Section 56 Terrorism Act 2000: Proving an Organisation is “Concerned in Acts of Terrorism” Through Non‑Defendant Conduct and Broad Statutory Definitions (with Co‑Defendant Hearsay Admissible with Caution)

1. Introduction

Choudary & Anor, R. v ([2026] EWCA Crim 395) concerned renewed applications for leave to appeal following refusal by the single judge. Anjem Choudary sought leave to appeal conviction and sentence; Khaled Hussein sought leave to appeal sentence only.

The convictions (Woolwich Crown Court, Wall J, 23 July 2024) arose from allegations that Choudary directed the activities of Al‑Muhajiroun (count 1: section 56 Terrorism Act 2000) and supported a proscribed organisation (count 3: section 12 Terrorism Act 2000), and that Hussein was a member of a proscribed organisation (count 4: section 11 Terrorism Act 2000). The prosecution case was factually complex and largely circumstantial, drawing on covert recordings (notably exhibit AG/6), undercover evidence, and evidence about activities of persons other than the defendants said to be undertaken in furtherance of the organisation(s).

The key appellate issues were evidential: (i) whether conduct/convictions of non-defendants could be admitted and used to prove the section 56 element that the organisation was “concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism”; (ii) whether such conduct amounted to “acts of terrorism” given the statutory definitions; and (iii) how the jury should be directed regarding a co-defendant’s voice note implicating Choudary. The case also addressed sentencing approach for the rarely prosecuted section 56 offence and the appropriateness of a life sentence on dangerousness grounds.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused:

  • Choudary’s application for leave to appeal against conviction on all three grounds;
  • Choudary’s application for leave to appeal against sentence (life imprisonment with a minimum term assessed at 28 years, adjusted for time on remand); and
  • Hussein’s application for leave to appeal against sentence (5 years’ custody plus 1-year extension period as an offender of particular concern).

In doing so, the Court endorsed (a) the admissibility and relevance of non-defendant conduct during the indictment period to prove the nature and activities of the organisation for section 56 purposes; (b) a broad reading of “acts of terrorism” via the statutory cross-definitions, including action taken “for the benefit of a proscribed organisation”; and (c) the admissibility (with caution) of co-defendant hearsay that was reliable and capable of safe evaluation within the wider evidential picture.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

R v BOB [2024] EWCA Crim 1494; [2025] 1 WLR 1101

The Court relied on R v BOB [2024] EWCA Crim 1494; [2025] 1 WLR 1101 as the contemporary restatement of principles governing admission of hearsay, particularly where the jury must assess reliability and safety. Although the judgment did not reproduce the full BOB framework, it adopted its organising concerns: (i) reliability of the hearsay statement, and (ii) whether the jury can safely evaluate it, especially given limits on challenge/cross-examination.

Applying that approach, the Court held Hussein’s voice note could properly be treated as admissible against Choudary (even if conceptually analysed as hearsay as between co-defendants), because it appeared intrinsically reliable (no obvious motive to lie to a supposed trusted associate), and because the jury could test it against substantial other evidence in the case.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Ground 1: Admission of non-defendant “bad character” evidence

Choudary argued that evidence about non-defendants (alleged members/associates) committing terrorist acts during the indictment period was wrongly admitted as non-defendant bad character.

The prosecution’s position was that the disputed material was not “bad character” in the operative sense but evidence “to do with the facts of the offence charged” and thus admissible under section 98 Criminal Justice Act 2003 rather than the more restrictive section 100. The trial judge, adopting a fairness-oriented route, applied the section 100 “substantial probative value” test and also considered exclusion under section 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The Court of Appeal held the evidence was clearly admissible. Its reasoning is important for section 56 cases:

  • Section 56 is activity-focused: unlike proscription offences (sections 11 and 12), section 56 requires proof that the organisation is “concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism”. That makes evidence of what members/agents did during the relevant period not collateral but central to an essential element.
  • “Directing” presupposes directed activity: because the allegation is directing others, the prosecution must prove those others’ terrorism-connected actions to establish the organisation’s character and the defendant’s directing role in that context.
  • Section 78 balancing was properly conducted: the evidence was highly probative; any prejudice was controlled by careful jury directions emphasising “no guilt by association”.

The Court also signalled that, properly analysed, the judge “would have been right” to admit it under section 98 without needing to reach section 100, reinforcing that in section 56 prosecutions, “organisation-activity” evidence will frequently be treated as part of the res gestae of the offence rather than mere character propensity material.

(B) Ground 2: Whether the admitted conduct constituted “acts of terrorism” for section 56

Choudary contended the trial judge wrongly treated convictions/misconduct (including non-violent offences such as supporting/proselytising for proscribed groups) as “acts of terrorism” to satisfy section 56.

The Court rejected this by anchoring the analysis in the statutory definition chain:

  • Section 56 Terrorism Act 2000: requires the organisation be “concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism”.
  • Section 20(2) Terrorism Act 2006: defines “terrorism” (for relevant purposes) as including anything constituting “action taken for the purposes of terrorism” within the meaning of the 2000 Act (via section 1(5)).
  • Section 1(5) Terrorism Act 2000: “action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes … action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.”

On that basis, the Court held the definitional provisions are “wide” and clearly accommodate treating conduct amounting to action for the benefit of a proscribed organisation as “action taken for the purposes of terrorism”, and thus as relevant “acts of terrorism” for section 56. The Court explicitly accepted this notwithstanding the “narrow focus” of evidence of actual violence during the indictment period (with violence evidence largely focused on Siddhartha Dhar’s Islamic State executions).

