Choudary & Anor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The court considered renewed applications for leave to appeal by two appellants following refusal by the single judge. Appellant (aged 59) was convicted at trial of directing a proscribed organisation contrary to section 56 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (count 1) and of supporting a proscribed organisation contrary to section 12 (count 3). Appellant B (aged 31) was convicted of membership of a proscribed organisation contrary to section 11 (count 4). The trial began on 4 June 2024 and convictions were returned on 23 July 2024 at the Crown Court before Judge [Last Name]; sentence was passed on 30 July 2024. The prosecution's case relied on covert recordings (including an exhibit labelled AG/6), evidence from undercover officers, agreed facts about activities of third parties alleged to further the organisations' objectives, and other documentary and audiovisual material. Appellant gave evidence; Appellant B did not. Appellant sought leave to appeal conviction and sentence; Appellant B sought leave to appeal sentence only.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether evidence of non-defendant conduct and convictions (non-defendant bad character) relating to members of Company A during the indictment period was admissible for proving that Company A was "concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism" for the purposes of section 56 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (and whether admission was properly determined under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, sections 98/100/101, and s.78 PACE).
2. Whether convictions and misconduct admitted in agreed facts (including the appellant's own prior conviction) could be treated as acts of terrorism for the purposes of proving the elements of the section 56 offence.
3. Whether the judge failed to give a required direction that a recorded voice note made by Appellant B was not evidence against Appellant (i.e. admissibility and proper jury direction on hearsay under CJA 2003 s.114).
4. Whether the sentences imposed on Appellant and Appellant B were manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (conviction and sentence)

• The admission of extensive non-defendant bad character evidence was wrong and prejudicial; much of it should have been excluded.
• The judge wrongly treated convictions and misconduct of others (and the appellant's prior conviction) as establishing acts of terrorism for section 56 purposes.
• The judge failed to direct the jury that the voice note by Appellant B (17 November 2021) was not evidence against Appellant, or otherwise misdirected the jury about its weight.
• On sentence, the life sentence and minimum term were unnecessary and manifestly excessive given Appellant had not personally committed terrorist violence; much of the organisation's activity was described as non-violent proselytising.

Appellant B's Arguments (sentence)

• The sentencing judge mis-categorised the offending under the Sentencing Council guideline (should have been lower category, e.g. C or on the cusp of B/C), producing an excessive custodial term.
• Appellant B's regional context (organisation not proscribed where he lived) and limited role and lack of previous convictions warranted lower sentence.

Crown's Arguments

• The contested non-defendant material was not bad-character evidence in the sense of excluding it but formed part of the facts of the offence and was properly admissible under section 98 (or, in any event, satisfied section 100/section 101 gateways).
• The convictions and conduct included in agreed facts demonstrated that Company A was concerned in terrorism during the indictment period and were therefore probative for section 56.
• The voice note was admissible in Appellant's case as hearsay in the interests of justice and the judge gave appropriate cautionary directions.
• Sentences imposed were within the proper exercise of judicial discretion given findings on culpability, harm and dangerousness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed admissibility and weight of the contested material in light of statutory provisions and trial rulings. It accepted that an offence under section 56 depends on evidence of what the organisation was actually doing and that evidence of third-party activities during the indictment period was intrinsically probative of whether Company A was "concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism." The court concluded the trial judge was entitled to treat this material as admissible under section 98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (and to apply the more exacting section 100 test in the interests of fairness). The judge's exercise of discretion under s.78 PACE to admit the material was held to be properly open to him given the high probative value and the careful jury directions to guard against prejudice.

On the second ground, the court examined the statutory definitions (Terrorism Act 2000 s.56; Terrorism Act 2006 s.20(2); Terrorism Act 2000 s.1(5)) and held that the admitted conduct and convictions in the agreed facts properly amounted to evidence that Company A was concerned in acts of terrorism for section 56 purposes.

On the hearsay point (voice note by Appellant B), the court treated the material as hearsay in Appellant's case but concluded it was admissible under CJA 2003 s.114(1)(d) (interests of justice). The court applied the reliability and assessment principles (citing R v BOB), found reasons supporting reliability, noted the voice note sat within a broader evidential matrix including AG/6, and held the judge's cautionary directions were appropriate.

On sentence for Appellant, the court accepted the sentencing judge's approach: assessment of culpability (highest level), harm (very serious, including foreseeable risk of deaths and contribution to fear of attack), and dangerousness. The sentencing judge set a starting point of 25 years, adjusted to 28 years for aggravating features, and then imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term (reduced for time on remand). The appellate court concluded the sentence was not arguably manifestly excessive given the factual findings and rarity and fact-sensitivity of s.56 offending.

On sentence for Appellant B, the court accepted the trial judge's placement in Category B of the guideline, the reduction to a 6-year starting point, identification of mitigation and aggravation, and the final determinate custodial term of 5 years with an additional 1-year licence period under the statutory regime. The court found no error of principle or manifest excess.

Holding and Implications

Appellant — Leave to appeal refused. The court refused leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. It held (1) the admission of non-defendant conduct and convictions was properly assessed and admissible for the purposes of s.56; (2) the admitted conduct established that the organisation was concerned in acts of terrorism; (3) the voice note was admissible hearsay in the interests of justice and the jury were adequately warned; and (4) the life sentence and minimum term were not arguably manifestly excessive.

Appellant B — Leave to appeal refused. The court refused leave to appeal against sentence, upholding the categorisation, mitigation/aggravation assessment, and the resulting custodial and licence periods as not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

Implications: The direct effect is that the convictions and sentences in question stand. The court applied established statutory tests and recent authority on hearsay; it did not purport to establish a novel binding precedent beyond applying existing principles.