee “shall be held in public” (section 42), with a discretion to go private where appropriate.
  • Health committee hearings are presumptively private (reflecting sensitivity of health matters), but that does not translate into general reputational anonymity.
  • High Court confirmation applications (post-finding, post-process) are not provided for as private by the Act; default is public.
  • The only explicit tilt toward private court hearings is at the interim suspension stage (section 45), where allegations are untested and the process incomplete—conditions the Court found far removed from Student A’s position after final internal findings and exhausted appeals.

Therefore, even if one accepted the analogy, it would point away from anonymity, because the comparable stage would be a public confirmation-type hearing.

v) Social media abuse: speculation cannot defeat Article 34.1

The Court treated potential online abuse as a real modern phenomenon but held that open justice cannot be curtailed on a generalised, anticipatory basis. It noted existing legal tools addressing unlawful harassment, including the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997 (as amended) and civil restraining orders under Part 5 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023. The applicant’s evidence did not establish a real risk to health and safety.

vi) Mental health and section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008

The Court considered, but rejected, reliance on section 27 (medical-condition anonymity) because:

  • There was no independent medical evidence establishing a qualifying “medical condition”.
  • The section is narrow: it targets identification as a person having a medical condition, not blanket anonymisation of litigation.
  • The statutory criteria are cumulative and were not met, consistent with the evidential approach in Teaching Council of Ireland v. S.R. [2018] IEHC 582.

vii) A pragmatic safeguard: temporary anonymity to protect the right of appeal

Notably, after refusing a permanent order, the Court nevertheless imposed temporary reporting restrictions to avoid making any appeal nugatory. This is a rights-protective procedural device: it does not re-characterise the merits of anonymity, but prevents irreversible publication before appellate review.

C. Impact

i) Practical rule for future anonymity applications in disciplinary-related judicial review

The judgment strongly signals that where a litigant seeks anonymity under the common law (i.e. outside a statutory scheme), the Gilchrist threshold will be applied with full rigour even for “limited” measures such as anonymising a party’s name. The decision discourages attempts to frame anonymisation as a low-cost, routine procedural convenience.

ii) Evidential discipline: assertions will not substitute for proof

Two recurring features are decisive for future cases:

  • Medical/mental health arguments will generally require independent evidence.
  • Online harassment concerns must be supported by concrete evidence of a real risk; general fears will not suffice.

iii) Professional regulation analogies: the statutory default matters

The Court’s close reading of the Pharmacy Act 2007 is likely to influence future attempts by students or professionals to claim anonymity by analogy. Where the relevant regulatory statute presumes public hearings (especially post-finding), courts will be slow to create broader privacy through common law.

iv) Appellate-rights “standstill” orders may become more common

While refusing permanent anonymity, the Court granted a time-limited restriction to preserve meaningful appellate review. This may crystallise into a commonly sought (and carefully bounded) interim measure in reporting restriction litigation: a short “hold” pending appeal, rather than long-term anonymity by default.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Open justice (Article 34.1): Court proceedings are presumptively public, including identification of parties, unless a limited exception is justified.
  • Common law power to regulate proceedings: Courts can control procedure (including privacy measures) even without statute, but only in exceptional cases meeting the strict Gilchrist threshold.
  • In camera hearing: A private hearing from which the public (and sometimes media) are excluded; more intrusive than anonymising a party.
  • Ex parte order: An order made without hearing the other side; it can be revisited inter partes, and does not shift the substantive burden where the applicant is the one seeking a constitutional exception.
  • Fitness to practise: A suitability assessment (especially for regulated professions) focusing on whether a person is fit to enter/continue in a profession, distinct from ordinary academic discipline, though the boundaries may be contested on the merits (not decided here).
  • De novo appeal: An appeal by way of a new hearing rather than a review of the earlier decision.
  • Temporary reporting restrictions to preserve appeal: A short-term prohibition on identification so an appeal is not rendered pointless by irreversible publication.

5) Conclusion

[2026] IEHC 54 reasserts that party anonymity in Irish High Court proceedings is an exception, not a convenience. Applying Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd, Simons J held that, absent statutory authority, a litigant must show very clear interests and pressing circumstances to justify departing from open justice—even where only an anonymisation order is sought.

The Court rejected reputational and livelihood concerns as a basis for permanent anonymity in this context, emphasising that public adjudication is ordinarily the means by which reputation is vindicated, particularly where the underlying fact (plagiarism) is admitted. It also rejected unsupported mental-health claims under section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008 and speculative fears of social media abuse.

At the same time, the Court crafted a measured procedural safeguard: temporary reporting restrictions to preserve the applicant’s right of appeal. The combined effect is a clear template for future cases—strict scrutiny for permanent anonymity, but a principled willingness to prevent irreversible harm to appellate rights through short, narrowly tailored interim restraints.