The practical effect is doctrinal: the threshold for proving an organisation is “concerned in” terrorism under section 56 is not confined to direct participation in physical attacks; it may be met by demonstrating organisational activity taken for the benefit of proscribed terrorist organisations, depending on the statutory fit and evidential proof.

(C) Ground 3: Co-defendant voice note and the need (or not) for a limiting direction

The impugned voice note (17 November 2021) was Hussein speaking to an undercover officer, referring to “working with Sheikh Anjem” and the perceived need for ITS not to associate with him. Choudary argued the judge should have directed it was not evidence against him.

The Court treated the statement as hearsay in Choudary’s case but held it was admissible (conceptually) under section 114(1)(d) Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“interests of justice”), even though no explicit section 114 ruling had been made at trial due to the co-defendant context. Applying the reliability/safety focus (with reference to R v BOB [2024] EWCA Crim 1494; [2025] 1 WLR 1101), the Court held:

  • the statement sat within a body of other evidence, enabling meaningful testing;
  • it was facially reliable (no obvious incentive to lie to a perceived trusted associate); and
  • the judge gave an appropriate cautionary direction on weight, emphasising Choudary could not challenge the statement when made and Hussein did not give evidence.

Accordingly, there was no arguable misdirection. The Court’s approach underscores that the correct response to co-defendant out-of-court assertions is not automatically exclusion or a “not evidence against X” direction; it may be admission with a calibrated warning where reliability and evaluative safety are established.

3.3. Impact

(A) Section 56 prosecutions: evidential architecture

The judgment strengthens a prosecution template for section 56: to prove the organisation is “concerned in” terrorism, evidence of what members/associates did during the indictment period may be essential and admissible as part of proving an element of the offence (often properly analysed under section 98 CJA 2003 rather than being fenced off as mere non-defendant bad character under section 100).

It also confirms that judges can (and should) blunt unfair prejudice through repeated, explicit “no guilt by association” directions while still allowing the jury to use the evidence for the limited statutory purpose.

(B) “Acts of terrorism”: breadth via “benefit of a proscribed organisation”

By expressly relying on section 1(5) Terrorism Act 2000 and section 20(2) Terrorism Act 2006, the Court endorsed a broad route to satisfying the “acts of terrorism” component in section 56. Future litigation is likely to focus on:

  • the line between ideological advocacy and “action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation”;
  • the evidential need to connect defendants’ directed organisational activity to that “benefit” concept; and
  • robust jury directions to avoid moral prejudice where evidence includes lawful (but extreme) speech alongside unlawful support.

(C) Co-defendant hearsay: admission with caution rather than categorical exclusion

The judgment illustrates a pragmatic appellate stance: where a co-defendant’s out-of-court statement is reliable and safely assessable in the context of other evidence, it may be admissible against another defendant, provided the jury is warned about the limitations in testing it. This is likely to be invoked in multi-defendant terrorism trials with covert recordings and undercover interactions, where statements naturally interweave defendants’ roles.

(D) Sentencing: life sentence and minimum term for section 56

Although not a guideline-setting judgment, it affirms key sentencing propositions for section 56:

  • absence of a Sentencing Council guideline does not impede a structured approach based on culpability/harm and statutory purposes;
  • cross-checking against analogous terrorism guidelines is legitimate as a “sense-check”; and
  • where dangerousness is found and persistence/ideological determination is entrenched, a life sentence may be “unavoidable”, even absent proof the defendant personally planned or executed a specific violent act.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Proscribed organisation (sections 11 & 12 Terrorism Act 2000): for membership/support offences, the prosecution generally proves the organisation is proscribed; it need not prove what the organisation has done, though such evidence may be used for context.
  • Section 56 (“directing”): a different structure—prosecution must prove (i) the defendant directed activities (at any level) and (ii) the organisation was in fact “concerned in” terrorism. That typically requires evidence of organisational conduct.
  • Non-defendant bad character (CJA 2003): evidence about other people’s wrongdoing can be “bad character” and subject to special controls; but if it directly proves an element of the charged offence (here, the organisation’s terrorist concern), it may be treated as fact-in-issue evidence under section 98.
  • Section 78 PACE discretion: even relevant evidence can be excluded if admission would have such an adverse effect on fairness that the court ought not admit it. Here, high probative value plus strong limiting directions meant exclusion was not warranted.
  • Hearsay and “interests of justice” (section 114(1)(d) CJA 2003): a route to admit out-of-court statements when fairness and reliability justify it, typically accompanied by judicial warnings about how cautiously the jury should treat the evidence.
  • “Action for the benefit of a proscribed organisation” (section 1(5) TA 2000): expands “action taken for the purposes of terrorism” beyond physical violence to conduct that benefits a proscribed organisation, enabling non-violent supportive conduct to play a role in terrorism characterisation where the statutory test is engaged.
  • Offender of particular concern / extension period: certain terrorism-related offences trigger a regime requiring an additional licence/extension period after custody to manage risk in the community (applied to Hussein).

5. Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s refusal of leave in Choudary & Anor, R. v consolidates an evidential and doctrinal pathway for section 56 Terrorism Act 2000 cases: (i) evidence of non-defendant conduct during the indictment period is not merely prejudicial character material but may be indispensable proof of the organisation’s terrorist “concern”; (ii) “acts of terrorism” can be established through broad statutory definitions, including action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation; and (iii) co-defendant out-of-court statements may be admissible against another defendant where reliability and evaluative safety are satisfied, supported by careful cautionary directions in line with R v BOB [2024] EWCA Crim 1494; [2025] 1 WLR 1101.

On sentence, the judgment underscores that leadership-direction terrorism offending can properly attract very severe punishment—including life imprisonment—where culpability, harm, and enduring dangerousness are found, even absent proof of personal participation in violent operational acts.